Order: The facts of this case have been so fully stated in the judgments of both the Courts below, that I do not propose to recapitulate them in great detail here. It is sufficient for me to state that accused 1 in the case, a Cashier employed at the Tirupattur branch of the State Bank of India, was convicted upon his admission of guilt, of criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs. 36,000 odd belonging to the Bank. There can be no doubt that, on the occasion in question, accused 1 secreted these monies on his person from the till of the Bank, and, on the pretext of leaving the building for lunch refreshment, escaped to Madras via Vellore through taxis and trains, in the company of the second accused (revision petitioner). The second accused was then a Havildar of an Assam Company of Rifles, on leave at Tirupattur, and staying at Mani’s Hotel, a restaurant run by his near relative. The second accused has been convicted of the offence of abetment of the criminal breach of trust, of which the first accused was admittedly guilty. A separate charge of criminal conspiracy against this revision petitioner failed in proof. The question is, whether the circumstances justify the conviction of the revision petitioner upon the charge of abetment, under any categories of the offence as defined under section 107, Indian Penal Code. Both the Courts below appear to think that the following pieces of evidence are significant, and that, in their cumulative effect, they justify an inference of guilt as far as the revision petitioner is concerned. These pieces of evidence are (1) evidence of close association and friendship between the two accused, (2) evidence of movements of the revision petitioner along with accused 1 or by himself, in the vicinity of the State Bank of India building, sometime prior to the offence or shortly prior to the offence, (3) evidence of P.Ws. 11 and 12 to the effect that the second accused obtained elastic rubber bands stitched for the first accused at the tailoring establishment of P.W. 11, ostensibly for the purpose of securing the socks worn by accused 1 along with the pants at the knee level. 11 and 12 to the effect that the second accused obtained elastic rubber bands stitched for the first accused at the tailoring establishment of P.W. 11, ostensibly for the purpose of securing the socks worn by accused 1 along with the pants at the knee level. The suggestion here is that these bands must have been utilised by accused 1 in secreting the currency notes which he took away from the Bank, and (4) the evidence of the subsequent movements of the two accused together in their journey from Tirupattur to Madras, and of lavish expenditure somewhat disproportionate to their means. But I am persuaded, after a careful review of the record of evidence, and consideration of the probabilities, that the conviction of this revision petitioner rests, at the best for the prosecution, upon either conjecture, however reasonable according to worldly experience, or a mere moral feeling that the party must be guilty. In other words, there is really nothing beyond a cloud of suspicion. Suspicion cannot substitute legal proof, and where it is so substituted for adequate legal evidence, and a conviction has been based thereon, a miscarriage of justice has really occurred, which merits interference in revision by this Court. In this context I would desire at the outset to observe, since the Courts below do seem to consider that the abetment in this case was a form of abetment by conspiracy as set forth in clause (2) of section 107, Indian Penal Code, that any charge of conspiracy is not established merely by proof of association together, nor by mere suspicion of guilt. Here, I cannot do better than to reiterate the passage in Underbill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th edition, section 508 which will be found set forth in Sivasubramanian Pandian v. State1, a Bench decision of this Court to which I was a Party. I could understand the inference of the Courts below, if the evidence had been more specific or if it had permitted any clearer inference. Since accused I was the Cashier of the Bank, it is abundantly clear that the movements of this revision petitioner in the vicinity of the Bank prior to this occurrence are of no singificance whatever. The evidence shows that accused 1 was inside the Bank in his capacity as cashier, actually handling monies, and that he took advantage of this opportunity to commit misappropriation and breach of trust. The evidence shows that accused 1 was inside the Bank in his capacity as cashier, actually handling monies, and that he took advantage of this opportunity to commit misappropriation and breach of trust. Since the hotel of Mani Iyer is, more or less, in the same neighbourhood, the physical movements of the revision petitioner are of practically no significance. As regards close association and friendship, here again, this would be relevant only if they tended to show any concert or preparation with regard to the particular crime designed; general association may imply nothing more than a not very fastidious predeliction for doubtful company. That may be morally reprehensible, but it is not the basis for any legal inference. As regards the bands ordered at the tailoring shop of P.W. 11, in which this revision petitioner does appear to have taken some initiative, the difficulty is that there is absolutely no evidence to connect these elastic bands with the actual offence. That is sheer conjecture, and it may be totally beside the mark, just as it may be a shrewd guess at the truth. Currency notes could be concealed in several ways about the person, and a cashier, presumably a trusted official, could easily leave the Bank building on the pretext of proceeding outside for lunch with these notes in his interior pockets. Elastic bands appear to be a device not necessarily called for with regard to the mechanics of the offence. In any event, we do not know that the bands had anything to do with secreting the notes. Again, we do not know that this revision petitioner (accused 2) was really let into the secret of the scheme by the first accused. The subsequent movements of these two persons are of practically no signficance. The learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be correct in his view of the law that the subsquent expenditure of monies is also a necessary element in proving a criminal breach of trust. In any event, the bulk of the monies were retained with accused 1, who was later found in possession of a fair sum and of luxury roods of admitted value when he was arrested at Calcutta. Only a very small sum of over Rs. 200 was recovered from the possession of the revision petitioner. In any event, the bulk of the monies were retained with accused 1, who was later found in possession of a fair sum and of luxury roods of admitted value when he was arrested at Calcutta. Only a very small sum of over Rs. 200 was recovered from the possession of the revision petitioner. It may be that he was not conscious of anything more criminal than being out for a lark in the company of accused 1, who was temporarily flush of cash. Even if accused 2 had suspicion about the source of this cash, that would not make him an abettor. In Esakki Thevar v. State1, I have examined the decisions of this Court laying down the principles upon which interference in a criminal revision would be warranted, in the case of a conviction. The authorities amply show that where the record is itself not capable of sustaining a conviction, and the conscience of the Court is roused to the extent of compelling the Court to find that the appellant ought not to have been convicted upon the evidence, such interference would be war ranted. The present is clearly such a case, for we cannot permit suspicion to substitute legal proof, so long as we adhere to the system of criminal jurisprudence which we have inherited from the past, which is the chief glory of our administration of justice, and the chief protection of the citizen in this country. I hence allow the revision, acquit the revision petitioner, and direct that he be set at liberty. V.S. ----- Petition allowed.