Order. In this appeal, a preliminary point is taken that the prosecution of the appellants is barred by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act (XXIV of 1859), which will be referred to in the course of this Order as ‘the Act.‘Although this point was not taken in the lower Court, I have permitted it to be raised here as it involves a question of limitation. Section 53, so far as it is material, is in the following terms: “All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the Police, shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise......” In the present case the three appellants were Police Officers at the material time and were respectively the Sub-Inspector of Police, a Head Constable and a Police Constable attached to the Vempalle Police Station; and the acts complained of against them included the offences of wrongful confinement to extort information which might lead to the detection of an offence; of voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort information which might lead to the detection of an offence of murder; and of causing disappearance of the evidence of murder-offences punishable under sections 348, 331, 302 and 201, Indian Penal Code. The alleged offences were committed on the 9th January, 1957, the preliminary charge-sheet was filed on the 22nd October, 1957 and the final charge-sheet on the 30th November, 1957; so that, if section 53 of the Act is applicable to this case, the prosecution of the appellants would have been barred by time and on that ground alone the appeal must succeed. It may be mentioned here that the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellants of offences under sections 342, 348, 331 and section 201 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code and has sentenced each of them to five years’ rigorous imprisonment in the aggregate. It may be mentioned here that the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellants of offences under sections 342, 348, 331 and section 201 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code and has sentenced each of them to five years’ rigorous imprisonment in the aggregate. For the present purpose it is not necessary toset out the facts of the case at length; suffice it to say that according to the prosecution, the three appellants, in the course of an investigation into an offence of house-breaking and theft had wrongfully confined one Arige Ramanna in the Police Station at Kadiri and with a view to extort information from him regarding an item of the stolen property, had tortured him to such a degree that the man succumbed to his injuries within a few hours. Now, the question for consideration is whether on the facts of this case the appellants can claim the benefit of section 53 of the Act and plead the bar of limitation. I am clearly of opinion that they cannot. Neither under the Act nor under any other law is a Police Officer empowered wrongfully to confine a person or to use bodily violence to extort any confession or information from a person in his custody. On the contrary, such abuse of power is made punishable by the Act as well as by the Indian Penal Code. In like manner, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherever a Police Officer is authorised to use force, such power is meticulously regulated and circumscribed by the relevant provisions of the Code; vide sections 46, 48, 49, 50 and 128, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 21 of the Act enumerates the duties of a Police Officer. It provides inter alia that it shall be the duty of every Police Officer to use his best endeavours and ability to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances; to preserve the peace; to apprehend disorderly and suspicious characters; to detect and bring offenders to justice; to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; and promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him. Section 44 of the Act, which is very material, prescribes penalties for violation of duty and for abuse of power. Section 44 of the Act, which is very material, prescribes penalties for violation of duty and for abuse of power. It says inter alia that every Police Officer who shall be guilty of any violation of duty, or who shall knowingly and wilfully andwith evil intent exceed his powers, or who shall offer any unwarrantable personal violence to any person in his custody, shall be liable on conviction before a Magistrate to a penalty not exceeding three months’ pay, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour not exceeding three months, or both. Likewise, the Indian Penal Code makes it an offence to confine a person wrongfully or to cause hurt to a person for the purpose of extorting any confession or information which may lead to the detection of an offence; vide section 348 and sections 330 and 331, Indian Penal Code. The first two Illustrations tosection 330 are of much significance in this context: “(a) A, Police Officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section. (b) A, Police Officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is deposited. A is guilty of an offence under this section.” Similarly, if a Police Officer intentionally or knowingly causes death in trying to extort any confession or information from a person in his custody, he would be guilty of an offence under section 302 or section 304, Indian Penal Code as the case may be. A is guilty of an offence under this section.” Similarly, if a Police Officer intentionally or knowingly causes death in trying to extort any confession or information from a person in his custody, he would be guilty of an offence under section 302 or section 304, Indian Penal Code as the case may be. It will thus be seen that the acts complained of against the appellants in this case are acts which are made penal both under the Act and under the Penal Code; and when a police officer does something which is expressly forbidden and made punishable and does it not through mistake or inadvertance but knowingly and wilfully, he cannot be heard to say that he has done or has intended to do that thing under the provisions of the Act or any other law; in truth his act falls outside the pale of the statute as it is done in deliberate contravention thereof and he is therefore not entitled to the protection afforded by it: “If a person knows that he has not under a statute authority to do a certain thing and yet intentionally does that thing, he cannot shelter himself by pretending that the thing was done with intent to carry out that statute” (Per Blackburn, J.1). To hold otherwise would be to throw a cloak of protection on police excesses which would work great public mischief; for in cases like the present one it may not be possible for the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file a charge-sheet within three months despite utmost diligence. However, the learned Advocate for the appellants has relied on two decisions of Chandra Reddy, J. (as he then was) in which the learned Judge has taken a contrary view. The first of these cases was decided by him in the Madras High Court; and in the second case which was decided in the Andhra High Court, the learned Judge adopted his earlier view. Both these revision cases arose out of the same prosecution and the same set of facts; the first revision was filed by one of the accused and the second one by his co-accused. The first case is Nichodemus v. State2. The petitioner there was the first accused in P.R.C. No. 1 of 1954. He was the Inspector of Police, Srikakulam. Both these revision cases arose out of the same prosecution and the same set of facts; the first revision was filed by one of the accused and the second one by his co-accused. The first case is Nichodemus v. State2. The petitioner there was the first accused in P.R.C. No. 1 of 1954. He was the Inspector of Police, Srikakulam. A complaint was filed against him and eleven others who were either Head Constables or Constable for offences under sections 343, 348 and 330, Indian Penal Code. The allegations against them were that in the course of an investigation into a series of cases of housebreaking and theft, the suspected person had been taken to the Police Station and with a view to extort a confession from him, under the directions of the Inspector, his subordinate officials had handcuffed the suspect, chained him to an iron bar of the door and subjected him to torture. Dealing with the preliminary point that the complaint was barred under section 53 of the Act as it had admittedly been filed beyond three months from the date of the commission of the offence, the learned Judge after quoting the section, observed as follows, at page 187: “It is clear from this provision that all actions and prosecutions against a Police Officer for anything done in discharge of his duties, or the purported discharge of his duties, should be filed within three months after the act complained of. In this case, it cannot be disputed that the alleged offence was committed by the petitioner in the course of his official duty as Inspector of Police, i.e., while he was investigatating into several crimes that were committed in the town of Srikakulam. There can be little doubt that the complaint falls within the purview of section 53 of the District Police Act, 1859. This is an obvious case covered by section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 and does not present any difficulty. I must, therefore, hold that so far as the petitioner is concerned, the complaint is barred under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859.” The second case is Bapaniah and others v. State1. Here also the learned Judge adhered to his earlier view. I must, therefore, hold that so far as the petitioner is concerned, the complaint is barred under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859.” The second case is Bapaniah and others v. State1. Here also the learned Judge adhered to his earlier view. Dealing with the same point he said at page 317: “As regards the maintainability of the preliminary objection, it looks to me that there is considerable force in it. To appreciate the contention of limitation it is necessary to set out the terms of section 53 (as amended) of the Madras Police Act: ***** Admittedly, the complaint was filed beyond three months after the occurrence. The only question is whether it falls within the terms of section 53. At the relevant time all the accused were Police Officers and it cannot be seriously disputed that the alleged offence was committed by these officers in the course of their official duty as Police Officers, namely, while investigating into cases of house-breaking and theft. It is clear from this section that any action against a Police Officer for things done by him, either in discharge of his duties or purporting to discharge them should be filed within a particular time. I have no doubt that this case is governed by section 53 of the Madras Police Act and the prosecution started more than three months after the offence is barred. It follows that the proceedings are unsustainable and are quashed.” With great respect to the learned Judge, I find it difficult to agree with the above construction of section 53 of the Act. It appears to me that the learned Judge has placed too much emphasis on the time factor and too little on what, in my opinion, are the crucial words of the section, viz., “under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the Police”. It would further appear that the learned Judge has equated ‘purported’ with ‘intended’ and pretended discharge of duty with purported discharge. In this connection, a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Lakshmanaswami v Mohammad Galah Hussain Saheb2, may be usefully referred to, wherein section 53 of the Act was elaborately considered and construed. It would further appear that the learned Judge has equated ‘purported’ with ‘intended’ and pretended discharge of duty with purported discharge. In this connection, a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Lakshmanaswami v Mohammad Galah Hussain Saheb2, may be usefully referred to, wherein section 53 of the Act was elaborately considered and construed. In the result, acting under rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules, I refer the following question for determination by a Bench of two Judges: “In the circumstances of this case, is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859?” [In pursuance of the above Order, the appeals came on for hearing before a Division Bench (Manohar Pershad and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.)] The Order of the Court was made by Manohar Pershad, J.-Our learned brother Basi Reddy, J., has referred this case to a Bench having regard to the important question of law involved. The question of law involved is whether in the circumstances of this case, the prosecution of the appellants is barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859. There are three decisions of our learned Chief Justice, viz., Nichodemus v. State3, Bapaniah and others v. State1 and Krishnamurthy, In re4. In the first two decisions, his Lordship has taken the view that the cases were covered by section 53 of the Madras Police Act and the prosecution started more than three months after the offence was barred. In the third case, his Lordship held that section 53 was inapplicable to the case because the act purported, viz., torture, was not within the official duties of the officer. It may also be noted that in the last mentioned case, there is no reference to the previous two cases decided by his Lordship. In C.P. Singh v. Hanumantha Rao1, Krishna Rao, J., while referring to the first two cases, followed an earlier Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Lakshmanaswami v. Hussain Saheb2, and has held that the benefit of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act is subject to the qualification that the Police Officer did not act maliciously and that the onus of proving malice lay on the complainant. As this is an important matter, we think it is better if this is decided by a Full Bench. The following questions are referred to the Full Bench: "(1) In what circumstances, the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of the Madras District Police Act would be available to an accused officer? (2) In the circumstances of this case is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859?" In pursuance of the above Order, the appeals came on for hearing before the Full Bench; the Judgment of the Full Bench was pronounced by Srinivasachari, J.-These appeals came before Basi Reddy, J., for final disposal and a preliminary point was taken before the learned Judge that the prosecution of the appellants was barred by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act of 1859 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Although this point was not raised in the lower Court, as it was a question of law, going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court, the learned Judge permitted the counsel to argue. After hearing the arguments, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the view taken in a judgment of the Madras High Court in Nichodemus v. State3, by Chandra Reddy, J., as a Judge of the Madras High Court and in Bapanaiah and others v. State4, a subsequent decision of the same learned Judge as a Judge of the Andhra High Court were not in consonance with the view taken by the Madras High Court in an earlier decision in Lakshmanaswami v. Hussain Saheb2. Inasmuch as the construction placed by Chandra Reddy, J., in the two cases referred to was not the same as that placed by the Madras decision (the last mentioned decision) he referred the case with the following question for determination by a Bench: "In the circumstances of this case, is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act?" In pursuance of the above order of reference, the cases were placed before Manohar Pershad and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ., and the Bench, having regard to the importance of the matter, thought it desirable to refer the matter to a Full Bench. The following questions were referred to the Full Bench: "(1) In what circumstances would the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of the Madras. District Police Act be available to an accused officer? (2) In the circumstances of this case is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act?" These two questions have now come up before us for consideration. The Madras District Police Act has been enacted for the better regulation of the Police within the territories in the Presidency of Madras. It deals with the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Police Officers. It also deals with the penalties that might be imposed on a Police Officer for unlawful acts. The Police Officers are liable to be prosecuted for offences committed by them and where such offences are committed while in the actual discharge of their duties, the law enjoins that such prosecutions or complaints shall be filed as early as possible. Section 53 prescribes a period of three months for the launching of prosecutions and the giving of at least one month’s notice of such action to the Police Officer or other superior officer mentioned in the section. Section 53 in so far as it is relevant reads as follows: "All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the Police, shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise......" Obviously, this section does not give any protection to the Police Officer allowing him to perpetrate crimes or commit offences. The Police Officer is liable to be punished and prosecuted like any other individual if he is responsible for an act which would constitute an offence under the Penal Code or under any other law. The protection afforded to the officer is limited to this extent that where in the discharge of his duties the Police Officer does anything which would amount to an offence, any action intended to be taken against him for such an offence would have to be commenced within three months. The protection afforded to the officer is limited to this extent that where in the discharge of his duties the Police Officer does anything which would amount to an offence, any action intended to be taken against him for such an offence would have to be commenced within three months. The policy of the Act and the object of this provision appears to be to ensure that Police Officers are not unnecessarily harassed by complaints and prosecutions being filed long after the alleged commission of the offence when it might not be possible to know under what circumstances the alleged act was done. The idea behind is that where the Police Officer in the course of discharge of his duties happens to do an act, which is an offence, a prosecution should be launched against him as early as possible so that the Police Officer might be in a position to explain his act as otherwise it might be difficult to do so at a distance of time. If the purpose of section 53 of the Act was not to permit the prosecution of Police Officers committing offences while in the discharge of his duties, then the section would be otiose. The only condition necessary for such prosecution is that the complaint should be filed within three months. The limited question that has to be examined is, in what cases and under what circumstances would the operation of the section come into play. The distinction as to whether a particular act which constitutes an offence could be regarded as having been done in the discharge of his duties or not are very subtle. Ordinarily where the act complained of could be integrated with the discharge of his duties, the act would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of his duties. If it was not part of his duties that he was performing then such an act would be outside the pale of section 53 of the Act. As to what would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties came to be considered by the Privy Council, Federal Court and the Supreme Court in connection with section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code a provision affording protection to public servants when prosecution is launched against them. As to what would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties came to be considered by the Privy Council, Federal Court and the Supreme Court in connection with section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code a provision affording protection to public servants when prosecution is launched against them. That section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, is intended to guard against vexatious proceedings against public servants and to secure the well-considered opinion of a superior authority before prosecution is launched against the inferior officer. Section 197 reads as under: "When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or when any Magistrate, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction-" This section also speaks of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. Therefore the question of obtaining sanction of the superior authority before launching a prosecution against the public servant would arise only where it could be said that the act complained of was done by the public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The question came to be considered in the case of Gill v. The King1. The question there was as to whether sanction before prosecution was necessary under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. Their Lordships of the Privy Council while approving the observations of Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor2, stated as follows: "The test would be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that what he does he does in virtue of his office." This observation would make it amply clear that the sole test in such cases would be as to whether the officer when challenged could offer as his explanation that this act was done as part of his official duty. The same was the view taken by the Supreme Court when their Lordships of the Supreme Court said that the act should be directly concerned with his official duties so that if questioned it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of his office. Vide Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu1. This question as to whether it was in fact a proper discharge of his duty would be matter that would have to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case; in other words, does the act in respect of which a complaint or prosecution is filed hinge on his duties as a Police Officer. Two other cases to which reference may be made in this connection are Srikantaiah Ramaiah v. The State of Bombay2 and Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab3. It would follow, therefore, that in order to a tract the provisions of section 53 of the Act, it is essential that the act complained of must have a bearing on the duty that the police official was discharging. This question is substantially one of fact and no hard and fast rule could be laid. It now remains to consider whether the dictum of Chandra Reddy, J. (as he then was) in the two cases decided by him is in conflict with the decision of the Madras High Court in Lakshmanaswami v. Mohammad Gala Hussain Saheb4. This case related to a suit filed by a party against a Police Sub-Inspector alleging that he accused him falsely of having obstructed a pathway by keeping bricks charging under sections 188 and 283, Indian Penal Code. The plea of limitation under section 53 of the Act was raised in this case. What the aforesaid decision laid down was that an act done by a Police Officer in the exercise of his police powers will not have the benefit of section 53 of the Act if it was done maliciously. This could be regarded only as an authority for the proposition that where a Police Officer transgresses the bounds of his legitimate duties pertaining to him as a Police Officer, this Act would not give him any protection. In an earlier decision of the Madras High Court, Goundan Venkataswami v. Chinnam Purushottam5, a Head-Constable sued the Sub-Inspector of Police for moneys had and received to the plaintiff’s use. In an earlier decision of the Madras High Court, Goundan Venkataswami v. Chinnam Purushottam5, a Head-Constable sued the Sub-Inspector of Police for moneys had and received to the plaintiff’s use. He said that the defendant had received the pay of the plaintiff but failed to give it to the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by section 53 of the Act. Admittedly this claim was based upon a breach of private contract. Such private contracts and their breaches were not covered by the Act and are acts done by police officials in their private capacity. While holding that the case was not covered by section 53 of the Act, the learned Judges observed that section 53 provided a special limitation for a special class of wrongs under the colour of the Police Act. This view of the learned Judges was followed and adopted by Ayling, J., In re Murugesan Naidu6. That was a case of the prosecution of the Police Constable for receiving an unauthorised fee or recompense. The learned Judge held that the prosecution filed after three months could not be held to have been barred because the offence complained of could not be regarded as an act done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the official powers. The whole case-law was reviewed with reference to corresponding English Law by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Pulavarti Lakshmanaswami v. Mohammad Gala Hussain4, already referred to. In that case, the learned Judges laid down that an act done by a Police Officer maliciously even though it might have been done in the exercise of his police powers, would not have the benefit of section 53. The learned referring Judge, Basi Reddy, J., was of the opinion that Chandra Reddy, J., as a Judge of the Madras High Court in Nichodemus v. State7, and his subsequent decisions as a Judge of the Andhra High Court in Bapanaiah v. State8, and in Krishnamurthi, In re9, equated ‘purported’ with ‘intended’ and ‘pretended discharge of duty’ with ‘purported discharge’. The learned referring Judge, Basi Reddy, J., was of the opinion that Chandra Reddy, J., as a Judge of the Madras High Court in Nichodemus v. State7, and his subsequent decisions as a Judge of the Andhra High Court in Bapanaiah v. State8, and in Krishnamurthi, In re9, equated ‘purported’ with ‘intended’ and ‘pretended discharge of duty’ with ‘purported discharge’. We must point out that the word ‘intended’ is used with reference to the act done and the expression ‘purported discharge of duty’ is used with reference to the latter part of the section, not with reference to the act done or intended to be done occurring in the first part, which bears only on the act complained of. There is absolutely no scope for equating ‘discharge’ or ‘puported discharge of the duties’ with act done or intended to be done. A reference to the observations of Chandra Reddy, J., in the cases decided by him would clearly show that no such equation was made. In that case the expression was used with reference to the discharge of his duties. We may also make it clear that the section applies both to ‘discharge’ as well as ‘purported discharge’. In the first of the cases decided by Chandra Reddy, J., an Inspector of Police who was investigating into a series of cases of house-breaking and theft questioned P.W. 1 regarding one of such occurrences. When P.W. 1 denied knowledge of it, he directed his subordinate officials to continue to investigate. P.W. 1 was taken to a comer and handcuffed and he was chained to the iron bar of the door. It would appear that this Inspector of Police when he went to the spot, finding the plight of P.W. 1, abused the Constables and directed them to release him. This direction of the Inspector was not carried out. P.W. 1, therefore, filed a complaint for offences under sections 348, 330, Indian Penal Code. The learned, Judge after disposing of the question whether a preliminary objection could be raised as regards the maintainability of the complaint, while dealing with the question of the bar of limitation, observed as follows: “In this case it cannot be disputed that the alleged offence was committed by the petitioner in the course of his official duty as Inspector of Police i.e., while he was investigating into several crimes that were committed in the town of Srikakulam. There can be little doubt that the complaint falls within the purview of section 53.” He held that the complaint was barred under section 53 of the Act. On the merits the learned Judge held that the accused Inspector of Police could not be held to be guilty of the offences. In the result he dismissed the revision petition brought by the complainant. In the second of the cases, viz., Bapaniah v. State1, the complaint filed against the police official was for offences under sections 343, 348 and 330, Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that with a view to extort information and confessions the officials caused hurt to P.W. 1 In the circumstances of the case the learned Judge held that the case was covered by section 53 of the Act. He observed that any action against a police officer for things done by him either in the discharge of his duties or purporting to discharge them should be filed within a particular time. The words “purported to discharge them” could not be regarded as amounting to equating ‘purported’ with ‘intended’ or ‘pretended discharge of duty’ with ‘purported discharge of duty’ as thought by Basi Reddy, J. All that was said by the learned Judge Chandra Reddy, was that the acts were done in the discharge of or in the purported discharge of the duties as a Police Officer. Section 53 would cover it. The question was elaborately dealt with by the learned Judge in Krishnamurti, In re2. In this case a Police Constable attached to a police out-station was on leave on a particular day and in the course of that day a person reported to him that his bull was missing and a certain person was suspected of theft. The suspect and another person went to the house of another person who was P.W. 1 in the case and the suspect pointed out P.W. 1 as the person to whom the stolen bull was handed over. The Police Constable on the pretext of taking him to the Sub-Inspector of Police took him to a ‘marava’ and gave him a beating asking him to confess the guilt. The person who was beaten with fear of further beating told that his sister P.W. 5 in that case knew everything about the bull. The Police Constable on the pretext of taking him to the Sub-Inspector of Police took him to a ‘marava’ and gave him a beating asking him to confess the guilt. The person who was beaten with fear of further beating told that his sister P.W. 5 in that case knew everything about the bull. P.W. 1 was belaboured and handcuffed whereupon he gave the names of other persons as having something to do with it (the theft). P.W. 1 it would appear fell at the feet of the Deputy Superintendent of Police who happened to be there and sought his protection. A charge-sheet was filed under section 330, Indian Penal Code, the accused were found guilty and the Police Constable was sentenced to one year’s R.I. In the revision that was carried to the High Court, a point was raised that the prosecution was barred by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Act. Dealing with this aspect of the case, the learned Judge stated that if a Police official were proceeded against while acting or purporting to act under the provisions of any other enactment, even then he will be entitled to the protection of section 53. He elaborated and clarified the position by observing that when a crime is committed in the discharge of an official duty or anything done in the execution of his office, this section would come into play. He further observed that it could not be pretended that in that case the Police Constable purported or intended to act within the sphere of his official duty when he tortured P.W. 1. In the view that he took that the act complained of was outside the purview of his official duty-for he was not the Police Officer attached to the station on that day-he held that the objection on the ground of the bar of limitation could not be sustained. The last observation of the learned Judge would indicate that it would do if the officer pretended to exercise his official functions, the act must have been done in the regular exercise of the official duty. We would only say that the protection afforded by the statute would disappear if the act is done with an improper motive such as spite or vengeance. We would only say that the protection afforded by the statute would disappear if the act is done with an improper motive such as spite or vengeance. An act with such an improper motive cannot be regarded as having been done in intended execution of a duty, but only pretended execution thereof. In effect an act done mistakenly but in the discharge of the duty would be covered by section 53 of the Act. The other test that might be borne in mind in this connection is that if the act complained which Constitutes an offence, by its very nature could not have been done by the officer while acting or purporting to discharge his official duty and further that act could have no necessary connection with the duties he was performing, such an act would not be covered by section 53 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act prescribes the duties of a Police Officer of which detection and bringing offenders to justice is one. Section 44 prescribes the penalties for violation of duty and for abuse of powers and makes it an offence for the Police Officer to offer any unwarranted personal offence to any person in his custody, so that when section 53 refers to acts done or intended to be done, it envisages prosecutions for abuse of his power among others in detecting and bringing offenders to justice and for offering any unwarranted personal offences to any person in his custody. Similarly, it also refers to any abuse of power conferred under any law. Elections 21 and 44. lend support to the view that the prosecutions with respect to acts lone or intended to be done which constitute offences must relate to the discharge of duties under powers conferred on the Police Officers. We would, therefore, answer the first question referred to us by saying that the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of the Act would be available to an accused officer only when the act complained of has been committed in the discharge of his official duties. We have already laid down that the question as to whether a particular act would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties would have to be determined on the facts and particular circumstances of the case. It is unnecessary for us to answer the second question. We have already laid down that the question as to whether a particular act would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties would have to be determined on the facts and particular circumstances of the case. It is unnecessary for us to answer the second question. This will be decided by a Single Judge. Reference answered accordingly. [Following the Opinion of the Full Bench, these appeals coming on for final hearing before Anantanarayana Ayyar, J., the Court delivered the following] Judgment.-In S.C. No. 23 of 1958, the Sessions Judge of Anantapur, tried four accused on various charges. He acquitted A-4 of the charges framed against him. He convicted A-1 to A-3 on various charges and sentenced them as shown below: Charge Finding Sentence 1. A-1 under section 343, I.P.C. Guilty under section 342 1 year R.I. 2. A-1 to A-4 under section 331, I.P.C. A-1 to A-3 guilty Each 5 years R.I. 3. A-1 to A-4 under section 348, I.P.C. A-1 to A-3 guilty Each 2 years R.I. 4. A-2 under section 302, I.P.C. Acquitted ... 5. A-1 to A-4 under section 302 read with section 34, I.P.C. A-1 to A-4 acquitted ... 6. A-3 and A-4 under section 201, I.P.C. A-3 guilty under section 201 read with section 109, I.P.C.; A-4 not guilty A-3 sentenced to three years, A-4 acquitted. 7. A-1 and A-2 under section 201 read with section 109, I.P.C. Guilty under section 201 read with section 109, I.P.C. Each three years R.I. The learned Additional Sessions Judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently. A-1, A-2 and A-3 have filed C.A. No. 551 of 1958 against their convictions and sentences. The Public Prosecutor has filed C.A. No. 74 of 1959 against the acquittal of A-4. Both the appeals were heard together by common consent and they are disposed of by this common judgment. The prosecution case is to the following effect: A-1 was the Sub-Inspector of Police, Vempalli. A-2 was a Head Constable and A-3 was a Constable of the same station. A-4 was the complainant in a case of theft. In the course of investigation of that theft, A-1 along with A-2 and A-3 kept one Arige Ramanna (hereafter referred to as the deceased) in wrongful confinement from 7th January, 1957 to 9th January, 1957, by keeping him in police custody. They also beat the deceased and extorted information from him. A-4 was the complainant in a case of theft. In the course of investigation of that theft, A-1 along with A-2 and A-3 kept one Arige Ramanna (hereafter referred to as the deceased) in wrongful confinement from 7th January, 1957 to 9th January, 1957, by keeping him in police custody. They also beat the deceased and extorted information from him. They are also guilty of murder, because they caused fatal injuries as a result of which the deceased died. After the deceased was beaten and when he was in a very bad condition, being almost in a state of collapse, the accused (A-3) and (A-4) put him in a jutka and carried him to Sugali Thanda near Vittalarayacheruvu and left him outside the Thanda and thus committed an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code. In this, they were abetted by A-1 and A-2. The prosecution examined 32 witnesses. None of them was declared hostile. The prosecution story, as made out by the evidence of these witnesses, is briefly as follows: On a complaint given by A-4 about house-breaking and theft in his house, the Vempalli Police registered a Crime No. 45 of 1952 under sections 457 and 380, Indian Penal Code and filed a charge-sheet in C.C. No. 1083 of 1952 against four accused. Three of them were available and were convicted. The fourth accused in that case viz., Patra Obanna was absconding and, therfore, the case as against him was numbered as a long pending case and entered in the register relating to such case. The Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Pulivendla (P.W. 26) wrote to the police to apprehend the accused or withdraw the case. Thereupon the Sub-Inspector of Police (A-1) took action and arrested Patra Obanna. The latter said that he had given one of the items concerned in the case, viz., gold gajjelu to a man in Kadiri Taluk and offered to show that man. Accordingly, A-1 took Patra Obanna with him. He also took A-2, A-3 and A-4 the complainant to assist him in his investigation. The party reached Kadiri on 6th January, 1957, by bus and took up their sojourn in the Kadiri Police Station. P.W. 14 is the Sub-Inspector of Kadiri Police Station. He deputed one Head Constable (P.W. 12) at the request of A-1 to assist him (A-1) in the investigation. A-1 to A-4 took P.W. 12 with them. The party reached Kadiri on 6th January, 1957, by bus and took up their sojourn in the Kadiri Police Station. P.W. 14 is the Sub-Inspector of Kadiri Police Station. He deputed one Head Constable (P.W. 12) at the request of A-1 to assist him (A-1) in the investigation. A-1 to A-4 took P.W. 12 with them. In the night of 6th January, 1957, Patra Obanna took them to the deceased in the village of Dasaravandlapalli which was within the limits of Gandlapenta Police Station. Patra Obanna showed the deceased as the man to whom he had given the jewel. When questioned by the Police, the deceased completely denied having received the gajjelu. Then A-1 took the deceased with him to Kadiri Police Station and questioned him. The deceased gave information that he had sold the gajjelu to P.W. 1, Nallasani Appala alias Appodu of Nallasanivaripalli. Accordingly, Patra Obanna took A-1 to A-4 as well as P.W. 12 to P.W. 1 in the morning of 7th January, 1957. A-1 questioned P.W. 1 about the information which the deceased had given regarding the gajjelu. P.W. 1 denied having purchased any property from the deceased. Then the Sub-Inspector (A-1) did not believe that assertion and searched the house and seized a set of gold gajjelu which was found inside a pot. P.W. 1 emphatically asserted that he had not received any property from the deceased. The latter had stated that he had given the gold gajjelu to P.W. 1 in the presence of one Gorantla Fakruddin of Katarapalli. Therefore A-1 wanted to examine Fakruddin (P.W. 11) and thereby find out whether deceased was speaking the truth or P.W. 1 was speaking the truth. From there he Sub-Inspector also took with him P.W. 1 along with the other accused, Patra Obanna and P.W. 12 to Kadiri. A-1 proceeded from Kadiri to Madanapalli with P.W. 1 and the deceased to trace Gorantla Fakruddin and question him. A-1 left A-2, A-3, A-4 and Patra Obanna at Kadiri Police Station. (The version of the accused is that A-2 and A-3 and Patra Obanna also went to Madanapalli with A-1, etc.). A-1 managed to trace P.W. 11 on 8th January, 1957, in the afternoon. A-1 questioned P.W. 11 in the presence of P.W. 1 and the deceased. P.W. 11 said on oath that he knew nothing about the sale of any gajjelu by the deceased to P.W. 1. A-1 managed to trace P.W. 11 on 8th January, 1957, in the afternoon. A-1 questioned P.W. 11 in the presence of P.W. 1 and the deceased. P.W. 11 said on oath that he knew nothing about the sale of any gajjelu by the deceased to P.W. 1. This suggested to A-1 that the deceased was not speaking the truth and that P.W. 1 was uttering the truth. So, A-1 took P.W. 1 and the deceased to Kadiri by a lorry and reached Kadiri in the early hours of 9th January, 1957. A-2 to A-4 and Patra Obanna were already there. The accused felt that the deceased had not spoken the truth originally and that the truth had to be gathered from him. So, they proceeded to extort information from him regarding the gajjelu belonging to A-4. They used for this purpose the room of the Sub-Inspector, Kadiri Police Station. A-2, A-3 and A-4 beat the deceased with hands, etc., abused him but the deceased did not give any information. Then A-1 suggested that it was not the proper way and that the hands of the deceased should be tied. A-3 pushed P.W. 1 out of the room (which was the Sub-Inspector’s room) and closed the door. P.W. 1 did not go away but stayed outside and peeped into the room through the window. He wanted to know what was going on. He was able to do so because the window was not closed. A-3 asked the deceased to hold out his hands and tied them heedless of the protests of the deceased. A-2 caught hold of the deceased by tuft of hair and pulled him up and down. A-4 lifted up the hands of the deceased and A-3 tied those hands by police patties (used by the police to tie on their legs). A-3 pushed back the tied hands so as to go behind the head. Then A-4 thrust a stick so as to be between the arms and the neck, i.e., the neck was to the one side of the stick and the arms were to the other side of the stick. It was a lathi. A-3 and A-4 pressed that stick. The deceased fell down on his face. A-2 abused the fallen deceased and hit him with a stick (police lathi) on the back of the head. On being hit, the deceased cried ‘I am killed’. It was a lathi. A-3 and A-4 pressed that stick. The deceased fell down on his face. A-2 abused the fallen deceased and hit him with a stick (police lathi) on the back of the head. On being hit, the deceased cried ‘I am killed’. He also admitted that he gave the property to Tai people at Kadiri. Thus, the operation had been successful and required information had been extorted from the deceased. The after-effects were very unpleasant to the deceased and embarrassing to the accused. A-1 got the stick removed and the hands of the deceased untied. But the deceased did not get up. A-3 and A-4 lifted him by the arms and put him so that his body was leaning against the wall and the legs were outstretched. The deceased again fell down on his face and was mumbling. ‘They have killed me. I will die’. Meanwhile, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kadiri, P.W. 14, held a parade in the parade ground next to the room which was within the sight of the Sub-Inspector’s room in which the occurrence took place. The Sub-Inspector, P.W. 14, P.W.12 and P.W. 13 as well as the Constable (P.W. 6) took part in the parade which went on from about 6 a.m. to 7-30 a.m. After the deceased had been beaten as mentioned above, the accused carried the deceased from the Sub-Inspector’s room into the station writer’s room through the connecting doorway. There, they put the deceased so as to be reclining against the wall. A-3 went and brought some coffee and ‘iddli’ and tried to persuade the deceased to take that refreshment. The deceased sipped some coffee and said that he could not take any more. P.Ws. 12, 13 and 15 saw the deceased in the condition referred to above. The station writer (P.W. 13) found A-1 standing there and the Head Constable, Vempalli (A-2) feeling the pulse of the deceased. P.W. 13 asked A-1 to take away the deceased. A-1 asked A-2 to get a ‘jatka’. Two policemen took the jatka of P.W. 17 to a place near the Police Station. A-2 to A-4 and Patra Obanna carried the deceased to the jatka. A-3 and A-4 put him into the jatka and went away westwards. A-3 and A-4 asked P.W. 17 to stop when they reached a place near Sugali Thanda near Vittalarayacheruvu. Two policemen took the jatka of P.W. 17 to a place near the Police Station. A-2 to A-4 and Patra Obanna carried the deceased to the jatka. A-3 and A-4 put him into the jatka and went away westwards. A-3 and A-4 asked P.W. 17 to stop when they reached a place near Sugali Thanda near Vittalarayacheruvu. There they took out the deceased from the jatka and laid him on the ground. At that time, the face of the deceased was covered with a cloth. Therefore, P.W. 17, could not see the body, and could not know whether the body was alive or dead. A-3 and A-4 came back and sat in the jatka and went back in it to Kadiri. A-1 took the signature of P.W. 1 on a paper on which something was written and returned the gajjelu to P.W. 1. P.W. 1 and Patra Obanna carried the beddings and other articles of A-1 and A-2 and followed them up to the bus stand and put them into the bus. A-1, A-2 and Patra Obanna sat in the bus. P.W. 1 went away. A-3 and A-4 joined A-1, A-2 and Patra Obanna in the bus. A ryot of Kotapalli, P.W. 18, was returning from Kadiri to his village and saw two Sugali boys weeping. He asked them as to what was the matter. Then, they (Sugali boys) told him that a corpse was brought in a jatka and left there. Those boys showed the corpse to P.W. 18. He found that it was the corpse of Arige Ramanna (deceased), who was known to him. On reaching his village, he told the deceased’s brother (P.W. 30) at about 3 or 4 p.m. The latter went to Udmulagutta Thanda, saw the corpse of the deceased and went and informed the village munsif, Gandlapenta, (P.W. 28). On P.W. 28 informing him that it was not in his jurisdiction and on being directed to go to the village munsif, Kadiri, P.W. 30 went with two boys to Kadiri and informed the village munsif, Kadiri, (P.W. 31). The latter went and saw the corpse of the deceased, kept two ‘vettis’ to watch it and recorded the statement, Exhibit P-2 from P.W. 30. He (P.W. 31) sent Exhibit P-2 to the police and a copy of it to the Magistrate. The latter went and saw the corpse of the deceased, kept two ‘vettis’ to watch it and recorded the statement, Exhibit P-2 from P.W. 30. He (P.W. 31) sent Exhibit P-2 to the police and a copy of it to the Magistrate. The Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W. 14) registered the crime as Crime No. 5 of 1957. As there were charges against the police, P.W. 14, sent a phone message to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The statement, Exhibit P-2 disclosed that, in the night of 6th January, 1957, the police had come to Dasarivandlapalli village and taken away the deceased stating that the latter had sold some stolen gold and thereby committed an offence. P.W. 19, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate went to the scene of offence. The Taluk Magistrate, Kadiri, (P.W. 20) held inquest over the corpse from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. on 10th January, 1957. Exhibit P-13 is the inquest-report. P.W. 19 investigated the case from 10th January, 1957. In the course of his investigation he seized some relevant records of Vempalli Police Station. He sent a report to Government on 29th January, 1957. On instructions from the Inspector-General of Police, the C.I.D. Inspector (P.W. 32) took up the investigation. After inquest, the corpse of the deceased was sent to Kadiri hospital. The Woman Assistant Surgeon (P.W. 24) held post-mortem from 8-20 a.m. on 11th January. 1957. She found on the body injuries described in the post-mortem certificate Exhibit P-29, as follows: * * * * * * The deceased appeared to have died of shock due to congestion of the brain and haemorrhage, caused by injury No. 5 on the head which was necessarily fatal. All the injuries could have been caused by a blunt weapon. After completing investigation, P.W. 32 filed a final charge-sheet. When examined, all the accused denied having committed the offences. They did not examine any defence witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge formulated three questions for consideration in paragraph 4 of his judgment. He held that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was unacceptable as against A-4 and acquitted him of all the charges. He found that the offence of murder was not made out, but that certain other offences were proved. He accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused. He held that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was unacceptable as against A-4 and acquitted him of all the charges. He found that the offence of murder was not made out, but that certain other offences were proved. He accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused. The main contentions urged on behalf of the appellants accused are as follows: (1) That the prosecution is barred by limitation under section 53 of the Madras District Police Act. (2) That the evidence of the prosecution witnesses implicating the accused is in the nature of evidence of accomplices and does not have independent corroboration of reliable witnesses which is required by law to render their evidence acceptable and fit to be acted upon. (3) That the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is unreliable and does not prove the case against the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. I am dealing with these contentions below: Contention No. 1.-This was raised as a preliminary objection when these appeals came up for hearing before my learned brother Basi Reddy, J. The learned Judge felt that he was clearly of opinion that the accused could not claim the benefit of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Central Act XXIV of 1859) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and plead the bar of limitation. But, all the same, in view of the decisions of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in T.G. Nichodemus v. State1, and in Bapanaiah and others v. The State2, Basi Reddy, J., framed the following question for determination by a Bench of two Judges: "In the circumstances of this case, is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859?" When this question came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Manohar Pershad and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ., the learned Judges, in addition to considering the two decisions of Chandra Reddy, J., in T.H. Mchodemus v. State1, and Bapanaiah and others v. The State2, also considered the decision of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in In re Krishnamurti3, and of Krishna Rao, J., in C.P. Singh v. Hanumantha Rao4, which made a reference to an earlier decision in Lakshmanaswami v. Hussain Saheb5. The learned Judges felt that ‘as this is an important matter, it is better if this is decided by a Full Bench’. The learned Judges felt that ‘as this is an important matter, it is better if this is decided by a Full Bench’. The following two questions were referred to a Full Bench: "(1) In what circumstances the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of the Madras District Police Act would be available to an accused officer? (2) In the circumstances of this case, is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859?" It may be observed here that question No. 2 above is identical with the point referred by my learned brother, Basi Reddy, J. The Full Bench accordingly dealt with the two points referred to them and decided as follows: ".....We would, therefore, answer the first question referred to us by saying that the bar of limitation prescribed by section 53 of the Act would be available to an accused officer only when the act complained of has been committed in the discharge of his official duties. We have already laid down that the question as to whether a particular act would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one’s duties would have to be determined on the facts and particular circumstances of the case. It is unnecessary for us to answer the second question. This will be decided by a Single Judge." Thus, the question which had been framed by my learned brother, Basi Reddy, J., and which was substantially the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellants, has to be answered with reference to the valuable guidance given by the answer of the Full Bench to question No. 1 and by that whole judgment. The Judgment of the Full Bench contains the following observations: "(1) The protection afforded to the officer is limited to this extent that where in the discharge of his duties the Police Officer does anything which would amount to an offence, any action intended to be taken against him for such an offence would have to be commenced within three months. The policy of the Act and the object of this provision appears to be to ensure that the Police Officers are not unnecessarily harassed by complaints and prosecutions being filed long after the alleged commission of the offence when it might not be possible to know under what circumstances the alleged act was done. (2) We may also make it clear that the section applies both to ‘discharge’ as well as ‘purported discharge’. (3) In effect, an act done mistakenly but in the discharge of the duty would be covered by section. 53. of the Act." The Full Bench approves and affirms the decisions of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in T.G. Nichodemus v. State1, and in Bapanaiah and others v. The State2: The Full Bench has observed as follows: "......The learned Judge while dealing with the question of the bar of limitation, observed as follows: ‘In this case it cannot be disputed that the alleged offence was committed by the petitioner in the course of his official duty as Inspector of Police, i.e., while he was investigating into several crimes that were committed in the town of Srikakulam. There can be little doubt that the complaint falls within the purview of section 53’. He held that the complaint was barred under section 53 of the Act.......In the second of the cases, viz., Bapanaiah v. State2, the complaint filed against the police official was for offences under sections 343, 348 and 330, Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that with a view to extort information and confessions the officials caused hurt to P.W. 1. In the circumstances of the case the learned Judge held that the case was covered by section 53 of the Act. He observed that any action against a Police Officer for things done by him either in the discharge of his duties or purporting to discharge them should be filed within a particular time." In the latter decision viz., Bapanaiah and others v. The State2, Chandra Reddy, J., observed as follows: ".... He observed that any action against a Police Officer for things done by him either in the discharge of his duties or purporting to discharge them should be filed within a particular time." In the latter decision viz., Bapanaiah and others v. The State2, Chandra Reddy, J., observed as follows: ".... At the relevant time all the accused were Police Officers and it cannot be seriously disputed that the alleged offence was committed by these officers, in the course of their official duty as Police Officers namely, while investigating into cases of house-breaking and theft.....I have no doubt that this case is governed by section 53 of the Madras District Police Act......." In the above two decisions, the Police Officers were found to have committed the acts (offences) when they were investigating into cases. In the present case, the alleged offences were committed on the 9th January, 1957; the preliminary charge-sheet was filed on the 22nd October, 1957 and the final charge-sheet on the 30th November, 1957 There is no doubt or dispute about the fact that A-1, A-2 and A-3 were investigating the cases of house-breaking and theft officially at the time they are alleged to have committed the offences which formed the subject-matter of the charges. On relevant facts, this case is substantially similar to the cases in T.G. Nichodemus v. State1, and Bapanaiah and others v. The State2. Therefore, A-1, A-2 and A-3 must be held to have been acting and to have committed the acts complained of, in the discharge of their official duties. Consequently, contention No. 1 is acceptable and correct. The question which was framed by my learned brother, Basi Reddy, J., has to be and is answered as follows: In the circumstances of this case, the prosecution of the appellants is barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act. On this finding alone, A-1, A-2 and A-3 are entitled to an acquittal. All the same, as there have been elaborate arguments on the other two contentions on facts, I am considering them also briefly below. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence of each of the witnesses,) In view of my finding on contention No. 1 as the prosecution was barred by section 53 of the Act, the conviction of A-1, A-2, A-3 and the concerned sentences are untenable. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence of each of the witnesses,) In view of my finding on contention No. 1 as the prosecution was barred by section 53 of the Act, the conviction of A-1, A-2, A-3 and the concerned sentences are untenable. Further on merits also (regarding contention No. 3) there appears to be good room to doubt the guilt of A-1, A-2 and A-3 on all the charges. I therefore set aside the convictions and sentences, allow C.A. No. 551 of 1958 and acquit A-1 and A-2 and A-3 of the various charges framed against them. A-1 and A-2 are said to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. A-3 is said to be in. jail. He is ordered to be released forthwith. (His Lordship then dismissed C.A. No. 74 of 1959 on the evidence.) A.S.R. ----- Appeal allowed; convitions set aside; State appeal dismissed.