JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—This petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated May 13, 1999 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sundernagar whereby the evidence of the petitioner/complainant (here-after referred to as the complainant) in Criminal Complaint No. 556-1/93, under Sections 463/197 of the Indian Penal Code has been closed. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 3. The evidence has been closed by the learned trial Magistrate on the ground that recording of the prosecution evidence is required to be completed within a period of two years from the date of the framing of charges for the commission of offences in which the maximum punishment provided may be imprisonment upto seven years. In the instant case the maximum punishment prescribed is imprisonment of seven years, but the recording of the post charge evidence of the complainant was not completed within two years, therefore, the evidence of the complainant stood closed. 4. Be it stated that the time limit for completion of recording of prosecution evidence within two years from the date of framing of the charge in a case where the maximum term of imprisonment provided as punishment is upto seven years, is not specifically provided for under the statute but is the law as laid down by the Honble Apex Court, therefore, to properly appreciate the controversy in hand, a reference may be made to the relevant cases wherein such law has been laid down by. the Honble Apex Court. 5. In case "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India and others, (1996) 4 SCC 33, the Honble Supreme Court with a view to protect and effectuate the right to life and liberty of the citizens guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and to ensure that criminal prosecutions do not operate as engines of oppression, issued the following directions to be followed in the length and breadth of the country: "1. (a) Where the offences under IPC or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any criminal court are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three years with or without fine and if trials for such offences are pending for one year or more and the accused concerned have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of six months or more, the criminal court concerned shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be found necessary, in the light of Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (b) Where the offences under IPC or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any criminal court are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five years, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences are pending for two years or more and the accused concerned have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of six months or more, the criminal court concerned shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to the imposing of suitable conditions, if any, in the light of Section 437, Cr.P.C. (c) Where the offences under IPC or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any criminal court are punishable with seven years or less, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences are pending for two years or more and the accused concerned have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of one year or more, the criminal court concerned shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to imposing of suitable conditions, if any, in the light of Section 437, Cr.P.C." "2.(a) Where criminal proceedings are pending regarding traffic offences in any criminal court for more than two years on account of non-serving summons to the accused or for any other reason whatsoever, the court may discharge the accused and close the cases. (b) Where the cases pending in criminal courts for more than two years under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are compoundable with permission of the court and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal court shall, after hearing the public prosecutor and other parties represented before it or their advocates, discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (c) Where the cases pending in criminal courts tinder IPC or any other law for the time being in force pertain to offences which are non-cognizable and bailable and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (d) Where the cases pending in criminal courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are pending in connection with offences which are punishable with fine only and are not of recurring nature, and if such pendency is for more than one year and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (e) Where the cases pending in criminal courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto one year, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than one year and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (f) Where the cases pending in criminal courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force the punishable with imprisonment up to three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases." "3. For the purpose of directions contained in clauses (1) and (2) above, the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused are summoned to appear in the court.” "4. For the purpose of directions contained in clauses (1) and (2) above, the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused are summoned to appear in the court.” "4. Directions (1) and (2) made hereinabove shall not apply to cases of offences involving (a) corruption, misapropriation of public funds, cheating, whether under the Indian Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or any other statute, (b) smuggling, foreign exchange violation and offences under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (c) Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Food Adulteration Act, Acts dealing with environment or any other economic offences, (d) offences under the Arms Act, 1959, Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987, (e) offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force, (f) offences against public tranquillity, (g) offences relating to public servants, (h) offences relating to coins and Government stamp, (i) offences relating to elections, (j) offences relating to giving false evidence and offences against public justice, (k) any other type of offences against the State, (1) offences under the taxing enactments and (m) offences of defamation as defined in Section 499 IPC." "5. The Criminal Courts shall try the offences mentioned in para (4) above on apriority basis. The High Courts are requested to issue necessary directions in this behalf to all the criminal courts under their control and supervision." (Emphasis supplied) 6. In case ‘Common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 775 , the Honble Apex Court clarified/ modified the instructions given in "Common Cause" case supra as under: "I. The time-limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paras 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused concerned or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of para 2 despite full co-operation by the accused concerned to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the accused concerned, nor is such delay caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per paras 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials against them." "II. The phrase "pendency of trials" as employed in paras l(a) to l(c) and the phrase "non-commencement of trial" as employed in paras 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under: (i) In cases of trials before the Sessions Court the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the cases concerned. (ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the accused concerned under Section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrates fee trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the Magistrate are asked under Section 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make." "III. (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrates fee trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the Magistrate are asked under Section 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make." "III. In para 4 of our judgment in the list of offences to which directions contained in paras 1 and 2 shall not apply, the following additions shall be made: (n) matrimonial offences under Indian Penal Code including Section 498-A or under any other law for the time being in force; (o) offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act including offences under Section 138 thereof; (p) offences relating to criminal mis-appropriation of property of the complainant as well as offences relating to criminal breach of trust under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law for the time being in force; (q) offences under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code or any offence pertaining to rash and negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law for the time being in force; (r) offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals as listed in Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code or such offences under any other law for the time being in force. 7. In case Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (AIR 1998 SC 3281), the Honble Supreme Court, in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued in the "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India cases (supra), issued the following further directions: "(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has been examined all the witnesses or not, within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial Court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial Court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the Court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by Clauses (i) to (iii)." 8. In case Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (JT 1999 (7) SC 317), while deciding the petition filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation, for clarification of the above directions, the Honble Supreme Court clarified some of the material aspects of the directions as follows: (i) If the trial gets postponed on account of pendency of any appeal or revision filed against any interim order even though there was no order of stay, it is open to the trial Court to reckon that period for being excluded from the period provided for completion of the prosecution evidence. (ii) If the prosecution evidence is closed in compliance with the directions contained in case Raj Deo Sharmas case (supra), it is still open to the prosecution to invoke the powers of the Court under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case, it is the duty of the Court to summon and examine or re-call and re-examine any such witness. (iii) Absence of the Presiding Officer in a trial Court is a valid cause which disables the prosecution from adducing evidence, therefore, such time can also be excluded by the Court from the period which has been prescribed for completing prosecution evidence. (iv) An additional period of one year can be claimed by the prosecution in respect of prosecutions which were pending on the date of judgment in Raj Deo Sharmas case (i.e. 8.10.1998) and the Court concerned would be free to grant such extension if the Court considers it necessary in the interest of administration of criminal justice. 9. As is evident from the above instructions, that these are not exhaustive to meet each and every eventuality which may arise to decide whether a certain period which lapsed for a particular purpose, is or is not to be excluded from the period prescribed for completion of the prosecution evidence. To decide its course of action in such eventuality which has not been specifically provided for, it is for the Court concerned to decide the further course of action in view of Instruction No. (iii) para 7 supra, that is to say that for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice, it is or is not—necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit. It is not possible to detail each and every exceptional circumstance where the Court may so grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence but a few of such circumstances may be where the parties and the witnesses of the prosecution are present but the statements of the prosecution witnesses may not be recorded because the Bar Members being on strike and thus the assistance to examine and cross-examine the witnesses being not available to the parties particularly where they are illiterate or semi-literate, where the parties, their counsel and prosecution witnesses are present but certain question about the admissibility of evidence is raised which the Court cannot decide there and then but takes its own time to decide such question resulting in non-examination of the witnesses who are present during the period when the question of admissibility remains under consideration with the Court, and where despite presence of the parties and the prosecution witnesses the prosecution evidence could not be recorded for a reason attributable to the inability of the Court to record such evidence. It is in such and similar circumstances that the Court may have to exercise its discretion in granting further time within the scope of Instruction No. (iii) para 7 supra. The discretion in favour of grant of further time, however, is to be exercised on the basis of cogent and sound reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice. 10. I now proceed to examine the matter in view of the abvoe instructions, clarifications, modifications and observations. 11. There is no dispute that the prescribed period of two years for recording of the prosecution evidence in the complaint is to be reckoned from March 28, 1995 when the charge against the accused was framed. Therefore, in the ordinary course such period would have expired on March 28, 1997. It is also not disputed that the accused preferred a Revision Petition against the order dated March 28, 1995 directing framing of the charge against him and as a consequence, the file was requisitioned by the Revisional Court. Though there was no order staying the proceedings before the trial Court but no further proceedings in the complaint could be taken in the trial Court due to requisitioning of the file by the Revisional Court from August 28, 1995 to November 29, 1996. Though there was no order staying the proceedings before the trial Court but no further proceedings in the complaint could be taken in the trial Court due to requisitioning of the file by the Revisional Court from August 28, 1995 to November 29, 1996. Even after November 29, 1996 the complainant had no notice of the file having been received back by the trial Court which directed issue of notice to the complainant who was served for appearance on December 13, 1996 when he appeared in the trial Court. Thus, the period from August 28, 1995 to December 13, 1996, i.e. one year three months, 21 days, will have to be excluded for computing the prescribed period of two years for completing prosecution evidence in view of the instruction No. (i) para 8 supra. 12. After the framing of the charge, the case was fixed for evidence of complainant on April 18, 1995, when the Presiding Officer of the Court was not present. Thereafter the case came up on April 25, 1999 when the accused was not present and his presence was secured on May 18, 1995. Thus, non-recording of the evidence of the complainant during the period from March 29, 1995 to May 18, 1995 is not attributable to any lapse on the part of the complainant but is attributable to the absence of the Presiding Officer and the accused on the due dates. Hence this period of one month 19 days is also liable to be excluded from the time prescribed for completion of recording of prosecution evidence in view of instruction No. (iii) para 8 supra and Instruction No. (iv) para 7 supra. 13. On December 13, 1996 when the parties were present, the Presiding Officer was again not present and no effective order in the matter could be passed during the period from December 13, 1996 to December 20, 1996 due to such absence. Hence this period of seven days is also liable to be excluded from the prescribed period, in view of instruction No. (iii) para 8 supra.7 14. Vide order dated December 20, 1996, the case was fixed for evidence of the complainant on January 20, 1996 when some witnesses of the complainant were present but could not be examined because the Members of the Bar Association were on strike. The case was adjourned for January 21, 1996. Vide order dated December 20, 1996, the case was fixed for evidence of the complainant on January 20, 1996 when some witnesses of the complainant were present but could not be examined because the Members of the Bar Association were on strike. The case was adjourned for January 21, 1996. However, the prosecution witnesses, two of whom were present, could not be examined because an application under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed for the accused which was dismissed on January 28, 1997. Since the adjournments caused in between were beyond the control of the complainant, therefore, the period from December 20, 1996 to January 28, 1997, i.e. one month 9 days, is also liable to be excluded from the prescribed period in view of the Instructions No. (iii) and (iv) para 7 supra. 15. Again, during the period from May 27, 1997 to June 18, 1997 when the case was listed for prosecution evidence on June 9, 1997, no effective proceedings could take place because of the post of Presiding Officer lying vacant. Vide order dated June 18, 1997, the case was fixed for evidence of the complainant on August 11, 1997 when two witnesses were present but the Presiding Officer was on leave with the result that no further effective proceedings, in the case were conducted till September 17, 1997. During the period from November 1, 1997, when the complainant was directed to produce evidence, to December 29, 1997 no effective proceedings took place due to the absence on leave of the Presiding Officer on December 4, 1997 and December 18, 1997 when the case happened to be listed. Therefore, the intervening period of three months, 28 days is also liable to be excluded while computing the prescribed period in view of the Instruction No. (iii) para 8 supra. 16. In view of the aforementioned permissible deductions, in all, a period of one year, ten months 24 days is liable to be excluded from being reckoned for computing the prescribed period for completion of the recording of prosecution evidence. Computed after deduction of the aforesaid period, said prescribed period would have expired on February 2, 1999 (i.e. 28.3.1995 + 2 years prescribed period + 1 year 10 months 24 days = 20.2.1999). 17. Computed after deduction of the aforesaid period, said prescribed period would have expired on February 2, 1999 (i.e. 28.3.1995 + 2 years prescribed period + 1 year 10 months 24 days = 20.2.1999). 17. The prosecution evidence was closed in the case on January 15, 1998 and thus the recording of evidence was concluded within the available prescribed period. 18. The matter, however, does not end here. The case was listed for statement of accused on February 4, 1998, February 18, 1998, April 2, 1998 and May 2, 1998. On the former three days the case was adjourned on the requests made by the accused. On May 2, 1998, an application was moved by the complainant for getting specimen signatures/thumb impressions for comparison for the disputed signatures/thumb impressions intended to be sent to the Examiner Questioned Documents. The application was allowed by the trial Court on September 14, 1998 and after taking the requisite signatures/thumb impressions on September 23, 1998, the concerned papers were ordered to be sent to the Government Examiner Questioned Document, Shimla. After requesting for some original papers, the Examiner submitted his report which appears to have been received by the trial Court on or before February 18, 1999 but after December 21, 1998. Evidently, this exercise was undertaken to bring on record additional evidence, otherwise the evidence of the complainant had been closed on January 15, 1998. While allowing the application under reference, the trial Court vide order dated September 14, 1998, observed as under : "The controversy inter se the parties relates to the preparation of false documents. The signatures/thumb impressions of the above noted witnesses are disputed on the said false document/affidavit. The comparison of the admitted signatures or thumb impressions of these persons with affidavit in question could help the court to settle the dispute in its proper perspective. The accused also does not oppose comparison of these signatures/thumb impressions from the expert. Therefore, I allow the application of the complainant and order the presence of the aforesaid witnesses for 22.9.1998 on p.f. Necessary charges to the tune of Rs. 1,000/- be also deposited within 7 days." (Emphasis supplied) 19. The accused also does not oppose comparison of these signatures/thumb impressions from the expert. Therefore, I allow the application of the complainant and order the presence of the aforesaid witnesses for 22.9.1998 on p.f. Necessary charges to the tune of Rs. 1,000/- be also deposited within 7 days." (Emphasis supplied) 19. A bare perusal of the above makes it clear that the trial Court was satisfied that the comparison of the disputed and specimen signatures/thumb impressions could help the Court to decide the case properly, that is in a just manner, and the request for such comparison was not opposed even by the accused. Therefore, in view of Instruction No. (ii) para 8 supa, the time taken in securing such report, which was beyond the control of the complainant to enlarge or shorten, and the requisite reasonable time, if any, which may be required to prove the report, cannot be counted against the prescribed period for completion of prosecution evidence. 20. It may also be pointed out that the case was pending on October 8, 1998. Therefore, the trial Court if satisfied, as it was in view of its order dated September 14, 1998, that comparison of the disputed signatures/thumb impressions would help in deciding the case in a just manner, it could allow an additional period upto one year to bring on record the material evidence which finally would have been in the interest of administration of criminal justice in view of the Instruction (iv) para 7 supra. 21. While directing the closure of the evidence of the complainant vide its order dated May 13, 1999, the trial Court while referring to the case AIR 1998 SC 3281 (supra), observed, "Taken into consideration the verdict delivered by the Honble Apex Court in the aforesaid authority it is safe to conclude that the evidence of the complainant is required to be closed by the order of the Court."^ Evidently, the learned Magistrate leaned in favour of safer course than the letter and spirit of the law as interpreted and laid down by the Honble Supreme Court. Therefore, having acted under misconception of the law as it is, the learned trial Magistrate failed to exercise the jurisdiction which vested in him in accordance with law. The impugned order, therefore, is unsustainable. 22. Therefore, having acted under misconception of the law as it is, the learned trial Magistrate failed to exercise the jurisdiction which vested in him in accordance with law. The impugned order, therefore, is unsustainable. 22. As a result, this petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the application of the accused for closure of prosecution evidence is dismissed. The learned trial Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case from the stage it was immediately before the application for closing the evidence of the complainant was presented by the accused. The case be taken for hearing on day-to-day basis and be disposed of preferably by December 31, 1999. 23. The parties, through their learned counsel, are directed to appear in the trial Court on 26.10.1999. 24. Records of the trial Court be returned forthwith. Petition allowed.