JUDGMENT : - S.K. Mookherjee, ACJ.: This writ application was moved as a public interest litigation. The petitioner is a Councillor of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. The subject matter of the writ application is possibility of award of contract in favour of respondent no. 5 for construction of six fly overs in the city of Calcutta. The averments in the application purported to make out a case that notice inviting application for pre-qualification bidding had been issued in January, 1998 and in response thereto several well-known companies such as Larson and Toubro, Trafalgar House Construction, Bridge and Roof, Hindustan Construction, Mecon India, National Building Construction Company as also respondent no. 5 applied for the said contract and selection of respondent no. 5, after short listing, to compete with the other firms, as mentioned above, as per publication in a newspaper, namely, Anandabazar Patrika, dated 18th October, 1998, had been made in disregard of all norms of equality and fair play, in compromise of the required criteria for having necessary eligibility for such selection; the ineligibility was alleged to be due to absence of experience of respondent no. 5 in any major construction of fly overs, which included construction of Steel Bridges in the past, required financial strength, opening up a possibility of national disasters; the reason for such undue favourable treatment, in case of respondent no. 5, was alleged to be the close acquaintance of one Mr. Kajal Sengupta, an influential personality in respondent no. 5, with different persons of the Government of West Bengal involved in making the selection of tenderers and the policy decisions regarding the constructions in question. By paragraph 22 of the application, Annexures 'C' series were sought to be made parts of the said application and such annexures appear to include Directors' Report for the year 31st March, 1996, Auditor's Report for the said year, Balance Sheet upto 31st January, 1996, Profit and Loss Account upto 31st March, 1996 and the various schedules annexed to the Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss Account; the said paragraph 22 was affirmed as 'information derived from the newspaper and other sources'. 2. 2. The application was directed to appear under the heading "To be Mentioned" on 28th October, 1998, and, on that date, the same was adjourned till 30th October, 1998 on the ground of illness of the learned Advocate General; on 30th October, 1998, the matter was heard in part and directed to appear on 5th November, 1998, on the prayer made, at 2-00 p.m. and thereafter from time to time fixation whereof was made suiting the Convenience of Court and Counsel, the matter was continued to be heard; in course of such hearings, two supplementary affidavits were filed by the writ petitioner, one on 6th November, 1998 and the other on 19th November, 1998 which purported to deal with certain documents, handed over on behalf of respondent no. 5, and supplementary affidavits were also intended to bring the official copies of such documents, obtained by the writ petitioner, on record as also the calculations made by the writ petitioner of the current bid capacity. The second supplementary affidavit was claimed to have been filed in compliance, with a direction by this Court to disclose the source of documents, which were made Annexure "A" to the writ application, and by paragraph 6 of the said supplementary affidavit, the source disclosed was "one of the petitioner's colleague" who was holding a discussion as a member of a trade union, who handed over the copies of Annexure "A" but did not disclose the source of his receipt of the documents included in such Annexure' "A". It is pertinent to note, at this stage, that necessity for disclosure of source of documents, which comprised Annexure "A", was felt, as, at page 19, the name of the person or the firm to which the same was issued was carefully inked out and a point was raised on behalf of the respondent that non-disclosure should lead to a presumption that some failed or un-successful bidder might be trying to reap a benefit by stalling the entire process of finalization of tenders and consequential construction by initiating the instant public interest litigation, through the petitioner, in a speculative way. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, from day one of the commencement of the present proceeding and through out the continuance thereof, had been reiterating his prayer, which according to him was absolutely innocuous, to issue a Rule and an interim order, restraining the respondents 1 to 4 from finally awarding the contract to respondent no. 5. We, however, were unable to accept such prayer, after giving very serious consideration to the stage at which the prayer was made, the magnitude of probable public mischief that might ensue, if a routine and formal course, as suggested by the petitioner, was followed, particularly, when, incontrovertibly the case pleaded through the present application was mainly attempted to be based on newspaper reports and unidentified sources of documents. We felt persuaded by our conscience that 'fascinating exercise', which the Court was to undertake, must• not allure to the extent of keeping its discerning eyes closed and shut and thus by its action jeopardise the "public interest" itself, which it has the solemn duty to protect through this newly devised concept of judicial interference. 3. We have already indicated that because of the magnitude of public mischief, we decided to, prima facie, find out the merit of the present application before issuing directions for affidavits though no doubt the sincerity and forensic dexterity of the Counsel, representing the different parties resulted in lengthy hearings. It will be advantageous to narrate the points of such dispute over which the arguments had been made. Annexure "A" to the writ application, reference to which has already been made by us, embodied a clause, being clause no. 5.2, which required a minimum criteria to include current bid capacity of not less than 60% of the estimated amount of the respective packages; the method for calculation of current bid capacity was also embodied, and, to follow the same, average annual turn over (with updating) in the last five years was to be found out. The counsel for the contesting parties advanced their own construction of the term 'turn over. According to Mr. The counsel for the contesting parties advanced their own construction of the term 'turn over. According to Mr. Roy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the same meant only sums received and receivable during the year, aggregate amount of sales effected or work done and such meaning and definition, according to him, conformed to the definition as given in section 43A of the Companies Act, 1956, in a simpler form, 'turn over', according to Mr. Roy, meant the amount of money, which was turned over in the business of a firm. On behalf of the contesting respondents, the said argument of Mr. Roy, was attempted to be countered by placing reliance on clause 2.7.02 of the documents, which laid down the manner in which evaluation was to be made and by reference to xerox copies of the documents, already filed along with the tender papers, which constituted the records before the authorities concerned, it was asserted that the respondent no. 5 had the requisite bid capacity and in doing so the approaches between the petitioner and. respondents differed on the propriety of inclusion of value of owner-issued materials-once that was allowed to be included it could not be contended that the respondent no. 5, did not have the necessary bid capacity. The required bid capacity for packages 1 and 2, were 3,600 lakhs and 1,800 lakhs respectively whereas the bid capacities of the respondent no. 5 worked out to 4088.75 lakhs. 4. The second contention, on which the eligibility of respondent no. 5, was sought to be assailed, related to absence of experience and past performance by it in executing contracts, similar in nature. In continuation of such contention, it was also averred and argued that the respondent no. 5, used to do some jobs for and on behalf of Calcutta Municipal Corporation and had no major experience or required expertise. Factually, on behalf of respondent no. 5, the said argument was sought to be controverted by categorical denial of any work being done by it as a contractor either under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation or under the State of West Bengal; the list of credentials which were on record and xerox copies of which were also produced in Court were claimed to show the different types of works and experience of the respondent no. 5, in contracts of similar nature. 5. 5, in contracts of similar nature. 5. In the background of the factual position, as attempted to be made out on behalf of the petitioner, the legal consequences as might follow on the basis of existence of such facts, such as, gross public wrong, public mischief and illegality causing serious public injury, a case that Senbo, respondent no. 5, became ineligible for being considered for selection, had been argued on behalf of the petitioner. In continuation of such argument, the learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that it was open to this Court to go into these questions and satisfy itself as to the correctness of the executive decision regarding Senbo's eligibility. Series of authoritative pronouncements had been referred to and relied upon in justification of the aforesaid approach of the petitioner. The respondents, in reply to the aforesaid submissions, contended that there is no controversy regarding the legal position that Court has power of judicial review but in the instant case in view of the factual position that the grounds of challenge to the eligibility of the respondent no. 5, not being factually tenable, interference by Court is not called for. The concept of public interest litigation, it was argued on behalf of the respondents, must be understood to be different from that of private litigation, as, in case of public interest litigation both the petitioner and the respondent owe a duty to Court to render assistance to prevent a public wrong or injury and no technicality is allowed to stand in the way of functioning of the Court as in the case of a private litigation thus requiring greater circumspection and restraint for the court to be exercised before any order is issued so that there may not be an occasion for public injury being caused by a routine approach by the Court. On behalf of the respondents, referring to the facts of the present case, it was sought to be illustrated as to how an irreparable public injury might be caused by following a routine procedure for asking for affidavits without looking into the available records though the same might demonstrably indicate that the petitioner's contentions have a fair chance of not being established finally; the uncertainty during the interregnum is bound to have diabolic repercussions in future. 6. 6. Having taken note of controversies, we now propose to embark upon investigation into the merits of the application as a public interest litigation petition. The concept of public interest litigation is an off shoot of judicial activism, first devised for the purpose of translating into action, the constitutional guarantees of equality before law for the rich and poor alike-to all those who inhabited invisible areas beyond the sights of administrators of justice-who were treated as downtrodden cross-section of the society having no means to take steps for vindication of their rights. 7. To make the remedy, by way of public interest litigation, effective, in the true sense, the usual formalities and rigidities of procedures were reduced to insignificance and the causes and sufferings of those, who had neither the means nor ability to seek judicial redress themselves, had been permitted to be championed and espoused before Courts by public spirited persons. The anxiety, which activated the Court, was to do justice without allowing the technicalities, which dominate a private adversary litigation, to intervene so as to render the Court a helpless on looker with folded hands in despair. The initial spirit of extending assistance to the downtrodden, helpless cross-section of the society was expanded gradually with the new exigencies of time, maintaining dynamism of judiciary, as to stretch the relief by way of public interest litigation for the enforcement of interest of that cross-section of public, whose pecuniary and legal rights or liabilities were affected, with repeated emphasis on the flexible character of the device above all rigidity. The theory of dominus litis, necessarily, had been made to pale into insignificance. In doing so, however, a serene warning had also been held out to forbid abuse of this generous and healthy outlook of Court by directing observance of self-discipline in the exercise of judicial activism. By way of such disciplinary restrictions, no one, who does not have sufficient real interest in instituting a PIL for redressal of public wrong or public injury, to wit, a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or who wants to secure a personal gain, private benefit, political mileage or has any other oblique consideration, can move such an application. By way of such disciplinary restrictions, no one, who does not have sufficient real interest in instituting a PIL for redressal of public wrong or public injury, to wit, a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or who wants to secure a personal gain, private benefit, political mileage or has any other oblique consideration, can move such an application. The intensity of vigil of the Court shall have to be enhanced when on the materials before it, it can be discerned that the assailed actions though affecting other persons having ability to seek redress, are not challenged by such capable persons but someone assuming the role of a public demagogue. Reference may be made to the cases of S.P. Gupta ( AIR 1982 SC 149 ), Janata Dal case (1992-4 SCC 305), Taj Bengal case (1987 SC 1109), Bhim Singh vs. D.D. Thakur (AIR 1983 NOC 55 J & K). 8. In the instant case, the norms of discipline, which have been so worked out go counter to the assertion of the petitioner. In the first place, the materials on which reliance has been 'placed by the petitioner are admittedly owing their origin to the newspaper reports and do not appear to have been affirmed upon researches undertaken by the petitioner which is an indispensable requisite [vide H.D. Deve Gouda vs. S.P. Anand, reported in (19961 6 SCC 734]. Secondly, the petitioner admittedly is a political person and owes allegiance to a particular political party, which is in opposition to the ruling party. The bona fides of the petitioner, therefore, requires to be very firmly established. It has to be very clearly indicated that the instant application is not intended to gain a political mileage or has not been moved for the purpose of assisting an unsuccessful party, who prefers to remain out of sight and get its cause vindicated through the petitioner. This aspect assumes great importance, as, in the facts of the present case, such unsuccessful party cannot be said to belong to the downtrodden, incapable or unable cross-section of the society. The deletion of the annexures as to wherefrom the same were received and the faltering explanation furnished in the supplementary affidavit, attempting to describe the circumstances under which such annexures came to the hands of the petitioner, shake the foundation of the bona fides of the petitioner. The deletion of the annexures as to wherefrom the same were received and the faltering explanation furnished in the supplementary affidavit, attempting to describe the circumstances under which such annexures came to the hands of the petitioner, shake the foundation of the bona fides of the petitioner. The absence of challenge from the side of the petitioner to the selection of other firms, whose selection, on application of the criteria of disabilities of respondent no. 5, leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner is being used as an instrument to feed fat the grievance of a particular applicant or few applicants against the respondent no. 5 alone, omitting other tenderers, whose eligibility may call for scrutiny by Court. Failure of the petitioner to meet the challenges thrown on behalf of respondent no. 5, to the case of the respondent no. 5, being managed by a blue eyed person of the State or being a blue eyed concern of the Government, coupled with non-impleadment of Kajal Sengupta whose association in the respondent no. 5, was sought to be made the foundation of preference in its favour, cast very serious doubts about the motive and intention of the petitioner in moving the instant writ application. The perfunctory and cavalier approach of the petitioner in moving the instant application may well lead to a conclusion that the petitioner does not fall in the category of public spirited persons nor does the application intend to espouse or champion the causes and prejudices affecting the public. 9. After having dealt with maintainability aspect of the present application as a public interest litigation on its own merit as also in view of the same having been moved at the instance of the present petitioner, we now admit to the other contentions constituting the dispute between the parties. 10. Regarding the first point of dispute over the current bid capacity, we have carefully considered the same. So far as section 43A and its explanation are concerned, the explanation has been specifically confined and restricted, in its operation, to the said section, and, accordingly, cannot be utilized for the purpose of finding out the meaning of the term "turn over" in its general sense. A proper reading of the tender documents, in their entirety, also unequivocally shows that the said explanation cannot have any application in the facts of the present case. A proper reading of the tender documents, in their entirety, also unequivocally shows that the said explanation cannot have any application in the facts of the present case. Clause 2.7.02 permits "all costs figures relating to works complete in India" to be taken into consideration for the purpose of evaluation. The case of George Oakes (Private) Limited vs. State of Madras, reported AIR 1962 SC at pages 10371048, on careful scrutiny, justifies inclusion of the amounts, received by the dealer and utilized by him in his business without being handed over forthwith to the Government and thus becoming parts of the circulating capital. The crux of the ratio in the said case, if applied, in the facts of the present case, would justify an inclusion of the prices of materials supplied by the employer, which otherwise the contractor would have had to supply, in the figures for turn over. Such meaning of the term "turn over" does not militate against the general dictionary meaning of the same. The said approach finds ample support from the decisions in the cases of State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley and Co., reported in AIR 1958 SC at page 506 (paragraph 45), Coochbehar Contractors' Association vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1996 (10) SCC 380 . It would be an incongruity and distortion of real cost of the project for the purpose of evaluation if the materials supplied by the employer, are to be excluded. In this connection, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the turn over figures and the manner of its calculation had been approved by the expert body of technical persons. 11. As to the second contention regarding absence of experience of respondent no. 5, the materials clearly indicate that the sufficiency of experience had been placed before an expert body for consideration and their views were acted upon. In the background of such factual position, the Court ordinarily remains loath to substitute its own view for that of the experts unless glaring perversity in the expert's view is present. There is no material before this Court making out the present case to be of such an exceptional nature as to persuade this Court to delve deep into the matter for determining the propriety of the experts view. 12. There is no material before this Court making out the present case to be of such an exceptional nature as to persuade this Court to delve deep into the matter for determining the propriety of the experts view. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, the present writ application has no merit and deserves to be rejected and we do so, accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. D.P. Sircar-I, J.: I agree. Writ application has no merit and deserves to be rejected.