Judgment P.K. Deb, J. Both these cases have been heard together and analogous as they arise out of the same judgment and decree. 2. The revision petition has been preferred by the defendant no.2 (alleged tenant) against the judgment and decree dated 16.9.1995 passed by the Second Addl. Munsif, Biharsharif, Nalanda, in Eviction Suit no. 20 of 1991 by which the suit has been decreed partially on the ground of personal necessity. First Appeal no. 123 of 1997 has been preferred by the plaintiff-opposite party Smt. Kamla Devi against the order of partial eviction alone which was in the form of inter change of the suit holdings between the plaintiff and defendants. First Appeal no. 123 of 1997 was originally filed before the District Judge, Nalanda, as Title Appeal no. 7 of 1995. 3. By an order dated 16.12.1996 passed by the Bench of this Court in Civil Revision petition, the title appeal was directed to be transferred to this Court from the Court of District Judge, Nalanda, for hearing the same along with the revision petition so that both can be disposed of together. Accordingly, the title appeal as mentioned above was withdrawn from the Court of the District Judge, Nalanda, to this Court and was re-numbered as First Appeal No. 123 of 1997 and as per order dated 16.12.1996 both the cases have been heard together and are being disposed of by the common judgment. 4. The facts of the case run as follow:- The suit holding which is holding no. 241 of Biharsharif Municipality stands on plot no. 33 of Khata no. 184 and contiguous holding as holding no. 242 also stands on the same plot. Originally both the holdings were owned by the husband of the plaintiff, namely, Mujeelal, who was working as a stamp vendor in the Civil Court. In the year 1971 the plaintiff has purchased both the holdings and the land beneath it from her husband by a registered deed of purchase and she started her own business of General Stores and of grocery in holding no. 242 while the holding no. 241 was originally inducted to one Madholal who was doing business in the name of a firm which was named as defendant no. 1 in the suit. After the death of Madholal, defendant no. 2 Bachi Devi started doing business in the shop house in holding no. 242 while the holding no. 241 was originally inducted to one Madholal who was doing business in the name of a firm which was named as defendant no. 1 in the suit. After the death of Madholal, defendant no. 2 Bachi Devi started doing business in the shop house in holding no. 242 and these happened only during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff filled the suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity and her requirement has been depicted in the plaint to the effect that her husband because of ailment and old age became bed-ridden and was having no income and she alone is doing business of General Stores and Kirana in holding no. 242 for earning her livelihood. But for better business her holding became too small and which requires to be broadened for keeping more articles for sale in the business and as such holding no. 241 was necessary to be vacated so that both the shops could be amalgamated for betterment of the business of the plaintiff. 5. Originally defendant Madholal contested the suit by filling written statement contending, inter alia, that the present suit is not maintainable as on the same ground. Plaintiff's husband Mujeelal filed the suit for eviction against him being Title Suit no. 62 of 1972 for personal necessity but the suit was dismissed and then the title appeal preferred being Title Appeal no. 51 of 1974 had also been dismissed. After dismissal of the earlier eviction suit the rent which was fixed earlier at Rs.34/- has been raised to Rs.125/and only as presurrising tactics for enhancement of rent the present suit has been filed through his wife by Madholal. It has further been stated that the present suit house is• the only earning source of the defendants for their livelihood and after the death of Madholal during the pendency of the suit his son Surendra Prasad is managing the business. The plaintiff's plea that the defendants have got other source of income when they have got shop and godown in the building of Zila Parishad was totally false rather the plaintiff's second son Sunil Kumar has got god own and shop house in the building of Zila Parishad. It is the further case of the defendants that the plaintiff has filed the suit only to pressurise the defendants to enhance the rent and nothing else. It is the further case of the defendants that the plaintiff has filed the suit only to pressurise the defendants to enhance the rent and nothing else. When the plea of personal necessity was once being rejected by the Court up to the appellate stage the same plea cannot be accepted in the present circumstances. On the basis of the pleadings the following issues were framed :-(i) Whether the plaintiff has cause of action for the suit and whether the suit is maintainable in its present form. (ii) Whether the suit is bad by law of limitation and the principle of waivers, estoppel and acquiescence. (iii) Whether the plaintiff has got bonafide personal necessity for getting the suit holding no. 201 vacated. (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of eviction. (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief in the suit. 6. For the (sic) on behalf of the plaintiff six witnesses have been examined while on behalf of the defendants ten D.Ws. have been examined. The plaintiff has examined her as P.W. 5 while P.W.6 is Ashok Kumar Sinha who was S-Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Court for the purpose of finding physical features of both the holdings, namely, holding nos. 241 and 242. Regarding personal necessity three other witnesses have been examined who had deposed that the plaintiff has got necessity of getting the suit holding vacated for broadening her shop house for the purpose of keeping more articles. Defendant has examined her on commission as D.W.10 and other witnesses have been examined only to deny the present necessity and also regarding the pressurrising tactics for enhancement of rent. 7. Learned Court below after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced came to the finding that the plaintiff has got the personal necessity to get her shop house broadened for keeping more articles for flourishing her business. It was further held that the small room which was behind the shop house in holding no. 242 was being used as a bathroom and cannot be utilised for the purpose of broadening the shop house in holding no. 242. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff has got her residential accommodation on the upper floor of both the holdings and it was also found in the Advocate Commissioner's report that there was no bathroom available in the residential accommodation. 242. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff has got her residential accommodation on the upper floor of both the holdings and it was also found in the Advocate Commissioner's report that there was no bathroom available in the residential accommodation. But after consideration of the Commissioner's report learned court below while considering partial eviction has held that as the house standing on the two holdings are old one, there was no possibility or there was apprehension of the house being damaged if the wall in between the two holdings are being broken for broadening the shop house of the plaintiff and as such he has ordered for eviction of the defendants from the suit holding on condition that the plaintiff would vacate her holding no. 241 wherein shop house has been situated for accommodation of the defendants. It is admitted fact as per the measurement given that the suit holding no. 241 has got greater area than the shop house of the plaintiff situated in holding no. 242. So such interchange has been ordered in the name of partial eviction. 8. Regarding the eviction decree passed, the defendants has filed the civil revision as stated already, but against the interchange of the two holdings in the name of partial eviction the plaintiff have filed the title appeal before the District Judge which has been transformed into First Appeal on being transferred to this Court. It has been argued strenuously in the revision petition that the plaintiffs are already doing business and their broadening of the shop house is only a plea for the purpose of getting the eviction decree. By referring to the evidence of D.W.3 it has been argued strenuously that the requirement as revealed from the side of the plaintiffs could not be termed as a reasonable requirement which was only a desire and a wish of the plaintiffs for the purpose of eviction of the tenant. It is the settled principle of law that merely desire or a wish does not construe the personal necessity as contemplated under Section 11 (1)(e). Requirement must be a reasonable one and a real and not an imaginary. The matter of personal requirement as contemplated under the Bihar Building Control Act has been interpreted by the court in various judgments and it was held that the personal necessity must be a real one differentiating from desire and wish. Requirement must be a reasonable one and a real and not an imaginary. The matter of personal requirement as contemplated under the Bihar Building Control Act has been interpreted by the court in various judgments and it was held that the personal necessity must be a real one differentiating from desire and wish. It must have a genuine reality in the circumstances of each case. 9. I have gone through the evidence of the plaintiffs' side. Three witnesses have been examined regarding the personal necessity of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff is a lady and is running the business for livelihood of her and her husband and she is having the necessity of getting the shop broadened for the purpose of keeping more articles for flourishing her shop business. She is having the shop not only General Stores but also a grocery one. So definitely she requires some more space for the purpose of broadening her shop house. Now whether the personal necessity as has been set up by the plaintiff can be challenged by the persons who are occupying the shop although they are not tenant in the terms and definition of tenant under the Act. It is an admitted fact that the business of the tenant are being looked after by the son. Plaintiff's wife Bachi Devi is not doing business and she has accepted the written statement filed by her husband. After the death of the husband, there remains limited scope for the son and the wife to challenge the personal necessity as set up by the plaintiff. In this respect a Division Bench Judgment of this Court as reported in 1985 PLJR 390 (Mrs. Veena Rani & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Isuati Amanullah & anr.) has been referred to from the side of the opposite parties and also a Single Bench judgment of this Court as reported in 1975 BBCJ 404 (Raghunandan Prasad vs. Deonandan Singh & Ors.). 10. After considering the evidence of both the parties, learned court below came to the finding that the plaintiff has got personal necessity to broaden her shop for flourishing her business and then her personal necessity is not an imaginary one but a real, bonafide and reasonable too. From the fact finding by the Court below there is limited scope of the revisional court to challenge the same or to interfere with same by re-appreciating evidence independently. From the fact finding by the Court below there is limited scope of the revisional court to challenge the same or to interfere with same by re-appreciating evidence independently. In this respect a judgment of this court as reported in 1993 (2) PLJR 127 (Sri Ram Padanath Dwivedi & anr. Vs. Shree Bhagwan Singh) may be referred to. Another judgment of this Court has also been referred to on this point by the learned counsel for the opposite parties as reported in 1996 (1) PLJR 465 (Smt. Manju Roy & Ors. Vs. Hira Mahto). 11. Thus I find that the issue of personal necessity as decided by the learned court below does not suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence on record. Evidence of both parties have been scrutinised for giving to the just decision with respect to the personal necessity. Thus the eviction decree on the ground of personal necessity cannot be interfered with by this Court. 12. Then comes the point of partial eviction. It appears that learned court below made a wrong approach in deciding this point of partial eviction. In the partial eviction he has practically passed order of interchange of the two shop houses between the plaintiff and defendants which can never be construed as legal one unless and until there is some sort of agreement between the landlord and the tenant. The question of partial eviction is to be decided in respect of the suit holding i.e. holding no. 241 alone and it cannot be embezzled with holding no. 242. There is no scope of interchange in the name of partial eviction. If the parties would have agreed to that proposal then perhaps such decree could have been passed for interchange but such agreement is not there between the parties then in the name of equitable relief as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure such order cannot be passed. The reasonings given regarding dillapidatedness of the house or apprehension that the house may collapse if for broadening the shop house the separating wall in between the holding nos. 241 and 242 is broken has got no substance as the plaintiff himself in her plaint at page-7 has specifically pleaded that both the holdings should be amalgamated for the purpose of keeping her more articles for flourishing of her business. 241 and 242 is broken has got no substance as the plaintiff himself in her plaint at page-7 has specifically pleaded that both the holdings should be amalgamated for the purpose of keeping her more articles for flourishing of her business. Then it became a burden of the plaintiff as to how she would get the separating wall removed for the purpose of broadening her shop and the court ought not to have stretched his imagination in that respect. It appears from the findings of the Court below that the whole of the suit holding was not required for the plaintiff for the purpose of broadening her shop and as such how much is needed is to be decided under the heading partial eviction. As the evidence is not there to that extent, the matter should go back on remand for deciding the issue of partial eviction afresh. In that view of the matter, the First appeal wherein the challenge is in respect of the interchange passed by the Court below in the impugned judgment is hereby allowed. The decree passed in the impugned judgment in the civil revision is hereby set aside and the matter is sent back to the court below for deciding the point of partial eviction afresh in the light of the observation made above. 13. Thus both the First Appeal and revision petition are disposed of but no order as to costs to either of the parties.