Hedge, J.: The appellant, who was the 1st accused in Sessions Case No. 100 of 1958 in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bijapur, was convicted under section 218, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The correctness of the conviction as well as the sentence is challenged in this appeal. The appellant, in about February 1954, was serving as a Head Constable at Kalkeri Outpost which was attached to Hippargi Police Station. The charge against the appellant is that he deliberately suppressed a panchanama as well as a report prepared by him in connection with the seizure of certain ganja from one Nabisab Kembavi on 23rd February, 1954, with a view to screen the offender from lawful punishment, and in its place substituted a new panchanama and a new report (Exhibits 6 and 7 respectively) containing false recitals and thus committed an offence under section 218, Indian Penal Code. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the appellant and some of his subordinates laid in wait on 23rd February, 1954, at a place called Hattihola, about two furlongs from Budihal to catch ganja smugglers from the former State of Hyderabad to Kalkeri; at about 2 or 3 p.m. on that day, they saw one Nabisab Kembhavi coming from Bammanahalli side; on suspicion they caught hold of him; he had a bundle which on search was found to contain 15 chits of ganja; at the instance of the appellant a panchanama was prepared showing the seizure of 9 chits; the remaining 6 chits were pocketted by the appellant; the panchanama in question was written by P.W. 2 (Meenappa) and attested by one Saibanna Naikalla (P.W. 3) and the Police Patil of Hallappa; signatures of these persons were also taken to some blank papers; thereafter the appellant prepared a report; the documents prepared were entered in the Tappal Book of Police Patil; the seized ganja, the panchanama as well as the report of the appellant along with the arrested accused Nabisab were made over to the Walikar to be taken to the Police Station at Hippargi; the appellant thereafter proceeded further for detecting other cases; and on that night he camped at a Hanuman Temple in Gundakanal. It is further alleged that at about 2a.m. that night, the acquitted accused 3 and 4 (Kashim Husseinsab and Badesab Keshimsab respectively) came and woke up the appellant and requested him to get Nabisab released; thereafter A-3 was sent to bring the panchas who signed the panchanama prepared on the previous day; the acquitted A-2 (Hussein Ismail) was sent to Kalkeri to bring back the papers and the accused. It is said that A-3 and A-4 brought Saibanna Naikalla (P.W. 3) the writer of the panchanama prepared on 23rd February, 1954 but the other attestors were not available. On 24th February, 1954 a new panchanama was prepared in which it was recited that some one unknown, when apprehended, threw 9 chits of ganja and ran away. This new panchanama was in due course sent to the Hippargi Police Station. That panchanama was sent back to the appellant for further investigation. Meanwhile on the 24th itself Ningangouda (Police Patil of Kalkeri) sent up a petition to the District Superintendent of Police, Bijapur, setting forth the true facts and alleging that the appellant on receipt of a bribe of Rs. 100 had faked up a new panchanama after having destroyed the earlier panchanama and had released the culprit Nabisab. That petition was forwarded to the Police Sub-Inspector at Hippargi for enquiry. After enquiry a charge-sheet was laid against the four accused, out of whom three were acquitted. The main witnesses who speak in support of the prosecution case are P.W. 1 (Shankarappa), P.W. 2 (Meenappa), and P.W. 3 (Saibanna). In addition one Yellappa a constable at Kalkeri Outpost in about February 1954 had been examined in the committal Court but before the trial of the case commenced ho died. His deposition in the committal Court was marked as Exhibit 57. Both P.W. 1 and Yellappa claim to have accompanied the appellant when he went to Budihal for tracing ganja smugglers. Both of them fully support the prosecution case. Yellappa has been cross-examined in the committal Court. It was not suggested to him that there was any enmity between him and the appellant. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve his testimony. The evidence of Yellappa is fully supported by P.W. 1, the other constable. In spite of the lengthy cross-examination of this witness, nothing useful was elicited from him barring a few minor omissions and contradictions. It was not suggested to him that there was any enmity between him and the appellant. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve his testimony. The evidence of Yellappa is fully supported by P.W. 1, the other constable. In spite of the lengthy cross-examination of this witness, nothing useful was elicited from him barring a few minor omissions and contradictions. Some suggestions of enmity with the appellant were made. But they were denied. The facts proved are insufficient to hold that there was any enmity between P.W. 1 and the appellant. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 2 who claims to have written the first panchanama. He says that at the time when he wrote the first panchanama, Nabisab was at the spot. According to him Exhibit 6 is not the panchanama written on that date and the recitals in Exhibit 6 are false. This witness had no motive to depose falsely against the appellant. P.W. 3 corroborates the evidence of Yellappa as well as P.Ws. 1 and 2. He claims to have attested the first panchanama. He further says that at about 4 a.m. on the next day, acquitted accused No. 3 came to his house and called him; thereafter both of them went to the house of P.W. 2; but P.W. 2 was not in his house; therefore A-3 and himself went to Gundakanal, where they met the appellant at the Hanuman Temple. He further says that a new panchanama was prepared on that day with false recitals and his signature obtained thereto. According to him, the signature of another person passing in front of the Hanuman Temple was also obtained by the appellant. Barring the fact that he had attested the panchanama knowing it to contain false recitals, no other material was elicited from him to discredit his testimony. It is not very difficult for a police officer to obtain attestations to panchanamas whether they contain true recitals or not. We cannot ignore the realities of life. P.W. 3 is not proved to have had any animosity towards any one of the accused before the Court below. He is a landlord paying a land revenue of Rs. 24 per year. The evidence of Yellappa as well as that of P.Ws. 1 to 3 had commended itself to the trial Court which had the benefit of seeing those witnesses in the box. He is a landlord paying a land revenue of Rs. 24 per year. The evidence of Yellappa as well as that of P.Ws. 1 to 3 had commended itself to the trial Court which had the benefit of seeing those witnesses in the box. The view of the trial Court as regards the veracity of the witnesses examined is entitled to weight. The evidence of these witnesses is fully supported by P.W. 6 (Ningappa) the Walikar of Budihal. He speaks about the taking of the document and Nadisab on 23rd February, 1954, to Kalkeri. He further speaks how A-3 and A-4 met him at a tea shop at Kalkeri and asked him not to take Nabisab to Hippargi Police Station till he heard from them again. According to him on the next day A-2 came and took charge of the accused Nabisab as well as the papers from him and sent him back to the village. His evidence appears to be quite convincing. The evidence of this witness is further supported by the evidence of P.W. 8 (Nagappa) and P.W. 9 (Narasappa). It gains further strength from the evidence of P.W. 10 (Chandappa). We are unable to agree with the learned trial Judge that P.W. 1 and the deceased Yellappa were in any sense accomplices. They did not co-operate with the appellant either in the commission of the offence with which he was charged or in the preparation of the records. The fact that they had the knowledge that false records had been prepared and that they did not inform the higher authorities at the earliest possible stage, cannot be in the circumstances of this case considered as throwing suspicion on the conduct of these witnesses. Both Yellappa and P.W. 1 were the subordinates of the appellant. Hence one could understand their delicacy. Some remote enmity with the appellant was suggested to P.W. 1. But we do not think that there is any substance in it. So far as the deceased Yellappa is concerned, not even that criticism is available. Even if we agree with the Court below that P.Ws. 1 to 3 and the deceased Yellappa should be considered as accomplices, the other evidence to which we have made reference, lends sufficient corroboration to the testimony of these witnesses. So far as the deceased Yellappa is concerned, not even that criticism is available. Even if we agree with the Court below that P.Ws. 1 to 3 and the deceased Yellappa should be considered as accomplices, the other evidence to which we have made reference, lends sufficient corroboration to the testimony of these witnesses. We are told that under the Rules, Walikar could not have been entrusted with the task of taking the arrested accused to the Police Station. But from the fact that the appellant contravened the Rules, no inference can be drawn that in fact Nabisab was not entrusted to the charge of P.W. 6. The evidence in this case carries conviction to our mind that the charge levelled against the appellant is satisfactorily established. The validity of the conviction of the appellant was next assailed on two legal grounds. Firstly it was urged that rule 542(1) of the Bombay Police Manual debars the prosecution of a Police Officer without the prior permission of the District Superintendent of Police. The said rule reads as follows: “(1) When the preliminary inquiry indicates a criminal offence, application for permission to prosecute should at once be made to the authority competent to dismiss, and permission should be promptly granted if that authority agrees that there is a prima facie case for a prosecution and does not consider that there exist adequate reasons, which must always be recorded, for not instituting a prosesecution. This procedure is necessary even where the default constitutes a cognizable offence and a prima facie case has been made out as a result of an investigation under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code. The sanction contemplated by this rule is of an administrative nature, intended to protect subordinate officers from unwarranted prosecutions arising out of the performance of their official duties and is analogous to the judicial sanction required by section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, in the case of a certain class of officers.” This rule does not appear to have any statutory force. It does not deal with the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of an offence under section 218, Indian Penal Code. It is merely an administrative instruction. Therefore the noncompliance of that rule does not vitiate the trial in any manner. It does not deal with the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of an offence under section 218, Indian Penal Code. It is merely an administrative instruction. Therefore the noncompliance of that rule does not vitiate the trial in any manner. The next and the more formidable objection taken is that the complaint in question is barred by section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, which provision reads: “In any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a Magistrate, Police Officer or other persons or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or other person, by any act done under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid, or where in it shall appear to the Court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained, or shall be dismissed, if instituted, more than six months after the date of the act complained of.” (Italics are ours.) Admittedly the present case was launched more than xix months after the occurrence. Hence the question for consideration is whether the same is hit by section 161(1). To answer the same, we have to go into the question whether the act complained of was done by the appellant under “colour of office”. But before doing so we must remind ourselves that ordinarily there is no limitation for taking cognisance of an offence. The exception will have to be clearly established. The expression “an act done under colour of any such duty or authority” is somewhat ambiguous. According to Wharton’s Law Lexicon “Colour of office” is explained thus: “When an act is unjustly done by the countenance of an office, being grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a shadow and colour.” The same expression is explained in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary as follows: “‘Colour of office’ is always taken in the worst part,and signifies an act evilly done by the countenance of an office, and is bears dissembling face of the right of the office, whereas the office is but a veil to the falsehood, and the thing is grounded upon vice, and the office is the shadow to it.” Before an act can be said to have been done under “Colour of office” it must be done “by virtue of office”. To put it differently it must be an official act. All acts done by officers cannot be termed as “official acts”. The essence of the matter is that it must have some connection with the duty to be performed or to put it in the words of Stroud “it must bear a dissembling face of the right of the office.” Decisions rendered under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, have some bearing on the point under consideration. That provision gives protect on to certain classes of public servants in respect of offences alleged to have been committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties.” Dealing with that provision the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari1, observed that the offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty; there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. Their Lordships further observed that it does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as that question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits; what the Court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. The language employed in section 197. Criminal Procedure Code, somewhat differs from the language contained in section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. In the former case the essence of the matter is that offence should have been committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.” In the latter case it is sufficient if the act is done “under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid”. For an offence to come within the scope of section 161 (1) it is sufficient if the offender did the act “under colour of office” though not strictly in the discharge of his duty. But in both the cases the officer must put on the veil of the office. For an offence to come within the scope of section 161 (1) it is sufficient if the offender did the act “under colour of office” though not strictly in the discharge of his duty. But in both the cases the officer must put on the veil of the office. Though the expression “colour of office” may cover a wider field than covered by the expression “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” both relate to official acts. The scope of the expression “colour of office” came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Narayan Hari Tarkhande v. Teshwant Raoji Naik and Dattaraya.1. In that case a Sub-Inspector of Police while investigating a cognizable offence against two beards sent for the plaintiff and questioned him as to his connection with the beards. The plaintiff disclaimed all knowledge about the beards. Then it was alleged that defendant-1 the Sub-Inspector grew angry and abused the plaintiff and pulled him up by his moustache. It was further alleged that defendant-2 at the instance of defendant-1 beat the plaintiff. It was also alleged that the Sub-Inspector did not correctly record the statements given by the witnesses. The plaintiff disclaimed all knowledge about the beards. Then it was alleged that defendant-1 the Sub-Inspector grew angry and abused the plaintiff and pulled him up by his moustache. It was further alleged that defendant-2 at the instance of defendant-1 beat the plaintiff. It was also alleged that the Sub-Inspector did not correctly record the statements given by the witnesses. Dealing with the former allegation, the Full Bench held: “That both the defendants were acting in the discharge of the duty imposed and the authority conferred by section 51(1), clause (b), Bombay District Police Act, when they summoned the plaintiff and questioned him in regard to the alleged offence; but that the alleged assault or battery cannot be said to have been committed under colour or in excess of such duty or authority within section 80(1) and that, the defendants are not entitled to notice either under section 80(4), Bombay District Police Act or Civil Procedure Code, section 80.” But coming to the latter grievance i.e., preparation of false records, the Court observed: “Where an investigating police officer reduces a statement of a witness to writing his act is on done under colour or in excess of a duty imposed or an authority conferred on him by section 51(1) (b),whether he acts bona fide or otherwise and even if he acts mala fide and in deliberate disregard of his proper duty or authority and deliberately takes down the statement of such witnesses incorrectly.” This decision clearly brings out the distinction between those acts that come “under colour of office” and those that do not come within the scope of that expression. The view expressed in Narayan Hari Tarkhande’s case1 was reiterated by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Amimiya Imammiya v. Emperor2. The scope of section 80(3) of the Bombay District Police Act, 1890, which for our purpose is in pari materia with section 161(1) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Abdullakhan v. Emperor3. The scope of section 80(3) of the Bombay District Police Act, 1890, which for our purpose is in pari materia with section 161(1) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Abdullakhan v. Emperor3. It was observed therein “that the object of the section is to protect Magistrates, Police Officers and others from stale prosecutions based on the fact that some duty imposed or authority conferred by a provision of the Bombay District Police Act or by some Rule or Order or direction lawfully made or given thereunder had been neglected or misused whether such neglect or misuse was bona fide or mala fide. The section provides that the offence or wrong must be under colour or in excess of a duty imposed or authority conferred by the Act and this by virtue of section 51 of the Act, includes duties imposed by other laws for the time being in force. This would not include acts which are obviously offences and in no manner reconcilable with the duties or functions of a Magistrate or Police Officer. Neither of the offences under sections 161 and 384, Indian Penal Code, come within the protection provided by section 80(3).” Applying the ratio of the above decisions, with which we are in respectful agreement, to the facts of the present case,the panchanama and the report prepared on 23rd February, 1954 though not true to facts may be said to have been prepared under “colour of office” but the panchanama and the report prepared on 24th February, 1954, cannot be said to have been covered by the veil of the office held by the appellant. That office had nothing to do in the preparation of those documents. They are clear fabrications and the fact that a Police Officer fabricated those documents is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of section 161 of the Bombay Police Act. On the 24th, the appellant had no duty to perform in regard to the crime detected on the 23rd. Hence it is not possible to hold that Exhibits 6 and 7 were acts done “under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid” as found in section 161 of the Bombay Police Act. In the circumstances of this case, the sentence imposed cannot be said to be excessive. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, the sentence imposed cannot be said to be excessive. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant shall surrender forthwith to his bail and serve the remaining portion of his sentence. S.V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.