Munikanniah, J.- This revision petition is before us having been referred, to a Bench by our learned brother, Jaganmohan Reddy, J. The relevant facts to be noticed are: In C.C. No. 353 of 1959 on the file of the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Tanuku, seven accused were charge-sheeted for offences punishable under sections 147 and 323, Indian Penal Code. On 12th March, 1959, the learned Magistrate discharged accused 4 to 7 under section 251-A (2), Criminal Procedure Code, as, in his opinion, the charge against them is groundless, and the trial proceeded against the other accused, viz., accused 1 to 3. The complainant filed a revision application under section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against this order of discharge and it was heard by the Additional Sessions Judge, Eluru. It was urged before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, who discharged the accused, did not assign in support of the order any reasons and that therefore the order of discharge was liable to be set aside. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on an examination of the statements recorded separately by the Sub-Inspector and the Circle Inspector under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, found that accused 4 to 7 were implicated only in the statements given before the Circle Inspector while nothing incriminating against these accused was stated before the Sub-Inspector and the statements of some of the witnesses were conflicting, and therefore felt that there was justification for the order of discharge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that no reasons need be given for discharging the accused under section 251-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code . He further sought to rely upon the decision of Govinda Menon, J., reported in Jayaraman, In re1, for holding that the proper time when the propriety of the order of discharge could be agitated in revision is only after the Court of enquiry or trial has finally disposed of the matter and that therefore the revision petition was not maintainable. As against this dismissal of the revision petition, the complainant preferred to this Court a further revision application which is now before us. As against this dismissal of the revision petition, the complainant preferred to this Court a further revision application which is now before us. The questions referred to the Bench are the following.- (1) Whether a revision lies against an order of discharge made by the Magistrate in respect of some accused pending final disposal of the case; and (2) Whether it is not necessary for the Magistrate while discharging the accused to give reasons therefor under section 251-A (2), Criminal Procedure Code. It is convenient to deal first with the second question. In support of the contention that it is not necessary to give reasons while discharging some of the accused when the case is pending against others, the wording of sections 251-A (2) and 253, Criminal Procedure Code, are sought to be contrasted. To enable a comparative study of them, they are set down hereunder: "251-A. (2) If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173 and such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge him." "253. (1) If upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 252, and making such examination making (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case, if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless." The absence of the words "for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate (found and underscored by us in sub-section (2) of section 253) in the language of the sub-section (2) of section 251-A is particularly stressed in support of this contention. It is urged that no reasons need be given by a Court when some accused are discharged in a case instituted on a police report. It is urged that no reasons need be given by a Court when some accused are discharged in a case instituted on a police report. Buta minute examination of these provisions, having regard to their setting and the purpose each one of them seeks to serve as individual distinct conceptions of the functions of a Court, makes it possible to postulate that though the absence of those words or anything parallel to subsection (2) of section 253 is deliberate, the assigning of the reasons by a Court that the charge is groundless is not meant to be dispensed with altogether. Section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, governs the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report. It is inserted by Act XXVI of 1955. The scheme adumbrated for speedy conclusion of committal proceedings dispenses with the hearing of the complainant (if any) and the taking of all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and the summoning of witnesses mentioned by the complainant or of persons otherwise ascertained as likely to be acquainted with the facts, as will be the case with the trial of a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report. The Magistrate has not also to find before discharging an accused that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction. On the other hand, what is required to be done by adopting the altered procedure prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 251-A, i.e., in a case instituted on a police report, is a consideration by the Magistrate of all the documents referred to in section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate is given the discretion of making an examination of the accused only when he thinks it is necessary; he has merely to give the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard and thereafter if he considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. It is clear that while proceeding under section 253, Criminal Procedure Code, certain pre-requisites are prescribed in order to find out no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, and that simpler procedure has been provided to enable the Magistrate in a case instituted on a police report to find out whether the charge against the accused is groundless. Nevertheless in either case, it cannot be said that it is intended by the Code that the discharge of an accused could be for no reason whatsoever. Sub-section (1) of section 253 and sub-section (2) of section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, provide, in our view, the power for a Court to discharge an accused, only if the procedure laid down in each category of cases as specified by the respective section, is observed. In a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the finding that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, is necessary to be reasoned out by a Court in order to discharge an accused; it is as well that why the Court considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, should also be specified while an order is passed by a Magistrate in a case instituted on a police report. Having regard therefore to the language in which these sections are couched it is incumbent upon the Magistrate not to act arbitrarily but only make the orders of discharge dependent upon intelligible reasons. The fact that in sub-section (1) of section 253 and sub-section (2) of section 251-A there was no express direction to give reasons does not dispense with or discard the need to give reasons. There is therefore no room for the contention that reasons are not required to be given in either case while orders discharging the accused are passed. We will now advert to the significance of the present sub-section (2) of section 253 and the absence of a similar provision in section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code. It is obvious that in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution or other evidence of persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case has to be taken by the Magistrate before the accused is discharged under sub-section (1) of section 253. There is also the examination of the complainant to precede the taking of the evidence and the examination of the accused by the Magistrate is also to follow the taking of the evidence. There is also the examination of the complainant to precede the taking of the evidence and the examination of the accused by the Magistrate is also to follow the taking of the evidence. As these stages are contemplated in the procedure to be followed in cases of private complaint, sub-section (2) of section 253 should have been found necessary to be enacted so that any stage in that case before an order of discharge is passed under sub-section (1) of section 253 the Magistrate could, if he considers the charge to be ‘groundless’ discharge the accused stating the reasons for doing so. In as much as the power to discharge before the recording of the whole evidence for the prosecution is made to be dependent upon the opinion of the Magistrate that the charge is groundless, there is specific direction in sub-section (2) of section 253 that the reasons therefor shall be recorded. This is only a pointer to the caution administered by the Legislature by enacting this provision that while it is necessary while acting under sub-section (1) of section 253 for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that no case has been made out as stated therein, the discharge of an accused in a previous stage of the case should be for stated reasons making out how the charge against the discharged accused is groundless. Thus reading the purpose for giving the direction in the section itself while acting under sub-section (2) of section 253, it is not reasonable or justifiable to suppose that reasons for discharging an accused under sub-section (1) of section 253 are thought unnecessary or otiose; so also in our view is the case with reference to Courts which discharge the accused under the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 251-A. It is also pertinent to observe that a provision parallel to sub-section (2) of section 253 is omitted to be inserted in section 251-A for the obvious reason that in the simplified procedure to be adopted under section 251-A for a case instituted on a police report, no stages such as the taking of evidence or the examination of the complainant or the summoning of persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case have been contemplated: but only a consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173, Criminal Procedure Code and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, presumably to be done in the course of the same hearing. Therefore, not only do we find the absence of a parallel to sub-section (2) of section 253 but also the justification for not stating in sub-section (2) of section 251-A that the reasons are to be recorded. It is thus clear that even without these words, as already observed by us, reasons are necessary to be given for discharging the accused; and the giving of reasons are not to be avoided ordinarily in any case when the discharge is in any previous stage of the case as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 253, Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Gangadhara Rao for the petitioner drew our attention to the employment of the words “record his reasons and discharge the accused” contained in subsection (1) of section 209 and to the similarity of the wording of sub-section (2) of section 209 to those of sub-section (2) of section 253. No doubt, sections 209 and 253 may be considered as parallel provisions pertaining to the discharge of an accused by a Magistrate enquiring into the cases triable by a Court of Session or a High Court and a Magistrate trying a warrant case, respectively. No doubt, sections 209 and 253 may be considered as parallel provisions pertaining to the discharge of an accused by a Magistrate enquiring into the cases triable by a Court of Session or a High Court and a Magistrate trying a warrant case, respectively. But once the purport of sub-section (1) of section 209 is noted, which is, that not only that the accused in that case is discharged, not because the charge in groundless or that no prima facie case against the accused has been made out, but the Magistrate considers that the accused has to be tried before himself, or some other Magistrate for offences for which no committal to Sessions Court is necessary, the specific directions that the Magistrate shall record reasons why the Magistrate considers so at that stage becomes intelligible. No doubt sub-section (6) of section 207-A which is in respect of an inquiry into a case instituted on a police report and triable by a Sessions Court contains the direction that the Magistrate shall record his reasons for discharging the accused. But again the discharge contemplated in that sub-section is only when the view of the Magistrate is similarly that the discharged accused should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate. So, what we have said in regard to the discharge under section 209 will equally apply to a discharge of the accused under this sub-section. It is, however, useful to have to refer to sub-section (2) of section 213 which is in respect of discharging the accused after cancelling the charge if there are no sufficient grounds in the view of the Magistrate to commit the accused. It is not stated therein that the reasons are to be recorded; nevertheless, we consider the fact that the Magistrate can act under this provision, if there are no sufficient grounds for committing the accused, implies, that the Magistrate shall give the reasons therefor as no Magistrate can annul a charge arbitrarily. Thus it will be seen there is no incongruity in the phraseology with which the sections referred to above have been couched, but that appropriate expressions suitable for the purpose for which these provisions are made, have been employed; and in any case the giving of reasons for any action taken by a Magistrate under these provisions cannot be said to have been done away with. Nor could it be said that it would accord with the accredited principles of justice and fairplay that when the Magistrate is required to find whether the situation such as these described in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, he could ever do so without assigning reasons therefor. On this analogy also, we are unable to find support for the contention that no reasons should be given by a Magistrate discharging an accused while trying a warrant case. The position where there are more than one accused and the order of discharge is in respect of some of them is not peculiar only to cases governed by section 253 but fall also to be dealt with under sub-section (2) of section 251-A. As such, some of the accused may be discharged in any previous stage of the proceedings as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 253 or while acting under sub-section (1) of section 253 or under sub-section (2) of section 251-A. But it makes little difference whether the sole accused or some of the accused are discharged. What has to be found by the Magistrate in each of these cases is whether the charge or charges are groundless. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in the case reported in Kasinatha Pillai v. Shanmugam Pillai1, has construed when a charge could be considered groundless. There it is not the non-disclosure of an offence that is made the criterion, but the opinion of the Magistrate that the evidence is such that no conviction could be rested on it should be available in order to justify that the charge against the accused who have been ordered to be discharged is ‘groundless’. This opinion, though given when section 251-A was not inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, will hold the field even in the altered situation where it is the record alone that has primarily to be looked into by the committal Court. It is needless also to point out that judicial opinion has been incessantly stressing the need for any and every judicial order to be of a speaking type. It is needless also to point out that judicial opinion has been incessantly stressing the need for any and every judicial order to be of a speaking type. The reasons for insisting on such a course have been that to a Court passing such an order arbitrariness should not be ascribed and that the revisional Court will always be able to judge the reasonableness of the order without having to find its own reasons to uphold the order of the Magistrate. We therefore, find no justification whatsoever for Magistrates while discharging accused to depart from this salutary principle. Our attention has been invited to the decision of Govinda Menon, J., in Jayaraman, In re2. The learned Judge has no doubt observed that: “it would not be proper for a Magistrate discharging some accused and framing charges against others to express at that stage any definite opinion regarding the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses examined for the prosecution.” It is therein held that since by framing the charge against the other accused the Court should be deemed to be in seisin of the whole case, reasons for the discharge of the accused could be given when the case is disposed of by a final order. In this view, the learned Judge indeed came to the conclusion that no reasons need be given at the time when the order discharging some accused is passed and that applications by the prosecution for setting aside orders of discharge in cases where charges have been framed against some of the accused alone, or against all the accused under some sections, should be made only after the Court finally disposed of the matter. The learned Judge relied upon an earlier decision in Govindaraj, In re3, where Venkataramana Rao, J., held the same view. The learned Judge relied upon an earlier decision in Govindaraj, In re3, where Venkataramana Rao, J., held the same view. But even the portion extracted by Govinda Menon, J., from that other judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J., and also the facts of the earlier case reveal that the Magistrate who was not giving the reasons at the time when he pronounced the order of discharge had only deferred to give the reasons, and put it off till the time of the final order, as that Magistrate felt having regard to that particular case that the parties would be embarrassed if the reasons were to be stated at that stage Thus the decision in Govindaraj, In re3, turned upon the question whether the Magistrate in doing so was acting illegally under such circumstances in withholding his reasons and postponing them till the final order in the case. This limited question was answered by Venkataramana Rao, J., by pointing out that the Magistrate in reserving the reasons till the final order, has not become functus officio in respect of the discharged accused. We are of the opinion therefore that the principle so enunciated by these two decisions is not meant to be of a general application but to a case of the nature which was before Venkataramana Rao, J. Such indeed is the proper way of looking at the observations of Govinda Menon, J., in Jayaraman, In re2, finds justification in the remarks of Balakrishna Ayyar,J., in Nalla Baligadu, In re1, and also that of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in the same decision at page 810 which runs thus: “But I do not think the learned Judge intended to lay down any invariable rule. These remarks should be understood with reference to the circumstances of the case.” It is further necessary to notice that the decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., and Govinda Menon, J., in Govindaraj, In re2, and in Jayaraman, In re3 respectively were rendered with reference to the provisions of section 253 only and that no direct authority in regard to an order of discharge falling under sub-section (2) of section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, has been placed before us. On the second point, we therefore conclude that our view for the above reasons is that an order of discharge passed under sub-section (2) of section 251-A should contain the reasons of the Magistrate as to why the charge against the accused proposed to be discharged are groundless in the accepted sense and meaning given to that word by the Division Bench in Kasinatha Pillai v. Shanmugam Pillai4. We will now take up the question whether a revision lies against an order of discharge made by the Magistrate in respect of some accused pending final disposal of the case. Some controversy seems to have centered round the position whether when the giving of reasons for discharging some of the accused or the accused of some charges is deferred till the end of the trial, the order of the Magistrate which does not contain the reasons could be taken in revision under sections 435 and 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A view has indeed been expressed by Govinda Menon, J., in Jayaraman, In re3, that as a matter of practice and convenience all applications made by the prosecution for setting aside orders of discharge should be made only after the Court finally disposed of the matter. But this has been considered by the Full Bench in Nalla Baligadu, In re1, and Balakrishna Ayyar, J., thought that Govinda Menon, J., did not intend to lay down any firm and inflexible rule. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., observed at page 805 as follows: “At what stage the revisional authority should be moved and at what stage it should interfere would in a very material degree depend upon the facts peculiar to each case.” To the same effect is the observation of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) as expressed in the separate though concurring judgment. The Full Bench were concerned with the questions of the order of a discharge of the accused under section 209, Criminal Procedure Code. There, the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Pulivendla, before whom the charge-sheet was laid, held an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Criminal Procedure Code and however directed that the accused shall be charged for various other offences the evidence disclosed and tried before him. Thus after an enquiry under Chapter XVIII, the proceedings were converted into one under Chapter XXI of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus after an enquiry under Chapter XVIII, the proceedings were converted into one under Chapter XXI of the Criminal Procedure Code. The revision preferred by the prosecution as against this order of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate w£.s allowed by the District Magistrate. Thereupon the High Court was moved to revise the order of the District Magistrate. Any assumption that it is only the conviction or an acquittal that gives rise to an order of discharge has been held to be improper. After holding that the observations of Govinda Menon, J., in Jayaraman, In re3, do not lay down any invariable rule, it was held that it is competent for the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge to revise the order of discharge without waiting for the termination of the proceedings before the Magistrate. The ratio of the decision of the Full Bench would, in our view equally govern the entertainment of revision applications against the order of discharge either under section 253 or under section 251-A. But what is contended by the petitioner herein is that when reasons are not given in an order discharging some of the accused or the reasons cannot be gathered in some form or the other from the order, an incurable irregularity has been committed which renders it possible to take the view that no order at all has been passed in such a case. Mr. Gangadhara Rao for the petitioner placed some reliance upon the case decided in Uttamrao v. Asru Hanwanta1. There, Bose, J., was considering an order of discharge passed under section 253(2), Criminal Procedure Code, by the trying Magistrate. Therein no reasons were given, nor was there material in that order to satisfy the High Court that the discharge was for good and proper cause. All that appeared in that order as the ground for discharging the accused is that as the complainant was absent, there was no evidence made available to the Court. The learned Judge therefore held that the absence of a complainant is not sufficient in cognizable and non-compoundable cases under Chapter XXI and also pointed out the difference between a summons case to which section 247 applied and a warrant case to which section 259 applied only if the offence is compound-able and non-cognizable. The learned Judge therefore held that the absence of a complainant is not sufficient in cognizable and non-compoundable cases under Chapter XXI and also pointed out the difference between a summons case to which section 247 applied and a warrant case to which section 259 applied only if the offence is compound-able and non-cognizable. The head-note which says "that the omission to record reasons for discharge is not a curable irregularity", is in our view misleading as in fact the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution that the omission to record reasons was a curable irregularity was merely noticed. The ratio actually turned upon the question whether there could be discharge for the reason that because the complainant was absent there was no evidence. Therefore, the approach to this question whether a revision lies against any order giving reasons or without the reason from the point of view of irregularity curable or otherwise is not the proper one. We cannot accept the extreme contention put forward by Mr. Gangadhara Rao that an order of discharge which does not contain reasons, is no order at all in the eye of the law and there is nothing for a revisional Court to revise. In our opinion, an order of discharge which on its face does not show reasons, is nonetheless an order passed by a competent Magistrate; it may be a bad order but it is nevertheless an order susceptible of being corrected by the Court of revision. The power of revision under section 435 or ordering further enquiry under section 436 is not made to be dependent upon the absence or presence of the reasons in that order of discharge. The correctness, legality and propriety of the order can be gone into by any Court which examines the order of discharge under its revisional powers and uphold the order of discharge or order further enquiry if it is satisfied that the order could not be taken without reasons or there is no justification for that order of discharge as the case may be. In this connection, we may also refer to the decision in Hanumantha Raju v. M. Ramanna2. It is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but it does not support the proposition that a revision is not entertainable because reasons in an order of discharge are not given. In this connection, we may also refer to the decision in Hanumantha Raju v. M. Ramanna2. It is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but it does not support the proposition that a revision is not entertainable because reasons in an order of discharge are not given. Therein, Subba Rao, C.J. (as he then was) was considering the correctness, legality and propriety of an order of the District Magistrate (Judicial) West Godavari, who dismissed a revision application filed against an order by the Sub-Magistrate discharging five of the seven accused before him. Though it appears that the absence of reasons in that order has been made a ground of attack to question the powers of the District Magistrate to entertain a revision against the order of the Stationary sub-Magistrate what has been actually laid down by Subba Rao, C.J., (as he then was) is that " when reasons are not given and when there are other circumstances making it not advisable tor the revisional Court to interfere at that stage, the revisional Court will be well within its rights in. dismissing the revision." It cannot therefore support an argument that a revision is incompetent against an order of discharge which does not give reasons therefor. The learned Judge has no doubt about the power to entertain a revision even against the orders or" discharge which do not contain the reasons, but only justifies the dismissal of the revision petition which has been entertained on the grounds as above stated. It is no doubt true that the Full Bench in Nulla Baligadu, In re3 were not concerned with an order of discharge where reasons are not given , for, the order it was considering contained reasons. Nevertheless, in our view, it is an authority that a revision will also lie against any order of discharge in respect of some accused or the accused of some of the offences even before the final order is passed after the trial of the accused for the charges framed against the undischarged accused. We would go further and point out that it is not always that the reasons for discharge of accused would overlap those for acquittal of the accused, and that it is especially so, inasmuch as the special procedure contained in sub-section (2) of section 251-A does not contemplate any discussion of the evidence which is not before it. We would go further and point out that it is not always that the reasons for discharge of accused would overlap those for acquittal of the accused, and that it is especially so, inasmuch as the special procedure contained in sub-section (2) of section 251-A does not contemplate any discussion of the evidence which is not before it. The giving of the reasons for discharging the accused is for this reason also inevitable. We feel therefore impelled to hold that a revision lies against an order of discharge made by a Magistrate in respect of some accused pending final disposal of the case, even if reasons are not given in that order itself. From what has been said above, it would not be correct for the Additional Sessions Judge, Eluru, to rely upon the decision in Jayaraman, In re1 and hold that a revision petition against the orders of the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Tanuku, is not competent. Further, there could be no dismissal of a revision application merely on the ground that the order of discharge does not assign any reasons in support of it. If the learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition on any of these grounds, we would not have necitated to interfere with the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Eluru. But we find that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has gone through the record and satisfied himself from the record that the statements of some of the witnesses are conflicting as accused 4 to 7 were implicated only in the statements given before the Circle Inspector while nothing incriminating against these accused was stated before the Sub-Inspector. We consider that this view of the Additional Sessions Judge provides the reasons even for the order of the Magistrate. In view of this we are unable to interfere with the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It follows that this petition should fail. It is therefore dismissed. A.S.R. ----- Petition dismissed.