Govinda Menon, J.- The appellant has been convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for having caused the death of his wife by cutting her with a chopper at about 12-30 p.m., on 4th January, 1960 and has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. He was found not guilty and acquitted of the offence under section 326, Indian Penal Code, for having caused grievous hurt to his mother by cutting her with a chopper. The prosecution case briefly is this: The accused was for some time employed in Bombay. Then he came back to his native village and married the deceased Narayani Ammal, daughter of P.W. 11 in January, 1959. The accused, his mother, P.W. 1, his sister, Pappammal, P.W. 2 and his wife were living together in his house in Tharur village. After the marriage P.W. 2 had gone to Ernakulam and was staying with another brother of hers who was employed there. In November, 1959, P.W. 1 went to Ernakulam to her son and while she was returning she brought back Pappammal with her. While P.W. 1 was away the accused and his wife alone were living in the house. The accused then began to ill-treat and beat his wife. P.W. 4 who is a maid-servant in the house informed their neighbour P.W. 3, Janaki Ammal and under instructions from her she sent her husband to the house of the deceased. The husband informed P.W. 11 the mother of the de-cased. She sent her relation P.W. 12 to the house of the accused to bring back her daughter. P.W. 12 accordingly went and took the deceased to her house. When P.Ws. 1 and 2 returned from Ernakulam they did not find the deceased in the house. The husband of the elder sister of P.W. 2 was then sent to the house of P.W. 11 and the deceased was brought back to the accused’ house. On the date of the incident on 4th January, 1960, the accused had gone to Alathur to purchase some medicine for his ailing mother. He returned with the medicine and the mother asked him to change his clothes and take his food. The accused went to the kitchen and the deceased served him food. P.W. 2 the sister then heard exchange of words between the accused and the deceased from the kitchen. He returned with the medicine and the mother asked him to change his clothes and take his food. The accused went to the kitchen and the deceased served him food. P.W. 2 the sister then heard exchange of words between the accused and the deceased from the kitchen. The accused asked the deceased ‘whom are you looking at and with whom were you talking’. The deceased said she did not look or talk to anybody. P.W. 2 then told the accused that he should not talk to her in that strain as she was not a woman of that type. The accused then told P.W. 2 that it was none of her business to interefere when he was questioning his wife. P.W. 1 hearing the conversation came to the kitchen and advised P.W. 2 to go away. While P.W. 2 was going the accused followed her and beat her with his shoe. P.W. 3, saw the beating and took P.W. 2 to the verandah of her house. The accused again went inside the house. The deceased and P.W. 1 were then sitting on a bench. The accused demanded the deceased to give him all her jewels. The deceased immediately obeyed and removed all her ornaments and gave it to him. The accused then went to the kitchen and soon afterwards returned with a chopper and cut the deceased on her head. On getting the cut, she fell down on the floor. P.W. 7 who was cooking food for certain Sabarimalai pilgrims in a shed about 50 feet away from the house heard the alarm raised by P.W. 1 and rushed to the house of the accused. He saw the deceased lying down and the accused standing nearby with a chopper in his hand. P.W. 1 was also standing there. Seeing blood he got frightened and ran away from the house. The accused again cut and when P.W. 1 tried to ward off the attack her left thumb was chopped off. P.W. 1 however wrenched the chopper from his hand and raising an alarm that the daughter was being killed came out of the house and threw away the chopper. P.W. 3 hearing this alarm came and took P.W. 1 also to the verandah of her house. P.W. 1 however wrenched the chopper from his hand and raising an alarm that the daughter was being killed came out of the house and threw away the chopper. P.W. 3 hearing this alarm came and took P.W. 1 also to the verandah of her house. P.W. 7 after seeing the incident at once went to P.W. 13, the President of the Panchayat Board and told him that the accused had cut the head of the deceased and that she was lying dead. P.W. 13 advised P.W. 7 immediately to go and inform the Adhikari. P.W. 10 who is living three houses away from the accused’s house hearing the alarm came and saw P.Ws. 2 and 3 sitting in the house of P.W. 3. P.W. 2 told him that the accused had beaten her and sent her out of the house, that her mother was inside the house, that cries are being heard and that he should go and enquire what the matter was. P.W. 10 being an old man went and informed P.W. 9, a teacher in the nearby Amber Charka School. P.W. 9 with a student in the school and P.W. 10 proceeded to the house. While going, they saw P.W. 1 sitting on the verandah of P.W. 3’s house and P.W. 1 told P.W. 10 that she had lost the tip of her thumb. The front door of the accused’s house was then seen closed. So they went towards the backyard, jumped over the wall and went near the courtyard wall and peeped over it, into the house. P.W. 9 then saw the accused standing with a chopper in his hand in the verandah of the house. The accused then shouted that nobody should go there and that he would kill if anybody dared get inside. P.W. 8 a person living half a furlong away hearing about that incident came to the house. He also went to the backyard and peeped inside and saw the accused standing with the chopper in the verandah of the kitchen. P.W. 7 after returning from P.W. 13 also went to the house and he also saw the accused standing with a chopper in his hand. The accused then went inside and closed the door. P.Ws. 7, 8 and 9 then came to the front side of the house. P.W. 7 after returning from P.W. 13 also went to the house and he also saw the accused standing with a chopper in his hand. The accused then went inside and closed the door. P.Ws. 7, 8 and 9 then came to the front side of the house. By that time the accused had also come and was fitting on a bench on the verandah of the house. P.W. 8 asked the accused what he had done and the accused told him in the presence of P.Ws. 7 and 9 that he had killed her and that they may go and inform the police. P.W. 8 then locked the door with the accused inside and kept the key with him. P.W. 5, a student while returning from the school to his house heard that the accused had murdered his wife and told his father P.W. 6 about it. P.W. 6 immediately came to the house and saw a large crowd there. The house was seen locked. He asked the accused what the matter was. The accused then said that everything was over. He then went to P.W. 16 the Village Munsiff and gave a statement Exhibit P-2. P.W. 16 recorded the statement and came over to the house. He saw the accused sitting on the bench in the verandah. He noticed blood-stains on the mundu and banian own by the accused. He also saw the front door locked. P.W. 8 opened the door and P.W. 16 got inside and asked the accused what the matter was. The accused then told him that the wife is murdered and is lying inside and that he could do whatever is necessary. P.W. 16 got inside and saw the dead body. He told the accused that he is going to send him to the police and that he should accompany him. P.W. 16 took him to his office. At the office, he prepared the yadast and sent the accused along with the Kolkaran, P.W. 17 to the Police Station. P.W. 17 produced the accused with the First Information Statement Exhibit P-2 and the yadast Exhibit P-5 before the Head Constable P.W. 22. P.W. 22 registered a case and arrested the accused and took into custody his blood-stained mundu and and banian, under a mahazar Exhibit P-13. P.W. 25 the Circle Inspector on getting the report came to the scene. P.W. 17 produced the accused with the First Information Statement Exhibit P-2 and the yadast Exhibit P-5 before the Head Constable P.W. 22. P.W. 22 registered a case and arrested the accused and took into custody his blood-stained mundu and and banian, under a mahazar Exhibit P-13. P.W. 25 the Circle Inspector on getting the report came to the scene. P.W. 16 was present in the house of the accused. He got the door opened and went inside and held the inquest. He then prepared the scene mahazar and recovered the chopper M.O. 1 which was thrown by P.W. 1 and another chopper M.O. 2 from the kitchen both of which were blood-stained. He then questioned all the important witnesses on the same day. P.W. 18 the Medical Officer conducted the autopsy. The accused was then produced before the Sub Magistrate of Chittoor. P.W. 19 the Sub Magistrate recorded the statement of the accused after observing all the formalities. The statement was not marked by the prosecution as it was not a confessional statement. That statement has been marked on the side of the defence as Exhibit D-2. After completing the investigation P.W. 25 the Circle Inspector of Police filed the charge-sheet against the accused. The accused when questioned in the committing Magistrate’s Court stated that he did not cut his wife or mother, that while he was sitting on the verandah of his house a masked person came and caught hold ofhis neck, that he heard the cries of his wife, that he became unconscious and did not know what happened afterwards. That was practically what he stated in the confessional statement Exhibit D-2. In the Sessions Court the story of the masked man was given up but he stated that he did not remember whether he had cut his wife. He denied enmity with the deceased. He stated that he does not remember whether he had ill-treated her or beater her. He also gave an elaborate statement about having some mental disease for which he had been treated at different places bydifferent persons. He has also examined three defence witnesses to prove the plea of insanity. The death of Narayani Ammal has been amply proved. P.W. 18 the Medical Officer who conducted the post mortem found 11 injuries which he has correctly described in the certificate Exhibit P-6. He has also examined three defence witnesses to prove the plea of insanity. The death of Narayani Ammal has been amply proved. P.W. 18 the Medical Officer who conducted the post mortem found 11 injuries which he has correctly described in the certificate Exhibit P-6. Injury No. 1 is described as: The right leg found severed completely at the level between middle and lower 1/3rd of right leg. The cut end is an incised wound round the circumference of the leg with an uneven cut. The bones of the leg (tabia and fibula) were found cut along with the muscles, nerves, tendons and blood vessels. Injury No. 3 was: An incised wound 3¼“x ½” x ¼“over the centre of scalp running diagonally from front to back towards right side cutting the skull bone completely underneath 3” long. Injury No. 4 was An incised wound 2" x ¼” x ¼" over the right occipital region cutting the skull bone underneath. The bone is cut only to half its thickness. Injury No. 11 was: Contusion of the skin about 1½” in diameter noticed over the right side of the chest over the 9th 10th and 11th ribs along the mid-axillary line. On internal examination the doctor found 2 oz., of blood in the peritoneal cavity. Over the parietal pleura of the right side of the thoracic cavity a contusion was found at the level of the 10th rib. On examination of the liver a rupture was found over the lateral lobe of the liver for a length of 3". The skull was found cut to its half thick less for 1½” length over the right occipital region at the level of external wound No. 4. The two cut wounds found inside the skull correspond to he external injuries Nos. 3 and 4. According to the doctor external injuries Nos. 1 to 6 could be caused with choppers like M.O. 1 or M.O. 2, the contusions by fisting or those portions of the body coming into contact with a hard substance and abrasions by falling down or by coming into contact with a rough substance like the wall. According to him the rupture on the liver may be due to a punch on that part of the body. According to him the rupture on the liver may be due to a punch on that part of the body. He is of opinion that the cause of death is shock due to the multiple injuries and that all the injuries put together are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is therefore no doubt that Narayani Ammal died as a result of the injuries sustained by her on that day. The question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt to the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution seeks to prove the case by the direct evidence of P.W. 1, the circumstantial evidence afforded by the testimony of P.Ws. 2 to 4, 7 to 10, 6 and 16, the presence of bloodstain; on the cloth and banian worn by the accused and the presence of blood on the choppers and the evidence of motive spoken to by P.Ws. 3, 4, 6, 11, 12 and 16. P.W. 1 is the mother. She has deposed that she had sent her son to Alathur on that day to get medicine for her, that after he returned he went to the kitchen and took his food and soon after she heard some altercation in the kitchen between the accused and the deceased, that P.W. 2 went and interfered and that there was an exchange of words between them, that she went to the kitchen and asked P.W. 2 to go away and that she left the house. Then she stated that the accused came to the deceased and asked her to give all her jewels, that the jewels were then handed over to the accused, that he then went to the kitchen and came out with a chopper. P.W. 1 further deposed that the accused then aimed a cut at the wall where the wife was sitting and when the deceased suddenly stood up the cut instead of bitting the wall struck against her head and she fell down, that she tried to wrest the chopper and while doing so she got injured and then she threw away the chopper and left the house and did not know what happened to the daughter-in-law. The prosecution was permitted to treat the witness as hostile and to cross-examine her with reference to her case diary statement and her statement recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution was permitted to treat the witness as hostile and to cross-examine her with reference to her case diary statement and her statement recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. The case-diary statement and Exhibit P-1 cannot be treated as substantive evidence. But her evidence in the Sessions Court to a great extent corroborates the prosecution case as to how the quarrel started. The injury sustained by her is spoken to by the doctor P.W. 18 who examined her on the same day. The doctor noticed an incised wound at the level of the interphalangeal joint between the distal and proximal phalanx of the left thumb cutting away the distal phalanx separately. The doctor has stated that the injury could be caused by a cut with a chopper. Though she might say that the injury was caused while she attempted to wrest the chopper the nature of the injury is such that it is unlikely that the injury would have been thus caused. Her story that the accused cut at the wall is incredible. P.W. 3 had deposed that she had heard the alarm of P.W. 1, that when she went and looked P.W. 1 came out with the chopper and threw the chopper on the steps. The police later recovered this chopper from the steps under a mahazar. P.W. 3 is a neighbour and is a thoroughly disinterested witness. No suggestion was made at the time of her cross-examination that she had any ill-feeling against the accused. It is only when the accused gave his statement under sect on 342, Criminal Procedure Code, that he came forward with the story that P.W. 3 is a lady of ill-repute and that he had disapproved her conduct and therefore is inimical towards him. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore perfectly justified in accepting her evidence and her evidence goes a long way in proving the prosecution case. P.W. 2 is the sister of the accused. She was not treated as hostile. Though she spoke to the origin of the quarrel she did not depose that she was beaten with a shoe and sent out, but we have the evidence of P.W. 3 that she saw the accused actually beating P.W. 2 with a shoe and that the took her to her house. She was not treated as hostile. Though she spoke to the origin of the quarrel she did not depose that she was beaten with a shoe and sent out, but we have the evidence of P.W. 3 that she saw the accused actually beating P.W. 2 with a shoe and that the took her to her house. We have also the evidence of P.W. 10 who deposed that P.W. 2 told him that she was beaten by the accused. P.W. 7, Kelu Menon, is another witness who was cooking food in a nearby shed for certain Sabarimala pilgrims. At about 12 noon he heard a row from outside and when he came out he found P.W. 2 being taken by P.W. 3. Then he went to the accused’s house. He heard cries from inside the house and therefore got in and he saw the deceased lying down and the accused standing there with a chopper in his hand. The accused’s mother P.W. 1 was also there. He says, he got frightened and left the place. He at once went and reported the matter to P.W. 13, the Panchayat President. P.W. 13 has corroborated the evidence of P.W. 7. After the mother left, the accused was alone inside the house with the deceased. There is no direct evidence as to what happened subsequently, but later it was found that the wife was severely injured and had died. P.W. 10 a neighbour on getting information from P.W. 2 went to P.W. 9 the teacher in the near by Amber Charka School. They came to the accused’s house, and found the front door of the Accused’s house closed. They went towards the back-yard and peeped over the court-yard wall. By this time P.W. 7 had also returned from the Panchayat President. P.W. 8 another neighbour had also come there. All of them saw the accused standing on the verandah outside the kitchen with a chopper in his hand. The accused threatened them that if anybody dared enter the house he would kill them. They also deposed that the accused closed the door and went inside. Then all of them came to the front side of the house. By that time the accused had also come and was sitting on a bench on the verandah of the house. P.W. 8 then asked the accused what he had done and the accused told him. They also deposed that the accused closed the door and went inside. Then all of them came to the front side of the house. By that time the accused had also come and was sitting on a bench on the verandah of the house. P.W. 8 then asked the accused what he had done and the accused told him. “Gnan avale sariyakki akathu ittithundae Ningal poyee policyl arivu kodutholu” This was heard by P.Ws. 7 and 9. P.W. 8 then locked the door. Nothing has been brought out in the evidence of these witnesses to discredit their testimony. A suggestion has been made that the accused in collaboration with P.W. 14 had started an agitation against P.W. 8 that he misappropriated the co-operative society funds. P.W. 8 has denied the suggestion. P.W. 14 was not even asked about it. In fact, according to P.W. 14 he did not even know the accused before the date of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence of these witnesses that they saw the accused with the chopper in the backyard is artificial, that it is unlikely that the accused would have paraded with the chopper in their presence only to qualify them to become witnesses in the case. The accused was standing in the verandah and could not have anticipated that anybody would scale over the wall and see him. As soon as he saw them the accused threatened them and at once closed the door and went inside. There is absolutely no reason to distrust their evidence and the extra-judicial confession spoken to by them can be accepted. Then we come to the evidence of P.W. 6. He is a relation of the accused. His son, P.W. 5, while returning from the school heard that the accused had murdered his wife and told his father about it. P.W. 6 at once came to the house and he found that the door had been locked from outside. He asked the accused what the matter was. The accused said “Ellam kazhinjnu”. He at once gave information to P.W. 16, the Village Munsiff. P.W. 16 recorded his statement and after reading the statement P.W. 6 affixed his signature to the statement. He asked the accused what the matter was. The accused said “Ellam kazhinjnu”. He at once gave information to P.W. 16, the Village Munsiff. P.W. 16 recorded his statement and after reading the statement P.W. 6 affixed his signature to the statement. In Exhibit P-2 he has stated that he got information from his son, that he went to the house and saw the accused sitting with blood-stained clothes and when questioned the accused told him that he had cut and killed his wife. P.W. 6 showed some inclination in cross-examination to help the accused who is his relation. When he stated in Exhibit P-2 very clearly that the accused admitted that he cut and killed his wife, in Court he only stated that the accused told him ‘everything is over’. He also stated in cross-examination that himself and the Village Munsif went to the police-station and the statement was signed by him only there. In his cross-examination he also attempted to prove the accused’s plea of insanity. P.W. 16, Padmanabhan Nair, is the Village Munsiff. He has deposed that P.W. 6 came to him and gave the statement, that he correctly recorded it and got his signature and then proceeded to the house of the accused. He stated that he saw the accused sitting on a bench in the verandah of his house, the mundu and banian which he was wearing were blood-stained, the house was locked, that P.W. 8 opened the door with the key which he had with him, that he got inside and asked the accused what happened and the accused said “Akathu baryayai konnu ittuthundi. Inientha venathangil chaithollu”. He got inside and saw the dead body of the woman. Later he took him to his office and sent him with his report to the police-station through his Kolkaran, P.W. 17. The report clearly makes mention of the extra-judicial confession made by the accused and corroborates his evidence in Court. He is a thoroughly disinterested witness. Nothing has been suggested as to why he should give evidence against the accused. We do not find any reason whatsoever to doubt the truth of his testimony. The report clearly makes mention of the extra-judicial confession made by the accused and corroborates his evidence in Court. He is a thoroughly disinterested witness. Nothing has been suggested as to why he should give evidence against the accused. We do not find any reason whatsoever to doubt the truth of his testimony. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that after taking the statement his duty was to send the yadast at once to the police-station, that he had no business to go to the house of the accused and take up the investigation of the case. The Village Munsif has given his explanation that he wanted to ascertain whether the statement given by P.W. 6 who is not an eye-witness is true and wanted to send the injured to the hospital, if she was not really dead. There is nothing unnatural in what the Village Munsif had done. Apart from this, when the Village Munsif has been told that the accused after committing the offence is siting in his house with blood-stained clothes, it was certainly his duty to have gone at once to the house and to see that the accused does not escape and to send him to the police-station. We believe his evidence. It was also argued that the exact words used by the appellant when he made the extra-judicial confessions are not given, that the version given by the witnesses vary and therefore the confessions should be excluded. The witnesses have deposed what the appellant has stated and we are not able to find any appreciable difference in the gist of the confessions made by the accused. From what the witnesses have stated it is clear that the accused had admitted that he had killed his wife. The Supreme Court in a recent case in Mulk Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1, dealing with extra-judical confessions have stated: “The value of the evidence as to the confession just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance were given. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance were given. If the rule is inflexible that the Courts should insist only on the exact words, more often as not, this kind of evidence, sometimes most reliable and, useful, will have to be excluded; for, except perhaps in the case of a person of good memory, many witnesses cannot repeat the exact words of the accused. It is for the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness, his capacity to understand the language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence or not.” In this case the witnesses who speak to the extra-judicial confession are thoroughly disinterested witnesses who have no axe to grind against the accused and they are persons who have no reason to invent a false confession. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore perfectly justified in accepting their testimony. In the case of P.W. 16 it was further stated that he is a person in authority, but that only makes it necessary for the Court to scrutinize his evidence with more than ordinary care in order to ascertain whether the confession was voluntarily made. The Court has to see whether such a person used any words which might possibly have induced the accused to confess. But if on the evidence there is nothing to show that there was any inducement the confession could be accepted. In this case there is not even a suggestion that any such inducement was made by the Village Munsiff. He is a respectable witness and thoroughly disinterested. We are therefore unable to agree that the extra-judicial confession spoken to by P.W. 16 cannot be accepted. The next important circumstance alleged against the accused is the existence of a strong motive. The prosecution case is that the accused suspected the fidelity of his wife, even though she was a chaste and a faithful woman. We have the evidence of P.W. 6 who is related to the accused that once or twice the accused complained to him about the character of his wife and that he wanted to divorce her. The prosecution case is that the accused suspected the fidelity of his wife, even though she was a chaste and a faithful woman. We have the evidence of P.W. 6 who is related to the accused that once or twice the accused complained to him about the character of his wife and that he wanted to divorce her. P.W. 16 has deposed that about 5 or 6 months prior to the occurrence the accused had told him that he wanted to divorce his wife as he suspected the character of the womam. We have then the evidence of P.W. 4 who is the maid servant in the house of the accused that after P.Ws. 1 and 2 left for Ernakulam the accused started ill-treating and beating his wife. She told P.W. 3 about this and as P.W. 3 was ill she advised P.W. 4 to inform the relatives of the deceased, that she sent her husband to P.W. 11 the mother of the deceased and informed her. P.W. 11 sent a relation of hers P.W. 12 to the house of the accused. P.W. 12 swears that when he went to the house of the accused he actually saw the deceased being assaulted and that he took the deceased to P.W. 11’s house. P.W. 11 the mother has stated that the deceased had told her that about 6 months after the marriage the accused was abusing and beating her saying that she looked here or there and that getting information from P.W. 4’s husband she sent P.W. 12 to fetch her daughter. The accused when questioned under section 342 has admitted that P.W. 12 Lad come and taken away the deceased to her house. There is no reason to disbelieve any of these witnesses. Added to that we have the evidence of P.W. 2 that on that day the quarrel started because the accused asked the deceased whom she was looking at and to whom she was talking. These circumstances show that the accused was labouring under a strong delusion about the unfaithfulness of his wife and disturbed by such thought had caused her death. It will not be out of place in this connection to consider the inconsistent pleas put forward by the accused in the Committing Magistrate’s Court and in the Sessions Court. These circumstances show that the accused was labouring under a strong delusion about the unfaithfulness of his wife and disturbed by such thought had caused her death. It will not be out of place in this connection to consider the inconsistent pleas put forward by the accused in the Committing Magistrate’s Court and in the Sessions Court. In the Committing Magistrate’s Court he had put forward the specific case of a masked man coming and trying to throttle him and his hearing cries of his wife from inside the house, the suggestion being that the unknown person must have killed the wife. In the Sessions Court this case was given up and he pretended not remembering anything. The learned counsel for the appellant had raised an argument that in view of the medical evidence the offence proved tohave been committed by the accused would not in any view be murder, because none of the injuries which the accused has been proved to have inflicted have been proved to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is true that the doctor has not said that any one of the injuries by itself was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. But looking at the nature of the injuries the only inference is that whoever has caused these injuries must have intended to cause the death of the victim. It is difficult to imagine how any human being could have survived the ferocity of the attack as is revealed by the nature of the injuries. Even if none of the injuries by themselves were sufficient in the ordinary course ofnature to cause death cumulatively they were certainly sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death which in effect took place soon after the assault. In our opinion if the prosecution evidence is accepted the offence is clearly one of murder. It had also been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the charge that had been framed by the Court what was stated was that the accused caused the death by cutting her with a chopper and not that he caused any injuries by fisting or punching. It had also been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the charge that had been framed by the Court what was stated was that the accused caused the death by cutting her with a chopper and not that he caused any injuries by fisting or punching. The learned counsel referred us to the evidence of the doctor that on dissection he found that the liver had ruptured and it could not be said that the death was not due to that injury and that the death must have been only as a result of cutting with the chopper. There is no substance in this argument. No doubt it would have been better if the charge had been more specific. But the mere omission to specify the details of how the injuries were caused in the charge cannot in the circumstances of this case have any effect as no prejudice has been alleged or shown. As pointed out in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, procedural laws are designed to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate them and if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct the irregularity is curable under section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. The object of a charge is to warn the accused person of the case he is to answer and if that test is satisfied it cannot be treated as if it was a part of a ceremonial. The imperfection in the charge even if there is any is curable provided no prejudice has been shown to have resulted because of it. In this case it is nobody’s case that any other person had entered the house or caused any one of the injuries found on the person of the deceased. The circumstances of the case show beyond the shadow of doubt that the deceased sustained all the injuries at the hands of the accused and accused alone. On a consideration of the entire evidence and the circumstances and probabilities of the case we have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that it was the accused who caused all the injuries on the deceased is perfectly justified. On a consideration of the entire evidence and the circumstances and probabilities of the case we have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that it was the accused who caused all the injuries on the deceased is perfectly justified. Finally we will deal with the plea of insanity that has been put forward on behalf of the accused. Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code deals with the plea of insanity. Section 84, Indian Penal Code, reads as follows: “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.” This provision embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law-“actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”-(An act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention.) In order to constitute crime, the intent and act must concur, but in the case of insane persons, no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will (furiosi nulla voluntas est.) It is necessary for the application of section 84, Indian Penal Code, to show (1) that the accused was of unsound mind; (2) that he was of unsound mind at the time he did the act and not merely before or after the act; and (3) as a result of unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. It is not therefore every person mentally diseased who ipso facto is exempted from criminal responsibility. This provision was examined in Queen-Empress v. Kedar Nasyr Shah2, a leading case which has been repeatedly followed. The learned Judges point out that the rule is in substance the same as is contained in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in Daniel M’Naghten’s case3. This provision was examined in Queen-Empress v. Kedar Nasyr Shah2, a leading case which has been repeatedly followed. The learned Judges point out that the rule is in substance the same as is contained in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in Daniel M’Naghten’s case3. There it was laid down that every man is to be presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary is proved and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must clearly be proved that at the time of committing the act the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. If unsoundness of mind is urged as a ground of exemption from liability, it is for the person who seeks the exemption to prove it. The accused must not leave the condition of his mind at the time of the commission of the offence in doubt, but must satisfy the Court that it was such that he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Accused’s condition, antecedent and subsequent to the commission of the crime is relevant only in so far as it might assist the Court in coming to a conclusion as to his mental capacity at the time when he committed the act. The accused cannot get the benefit of section 84 by merely creating a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court about the existence of circumstances bringing his case within the exception. The burden of proof resting on the accused to prove the insanity is no doubt not so onerous as the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. The burden of proof resting on the accused to prove the insanity is no doubt not so onerous as the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. As observed by Viscount Hailsham, L.C., in Sodeman v. Rex1: “the burden in case in which an accused has to prove insanity may fairly be stated as not being higher than the burden which rests on a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings.” As to what is the burden resting upon a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings, can best be stated in the words of Willes, J., in Cooper v. Slade2. That learned Judge referred to an ancient authority in support of what he termed “the elementary proposition that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict.” Applying this rule of burden of proof, if on a consideration of the prosecution evidence and the evidence led by the accused the Court comes to the conclusion that there was a probability of the accused being legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he would be entitled to be acquitted on the ground of insanity. This is quite different from holding as was held in Prabhoo v. Emperor3, which has gone to the extent of saying that the accused is entitled to be acquitted on the ground of insanity even if a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court whether he is or is not entitled to the benefit of the exception under section 84. There is clear distinction between medical and legal insanity. The Courts are concerned with the legal and not with the medical view of the question. A man may be suffering from some form of insanity in the sense in which he term is used by medical men, but may not be suffering from unsoundness of mind as is described in section 84. If the facts of a particular case show that the accused knew that he had done something wrong it did not matter how though he might be insane from the medical point of view he could not be exonerated under section 84, Indian Penal Code. If the facts of a particular case show that the accused knew that he had done something wrong it did not matter how though he might be insane from the medical point of view he could not be exonerated under section 84, Indian Penal Code. Reference may be made to the decision in In re Pappathi Ammal4 Hazara Singh v. The State5; Kashiram v. The State6; Nitai Naik v. The State7 and Emperor v. Godka Goala8, where the question of the applicability of section 84, Indian Penal Code, has been elaborately discussed. In the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, we may now consider the evidence in this case with regard to the plea of insanity. Three witnesses have been examined on the side of the accused. D.W. 1 is a close neighbour of the accused. He stated that the accused was not going for work for the last 4 or 5 years. To a question as to why he was not going for work his first answer was that the accused is a rich person and that is why he does not go for work. The counsel for the accused then pulled him up and asked him about his physical condition. The witness then woke up and said that there was something wrong with his head. He also spoke of the accused going to Shornur for treatment, his treatment under D.W. 2 the retired Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Madras and of his going to the Chottanikara temple for worship for his mental derangement. His evidence even if true does not help the accused in making out what his condition was at the time of the incident or immediately before or after the incident. D.W. 2, the retired Superintendent of the Mental Hospital, Madras, stated that he had treated the accused between 19th April, 1959 and 7th May, 1959 and in his opinion he was suffering from schizophremia, a peculiar mental disease. The doctor gives the symptoms which he had noticed, as no inclination to secure any employment and losing of all initiative; that he was just drifting and his touch with reality being very low; that he was living in fantasy and his ideas being poor; that his sleep was not satisfactory, that he took life easy and was easily led or misled. The witness also stated that he used to talk to the accused every time he visited him and he was answering all questions as much as he can under the circumstances. He says that there was something fundamentally wrong with the accused. The evidence of the doctor would at the most show that the accused was not mentally a normal person. This cannot amount to legal insanity. D.W.3 is an Ayurvedic Physician who treated the accused in the Ayurveda Vaidayasala at Shornur between 15th August, 1957 and 9th October, 1957 and 31st May, 1959 and 28th June, 1959. He gives his opinion that the accused was suffering from a disease known as Vadonmatham. The main symptoms which he had noticed were talking incoherently. Later he came forward with more details of this disease and suggesting that the accused was insane. The learned Sessions Judge has discussed the evidence of this witness in paragraph 26 of the judgment and we agree with the learned Sessions Judge that his evidence is not reliable and cannot be accepted. It is also significant to note that the theory of insanity has been suggested only to the witnesses who are either relations or close friends of the accused and not to any of the disinterested neighbours or the Village Munsiff who knows the accused personally and who is expected to know the condition of the accused. The learned counsel for the appellant referred us particularly to the conduct of the accused namely the evidence that he got the jewels worn by the deceased and throwing it into the well. The jewels were later recovered by the Sub-Inspector from the well. We are not prepared to agree that this is an indication that at the time of the incident he was insane. This conduct is perfectly consistent with a sane but a highly jealous husband always suspecting the fidelity of his wife and throwing the jewels worn by the wife out of disgust and an uncontrollable temper. On the other hand, we have the evidence of the conduct of the accused as spoken to by witnesses P.Ws. 7, 8 and 9 that when they saw him in the back verandah of the kitchen the accused threatened them that if they dared enter the house they would be killed. Then there is his further conduct in closing the door and going inside when they saw him. 7, 8 and 9 that when they saw him in the back verandah of the kitchen the accused threatened them that if they dared enter the house they would be killed. Then there is his further conduct in closing the door and going inside when they saw him. Later his conduct in telling P.Ws. 7, 8, and 9 that he had killed his wife and that they may inform the authorities and his extra-judicial confession to P.Ws. 6 and 16 that he has murdered his wife and that the Village Munsiff may do whatever is necessary. All these show that he was perfectly sane, knew that what he had done was wrong and was prepared to suffer the consequences of his wrongful act. From all these it is clear that the accused was conscious of the nature of his act and as stated in Queen Empress v. Lakshman Dagdu1, “if he was conscious of its nature he must be presumed to have been conscious of its criminality”. We must also remember that on that day morning he was sent by his mother to purchase medicine. It is unlikely that if he had been not mentally alright on that day he would have been sent to Alathur, a place five miles away from his house. We have also the evidence that he had been examined by the Assistant District Medical Officer of the Headquarters Hospital, Palghat. He is Court witness No. 1. The doctor had placed him under observation for 10 days and has issued a certificate Exhibit C-2 reporting that the accused is not a lunatic. He is the sub-jail doctor also. He used to visit the sub-jail often. He has categorically stated that he did not observe any signs of lunacy in the accused either during the period of his observation or when he had later visited the sub-jail. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that during the course of the trial also he was not able to observe anything abnormal in the accused and that from the questions put to the accused under section 342 and the answers given by him it is seen that he is capable of understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers. The learned counsel had argued that the crime was motiveless but the mere fact that an act is without apparent motive is not by itself sufficient to establish insanity. The learned counsel had argued that the crime was motiveless but the mere fact that an act is without apparent motive is not by itself sufficient to establish insanity. From all these circumstances the only irresistable inference is that the accused was not insane at the time when he committed the act as to entitle him to claim exemption under section 84, Indian Penal Code. The result is that the conviction of the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code, is correct and is hereby confirmed. Imprisonment for life is the minimum that could be awarded and it is also confirmed. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. M.C.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.