Govinda Menon, J.- This is an appeal under section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code against the acquittal of the respondents who were the accused in Sessions Case No. 3 of 1958 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge of Irinjalakuda. The facts of the case so far as are necessary for the decision of this appeal may be taken as follows. The first accused in the case was the cashier of the Mala Branch of the Mala Catholic Union Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Mala Bank). In his capacity as the cashier of the bank, he was in charge of the cash as well as the jewels of the bank. The Mala Bank among its other businesses used to advance money on the pledge of ornaments. The second accused was the proprietor of a private bank known as Chacko’s Bank. The third accused who is the brother of the second accused was in charge of the Chacko’s Bank at Mala and the fourth accused was the peon of that branch. Chacko’s Bank was also lending money on the pledge of jewels and they were re-pledging the ornaments thus obtained. The prosecution case was that all the 4 accused conspired together to cheat the Mala Bank and in pursuance of the conspiracy the jewels pledged by Chacko’s Bank with the Mala Bank were from time to time clandestinely handed over by the first accused to the third accused without the money due under the pledge being paid. P.W. 1, the Secretary of the Mala Bank got some information about this and deputed P.W. 10, the Inspector of the bank to check the cash balance of the Mala Bank. On verification of the cash balance, a shortage of Rs. 2,000 was detected, but the first accused made good the deficit on the same day. P.W. 10 reported this to P.W. 1 and also to P.W. 2 the Managing Director. Thereupon another person was appointed as the cashier and the first accused was demoted as a clerk. The new cashier took charge of the cash from the first accused and started checking the gold ornaments. P.W. 10 reported this to P.W. 1 and also to P.W. 2 the Managing Director. Thereupon another person was appointed as the cashier and the first accused was demoted as a clerk. The new cashier took charge of the cash from the first accused and started checking the gold ornaments. It is then stated that the first accused finding that the fraud would be detected, approached P.W. 16, one Kunjikuru who was the manager of an orphanage at Puliyilakunnu and made a clean breast of the fraud that had been perpetrated by him and gave a written statement admitting his guilt Exhibit P-8. P.W. 16 sent a letter Exhibit P.-7 to P.W. 2. P.W. 1 the Secretary and P.W. 9 the then Agent of the bank met P.W. 16 and also saw the written statement of the first accused Exhibit P.-8. P.W. 2 was also informed of this and the first accused was sent for and he came to the bank and on checking the jewels, jewels worth Rs. 77,000 repledged by Chacko’s Bank were found missing. The authorities of the Mala Bank then decided to lodge a complaint before the Police and so a complaint Exhibit P.-9, was filed by P.W. 1 on 26th March, 1953, before the District Superintendent of Police, Trichur. The Superintendent endorsed the complaint to P.W. 3, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Chalakudi. The Sub-Inspector on receipt of this complaint registered a case and arrested the first accused and took into custody the relevant documents. After completing investigation he laid a charge sheet against the accused. One of such cases, Sessions Case No. 5 of 1927 of the Trichur Sessions Court ended in conviction of the first and third accused. The matter was taken up in appeal to this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 35 and 36 of 1957 and the conviction was reversed. In respect of another item, there was Sessions Case No. 2 of 1958 which ended in an acquittal and nothing seems to have been done in respect of that acquittal. This case is in respect of another instance of an alleged breach of trust relating to the pledge of M.O. 1 series. The learned Judge on a consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary found that the entrustment with the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused. This case is in respect of another instance of an alleged breach of trust relating to the pledge of M.O. 1 series. The learned Judge on a consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary found that the entrustment with the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused. P.W. 1 the first informant in the case applied to this Court for leave to file an appeal against the order of acquittal and on leave being granted this Criminal Appeal has been filed. The learned counsel for the respondents raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal. Shortly stated his objection is that this case was initiated on a police report and the first informant has no locus standi to file this appeal against the order of acquittal. Clause (3) of section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, says: “If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.” It is clear, therefore, from the provisions of this clause that acquittal should have been passed in any case instituted upon a complaint. ‘Complaint’ has been defined in section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code and it is as follows: “Complaint means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action, under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a Police Officer”. So it is only the person who makes the allegations orally or in writing to a Magistrate who has been given the right under clause (3) of section 417 to file an appeal against the order of acquittal. It is contended that the expression ‘complainant’ must be taken to include a person who makes a complaint to the Police as well. But the definition of the expression ‘complaint’ in section 4(1)(h) refers only to a complaint made to a Magistrate and not to the Police or to the Village Munsiff although such a complaint may ultimately result in the Magistrate taking action against the accused. But the definition of the expression ‘complaint’ in section 4(1)(h) refers only to a complaint made to a Magistrate and not to the Police or to the Village Munsiff although such a complaint may ultimately result in the Magistrate taking action against the accused. The question in such cases would be whether the Magistrate took cognizance on a complaint or on a police report. If cognizance is taken on a police report it is only the State Government who is given power to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal. Similarly in cases where a complaint is originally made to the Magistrate but which is forwarded to the Police for investigation and later cognizance is taken on the police report the complainant does not get the right of filing an appeal. This view finds support in the case Prasannachary v. Chikkapinachari1. There the petitioner made a written complaint to the Police that the accused trespassed into his house, assaulted him and caused him hurt. After investigation a charge-sheet was laid against the accused and after trial the accused were acquitted. In an appeal against acquittal filed by the petitioner the first informant it was held that the case was one instituted in the Court by the Police and not by the petitioner and therefore the petitioner was not entitled to Special Leave of the High Court to appeal. In In re Syed Ibrahim2, the same view was taken. There, the first information was given to the Village Munsiff which resulted in investigation by the Police and the filing of the charge-sheet. It was held that the first information of the commission of an offence given to Village Munsiff will not fall within the definition of a ‘complaint’ and therefore the petition under sub-section 3 was incompetent. B.V. Muchappa v. N.Venkataswamy1was a case where a written complaint was presented to the Magistrate. Cognizance was not taken on that complaint but the Magistrate ordered investigation under section 158(3), Criminal Procedure Code, which resulted in the police placing a charge sheet. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offences disclosed in the charge sheet and acquitted the accused. B.V. Muchappa v. N.Venkataswamy1was a case where a written complaint was presented to the Magistrate. Cognizance was not taken on that complaint but the Magistrate ordered investigation under section 158(3), Criminal Procedure Code, which resulted in the police placing a charge sheet. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offences disclosed in the charge sheet and acquitted the accused. It was held: “the Magistrate not having taken cognizance of any offence upon receipt of the complaint, there was no case instituted upon complaint within the meaning of section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code and therefore the complainant was not entitled to make the application for special leave to appeal.” Our attention was drawn to a decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court reported in Kshetrabashi Panda v. Lalit Kumar Sen Gupta2, where the petitioner filed a petition of complaint and the Magistrate ordered the petition to be sent to the police for necessary action and the investigation by the police resulted in a charge sheet. It was held that the case was ‘instituted upon a complaint’. With great respect we are unable to follow this decision in preference to the Division Bench ruling of the same High Court reported in Sk. Osman Gani v. Baramdeo Singh3. Following the above rulings we hold that the appeal is incompetent. It is then argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that special leave to appeal having been already granted under section 417(3), it is not open to the respondents now to question the competency of this appeal and that the question must be deemed to have been decided by the High Court on the application for special leave. No doubt both for making an application for leave to file an appeal as also for presenting the appeal, it is necessary that the case should have been instituted upon a complaint. But it cannot be contended that merely because an appeal has been admitted or that leave has been granted to file the appeal would 62 a bar to the opposite party from questioning or the Court from considering whether the appeal really lies. A complainant may present an appeal to the High Court under section 417(3) only if the case was instituted upon a complaint and therefore it is necessary before hearing the appeal to decide whether the appeal his been properly filed. A complainant may present an appeal to the High Court under section 417(3) only if the case was instituted upon a complaint and therefore it is necessary before hearing the appeal to decide whether the appeal his been properly filed. The decision on the petition for leave to file the appeal cannot amount to a decision in appeal that the appeal is competent. In the case reported in Mukhlal Singh v. Kishimi Singh4, a similar question had been raised as to whether an appeal to the Privy Council was competent in a case where special leave to appeal had already been granted on an ex parte application. Relying upon an earlier decision in Govinda Mangamma v. Madi Mahalakshmamma5, it was held that merely because leave has been granted, it does not preclude the Board when the true facts are brought before it from going into the question whether the appeal is competent or not. The same view has been taken by Raman Nayar, J., in Criminal Appeal 241 of 1959 (unreported). We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by our learned brother. We therefore hold that it is open to the respondents to contend and the Court in holding that the appeal is not maintainable. It was finally argued that even though the appeal is incompetent, this appeal petition could be treated as a petition in revision. No doubt, on examining the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding the High can exercise powers of revision in appropriate cases. But it must be remembered that this is a revision against an order of acquittal. An appeal was open to the State but the State did not think it necessary in the interest of justice to avail of the remedy. As a matter of fact, the learned Public Prosecutor who appeared for the State in this appeal did not challenge the correctness of the order of acquittal. Even if it were an appeal, it is now well-settled that in an appeal against acquittal it is not sufficient that the High Court could come to a different conclusion, but there must be substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal. The powers of revision are more limited in nature. Even if it were an appeal, it is now well-settled that in an appeal against acquittal it is not sufficient that the High Court could come to a different conclusion, but there must be substantial and compelling reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal. The powers of revision are more limited in nature. Dealing with the powers of the Revisional Court in a revision by a private party against the order of acquittal, the Supreme Court in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla1has stated: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 439 is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal against which the Government has a right of appeal under section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record.” This decision has been followed in Harihar Chakravarty v. The State of West Bengal2. In Logendranath Jha v. Shri Polai Lal Biswas3, Patanjali Sastri, J., observed: “Though sub-section (1) of section 439 authorises the High Court to exercise, in its discretion, any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by section 423, sub-section (4) of section 439 specifically excludes the power to”convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction“. This does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law re-appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal is based.” The question here is whether the interests of public justice require that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge should be interfered with. The charge in this case was in respect of a single instance of an alleged breach of trust relating to M.O. 1 series comprising of 5 gold bangles, 2 chains and a locket which had been pledged by P.W. 14 with the third accused for Rs. 160, on 28th May, 1952. The charge in this case was in respect of a single instance of an alleged breach of trust relating to M.O. 1 series comprising of 5 gold bangles, 2 chains and a locket which had been pledged by P.W. 14 with the third accused for Rs. 160, on 28th May, 1952. The prosecution case is that these jewels were repledged by the third accused along with other items in the Mala Bank under a repledge form Exhibit P-42 on 29th May, 1952, for a sum of Rs. 150. The case is that later the first accused in whose custody these jewels were, had fraudulently and dishonestly handed over the jewels to the third accused without receiving the amount due in respect of these loans, that on 3rd October, 1952 the third accused again pledged these jewels for Rs. 200 with P.W. 12 from whom they were taken into custody by the police. The question for decision for the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the actual entrustment of these jewels M.O. 1 series the subject-matter of this charge, with the first accused and whether there was dishonest conversion of the same viz., returning of these jewels without receiving the loan amount. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has elaborately considered the oral and documentary evidence with regard to the entrustment in para. 9 of the judgment and found that entrustment has not been satisfactorily proved and that there is no proof of wrongful conversion. We have been taken through all the relevant evidence in the case and we cannot say that the appreciation of the evidence by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge is either perverse or not warranted by the evidence in the case. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, there does not seem to be any ground for interference in revision and we accordingly dismiss the appeal. M.C.M. ----- Appeal dismised.