JUDGMENT This is second appeal by tenants against the concurring judgment of District Judge, Rajnandgaon in Civil Appeal No. 9-A/81 passed on 4.4.1989 confirming the trial Court's decree of eviction against the tenants in favour of the landlord in respect of suit premises passed by Civil Judge Class-II, Rajnandgaon, in Civil Suit No. 136-A/79 decided on 15.1.1981. The disputed premises is residential house, admittedly let out to appellants/ defendants. It has been found by the Courts-below that it was let out for residential purpose only, and the landlord the present respondent needs the premises for her own residence bonafidely and she has no other suitable residential accommodation to satisfy her need. These are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court. The defendants had challenged the claim of the plaintiff denying her bonafide need and also urging that the premises had been taken for residential-cum-commercial purpose. However, both these assertions were negatived by both the Courts. The second appeal was admitted on the following questions of law as substantial questions : (i) Whether the Courts-below were right in holding that there was no alternative suitable accommodation available to the plaintiff/respondent ? (ii) Whether the Courts-below were right in granting a decree for eviction to the plaintiff/respondent under section 12(1) (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act? Learned counsel for the appellants has taken this Court through the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence on record. The disputed house is in an area of 21 ft. x 29 ft. It has not been argued before this Court nor a question about it was framed whether there is a flaw in the finding that the premises was let out only for residential purpose. The plaintiff had pleaded in her plaint that she did not own or possess any other house in Rajnandgaon Town where the disputed house is situated and she was residing herself in a tenanted house and so she needed this house for her own residence bonafidely. The defendants had pleaded that apart from the disputed house the plaintiff had another family house (KHANDANI MAKAN). The defendants expressed ignorance as to where the plaintiff was residing. It was not urged that she was in possession of any KHANDANI MAKAN. It was pleaded that she wanted to raise the rent and that is the only reason for filing the suit. The defendants expressed ignorance as to where the plaintiff was residing. It was not urged that she was in possession of any KHANDANI MAKAN. It was pleaded that she wanted to raise the rent and that is the only reason for filing the suit. Learned counsel for the appellants in the second appeal has put only one assertion, that the plaintiff, in her statement in the Court, admitted that there was a family house in which her father Champalal and her two brothers; Namichand and Kesharchand used to reside and the house belonged to her grand-father once and presently Ghewar Chand son of Nemichand is only residing in that house. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants is that the plaintiff did not plead that there was such a family house which was not available to her or was not in her possession or was insufficient for her residence. It is urged that the very fact that her father Champalal had a l/3rd share in his house suggests that after the death of Champalal she must have inherited a share in the house, presumably 1/9th share as she has one sister and one brother namely Pukhraj. The size of that house was not known. So it is urged that the inference should be taken that she had failed to prove the bona fide need of the disputed premises as she had failed to establish that no other premises suitable for accommodation is available to her. After going through the judgment of the trial Court as well as of the first appellate Court, this Court finds that all these aspects have been properly dealt with. Ghewar Chand appeared in the witness box as PW 3. He is presently residing in the so cal1ed family house at Sadar Bazar, Rajnandgaon. He has asserted that apart from the disputed house Meena Bai plaintiff has no other house and she has no right in the Sadar Bazar House. He, of course, stated that Meena Bai plaintiff was residing on rent in a tenanted house. She had purchased this disputed house. He admitted that Sadar Bazar house belonged to his grand-father, but, he had been residing in the same house (HUM LOG RAHATE AA RAHE HAI). He does not know when there was any partition. He does not know if Champalal was given any share in this house. She had purchased this disputed house. He admitted that Sadar Bazar house belonged to his grand-father, but, he had been residing in the same house (HUM LOG RAHATE AA RAHE HAI). He does not know when there was any partition. He does not know if Champalal was given any share in this house. Plaintiff herself as PW I has stated all these aspects. There is no material on record to infer that the plaintiff is in possession of any portion of Sadar Bazar house where Ghewar Chand is residing or was in possession of the same at the time of filing of the suit. There is no material to suggest that Champalal got a share in that house and how it was that only Ghewar Chand and not family of Champalal was residing in that house. Plaintiff has stated that Pukhraj had purchased another house in the area of Gudakhu Line in Rajnandgaon and he was residing there. She sometime was residing with her brother Pukhraj. Pukhraj had built that house. There is no material on behalf of the defendants to establish that the plaintiff is in possession of any other house which may be available to her as a matter of right. In order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff on grounds of bona fide need for residence, it has to be shown that another house owned by her is available to her for residence being in her possession. If so, she may show that such house is not suitable for her residence. Here the first aspect is not brought on record. It is in fact established that she has no other house available to her for residence being in her possession or owned by her. This Court, therefore, finds that the inference taken by the trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court cannot be faulted and infact is factually and legally correct. This appeal has, therefore, no substance. The same is dismissed with costs.