Jegde, J.- The State of Mysore has appealed against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Munsiff and First Class Magistrate, Mercara, in Criminal Case No. 163 of 1956. In that case the respondent Lt. Col. D.C. Basappa, a Planter and Proprietor of Madapur B. Estate was the accused. He was charged with the offences under sections 3(1)(a) and (j) read with section 4 of the Coorg Prohibition Act, 1956(which shall be hereinafter called ‘the Act’). But the learned Magistrate has acquitted him of both the charges. The prosecution case is that P.W. 6 (Sri R.R. Bangara, Deputy Superintendent of Police, North Coorg) having got information that the accused was in possession of prohibited liquor, obtained a search warrant on 25th September, 1956 from the First Class Magistrate, Mercara, for searching the house of the accused in Madapur for contraband excisable articles. According to the prosecution, the search party left Mercara at about 6-30 p.m.; it consisted of P.W. 6, P.W. 4 (Sri N.R. Suvarna, Deputy Superintendent of Police, South Coorg), P.W. 1(Sri K. B. Appachu, Sub-Inspector of Police, Mercara) and some Constables; they took along with them P.W. 2(Dr. A. M. Abubacker) and one Muddura Appayya as search witnesses; on reaching Madapur, they took two more witnesses with them, one of them being P.W. 5(K. Ponnappa); the party reached the bungalow of the accused at about 7-45 p.m.; after stationing some Constables round the house of the accused, P.W. 6 accompanied by P.Ws. 4, 1 and the search witnesses went and tapped at the front door; the door was opened by the accused; thereafter he was informed about the search warrant; while talking with the accused they found him smelling liquor; P.W. 6 ascertained from him whether he had a permit to possess or to consume liquor; but he was told that the accused had no such permit; thereupon the accused was arrested and a Mahazar Exhibit P-1 was prepared; thereafter they commenced the search of the accused’s house; in the pantry of the accused’s house, there was a cupboard; P.W. 6 asked the accused to open the cupboard; the accused opened the same with a key which he had with him; in that cupboard they found two bottles of White Horse Whisky, which are marked as M.Os. 1 and 2 in this case; Mahazar Exhibit P-2 was prepared for the seizure of those bottles; at the same time they also prepared the search list Exhibit P-3, a copy of which was served on the accused; on that night there were several guests in the house of the accused; they consisted of Mrs. and Mr. Morgan, Mrs. and Major Abuluwalia (C.W. 1) and Mrs. and Mr. Siddanna (D.W. 1) and Mr. Chikkanna; Mr. Chikkanna and Mr. Siddanna are the brothers of the accused; after the search of the house, the accused was sent to the Civil Assistant Surgeon at Madapur for examination; but the Civil Assistant Surgeon was not available, hence he was later on sent to the Civil Assistant Surgeon at Somwarpet, who is examined as P.W. 3 in this case; his report (Exhibit P-6) indicates that the accused was likely to have consumed alcohol; after the return of the accused from Somwarpet, P.W. 6 informed the accused that he would like to search his office and he wanted him to accompany him to his office premises which was about 2 furlongs from the bungalow; the accused declined to accompany him but asked his servants Sabu and Ganapathy to accompany the police party; the lock of the office premises was opened by the Head Clerk Sadasiva Shetty; the premises in question has three rooms, the centre room having a loft which was completly enclosed; P.W. 6 directed P.W. 1 to force an opening in the loft and it was accordingly done; inside the loft they found 64½ bottles of foreign liquor; those bottles were seized as per Exhibit P-5, out of those 64½ bottles, 3 bottles were Partner’ Port Wine, 2 bottles Devars White Label, 2 bottles Fiasha Sherry, 1 bottle Sandy Man Dry Amantilada, 1 bottle of Amantilada Sherry Shandy Man, 3 bottles of Kopke Club Sherry, 7 bottles Becks Beer, 9 bottles Martal Cognac, 2 bottles Pommerigrams, 6 bottles Crowfords Old Scotch Whisky, 1 bottle Vermouth Kora, 3 bottles Antizon Dorf, 2 bottles Extra Quality Very Dry Ag. Champagne, 1 bottle Bourough Dry Gin, 4 bottles Mory Brizard Crimi-De-Minku-Glosale, ½a bottle White Horse, 6 bottles Gordain’s Dry Gin, 2 bottles Heigs Gold Label Scotch Whisky and 9 bottles White Horse Haller Scotch Whisky; a Mahazar was prepared which is marked as Exhibit P-4 in this case. Champagne, 1 bottle Bourough Dry Gin, 4 bottles Mory Brizard Crimi-De-Minku-Glosale, ½a bottle White Horse, 6 bottles Gordain’s Dry Gin, 2 bottles Heigs Gold Label Scotch Whisky and 9 bottles White Horse Haller Scotch Whisky; a Mahazar was prepared which is marked as Exhibit P-4 in this case. The charge sheet in this case was laid on 29th September, 1956. On 22nd November, 1956, the prosecution applied for amending the charge sheet by including Sadasiva Shetty as a co-accused in the case. But this application was resisted by the accused and the trial Court was pleased to reject that explication observing: If information was received against any other person the investigation officer is at liberty to file a further charge-sheet against such person but no other person can be joined as an accused in this case." Evidently, the prosecution wanted to include Sadasiva Shetty as a co-accused for the reason that he had the key of the office premises and to meet a possible plea of the accused that he was not in possession of the 64½ , bottles of liquor seized from his office premises. As such an independent charge-sheet against Sadasiva Shetty may be of little avail to the prosecution and further it is likely to weaken the case against the accused. At any rate this order was not challenged in revision and it has become final. Before discussing the evidence in the case, one other circumstance may be mentioned. P.W. 1 was examined on 17th December, 1956; 4 more P.Ws. were examined on the 18th and the case was adjourned for the examination of P.W. 6 as he had been transferred out of Coorg in the meantime, and was serving in the Madras State. But on 18th December, 1956, the accused filed an application to summon Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness. It does not appear that the prosecution was heard before ordering the issue of summons to Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness. But on 17th January, 1957, after the examination of P.W. 6, when the Court proceeded to examine Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness, the learned Public Prosecutor appears to have objected to the same. It does not appear that the prosecution was heard before ordering the issue of summons to Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness. But on 17th January, 1957, after the examination of P.W. 6, when the Court proceeded to examine Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness, the learned Public Prosecutor appears to have objected to the same. From the notes maintained by the Court, it is seen that the Public Prosecutor had represented to the Court that there was no need to examine Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness at that stage and the question could be considered after the defence evidence was taken. The Court overruled that objection and examined Major Abuluwalia as a Court witness. Admittedly Major Abuluwalia is a good friend of the accused. He and his wife were spending their week-end with the accused at the time when the search in question was conducted It is seen from his evidence, that P.W. 6 searched the room occupied by his family in spite of protests from him. Evidently the prosecution thought it unsafe to examine him as its witness. It is nobody’s case that Major Abuluwalia would not have been available to the Court for examination at a later date. It is not known why the learned Magistrate chose to examine him as a Court witness at that stage of the case. The learned Magistrate has not given any reasons in support of his order. While it is true that the Court has large powers under section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, to examine any witness at any stage of the case, the very width of the powers conferred on the Court, implies a corresponding responsibility on the Court to see that it is wisely exercised. It is not that the Court felt any need to examine him. The initiative came from the accused. The Court had no reason to believe that the defence will not examine him. Sri Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the accused conceded before us that if the Court had declined to examine him as a Court witness, the accused certainly would have examined him as his witness. It:.s clear that the defence desired to have the opportunity to cross-examine him and as such tried to pass him off as a Court’s witness. In the circumstances of this case, we are clearly of opinion that the learned Magistrate did not properly exercise his discretion. It:.s clear that the defence desired to have the opportunity to cross-examine him and as such tried to pass him off as a Court’s witness. In the circumstances of this case, we are clearly of opinion that the learned Magistrate did not properly exercise his discretion. He has unnecessarily given room for criticism that he had tilted the scales against the prosecution. Be that as it may, Major Abuluvalia’s evidence, is on record and the same cannot be ignored. It will have to be taken into consideration in deciding the points at issue. The prosecution case is spoken to by P.Ws. 1 to 6. P.W. 3 (Dr. N.M. Ganapathy) merely speaks to the condition of the accused at the time when he examined him on the night of the occurrence. The other witnesses speak to the search and the seizure, of two bottles of White Horse Whisky (M.Os. 1 and 2) from the cupboard in the pantry of the accused’s house and 64½ bottles of foreign liquor of various descriptions from the loft of the office room of the accused. On the charge of consumption of liquor or any intoxicating drug falling under section 3(1)(j) of ‘the Act’, the only relevant evidence is that of P.W. 3. According to him, at the time of the examination of the accused, he found the pupils of the accused dilated and that his pulse rate was 100 per minute whereas the normal pulse rate is 72 per minute. He is of the opinion that these conditions might have been caused as a result of taking alcohol. But in his cross-examination he frankly admitted that those conditions could be caused by other facts as well and the observations made by him are not conclusive enough to come to an affirmative conclusion that the accused had consumed liquor. Further Madapur is reasonably close to non-prohibited areas and the possibility of the accused consuming liquor in a non-prohibited area cannot be ruled out. The Court below has enumerated a number of circumstances in support of its conclusions that the prosecution has not made out satisfactorily that the accused had consumed prohibited liquor or other drug. We agree with the Court below and hold that this charge is not made out. The Court below has enumerated a number of circumstances in support of its conclusions that the prosecution has not made out satisfactorily that the accused had consumed prohibited liquor or other drug. We agree with the Court below and hold that this charge is not made out. As regards the charge under section 3(1)(a) of ‘the Act’ i.e., possession of liquor, the same has to be considered under two sub-heads: (1) the recovery of two bottles of White Horse Whisky found in the cupboard in the pantry of the accused’s house, and (2) recovery of 641 bottles of foreign liquors found in the loft of the office room of the accused. As regards the latter, the learned Public Prosecutor who conducted the case in the Court below appears to have conceded that the evidence on record is insufficient to hold that they were in the possession of the accused. The appeal memo. filed in this Court is also silent about it. This is rather difficult to understand. The seizure of 64½ bottles of foreign liquor from the loft in the office of the accused is not denied. Prima facie they were in the possession of the accused. Along with this fact, one has to take into consideration the presumption arising under section 3(2) of ‘the Act’. But there it is. The prosecution had dropped this part of the case unceremoniously. Hence we shall have to leave it alone. It is not denied that two bottles of White Horse Whisky (M.Os. 1 and 2) were seized from the house of the accused on the night of 23rd September, 1956. The circumstances under which those bottles were seized were spoken to by P.W.s 1, 2 and 4 to 6. P.W. 4 and P.W. 6 were Deputy Superintendents of Police; P.W. 1 was a Sub-Inspector of Police; P.Ws. 2 and 5 were the search witnesses. None of these witnesses are shown to have any enmity against the accused. Nor is it shown that the police had any oblique reason to foist a case against the accused. Their evidence is corroborated by the documents prepared at the time when the contraband articles were seized. In Exhibit P-2 the Mahazar drawn up at that time it is stated: “Col. Nor is it shown that the police had any oblique reason to foist a case against the accused. Their evidence is corroborated by the documents prepared at the time when the contraband articles were seized. In Exhibit P-2 the Mahazar drawn up at that time it is stated: “Col. D. Basappa took me and also the witnesses to the pantry room which is adjacent to the dining room of his bungalow and opened the lock of the wooden shelf which is fitted with mirror, with the key which was with him, and produced from the said shelf two full White Horse Whisky bottles. On one bottle bears No. 933916 and on another bottle is the No. 1355-224.” The search list prepared at the same time is marked as Exhibit P-3. Admittedly a copy of this list was served on the accused and his signature was obtained on Exhibit P-3. In that list there is a note to the following effect: “The above bottles were found in a wooden shelf (chest of drawers) in the pantry room which is situated adjacent to dining room in the bungalow of Lt. Col. D.C. Basappa.” The accused is an educated man and is well placed in life. It is reasonable to assume that he had read Exhibit P-3 before signing the same. It is not his case that the copy served on him does not contain the note in question. If this note represents the facts correctly, then quite clearly the two bottles of White Horse Whisky were taken from the cupboard in the pantry. This list further shows that the accused was present at the time of the seizure of these bottles. This document substantially corroborates the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses on that point. It was contended before the trial Court though the Court below had not given any finding on the same-and those contentions were repeated before us, that Exhibit P-2 was not drawn up at the scene on the night of the occurrence and it must have been drawn up in the police station after the police party returned from the scene. Support for this contention is sought from the fact that while Exhibit P-1 was written on page 15706 of the Case Diary, Exhibit P-2 was written on page 13704 and Exhibit D-1 the requisition sent to the Doctor was written on page 15705. Support for this contention is sought from the fact that while Exhibit P-1 was written on page 15706 of the Case Diary, Exhibit P-2 was written on page 13704 and Exhibit D-1 the requisition sent to the Doctor was written on page 15705. According to the prosecution Exhibit P-1 was written first and Exhibit P-2 was written later. From the pagination, the defence argues that Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-2 could not have been written as suggested by the prosecution. Sri Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the accused has also invited our attention to the evidence of P.W. I on this point which is highly artificial and unconvincing. It is possible and likely that Exhibit P-2 was written first and Exhibit P-1 was written later and the witnesses are making a mistake about the sequel of events. But that in no way discredits the prosecution evidence nor does it lend any support to theory that no document other than Exhibit P-3 and Exhibit D-1 were written in the house of the accused. If the trial Court which had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the box had disbelieved the witnesses, we should have hesitated to reject its conclusion. But in the instant case there is nothing in the judgment of the trial Court to show that the Court had formed an unfavourable impression of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. No satisfactory reasons are given to reject the testimony of responsible police officers and independent search witnesses. Their evidence is consistent and prima facie creditworthy. On an examination of the judgment of the trial Court, it is seen that just two reasons appear to have persuaded the Court below not to rely on the prosecution evidence. Those reasons are found in paragraph 16 of the judgment. They are: 1. “If P.W. 6 had really questioned these persons (guests present) regarding the permits it would have been in the fitness of things to have recorded the statements of these persons which P.W. 6 has not done. If the statements of these persons had been recorded it would not have given any room for any one of these persons claiming the ownership of the bottles at a later stage,” and 2. If the statements of these persons had been recorded it would not have given any room for any one of these persons claiming the ownership of the bottles at a later stage,” and 2. "In the first place the key with which the cupboard was alleged to have been opened was not seized and that is a lacuna in the investigation of the case and which goes to suggest that the key-theory is an invention and there was no key at all with which the accused is alleged to have opened the cupboard." As mentioned earlier, the witnesses produced by the prosecution are respectable and disinterested witnesses. Their evidence is consistent and there is nothing inherently unbelievable in their evidence. P.W. 6 in the course of his examination has stated that none of the guests present had permits and that he had questioned them. He further stated that he had not recorded their statements in the case diary. Admittedly none of the persons present had permits with them at the time of the search. It is not the law that the Investigation Officer should record every information elicited by him from the persons questioned by him during the investigation. Nor are we able to see the force of the learned Magistrate’s observations: "If the statements of these persons had been recorded it would not have given any room for any one of these persons claiming the ownership of the bottles at a later stage." As regards the non-seizure of the key, it is quite clearly an omission on the part of the Investigation Officer. If the key had been seized, it could have afforded some corroboration to the prosecution evidence. But we do not think that the non-seizure of the key is a material circumstance in the case. The basic and essential evidence is the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 4 to 6. If their evidence is otherwise satisfactory and convincing, the non-seizure of the key cannot in any manner affect the credibility of their testimony. If their evidence is not otherwise trustworthy, then the fact that the key had been seized would have been of little value. We are of the opinion that the learned Magistrate has given indue importance to this omission on the part of the prosecution. No other reasons; have been given by the learned Magistrate for discarding the evidence of P.Ws. If their evidence is not otherwise trustworthy, then the fact that the key had been seized would have been of little value. We are of the opinion that the learned Magistrate has given indue importance to this omission on the part of the prosecution. No other reasons; have been given by the learned Magistrate for discarding the evidence of P.Ws. 1, a and 4 to 6. We are clearly of the opinion that the trial Court adopted a wrong approach to the case and fell into a serious error in not considering the first things first and making a mountain of a mole hill. Moreover the trial Court appears to have completely lost sight of the importance of the note made in Exhibit P-3. It clearly took a superficial view of the evidence on record. Now coming to the evidence of C.W. 1(Major Abuluwalia), we are not impressed with his evidence. The Court below has not purported to have relied on his evidence in acquitting the accused. Admittedly he is a good friend of the accused and he was his guest on the night of the occurrence. His evidence is vague and halting. In his chief-examination he started by saying: "I saw something like the two bottles in M.O. 1 and M.O. 2 being taken away from the house by the Police." But during his cross-examination by the defence counsel he became more positive. He deposed that these two bottles (M.Os. 1 and 2) were on the table in the dining room when he first saw them. He also swore that when P.W. 6 and others made a search of the house of the accused, the accused was with them (the guests) in the conservatory of the drawing room. These facts are falsified by the facts mentioned in Exhibit P-3. Similarly we are unable to attach any value to the evidence of D.W.1 (Siddanna). Admittedly he is the elder brother of the accused. His evidence is full of inaccuracies and improbabilities. According to his evidence, the two bottles of White Horse Whisky (M.Os. 1 and 2) belonged to him. It is difficult to believe that he had carried two bottles of Whisky when he went to the house of his brother forthe alleged purpose of spending some days with him. His evidence is full of inaccuracies and improbabilities. According to his evidence, the two bottles of White Horse Whisky (M.Os. 1 and 2) belonged to him. It is difficult to believe that he had carried two bottles of Whisky when he went to the house of his brother forthe alleged purpose of spending some days with him. Admittedly he did not carry his permit with him, which he is required to do, if he takes with him any liquor obtained under that permit. If his present version is true, he would have certainly moved the authorities concerned for the return of the Whisky bottles (M.Os. 1 and 2) immediately after they were seized. He kept mum over the matter till he came into the witness box. He is not an ordinary villager. He is an educated man and a planter. In his cross-examination he swore. "I did not know whether the police had prepared a Mahazar for the seizure of the two bottles. I did not know that the police would put up a case against the accused. I did not know whether the house of the accused was searched under a search warrant obtained by the police from a Magistrate. I left the house of the accused at 11-30 or 12 that night before the accused returned from Somwarpet.“ It is difficult to believe this story. While giving reasons, why he brought those 2 bottles to his brother’s house, he says: ”I took the two bottles of whisky for my consumption as also to give other permitholders whom I expected to visit my brother’s place. I did not definitely know as to who all would be present in the accused’s house, but the accused had told me that some guests were coming.“He told the Court:”I had asked P.W. 6 to give the two bottles of Whisky to me. I asked him twice or thrice and he said they would be given to me. I did not take any further steps for the recovery of the two bottles.“ It is not explained how these two bottles brought by the defence witness (D.W. 1) went into the cupboard of the accused. It will be seen that during the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 no suggestions were made to the effect that D.W. 1 had claimed those bottles as his, on the night of the occurrence. It will be seen that during the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 no suggestions were made to the effect that D.W. 1 had claimed those bottles as his, on the night of the occurrence. This story was put forward for the first time when P.W. 6 was cross-examined. The Court below has also overlooked the significance of the presumption of law raised by section 3(2) of ‘the Act’. The relevant portion of that provision reads as follows: ”It shall be presumed until the contrary is shown- (a) that a person accused of any offence under clauses (a) to (j) of sub-section (1) has committed such offence in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or * * * for the possession of which he is unable to account satisfactorily; “ The Court below did consider this provision while dealing with the case under section 3(1)(j) but it failed to consider the same while examining the charge under section 3(1)(a). The possession referred to in section 3(2)(a), in our judgment refers to physical possession as distinguished from legal possession. M.Os. 1 and 2 were found in the house of the acused. Prima facie he was in possession of those articles. Hence section 3(2)(a) of ‘the Act’ raises a presumption that he is guilty of an offence under section 3(1)(a) unless he accounts for his possession satisfactorily. This presumption ought to have been borne in mind by the Court below in assessing the evidence on record. See State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer1. The special rule contained in section 3(2)(a) having not been borne in mind) the learned Magistrate’s approach to the case was an erroneous one. As shown earlier, the Court below had missed certain salient features of the case in assessing the evidence or at any rate those features were not properly appreciated. A highly artificial view of the case was taken. There was misconception of both law and fact. We have no doubt that the acquittal in question is manifestly wrong and if left undisturbed may shake the public confidence in the administration of justice. Sri Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the accused asked us to bear in mind the limits under which a Court of appeal could interfere with an order of acquittal. We have no doubt that the acquittal in question is manifestly wrong and if left undisturbed may shake the public confidence in the administration of justice. Sri Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the accused asked us to bear in mind the limits under which a Court of appeal could interfere with an order of acquittal. In considering this appeal we have borne in mind the several pronouncements of the Supreme Court, beginning with the case of Surajapal Singh and others v. The State2, and ending with that of A. Vaidyanatha Aiyar’ case1. On a true understanding of these decisions the following principles are deducible; (i) It is well settled that the High Court has wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against the order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against the order of conviction; (ii) before setting aside the order of acquittal, it is not necessary for the High Court to hold that the order of the trial Court is perverse; (iii) but while re-assessing the evidence, the appellate Court should bear in mind”the presumption of innocence“of the accused, which presumption is reinforced by the order of acquittal; (iv) when the order of the trial Court is based on an appreciation of the oral evidence, the appellate Courts both Civil as well as criminal, must be slow in differing from the conclusion of the trial Court as the trial Court had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and observing their demeanour; and (v) if two reasonable conclusions could be drawn from the evidence on record, the conclusion that had commended itself to the trial Court should be respected. This follows as a corollary to the doctrine of”presumption of innocence" of the accused. While the law places no limits on the powers of the appellate Court, to review the evidence on record, prudence requires that no one should be convicted except on substantial grounds and an appeal against an acquittal should not be allowed unless the appellate Court is clearly satisfied that the order of acquittal is wrong. We think that it is in this sense the words " compelling reasons " were employed by the Supreme Court. This is made clear when we consider the case of Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. We have borne in mind these principles in examining the present appeal. We think that it is in this sense the words " compelling reasons " were employed by the Supreme Court. This is made clear when we consider the case of Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. We have borne in mind these principles in examining the present appeal. But we have no hesitation in concluding that the accused had been wrongly admitted of the charge under section 3(1)(a) of ‘the Act’. The conclusion of the trial Court cannot be justified on any reasonable view of the case. In the result, the appeal, in so far as it relates to the charge of possession of the two bottles of White Horse Whisky (M.Os. 1 and 2) is allowed and the accused convicted under section 3(1)(a) read with section 3(1)(k)(iii) of the Act’ and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500(Five hundred only), in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. In other respects the order of the Court below is sustained. S.V.S. ----- Appeal partly allowed,