Order.- This is a petition to revise the Order of the District and Sessions Judge, Guntur, in Crl.R.P. No. 14 of 1959 on his file. The relevant facts are briefly as follows: On Amirineni Chenchaiah filed a complaint in C.C. No. 435 of 1958 against three accused complaining of various offences. The first accused was the President of the Vemuru Panchayat Board. The second accused was a clerk of the Panchayat Board The third accused was a contractor and a close associate of the first accused He was not officially connected with the Panchayat Board. In the complaint the complainant alleged that he was a recognised contractor of the Panchayat, that the first accused, in his capacity as President, Panchayat Board, did the following acts: (1) The first accused destroyed a tender form which the complainant put in (2) The first accused falsified the books of the Panchayat Board by introducing another tender form in favour of the third accused. (3) The first accused (who was also the Executive Officer in charge) in conspiracy with the second accused attempted to manipulate a resolution and issued a cheque for Rs. 1,266 in favour of the third accused. The second and third accused were charged as abettors. The complainant filed the complaint before the Additional Munsif-Magistrate Tenali The latter took the complaint on file under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, against the above three accused The complainant mentioned in his sworn statement that the Panchayat Board members told in him that A-1 and A-2 had destroyed the tender form and manipulated the records. So, the learned Magistrate issued summons to all the accused. On behalf of the first accused, a petition was filed that cognizance should not have been taken of the complaint as there was no previous sanction as contemplated under section 106 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to for convenience as the ‘Act’). Another petition was filed on behalf of the second accused under section 107 of the Act. The learned Magistrate, after hearing both sides, dismissed the complaint altogether as against all the three accused. The complainant took the matter in revision before the Sessions Judge, Guntur. Another petition was filed on behalf of the second accused under section 107 of the Act. The learned Magistrate, after hearing both sides, dismissed the complaint altogether as against all the three accused. The complainant took the matter in revision before the Sessions Judge, Guntur. The latter held that the complaint could not be entertained (because of want of previous sanction as contemplated under section 106 of the Act) only so far as the first accused was concerned but that the complaint as regards the second and third accused was not barred. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge allowed Crl.R. P. No. 14 of 1959 so far as the second and third accused were concerned and dismissed the revision petition as regards the first accused. Thereupon, the complainant filed this revision petition in this Court so far as the first accused is concerned. The sole point for decision in this case is whether the complaint as against the first accused is barred for want of previous sanction under section 106 of the Act. Section 106 of the Act reads: “When the President, executive authority or any member, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government.” This section is analogous to section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, which runs as follows: “. . . . when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction . . . .” The effective portion relevant for the purpose of this case (which I have underlined in both the sections) is substantially the same. The important question is whether the acts alleged in the complaint constitute an offence committed by the first accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. . . .” The effective portion relevant for the purpose of this case (which I have underlined in both the sections) is substantially the same. The important question is whether the acts alleged in the complaint constitute an offence committed by the first accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. In Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor1, it was observed as follows, at pages 55-56: “I would observe at the outset that the question is substantially one of fact, to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances; it seems neither useful nor desirable to paraphrase the language of the section in attempting to lay down hard and fast tests.” Though there are no hard and fast tests, a perusal of the various decisions indicate as to what are the features which can be usefully considered in deciding this question of fact and the correct approach. Hori Ram Singh v Emperor1, is a decision of the Federal Court on the necessity for sanction under section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is similar in terms of section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code. In the course of his judgment, Varadachariar, J., discussed the scope of section 270 and after observing that the decisions on that section were not uniform, proceeded to group them under three categories; “(1) Those which had held that sanction was necessary when the act complained of attached to the official character of the person doing it; (2) Those which has held that it was necessary in all cases in which the official character of the person gave him an opportunity for the commission of the crime; and (3) Those which had held it necessary when the offence was committed while the accused was actually engaged in the performance of official duties.” The learned Judge expressed his agreement with the first of the three views. The learned Advocate for the first accused seeks to distinguish that decision on the ground that section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was substantially different from section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, in view of the fact that section 270(1) relates to "any act done.....in the execution of his duty as a servant of the Crown of India" whereas section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, refers only to "any offence committed while acting.....in the discharge of his official duty". This is a subtle distinction without a substantial difference as seen from the following passage in the judgment of the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor1, at extracted by me below: ".....When a public servant simply embazzles some property entrusted to him and thereby commits a criminal breach of trust under section 409, he is not doing an act, not even purports to do an act, in execution of his duty; when he commits the act, he does not pretend to act in the official discharge of his duty." The learned Judges of the Federal Court have used the concerned words appearing in section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and also the concerned words appearing in section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, in the same sentence, treating them as having the same meaning. In section 53 of the Madras District Police Act (Central Act XXIV of 1859) the words used are "anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act." It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Venugopal, In re2, that the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of Act (XXIV of 1859) would be available to an accused officer only when the act complained of has been committed in the discharge of his official duties and that the question as to whether a particular act should be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties would have to be determined on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, clear that the words used in section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 "any act done .... in the execution of his duty" have substantially the same meaning as "offence committed while acting in the discharge of his official duty" in section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. It was held in H.T. Huntley v. Emperor3, by the Federal Court that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act. For determining as to whether an act was done or purported to be done in official capacity, various principles have been laid down in several important decisions.. It was held in H.T. Huntley v. Emperor3, by the Federal Court that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act. For determining as to whether an act was done or purported to be done in official capacity, various principles have been laid down in several important decisions.. In Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor1, the Federal Court observed as follows: "The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by any one else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done of purporting to be done in the execution of his duty." In Gill’s Case4, the Privy Council observed as follows: "A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office." In Ramayya v. State of Bombay5, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Now it is obvious that if section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, is construed too narrowly, it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official’s duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done; in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it.” In Amrit Singh v. State of Pepsu1, it was observed as follows: “....It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code.....but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties...... ****** If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.” In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari2, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles: “(a) There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. (b) It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What the Court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. What the Court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. (c) The mere fact that the act is an offence is not sufficient to decide that sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, is not necessary.“ In Satwant Singh v State of Punjab3, the following principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court: ” . . . . The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.“ I am referring below to the various observations made in several decisions in connection with the application of the above principles to concrete facts. In Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor4, the facts were as follows: A Sub-Assistant Surgeon was charged under section 409, Indian Penal Code, with having dishonestly removed certain medicines from a hospital which was under his charge, to his own residence, and under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, with having failed to enter them in the stock-book. The sanction of the Government had not been obtained for the prosecution under section 270(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The point for decision was whether such sanction was necessary. The Federal Court held that the charge under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, required sanction but that no sanction was required for a charge under section 409, Indian Penal Code. As regards the charge under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, the Federal Court observed that ”the official capacity is involved in the very act complained of as amounting to a crime, because the gravamen of the charge is that the accused acted fraudulently in the discharge of his official duty.“ Therein, it was observed as follows at page 53: ”........ an offence under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, is committed if an officer or servant or any one employed or acting in such capacity, wilfully and with intent to defraud, falsified any book or account. an offence under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, is committed if an officer or servant or any one employed or acting in such capacity, wilfully and with intent to defraud, falsified any book or account. Thus, where it is his duty to maintain a record or a register, and in maintaining that register he makes some entries which are false to his knowledge, he is certainly purporting to act, though not actually acting, in the execution of his duty because he is making certain entries in the register, knowing them to be false. He is ostensibly professing to be discharging his official duty in maintaining the register, which he is bound to maintain correctly. In making the entries he pretends or purports to act in the execution of his duty; but in point of fact he is acting in direct dereliction of it.” On the other hand, as regards an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, the learned Judges pointed out that: “the official capacity is material only in connection with the entrustment and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion, which is the act complained of.” That was a case where the act proved against the doctor was of secret misappropriation or conversion to his own use. Therein, the learned Judges observed as follows at page 52: “If the present case had merely been that medicines were openly removed from the hospital dispensary to the house on some pretence, it might have remained ambiguous whether the act purported to be done in execution of duty or not. But apparently the case as put forward in the compounder Din Mohammad’s application submitted with the police report, and also as found proved by the Magistrate at the trial, was one of secret misappropriation or conversion to one’s own use” In H.H. Gill v. The King1, the accused was charged under section 161, Indian Penal Code, with taking bribes and under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, with conspiracy. On the question whether sanction was necessary under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, it was held by the Privy Council that as the facts with which the accused was charged could not be justified as done by virtue of his office, no sanction was necessary. In Albert West Meads v. The King2, an officer had received two sums of money and was subsequently unable to produce them. In Albert West Meads v. The King2, an officer had received two sums of money and was subsequently unable to produce them. He was charged with criminal misappropriation and convicted. It was contended by the accused that the conviction was illegal for want of sanction. The Privy Council following H.H. Gill v. The King1, rejected that contention. In Albert West Meads v. The King2, the accused did not claim to have spent the amount in the course of his official duties but stated that the moneys had been consumed by fire. It is with reference to these facts that the Privy Council observed at page 159: “. . . . the appellant could not justify the acts in respect of which he was charged, i.e., acts of fraudulently misapplying money entrusted to his care as a public servant, as acts done by him by virtue of the office that he held.” In Ramayya v. State of Bombay3, three accused, who are Government servants were in charge of the stores which were kept in the Military Engineering stores depot at Dehu Road near Poona and which had been entrusted to them in various capacities. They (accused) entered into a conspiracy to defraud Government of these properties and in pursuance of this conspiracy, they (accused) arranged to sell the stores to the approver (P.W. 1) for a sum of Rs. 4,000. The money is said to have been paid and then the stores were passed out of the depot. The money has been pocketed by the three accused and not credited to the Government. A number of charges were framed including criminal breach of trust in futherance of the common intention of all under section 409, Indian Penal Code, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court observed as follows at page 293: “We have therefore first to concentrate on the word ‘offence’. Now, an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. The Supreme Court observed as follows at page 293: “We have therefore first to concentrate on the word ‘offence’. Now, an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against accused 2 are, first, that there was an ‘entrustment’ and/or ‘dominion’; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was ‘in his capacity as a public servant’; third, that there was a ‘disposal’; and fourth, that the disposal was ‘dishonest’; now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity.” It was also observed as follows at page 293: “Therefore, the act complained of, namely, the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official, act, but in either event the act was official because accused 2 could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely, officially, permitting their disposal." Similarly as regards the abetment of the offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court observed as follows at page 293: "The act of abetment alleged against him stands on the same footing, for his part in the abetment was to permit the disposal of the goods by the doing of an official act and thus "wilfully suffer " another person to use them dishonestly: section 405, Indian Penal Code. In both cases, the ‘offence’ in his case would be incomplete without proving the official act." It was therefore held that sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, was necessary and since there was no such sanction, the trial was held to vitiated from the start. In Amrit Singh v. State of Pepsu1 the appellant received the sum of Rs. 51, alleged to have been misappropriated, as Sub-Divisional Officer, and he admitted receipt of the same. It was his duty to pay that amount to the Khalasi Parma and take his signature or thumb-impression in acknowledgment thereof. In Amrit Singh v. State of Pepsu1 the appellant received the sum of Rs. 51, alleged to have been misappropriated, as Sub-Divisional Officer, and he admitted receipt of the same. It was his duty to pay that amount to the Khalasi Parma and take his signature or thumb-impression in acknowledgment thereof. The accused claimed to have paid the amount to Parma and the acquittance roll recorded the payment, and there was in acknowledgment thereof a thumb impression as against his name. The Supreme Court observed that, if what appeared on the face of the roll was true (and whether it was true or not was not a matter relevant at the stage of sanction) then the acts with which the accused was charged fell within the scope of his duties and could be justified by him as done by virtue of his office. It was held that sanction was required clearly under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, before the accused could be prosecuted under section 409, Indian Penal Code and the absence of such sanction was fatal to the maintainability of the prosecution. In that case, the conviction was quashed for lack of sanction. In Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab2, one Henderson was charged with intentionally aiding Satwant Singh in the commission of an offence punishable under section 420, Indian Penal Code, by falsely stating as a fact in his report that Satwant Singh’s claim were true and that statement had been made knowing all the while that the claim in question were false and fraudulent and accordingly committing an offence under section 420/109, Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court observed as follows at page 271: "It appears to us to be clear that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an offence punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, is one of them and the offence of cheating or abetment thereof isanother. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an offence punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, is one of them and the offence of cheating or abetment thereof isanother. ****** The act of cheating or abetment thereof has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty." It was held, on the particular facts of that case, that the act committed by Henderson which amounted to abetting Satwant Singh to commit an offence of cheating was not committed by Henderson while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and that, therefore, no previous sanction was necessary under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code. In Dhannjay v. M.S. Uppadyaya3, the accused persons who were in the employ of the Northern Railway, on the request of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Establishment but without any reference to their superior officers, went to witness a search in the house of the complainant, another railway employee and were alleged to have committed offences of theft, misappropriation of properties belonging to the complainant and wrongful confinement. It was held by the Supreme Court that the duties of the accused as public servants had prima facie nothing to do with witnessing any search or helping any police officer in the matter of searches, that when the accused went to witness the search they did so not in pursuance of the Home Office memorandum and so could not possibly be said to be performing their official duty or purporting to act in the performance of their official duty. Therein, it was also pointed out that assuming that witnessing the search in the complainant’s house was in performance of their official duty, the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused could have no direct connection with the act of witnessing the search and that the mere fact that an opportunity to commit an offence was furnished by the official duty was not such a connection of the offence with the performance of such duty as to justify even remotely the view that the acts complained of were within the scope of their official duty. Hence it was held in that case that sanction under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, was not necessary. In Makhan Lal v. State1, a Sub-Postmaster was charged under section 409. Indian Penal Code, for misappropriating certain money. Hence it was held in that case that sanction under section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, was not necessary. In Makhan Lal v. State1, a Sub-Postmaster was charged under section 409. Indian Penal Code, for misappropriating certain money. The first count of the charge under section 409, Indian Penal Code, is in respect of shortage of Rs. 316-4-9 in cash and stamps. The second count was in respect of a sum of Rs. 728-9-0 on account of M.Os. which was not credited to the Government; it was alleged that the accused misappropriated the same. The Calcutta High Court held that no sanction was necessary under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, mainly on the following grounds: “1. The fact that he was entrusted with the money in his official capacity is not sufficient to attract section 197. 2. The act of misappropriation cannot be said to be an act done or purported to be done in an official capacity. The acts complained were not so integrally connected with the duties of he office of the Sub-Postmaster as to be inseparable for they were not so integrally connected. 3. There was no reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duly. 4. The impugned act was not so related to the official duty of the accused that he could set up a reasonable claim that he did the act in the course of the performance of his duty.” It will be observed that the ultimate decision in that case was based on the application of the principles stated in other decisions, referred to earlier, to the facts of that case. Thus, it would appear from the various decisions on the subject that offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant can be classified under three heads, with reference to act or acts said to have been done by him: (1) Offence relating to act which by its very nature could have been committed only in official capacity, for example, offence under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, ‘wherein the official capacity is involved in the very act complained of as amounting to a crime, because the gravamen of the charge is that the accused acted fraudulently in the discharge of his official duty’-See Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor2. (2) Offence relating to act which by its very nature could not have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, for example, offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code-See Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab3. (3) Offence relating to act which could or could not have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, for example, offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code. An offence need not necessarily consist of a single act or element. It is usually composed of various elements which involve various acts. One element or act may not be sufficient to attract the provisions of the law regarding sanction like section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, for example, entrustment in the case of an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code. Some other element may be decisive, for example, the act of disposal of property concerned in an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code. The act has to be scrutinised with reference to the relevant facts and circumstances and the various principles enunciated in the various decisions to see whether the provisions of law requiring sanction are attracted. In any particular case to find out whether the protection such as one under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, is available to an officer regarding an offence with which he has been charged, the following procedure appears to be proper. (i) It has to be seen whether the offence falls under one of the three categories. (ii) If it falls under category (1) or category (2) the position will be clear. (iii) If it falls under category (3), it has to be seen as to what are the essential elements which constitute the alleged offence (concerned in section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, or section 106 of the Act) and what are the individual acts concerned in the various elements. (iv) With reference to each of these elements, it has to be seen what act the accused did and whether that act was done by him or purported to be done by him in his official capacity. (iv) With reference to each of these elements, it has to be seen what act the accused did and whether that act was done by him or purported to be done by him in his official capacity. Applying the above procedure to the present case, it has to be seen whether sanction under section 106 of the Act was necessary for taking the complaint on file against the first accused. The issue of cheque by the first accused in the name of the third accused is certainly an official act which could have been done by him only in his capacity as President of the Panchayat Board and not in any other capacity. The act of the first accused in entering the tender in favour of the third accused in the register could also have been done by him only in his capacity as President of the Panchayat Board. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Bhimaraju that it is a tender which was falsely introduced and that the entry was made with a mala fide intention. But, as observed in Ramayyo v. State of Bombay1, it is the act which is more crucial and not the duty and it is the physical part of the act of making entry in the register which is crucial and not the intention or motive of the accused. This physical act was also integrally connected with his official work and had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his official duty. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner-complainant chat the act of the accused in destroying the tender which had been put in by the complainant does not come within the ambit of the accused’s official duties. Section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, reads: “Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, paper, writing.....shall be punished with imprisonment.....” This directly covers the case of destruction of the tender. Section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, reads: “Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, paper, writing.....shall be punished with imprisonment.....” This directly covers the case of destruction of the tender. An offence under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, can be committed only by a public servant or other officer contemplated in provision like section 106 of the Act, as contrasted to an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, in which one element, namely, ‘entrustment’ must necessarily be in the accused’s capacity as public servant whereas the ‘misappropriation’ need not necessarily be in his capacity as a public servant. (Vide Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor2.) The first accused as President of the Panchayat Board was entrusted with various documents. He was bound to maintain them and make correct entries about them in the register. If he had preserved the tender he would have acted in discharge of his duty. If he had destroyed the tender, he failed to preserve it as he was bound to do. But, still evenin destroying the tender, he acted in official capacity though he would have committed an offence by destroying a record which he was bound to preserve. It does not appear that the act of the first accused can be considered to be not integrally connected with his duty as President, Panchayat Board, or that it can be divorced from his duty. He was in lawful charge of the tender. If he destroyed it, he actually destroyed it as President of the Panchayat Board and not as a private person. The alleged offence under section 477-A, Indian Penal Code, comes under category (1). So, I agree with the finding of the Court below that sanction under section 106 of the Act was necessary in this particular case for prosecution of the first accused. In the result, I dismiss the petition. A.S.R. ----- Revision dismissed.