Order.- Miss T. Pankajam filed a private complaint against one V.R. Venugopal charging the latter with having committed offence under section 417, Indian Penal Code, in the Court of the Sixth City Magistrate, Hyderabad. The learned Magistrate took the case on file under section 417, Indian Penal Code. The Advocate for the accused in the trial Court raised certain preliminary objection about jurisdiction and contended that the accused should be discharged straightaway. The learned trial Magistrate considered the preliminary objection and passed an order, dated 13th January, 1960, holding that her Court had jurisdiction to try the case and that there was no need to discharge the accused at that stage. The accused filed Crl.R.P. No. 53 of 1960 against that order in the Court of the Chief City Magistrate-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. The latter dismissed the revision petition, observing as follows: “It is only the High Court that can interfere with the orders passed regarding jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, the petitioner should approach the High Court to set aside the order of the lower Court if he is entitled to get it set aside.” Thereupon, the accused has filed this petition praying that the order of the two Courts be set aside and that the complaint be dismissed. The allegations in the complaint in brief are as follows: The accused was working as a Demonstrator in the Government Arts College, Engineering College, etc., at Anantapur, from 1949 to 1953. He was unmarried. He made friends with the complainant who was an unmarried young woman and a b.a., b.t. and was working as a School Assistant in the Government Girls’ School at Anantapur from 1950 to March, 1954. The accused promised to marry her and wanted her to have sexual relations with him. The complainant believed those promises and yielded to his request and began to live in unmarried intimacy with him. All the same, she was frequently reminding him about the promise of marriage and asking him to marry her. The accused was repeating his promises and reaffirming them but, at the same time, postponing the marriage on some pretext or other. This unmarried intimacy between the two unmarried people which started at Anantapur continued even after the accused went away on transfer from Anantapur to Madras in August, 1953 and even after the complainant was transferred from Anantapur to Kurnool in March, 1954. This unmarried intimacy between the two unmarried people which started at Anantapur continued even after the accused went away on transfer from Anantapur to Madras in August, 1953 and even after the complainant was transferred from Anantapur to Kurnool in March, 1954. In February, 1957, the accused joined as a Senior Research Scholar at Kodaikanal Observatory. Then also, the complainant importuned the accused to marry her but the accused asked for more time by representing that he had entered into a bond with the Government of India and that he would have to pay Rs. 3,000 to the Government if he married. The accused further induced the complainant to lend him various sums of money on various dates, amounting to over Rs. 3,000 (as stated in para. 3 of her complaint) by representing to her that he would surely marry her and repay the same after his course at Kodaikanal was finished. On 31st July, 1959, the complainant went to Kodaikanal and implored him to marry her. On this occasion, the accused made a final promise on 1st August, 1959 (at Kodaikanal) that he would go over to Hyderabad in about the second week of August, 1959, to marry the complainant at Hyderabad and asked her to incur the necessary expenditure and make all arrangements for the marriage, promising to repay the amount at Hyderabad, at the time of the marriage. Believing this representation, the complainant incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 200 purchasing provisions, clothes, etc., for making arrangements for the marriage at Hyderabad. The accused did not turn up as promised. On 29th August, 1959, the complaint sent her brother, T. Lakshmana Rao to Madras to implore the accused and bring the latter to Hyderabad for celebrating the marriage as promised. Lakshmana. Rao accordingly met the accused at Madras on 30th August, 1959 and implored the accused but found that the latter was very evasive and wanted to postpone the marriage on some pretext or other. So, Lakshmana Rao suspected the bona fides of the accused and issued a notice in writing, dated 1st September, 1959, from Hyderabad requesting the accused to marry the complainant and to avoid ruining her life. So, Lakshmana Rao suspected the bona fides of the accused and issued a notice in writing, dated 1st September, 1959, from Hyderabad requesting the accused to marry the complainant and to avoid ruining her life. In response, the accused wrote a letter, dated 3rd September, 1959; from Madras addressed to the complainant at Hyderabad (where she was staying with her brother Lakshmana Rao) mentioning that he intended to marry another girl and not the complainant. Shortly prior to the filing of the complaint (which was. on 30th September, 1959), the complainant came to know that the accused had married another girl called Jayalakshmi on or about 9th September, 1959. The relevant portion in the complaint regarding jurisdiction is as follows: "By his letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, addressed to Hyderabad and received by the complainant at Hyderabad on 4th September, 1959. the accused for the first time communicated to the complainant his intention to marry another girl of his choice, thus completing the act of cheating the complainant at..........Hyderabad to which place he communicated his letter. The accused thus deceived the complainant fraudulently and dishonestly inducing on 1st August, 1959, to spend money for marriage expenses at Hyderabad and to deliver moneys to him as well as to his father, mother and brother on former occasions, and also by fraudulently and dishonestly inducing the complainant to move with him as his wife and also to cohabit with him making her believe that they are husband and wife and that he would perform the formal ceremonial marriage later on, which acts the complainant would not have done if she were not so deceived and thus by his act caused damage and harm to the complainant in body, mind and reputation and property............" In the sworn statement, the complainant stated as follows: "..........Stating that he would marry me, he spoiled me and had cohabited with me all these nine years and ultimately married another girl and in August, for the first time, he made me to understand that he is giving a go-bye to the promise........" The learned Advocate for the accused has relied on the above passages in the complaint and the sworn statement. The arguments proceeded on the basis of the complaint and the sworn statement alone and on their effect, if they were assumed to be true. This judgment is accordingly passed on the same basis and assumption. The arguments proceeded on the basis of the complaint and the sworn statement alone and on their effect, if they were assumed to be true. This judgment is accordingly passed on the same basis and assumption. This does not affect the duty and necessity of the Court which tries the case to go into the question of the truth of the contents of the complaint and the sworn statement. The points urged before me are: (1) That the Court of the Sixth City Magistrate at Hyderabad did not have any jurisdiction to try the case. (2) That there was no prima facie case against the accused and he ought to have been discharged straightaway under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code. I am dealing with them below: Point 1.-The allegations in the complaint make out three items of cheating. For convenience, they are referred to hereafter as such items. They are as follows: (1) That the accused fraudulently promised to marry the complainant and thereby deceived her and induced her to cohabit with him. The complainant says that she would not have agreed to the cohabitation i.e., sexual relations but for his fraudulent and false representation that he would marry her. (2) That the accused, by similar false representation that he would marry her, made the complainant advance to him various sums of money. The complainant says that she would not have lent those sums of money but for his promising that he would surely marry her and repay the same after his course at Kodaikanal was finished. Whether he pays after his course at Kodaikanal was finished or not, the allegation that he induced her to advance the moneys (i.e., deliver property) by promising to surely marry her and if such promise and representation were false, dishonest and fraudulent, it is an allegation that he cheated her. (3) That on 1st August, 1959, the accused promised and represented to the complainant in person at Kodikanal that he would go over to Hyderabad in about the second week of August, 1959 and asked her to spend money and make all arrangements for the marriage and incur expenditure for the same. The promise and representation were intentionally false and fraudulent but because she believed the promise and representation, she was induced by the accused to act at Hyderabad on the basis of the promise and incur an expenditure of Rs. 200. The promise and representation were intentionally false and fraudulent but because she believed the promise and representation, she was induced by the accused to act at Hyderabad on the basis of the promise and incur an expenditure of Rs. 200. It is also alleged that the accused wrote a letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, finally from Madras and it reached the complainant at Hyderabad on 4th September, 1959 and that, in his letter, for the first time, the accused indicated to the complainant that he intended marrying another girl of his choice and thereby made the complainant understand that the accused was not going to marry the complainant. Section 415, Indian Penal Code, which defines the offence of cheating, runs as follows: "415. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’." The definition contains two parts. The first part requires fraudulent or dishonest inducement of the complainant by the accused to deliver any property, etc., Item 2 of cheating would come tinder the first part. The second part of the section embraces cases in which no transfer of property is necessarily occasioned by the deception and some possible cases in which such a transfer occurs. The inducement in the second part must be intentional. Items 1 and 3 of the offence complained of would come within the second part. But, in such a case, the inducing regarding items 1 and 3 must be by the promise to marry being intentionally false so as to deceive the complainant. The cheating regarding item 2 must have been by the promise to marry being dishonest or fraudulent. On the whole the allegations would make out offence of cheating if the promises of the accused to marry the complainant were false and he knew them to be false at the time when he induced the complainant to act. The cheating regarding item 2 must have been by the promise to marry being dishonest or fraudulent. On the whole the allegations would make out offence of cheating if the promises of the accused to marry the complainant were false and he knew them to be false at the time when he induced the complainant to act. For purposes of convenience, the intention necessary to make out cheating regarding the respective items 1 to 3 is hereafter referred to as ‘deceiving intention’. Illustration (g) to section 415 runs: “(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery. A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo plant and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.” This Illustration brings into relief the features which are relevant and important for the decision of this case. It is clear from Illustration (g) as well as the other Illustrations under section 415, Indian Penal Code, that, to make out a completed offence of cheating, the complainant who is the victim of false, fraudulent or intentionally deceptive representation must have committed the act which he is induced by the accused to do (by such inducement). If the act is not done by the complainant as a result of the inducement, the act of cheating would not be completed though in certain circumstances, an offence of attempting to commit cheating might have been committed. In other words, to make out a completed offence of cheating, it has to be proved that the victim actually acted upon the inducement which was made by the accused. In the present case, the accused is said to have induced the complainant to commit acts (advance moneys and agreeing to cohabit) by promising to marry her, at the time of obtaining various sums amounting to over Rs. 3,000 as loan and at the same time of inducing the complainant to cohabit and have illicit intimacy with him. In the present case, the accused is said to have induced the complainant to commit acts (advance moneys and agreeing to cohabit) by promising to marry her, at the time of obtaining various sums amounting to over Rs. 3,000 as loan and at the same time of inducing the complainant to cohabit and have illicit intimacy with him. If at the time when he made those promises the accused really did not intend to marry her or to keep up his promise or carry out his representation, then he would have committed cheating. On the other hand, if at the time when he made those promises, he really intended to marry her and subsequently changed his mind, gave up his original intention, refused and failed to marry the complainant, his action would have amounted only to a breach of contract. The question whether, at the time he made those promises, he really intended to marry the complainant is a question of fact which can be decided and has to be decided only after evidence is let in. It is not possible or proper for this Court to decide that question at this stage without any evidence and on the basis of arguments based on mere probabilities. The same is the position regarding the promise alleged to have been made by he accused at Kodaikanal on 1st August, 1959, to the complainant in person. Section 179, Criminal Procedure Code, runs as follows: “179. When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued.” Illustration (c) to section 179 reads: “A isput in fear of injury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and is thereby induced, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, to deliver property to the person who put him in fear. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y.” The offence of cheating like the offence ofextortion is committed by wrongful obtaining of consent. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y.” The offence of cheating like the offence ofextortion is committed by wrongful obtaining of consent. The essential difference between extortion and cheating is that, in extortion, the offender obtains consent by intimidation and, in cheating, the offender obtains consent by deception. Consequently, the above Illustration would apply to a case of cheating (first part of section 415, Indian Penal Code) if it is suitably worded thus: “(c) A is subjected to fraudulent or dishonest representation deceitfully within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and is thereby induced, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, to deliver property to the person who deceived him by fraudulent, dishonest and deceitful representation. The offence of cheating committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y.” The same Illustration can also be suitably modified in wording so as to apply to a case of cheating coming under the second part of section 415, Indian Penal Code. It will be seen from the above Illustration that Court X is the Court, within whose jurisdiction, the inducement, namely, the relevant act committed by the accused with the ‘deceiving intention’ required in section 415, Indian Penal Code, took place. Court Y is the Court within whose jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. For the purpose of this Illustration, the induced act of the victim is treated as the consequence of something which has been done by the accused. From this point of view, the inducing act which was committed by the accused regarding all the three items admittedly took place outside the jurisdiction of the Sixth City Magistrate, Hyderabad (hereafter referred to for convenience as the Hyderabad Court.). The induced acts which the complainant performed as a result of the inducement by the accused, are as follows: (1) As regards items 1 and 2 outside the jurisdiction of the Hyderabad Court. (2) As regards item 3, within the jurisdiction of the Hyderabad Court. Consequently, on the basis of the above Illustration, it would appear that the Hyderabad Court comes within the category of Court Y regarding item 3 and does not come within the category of Court X or Court Y regarding items 1 and 2. (2) As regards item 3, within the jurisdiction of the Hyderabad Court. Consequently, on the basis of the above Illustration, it would appear that the Hyderabad Court comes within the category of Court Y regarding item 3 and does not come within the category of Court X or Court Y regarding items 1 and 2. As regards items 1 and 2, it has been contended by the learned Advocate for the complainant that the Hyderabad Court had jurisdiction to try because the letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, written by the accused from Madras reached the complainant at Hyderabad. The question is whether complainant’s receiving the letter at Hyderabad is a ‘consequence which has ensued’ with reference to ‘anything which has been done’ as mentioned in section 179, Criminal Procedure Code. I have already pointed out that as regards items 1 and 2 the offence of cheating was already completed even before the complainant came to Hyderabad shortly prior to 1st August, 1959. The inducing acts of the accused had been over. The deceiving intention ought to have and need have existed only at the time when the accused committed the relevant acts of inducement and not after the time when the complainant committed the induced acts (believing the representations made by the accused). The letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, which the accused wrote, is no by itself an essential act to constitute the offence of cheating, for, without that letter and even without the reading of that letter, the offence of cheating would have been completed if the version of the complainant were true. Thus, the offence would have been completed even if, in the letter, the accused had written that he was going to marry the complainant (i.e., directly contrary to what he has actually written) provided the accused had had the deceiving intention while inducing the complainant to commit the various relevant acts. On the other hand, if the accused had not had the deceiving intention when he induced the complainant to commit the various relevant acts, but had really bona fide intentions and spoken the honest truth, then no offence would have been committed by him simply because he wrote in the letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, that he intended to marry another girl and was not going to marry the complainant. The letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, can be of evidentiary value for various purposes, for example, to prove whether the accused had the deceiving intention at the time when he committed the inducing acts or to show why the complainant did not file complaint till September, 1959. But, neither the letter nor its contents nor the effect on the mind of the complainant on receiving and perusing the letter can be considered to be a consequence of acts already done, as contemplated in section 179, Criminal Procedure Code. It is represented that the complainant is in the unhappy position of one who has unmarried intimacy with a man who promised to marry her and has not kept his promise. But, being not married to a man with whom she led a life of intimacy is the consequence of having intimacy with a man to whom she was not already married. If such a situation is a consequence of the cheating, it ensued even before she came to Hyderabad and even before she received the letter, dated 3rd September, 1959. If any offence of cheating had already become completed because of the inducement by the accused with the deceitful intention and the induced act being committed by the complainant, it would not cease to be an offence of cheating even if the accused later on changed his mind and even if (in consequence) he really married the complainant. So, it is not possible to lookupon the receipt of the letter at Hyderabad as a consequence contemplated in section 179, Criminal Procedure Code and as giving jurisdiction to the Hyderabad Court. If the place of the receipt of this particular letter, dated 3rd September, 1959, can give jurisdiction, then the result would be that if the complainant had been going about from place to place on leave, it would be open to her to file a complaint in any place where she happened to be when she received the letter though none of the relevant acts which constituted the offence was committed in that place and no material consequence ensued at that place, as a result of the cheating (apart from receiving the letter). In Metcalfe v. Watson1, which has been relied on by the complainant, it was held that the Court at Buxar had jurisdiction to try a case on the ground that a crucial, letter, over which the complainant was clearly led to realise that there was an intention to cheat on the part of the accused, was received by the complainant at Buxar. The judgment does not disclose the full facts of that case or the full contents of the letter. It does not appear clear from the decision as to under what provision of the Criminal Procedure Code or any other law, jurisdiction was given to the Court at Buxar because of the complainant’s receiving that crucial letter. Therein, it was observed: “........It is pointed out by the learned Vakil who appears for the complainant that the crucial letter by which for the first time the complainant was clearly led to realise that there had been an intention to cheat on the part of the accused was received by him at Buxar; and I think on the authority of Queen v. Rogers2, it is quite clear that there was jurisdiction in this case to try the accused at Buxar.” In Queen v. Rogers2, which has been relied on in the above decision, the relevant facts were as follows: The accused was a clerk whose duty it was to remit at onceto his employers in Middlesex all moneys collected by him as their clerk. On 18th of April, 1877, he collected some amount from a customer at York but never remitted any portion of it. On 19th and 20th of April, he wrote and posted from places in Yorkshire to his employers in Middlesex letters making no mention of the money so collected. On 21st of April, he wrote and posted at Doncaster in Yorkshire to his employers in Middlesex, a letter which was intended to make them believe that he had not then in fact collected the money in question. Those letters were duly received by the employers in Middlesex. The accused was charged with embezzlement of the amount concerned. The majority of four Judges consisting of Kelly, C.J., Field, J., Lindley, J., and Manisty, J., held that the accused could be tried at Middlesex onthe ground that the offence of embezzlement was completed only when the prisoner wrote the letter and when it was received in Middlesex. The accused was charged with embezzlement of the amount concerned. The majority of four Judges consisting of Kelly, C.J., Field, J., Lindley, J., and Manisty, J., held that the accused could be tried at Middlesex onthe ground that the offence of embezzlement was completed only when the prisoner wrote the letter and when it was received in Middlesex. The fifth Judge Huddleston, J., wrote a dissenting minority judgment. The Judges who gave the majority judgment acted on the basis that ‘the offence was completed when the prisoner by letter made the false statement to his employers as to the receipt of the money’. Field, J., has observed as follows (at page 34): “If a complete embezzlement had been proved in Yorkshire, no part of which was committed in Middlesex, different question would have arisen, but here there is no proof or indication of a complete embezzlement prior to the letter of the 21st of April, in which he gives a false account, showing that he had at that time committed the embezzlement......” Regarding the action of a letter like the one, dated 21st April, 1877, Field, J., stated thus (at page 34): “........A letter is intended to act on the mind of the recipient, its action upon his mind takes place when it is received. It is like the case of firing of a shot, or the throwing of a spear. If a shot is fired, or a spear is thrown, from a place outside the boundary of a county into another county with intent to injure a person in that county, the offence is committed in the county within which the blow is given. So with a letter........” The same learned Judge (Field, J)., has further observed as follows (at page 35): “No doubt there is a distinction between that which is mere evidence of a crime, and that which is the crime or is part of the crime itself. I quite agree that it is not sufficient that there should be nothing more than evidence of the crime in the county in order to give jurisdiction.” Manisty, J., made the position clear as follows (at page 41): “........It would always be a question where the offence took place, where it was completed, whether when the false statement as to the receipt of the money was made the money had been squandered. It is to be allowed for a prisoner to say in defence, ‘I made a false accounting in Middlesex, but I actually spent the money, I actually misappropriated it elsewhere and long before’, or that I conceived the intention of misappropriating it elsewhere? In this case there was a fraudulent non-accounting in Middlesex. He was well indicted in that county, although he might also, I think, have been indicted in the county of York......” Huddleston, J., in his minority judgment observed (at page 40) as follows: “The stealing is the crime, the non-accounting the evidence of it, and as the evidence in the present case shows that the stealing was in Yorkshire, and that the prisoner never was in Middlesex until after he was arrested, I am of opinion that he was not rightly tried in Middlesex.” It would appear that on the facts of that case, if the question were whether the accused cheated the customer by receiving the amount from him (customer) at York, by dishonest or fraudulent representation (for example, if he were really not authorised by his principals at Middlesex and if he falsely represented that he had authority to receive), the offence would have been completed at York and the letter dated 21st April, 1877 would not have given jurisdiction to the Court at Middlesex, on relevant particulars, on the principles of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code. If the principles of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code can apply to the facts of that case, the position would be that under section 182, Criminal Procedure Code, the Court at Middlesex had jurisdiction to try the case (as also the Court of York had) since it was clear from the facts that part of the offence was committed in Middlesex (as held by the majority of the learned Judges) and part in York. It does not appear clear as to how the learned Judge in Metcalfe v. Watson1, found on the application of the decision in Queen v. Rogers2, that the receipt of the letter at Buxar gave jurisdiction to the Court at Buxar. Learned counsel for the complainant is not able to show under what provision of law the receipt of he letter at Buxar gave jurisdiction to the Court at Buxar. Learned counsel for the complainant is not able to show under what provision of law the receipt of he letter at Buxar gave jurisdiction to the Court at Buxar. On the facts of the present case, I have already made it clear that the letter dated 3rd September, 1959, is not part of any of the three items of the offence of cheating but is only evidence of the intention of the accused at the relevant time and, therefore, evidence of the crime. The receipt of the letter dated 3rd September, 1959, does not appear to give jurisdiction under section 179 or any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. So, the decision in Metcalfe v. Watson1 is not of any help to the complainant so far as the facts of this case are concerned. The learned Advocate for the accused contends that the version in the sworn statement that in August, 1959, the complainant came to know, for the first time,that the accused was giving go-bye to his promise shows that her version in the complaint that, for the first time, she came to know from the accused’s letter dated 3rd September, 1959, that he indicated his intention to marry another girl of his choice, must be false. At this stage, it is not possible to say for certain as to whether the complainant would or would not be able to give a satisfactory explanation reconciling her statement in the complaint with her version in the sworn statement. But, in any case, the sworn statement does not necessarily falsify the complainant’s case regarding item 3 of cheating in which the promise was on 1st August, 1959 and the arrangements were all made obviously in about the second week of August, 1959. For, the sworn statement can mean that the complainant came to know that the accused was giving go-bye to the promise in August, 1959, after the induced acting of the complainant and even after the accused failed to turn up for the marriage. The learned advocate for the accused relies on the decision in Chamarbaugwalla v. Ramachandra Rao1. Therein, it was held as follows: “In order to constitute an offence under this section, there should be a dishonest intention on the part of the accused which must precede or accompany the act of dishonesty. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution. Therein, it was held as follows: “In order to constitute an offence under this section, there should be a dishonest intention on the part of the accused which must precede or accompany the act of dishonesty. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution. Cheating amounts to inducing victim to enter into a bargain which he would not enter into if he knew the real facts............” This does not help the accused as the specific case of the complainant is that she would not have done the induced acts but for inducement, which was done with deceptive intention. In Jamadar Rai v. Emperor2, the facts of the case were that A agreed to give his daughter in marriage to B’s brother and received some earnest money, that later on when B went for the marriage, he found that A’s daughter was actually being married to another person and that when B asked for an explanation, he was told that B’s brother would be married to the daughter of another man. It was held that there was only a breach of contract and that A was not guilty of cheating inasmuch as he had not made any false representation to B. A perusal of the judgment shows that the learned Judges merely considered the question as to whether A’s daughter was in marriageable condition (not being already married to somebody else) when A promised to give that girl in marriage to B’s brother and held that as it was found that the girl was in marriageable condition, A had not made any false representation. The learned Judges did not go into the question as to whether, at the time when A made the promise to give the girl in marriage, A did mean to give her in marriage. The learned Judges do not seem to have doubted the existence of a genuine, honest intention of A to really give the girl in marriage to B’s brother at the time when A made the promise. That decision does not affect the Illustration (g) to section 415, Indian Penal Code and is not helpful in the present case. The learned Judges do not seem to have doubted the existence of a genuine, honest intention of A to really give the girl in marriage to B’s brother at the time when A made the promise. That decision does not affect the Illustration (g) to section 415, Indian Penal Code and is not helpful in the present case. In Diwan Singh v. Emperor3, it was simply held that section 179, Criminal Procedure Code had no application to facts of that particular case because the consequence concerned in that case arose at Delhi as soon as the newspaper was published at Delhi and that the offence became completed at Delhi. The learned Judges have specifically referred to a decision in Trikamiji v. Emperor4, and distinguished it on the ground that in the other case, the offence became completed at Yeotmal by reason of the consequence ensuing in that place as a result of the execution of a mortgage deed which was done at Bombay, thereby attracting the operation of section 179, Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case, regarding item 3, as the induced act of cheating became completed only when the concerned induced act was done by the complainant at Hyderabad, the place where she did the induced act gave jurisdiction to the Hyderabad Court. In other words, her action in spending money and making arrangements at Hyderabad gave jurisdiction to the Court at Hyderabad. The above decision does not help the accused. In Raghbir v. Kurukshetra Motor Co.5, it was held, regarding a case of cheating, that the allegation in the complaint (about cheating) showed that deceit, inducement and delivery all took place at Delhi and that it was not shown as to how a Court in Karnal district had jurisdiction. In that decision, an observation was made as follows: “Assuming that loss was sustained by complainants in the Karnal district, this will not have the effect of bringing the case under section 179, Criminal Procedure Code............Loss, however, is not a necessary element of the offence of cheating. There must be an intention to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain but it is not essential that loss should be caused.” The above observation did not go to decide that case. It is in the nature of obiter because that case was decided on the fact that the loss, if any, really took place at Delhi. There must be an intention to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain but it is not essential that loss should be caused.” The above observation did not go to decide that case. It is in the nature of obiter because that case was decided on the fact that the loss, if any, really took place at Delhi. The facts of that case would show that the loss, which consisted of certain parts being missing in a lorry, was only discovered at Karnal. So, the above observation is not helpful to the accused or to decide the present case. It is contended by the learned advocate for the complainant-respondent that the Hyderabad Court would have jurisdiction under section 182, Criminal Procedure Code, which reads: “When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or, where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,-it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” But it has not been shown to me as to how the Hyderabad Court will have jurisdiction under section 182, Criminal Procedure Code, with regard to items 1 and 2. Consequently, I hold that the Hyderabad Court has no jurisdiction to try the offence concerned in items 1 and 2, and that it has got jurisdiction only to try the offence concerned in item 3. Point 2.-The learned advocate for the accused has relied on the decision of my learned brother Srinivasachari, J., in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Ramachandra Rao1, wherein it was held that it was competent for a Magistrate to discharge an accused under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code, at any stage even before evidence was recorded so long as the conditions required in section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code were satisfied, i.e., the complaint being found to be groundless and the Magistrate recording reasons for discharge, on such grounds. Of course, it is true that the learned trial Magistrate had the power to discharge the accused under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code, if the requisite conditions were satisfied. Of course, it is true that the learned trial Magistrate had the power to discharge the accused under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code, if the requisite conditions were satisfied. It has not been established on the facts of this case (as disclosed by the complaint and the sworn statement), that the charge by the complainant was ground ess. So, the learned trial Magistrate was not wrong in not discharging the accused under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code. But, this does not affect the fact of the question of jurisdiction, concerned in Point 1. In the result, I find that the Court of the Sixth City Magistrate, Hyderabad, had got jurisdiction to hear the case only regarding item 3 but did not have jurisdiction to decide as regards items 1 and 2. The revision is accordingly allowed in part. A.S.R. ----- Revision allowed in part.