R. H. ZAIDI, J. By means of this peti tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 20-12-1998 passed by Superintendent of Police, Pratapgarh, dismissing the petitioner from the post of the police constable (Civil ). 2. It appears that the petitioner while posted at police chowki, Dilip Pur, Khan-dai, District Pratapgarh married Smt. Rajesh Kumari, daughter of Adya Prasad, during the life-time of his first wife, in violation of the provisions of U. P. Govern ment Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Out of the said wedlock one daughter was also born to Smt. Rajesh Kumari. On receipt of the complaint against the petitioner preliminary enquiry was conducted at Pratapgarh. On the basis of the said preliminary enquiry, charge- sheet was framed, which was communicated to the petitioner along with show-cause notice. Petitioner submitted his reply. The dis ciplinary proceedings were conducted at Pratapgarh. In the meanwhile, petitioner was transferred from Pratapgarh to Rai Bareli. After following the procedure prescribed under the law, the impugned order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner, as the charge levelled against him was proved from the evidence on record. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the impugned order was based on wrong facts, it was mala fide and has been passed without following the procedure prescribed under the law. It was also urged that Superinten dent of Police, Pratapgarh has no jurisdic tion to pass the impugned order of dis missal, as on the date the order was passed, the petitioner was not posted at Pratap garh. 4. On the other hand, learned Stand ing Counsel objected to the main tainability of the writ petition, on the ground of availability of statutory alterna tive remedy. It was urged that the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner was appealable. Appeal lies to the next higher authority, to the appointing/punishing authority. Petitioner could also file a claim petition before the U. P. Public-Services Tribunal under Section 4 of U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, inasmuch the petitioner was Government Servant. The writ petition was therefore, liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Petitioner could also file a claim petition before the U. P. Public-Services Tribunal under Section 4 of U. P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, inasmuch the petitioner was Government Servant. The writ petition was therefore, liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Rule 20, of the U. P. Police Officers Subordinate Rank (Punishment and Ap peal) Rules, 1991 provides as under: "20. Appeal-- (1) Every Police Officer against whom an order of punishment mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii), or clause (a) and sub-clauses (i) to (iv) or clause (b) entitled to prefer an appeal against the order of such punishment to the authority mentioned below- (a) to the Deputy Inspector General, if the original order is of the Superintendent of Police or Officers empowered under sub- rule (4) of Rule 7 of these rules; (b) to the Inspector General, if the original order is of the Deputy Inspector General; (c) to the Director General, if the original order is of Inspector General; (d) to the State Government, if the original order is of Director General. (2) No appeal shall lie against an order inflicting any of the petty punishments enumerated in sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 4. (3) Every Officer desiring to prefer an appeal shall do so separately. (4) Every appeal, preferred under these rules shall contain all materials, statements, ar guments relied on by the police officers prefer ring the appeal and shall be complete in itself, but shall not contain disrespectful or improper language. Every appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of final order which is the subject of appeal. (5) Every appeal, whether the appellant is still in service of Government or not, shall be submitted through the Superintendent of Police of the district or in the case of Police Officers not employed in district work through the head of the office to which the appellant belongs or belonged. (6) An appeal will not be entertained un less it is preferred within three months from the date on which the Police Officer concerned was informed of the order of punishment. Provided that appellate authority may, at his discretion, for good cause shown extend the said period upto six months. (6) An appeal will not be entertained un less it is preferred within three months from the date on which the Police Officer concerned was informed of the order of punishment. Provided that appellate authority may, at his discretion, for good cause shown extend the said period upto six months. (7) If the appeal preferred does not comp ly with the provisions of sub-rule (4) the appel late authority may require the appellant to com ply with the provisions of the said sub-rule within one month of the notice of such order to him and if the appellant fails to make the above com pliance the appellate authority may dispose of the appeal in the manner as it deems fit. (8) The Director General or an Inspector General may, for reasons to be recorded in writ ing, either on his own motion or on request from an appellate authority before whom the appeal is pending transfer the same to any other officer of corresponding rank. " 7. Impugned order of dismissal has been passed by the competent authority i. e. Superintendent of Police, Praiapgarh, in exercise of powers under Rule 14 (1) read with Rule 4 (i) (a) of the said Rules. Impugned order of dismissal was, thus, appealable before the Deputy Inspector General the Police as provided under the afon straight away without approaching the appellate authority. 8. The other statutory remedy avail able to the petitioner is under Section 4 of the U. P Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976. Section 4 of the said Act reads as under: 4. Reference of claims to Tribunal-If any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment as such public servant his employer or any officer authority or authority subordinate to the employer has dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract, or- (a) in the case of a Government Servant, with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution. (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : He shall refer such claim to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal, thereon, shall subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, be final. " The second proviso to aforesaid sec tion also emphasizes upon exhaustion of departmental remedies. The petitioner could take all points, which are being raised by means of this petition before the appellate authority or before the Services Tribunal. Learned Standing Counsel, in my opinion, is right in his submission that the present petition was liable to be dis missed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy. A reference in this regard may be made to the following decisions :- 1. C. A. Abraham v. Income Tax. Officer, Kottayan andanother, AIR 1961sc609. 2. S. Jaga Deesai v. Ayya Dadar Ammal College andanother, (1984) 1scc158. 3. Jai Singh v. Union of India and other, AIR 1977 SC 898 . 4. Firm Har Prasad Sheodutt Rai v. Sales Tax Officer Bulandshahr, AIR 1959 (All) 246 . 9. Answer to the question as to whether the impugned order of dismissal was without jurisdiction, depends on several questions of fact. In the present case, admittedly occurrence has taken place at Pratapgarh, preliminary enquiry was conducted at Pratapgarh, charge-sheet was served at Pratapgarh and the petitioner submitted his explanation at Pratapgarh. Thereafter, the disciplinary proceedings were also conducted at Pratapgarh. Therefore, submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order was wholly without jurisdiction and the present petition was legally main tainoresaid rules. Petitioner has not availed the statutory alternative remedy, and filed the present petitiable, cannot be accepted. However, I, without expressing my opinion on the question of jurisdiction, finally uphold preliminary objection raised by learned Standing Counsel and, hold that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy. It is, however, ob served that the petitioner will be at liberty to avail any one of the aforesaid alterna tive remedies, if he is so advised. 10. Subject to what has been stated above, writ petition fails and is dismissed in limine. Writ Petition dismissed. .