Honble SHARMA, J.–The petitioner seeks to quash the award dated January 8, 1996 of the Labour Court Ajmer whereby the termination of the services of the respondent workman was declared illegal and a direction was issued to reinstate the workman in the services with 50% back wages. (2). The petitioner averred in the writ petition that there were several matters of embezzlement loss of property and the other misconduct against the respondent No. 2 Shyam Sunder Dani for which a charge sheet dated June 18, 1993 was issued to him. Respondent No. 2 in the reply of the charge sheet denied the allegations. The petitioner was not satisfied with the reply and terminated the services of respondent No. 2 vide order dated Sept. 20, 1993. The respondent No. 2 raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer Ajmer. The Conciliation Officer failed and the State Government by Notification dated July 7, 1995 referred the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ajmer. Labour Judge recorded the evidence and after hearing the parties passed the impugned award observing that as no enquiry for misconduct of the respondent No. 2 was held, the termination was bad in law. However, it was also observed that looking to the conduct of respondent No. 2 the employer may give him some other job and if he does not prove himself of a good conduct, then after an enquiry his services can be terminated. (3). Mr. Virendra Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made a scathing criticism of the impugned award from all angles. The main contention of learned counsel is that the Labour Judge ought to have at the outset held that there was no domestic enquiry held by the employer in respect of misconduct and thereafter opportunity to adduce evidence ought to have been provided to the parties regarding the issue of `misconduct. But in the instant case no such procedure was followed and the evidence was recorded on merits of the reference. After recording the evidence of the respondent No.2 only an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner employer to rebut the evidence. Basic authority on which the reliance was placed by Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel is The United Planters Association of Southern India vs. K.G. Sangameswaran (1). Mr. After recording the evidence of the respondent No.2 only an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner employer to rebut the evidence. Basic authority on which the reliance was placed by Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel is The United Planters Association of Southern India vs. K.G. Sangameswaran (1). Mr. Agrawal, had invited my attention towards para 12 of the said decision which read thus:- ``Before construing the provisions of Sec. 14 and Rule 9, it may be stated that it has always been the philosophy of Industrial Jurisprudence that if the domestic enquiry held by the employer was defective, deficient, incomplete or not held at all, the Tribunal instead of remanding the case to the enquiry officer for holding the enquiry de novo, would itself require the parties to produce their evidence so as to decide whether the charges, for which discplinary action was taken against the employee, were established or not. Mr. Agrawal, laid emphasis on the words would itself require and canvassed that as per mandate of the K.G. Sangameshwarans case (supra) the Labour Court itself suo motu was bound to provide opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence so as to decide whether the charges for misconduct were established or not. Providing the opportunity to rebut the evidence of the employee on merit was not sufficient. Further opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of charge of mis-conduct was also required. It was also contended that direction in respect of 50% of the back wages are also illegal in view of State of UP. vs. Ved Pal Singh (2). Placing reliance on U.O.I. vs. Shri Bihari Lal Sidhana (3) learned counsel urged that reinstatement of the respondent No. 2 in the face of serious charges of misconduct would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of money. (4). On the other hand, Mr. Virendra Bandhu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 supported the impugned award and canvassed that ample opportunity for adducing evidence was provided to the petitioner and there is no jurisdictional error in the award. Reliance was placed on Sharkars case (4). (5). I have pondered over the matter and carefully weighed the material on record. (6). Virendra Bandhu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 supported the impugned award and canvassed that ample opportunity for adducing evidence was provided to the petitioner and there is no jurisdictional error in the award. Reliance was placed on Sharkars case (4). (5). I have pondered over the matter and carefully weighed the material on record. (6). Proviso appended to Sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for short the Act) provides that the Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be would rely only on the material on record and shall not take any fresh evidence. But their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co.s case (5) propounded that inspite of the prohibition contained in the proviso to Sec. 11-A of the Act the Tribunal, in order to satisfy itself as to the guilt of the person charged had the jurisdiction to take the fresh evidence where domestic enquiry was found defective. (7). It was again reiterated in the East India Hotels vs. Their Workmen (6), The Cooper Engineering vs. P.P. Mundha (7), Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. vs. T.B. Kadam (8) and Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. A.B. Zodge (9) that the parties have the right to adduce evidence before the Tribunal and the Tribunal can on the basis of such evidence, come to its own conclusion as to the guilt of the employee. (8). In K.G. Sangameshwarans case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Virendra Agra-wal learned counsel for the petitioner, an application to produce the evidence in support of charges levelled against the respondent was filed before the Appellate Authority who had jurisdiction and power to record the evidence at the appellate stage as provided by sec. 41(2) read with Rule 9(3) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Rules 1948. K.G. Sangameswaran (for short KGS), an accountant was dismissed from service for serious misconduct including misappropriation. The order was challenged by KGS before the Appellate Authority, who allowed the appeal set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of KGS with full back wages. The order of dismissal was set aside by the Appellate Authority principally on the ground that the order of dismissal could not have been passed without first holding a domestic enquiry into the allegations made against KGS. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after analysing the provisions of sec. The order of dismissal was set aside by the Appellate Authority principally on the ground that the order of dismissal could not have been passed without first holding a domestic enquiry into the allegations made against KGS. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after analysing the provisions of sec. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act 1947 and Rule 9(3) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Rules 1948 observed that the Appellate Auth-ority had the jurisdiction to take evidence at the appellate stage and to come to its own conclusion about the guilt of the delinquent employee KGS. In para 26 of the said judgment it was indicated by their Lordships thus- ``The Appellate Authority, therefore, committed grave error in the exercise of its jurisdiction by not disposing of the application of the appellant for additional evidence and proceeding to dispose of the appeal on the ground that the order of dismissal having been passed without holding a domestic enquiry, was bad in law. (9). In the case on hand the petitioner produced the evidence on the merits as has been admitted in ground `D of the writ petition thus- ``D-Because the learned Labour Judge has given an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the merits and the parties have by implied permission lead evidence regarding the misconduct. The learned Judge ought to have thereafter decided the matter on the basis of material on record as required by the proviso to sec. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. If the petitioner wanted to produce additional evidence an application in this regard could have been filed but it cannot be said that Labour Court itself had to observe that it wanted to decide the matter treating the dismissal based on no enquiry and thus was duty bound to provide opportunity to produce additional evi-dence to the petitioner. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with Mr. Agrawal learned counsel that words `would itself require used in para 12 of KG Sangameswarans case (supra) canvassed that the Labour Court suo motu was bound to provide opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with Mr. Agrawal learned counsel that words `would itself require used in para 12 of KG Sangameswarans case (supra) canvassed that the Labour Court suo motu was bound to provide opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. These words were used in the facts and circumstances of KGS case in view of the fact that application to produce additional evidence was filed before the Appellate Authority by the employer and there was such provision in Sec. 41(2) and Rule 9(3) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act and Rules. (10). Other arguments of Mr. Agrawal learned counsel relate to finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court on the basis of the appreciation of evidence of the parties. It was held in Dhoarngdhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. Saurashtra State (10) that ``The High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was not competent to set aside the finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. (11). While exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, judgment of the Labour Court cannot be examined by this court as an appellate court. The finding of the subordinate court can only be upset if there is an error of jurisdiction which I do not find in the impugned judgment. (12). The writ petition thus fails and stands dismissed. Costs easy.