Judgment :- The tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 1969 of 1998 on the file of the Rent Controller, Madras and appellant in R.C.A. No. 551 of 1991 on the file of the Appellate Authority, Madras is the revision petitioner. The respondent is the landlord in that proceedings. It may be noticed here that the revision petitioner is the sister of the respondent. Eviction was sought for on three grounds namely wilful default in payment of rent, denial of title, and owners occupation of a non-residential building. The Rent Controller rejected the request of the landlord on the ground of owners occupation. However he chose to grant the relief under the other two grounds. The tenant appealed in R.C.A. No. 551 of 1991 against the order of eviction granted on the two grounds. The landlord also appealed in R.C.A. No. 171 of 1992 against the dismissal of the petition on the ground of owners occupation. Both the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment. The Appellate Authority dismissed the landlords appeal. The Appellate Authority in the tenants appeal, reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on the ground of default but however affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller on the ground of denial of title. Hence the present revision before this Court against the judgment in her appeal. 2. I heard Dr. G. Krishnarnurthy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.C. Chandrasekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Even at the outset, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that though he had filed a revision against the order of the Appellate Authority (the fact remains that the landlord had not filed any revision against the judgment in R.C.A. No. 171 of 1992 and likewise, the landlord had also not filed any revision against the order in R.C.A. No. 551 of 1992 against the findings rendered by the Appellate Authority on the ground of default, thereby reversing the order of the Rent Controller on that issue) yet, in view of the long line of decisions of this Court that even without filing a revision, the landlord would be entitled to argue in the revision filed by the tenant on points held against the landlord, he intends arguing. In view of the precedents on this point available in this Court, the landlords counsel is permitted to argue on the finding of the Appellate Authority on the ground of wilful default. At the same time, the learned counsel for the respondent very clearly stated that he is not addressing any arguments on the ground seeking eviction on the ground of owners occupation of a non-residential building on which the landlord had been non suited concurrently. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that there is no denial of title at all in this case and therefore the Appellate Authority erred in law and on facts in ordering eviction even on the ground of the denial of title. As far as the wilful default in the payment of rent is concerned, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the tenant had already filed R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1998 for depositing of rent and in that case, on the landlord agreeing to receive the rent, the Rent Controller disposed of that petition holding against the tenant solely on that ground. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the initiation of R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1998 by the tenant, the pendency of the same simultaneously along with the petition for eviction and the manner of disposal of that application will indicate that the tenant was ever ready and willing to discharge her obligations to pay the rent and therefore it cannot be said that the Appellate Authoritys finding on that ground is bad in law. However the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the default period complained of is from January 1988 to May 1988 at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month and the Rent Control Petition came to be filed in August 1988. The rent itself came to be paid only on 21.2.1991 and this is a clear indication of the mind of the tenant to hold that she is definitely guilty of willful default in payment of rent. 200/- per month and the Rent Control Petition came to be filed in August 1988. The rent itself came to be paid only on 21.2.1991 and this is a clear indication of the mind of the tenant to hold that she is definitely guilty of willful default in payment of rent. As far as the denial of title is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent would argue that the notice sent prior to the filing of the Rent Control Petition contains clear act on the part of the tenant denying the title of the landlord, which is not bona fide and therefore, the order of eviction granted on that ground must be sustained. 4. In the light of the submissions by the learned counsel on either side, let me decide the issues. As far as the question of denial is concerned, it appears that the landlord heavily relied upon Ex. P-6 lawyers notice dated 2.4.1988 issued on behalf of the tenant to the landlords counsel. As already noticed by me, the fact remains that the father of the landlord and the tenant owned large” extent of properties. Prior to issuing Ex. P-6, the tenant had sent a lawyers notice dated 26.2.1988, marked as E x. P-3, to the landlord stating that the landlord is refusing the rents tendered and thereby asking him to name a bank. The landlord sent a reply notice dated 14.3.1988 setting out certain facts and that he wanted the tenant to vacate. In that context only, Ex. P-6 came to be issued. I perused Ex. P- 6 to find out whether there is any denial of title. I find from Ex. P-6 that the tenant had admitted the landlord-tenant relationship. However there is an averment in the notice that when Ex. P-3 came to be issued, the tenant was under the impression that the father P. Muthusamy would have settled the property on the present landlord. However on a search of the Encumbrance Certificate Register, none was found. Therefore a demand was made on behalf of the tenant against the landlord to divide the property by metes and bounds and allot 1/7* share to the tenant. Obviously, this demand was made on the ground that if the death of the original owner was intestate, then all the heirs would have a share. I find that even in this Ex. Obviously, this demand was made on the ground that if the death of the original owner was intestate, then all the heirs would have a share. I find that even in this Ex. P-6, a request was made to the landlord to name a bank so that the rents would be deposited. In view of the recitals in Ex. P-6, I am of the opinion that it would not amount to denial of title at all. The tenant categorically admitted at all stages that he is a tenant and he is liable to pay the rent. Therefore the finding of the authorities below that the tenant is guilty of denial of title and it was not bona fide, is erroneous in law. Accordingly the finding of the authorities below on the ground of denial of title is set aside. 5. Now coming to the question of wilful default to the payment of rent, it is no doubt true that though the Rent Controller ordered eviction on that ground also, the Appellate Authority had reversed that finding. I am also conscious about the fact that the landlord had not filed any revision before this Court as already noticed earlier. However that will not disable him from urging before this Court even on the ground of wilful default in view of a number of decisions of this Court. Accordingly I applied my mind carefully to the materials on record to find out whether the finding of the Appellate Authority on the ground of wilful default rendered in favour of the tenant could be sustained or not. The default period is stated to be from January 1988 to May 1988 at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. The Rent Control. Petition came to be filed on 8.8.1988. The tenant in the counter would state that the landlord had not responded to the notice issued on behalf of the tenant to name a bank; the rent sent by money order was refused and therefore the tenant cannot be held to be guilty of wilful default in paying the rent. Except this, no other defence is raised as to why eviction should not be ordered on the ground of wilful default in payment of the rent. She would further state that she was regular in payment of rents and denied that she is a defaulter. Except this, no other defence is raised as to why eviction should not be ordered on the ground of wilful default in payment of the rent. She would further state that she was regular in payment of rents and denied that she is a defaulter. Beyond this, nothing further specific is seen in the counter. It is no doubt true that the tenant had filed R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1988 under Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act on 8.8.1988. Her request in that petition was for permission to deposit the rent from the month of January 1988 onwards. The deposit petition is marked in this case as Ex. P-1. That petition was dismissed for default originally on 18.7.1990 and subsequently after restoration was disposed of finally later on as indicated earlier. It is also on record that the tenant had sent the rent due for January 1988 under a money order dated 24.2.1988 and the same was refused. The refused money order coupon is marked as Ex. P-3 in this case. It is also on record that the tenant filed O.S. No. 2416 of 1989 in the City Civil Court against the landlord and several heirs of the original owner for partition and that suit was also dismissed for default long before. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a petition to restore the same is still pending consideration. On these facts, the question that falls for consideration is whether the tenant could be held to be guilty of wilful default in payment of rent. 6. It is no doubt true that the default period complained of in this case commenced from January 1988. Ex. P-3, the returned money order coupon would show that the rent for the month of January 1988 sent by money order was refused followed by the notice dated 26.2.1988 (Ex. P-3) from the tenant to the landlord to name a bank. Ultimately the Rent Control Petition for deposit itself came to be filed. The mere fact that the landlord refused to receive the rent for the month of January 1988, does not absolve the responsibility of the tenant to pay the rent for the subsequent months. P-3) from the tenant to the landlord to name a bank. Ultimately the Rent Control Petition for deposit itself came to be filed. The mere fact that the landlord refused to receive the rent for the month of January 1988, does not absolve the responsibility of the tenant to pay the rent for the subsequent months. She has not placed any material before the authorities below for not having paid the rent for the subsequent months after the rent for January 1988 was refused by the landlord. The mere fact that the tenant had filed a petition for deposit of rent, by itself, would not enable the tenant to wriggle out of the situation in which she is placed on account of non-payment of rent unless she explains as to why she was unable to pay the rent for the periods preceding the filing of the Rent Control Petition for deposit. Unfortunately in this case the tenant, except relying upon Ex. P-3, which is for payment towards January 1988, had not placed any other material either oral or documentary, as to why she had not sent the rents due to the landlord for the period subsequent to January 1988. Equally so is the inaction on the part of the tenant to move for any interim order in R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1988 for any interim deposit. It appears that she was rest content by filing of the petition to deposit the rent alone and without taking any further steps to have any order for interim deposit. Thereafter there is no deposit at all in R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1988 during the pendency of the said petition. The tenant paid a sum of Rs. 7, 400/- by way of cheque dated 21.2.1991 for the period of 37 months covering 1988, 1989, 1990 and the first month in 1991. Why she had kept the rents accumulated in her hands for such a long period, there is no explanation on the part of the tenant. 7. The returned money order coupon Ex. R-3 reached the tenant on 24.2.1988. However he came to file the petition for deposit only on 27.7.1988 If really the tenant was anxious to discharge her obligation to pay the rent, the tenant should not have waited for such a long period of five months. The Rent Controller found this aspect against the tenant. R-3 reached the tenant on 24.2.1988. However he came to file the petition for deposit only on 27.7.1988 If really the tenant was anxious to discharge her obligation to pay the rent, the tenant should not have waited for such a long period of five months. The Rent Controller found this aspect against the tenant. However the Appellate Authority, being guided by Ex. R-3 followed by Ex. P-3 notice and the filing of the deposit petition, proceeded to hold that the tenant was taking all steps to pay the rent and therefore she cannot be held to be guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent. This appears to be a conclusion reached on an improper appreciation of the material on record. It may be true that the tenant had discharged her obligation in paying the rent for the month of January 1988, which had been refused. But what the tenant had been doing after that is the question which has to be taken into account to decide whether the tenant is guilty of wilful default in paying the rent or not. As already noticed, Ex. R-3 reached the tenant on 24.2.1988. She gave the notice, asking the landlord to name a bank on 26.2.1988, which met with reply dated 14.3.1988. But thereafter she did not take any further action immediately and she came to file R.C.O.P. No. 2201 of 1988 only on 8.8.1988. This conduct on the part of the tenant in waiting for such a long time arid paying the sum of Rs. 7,400/- only on 21.2.1991 is a clear indication of the mind of the tenant that she is not willing to pay the rent. This aspect had escaped the attention of the learned Appellate Authority. Dr. G. Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, brought to my notice the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabiraman ( AIR 1985 SC 582 ) to hold that in all cases of wilful default, the landlord is under a legal obligation to give a notice demanding rent and if such a notice is not issued, the landlord cannot be given the relief of eviction on the ground of wilful default. This submission appears to be not correct. This submission appears to be not correct. The law is not that the landlord should necessarily issue a notice demanding rent before the filing of the eviction petition seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default. What is stated in the judgment is that if the landlord chooses to give a notice and the rent remained unpaid for the period of two months after the receipt of such notice, under the statute, a presumption is created that the default is wilful. Beyond that, the judgment does not say anything else in this regard. The other judgment brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in Mohideen Sahib v. Theodre Samuel (1985 2 MLJ 355) to contend that failure to resort to Section 8 of the said Act would not by itself mean that the tenant is guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent. In this case the tenant had already resorted to filing of the petition under Section 8 of the said Act but on the facts I have found mat the default is wilful. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenant is guilty of denying title which is not bona fide , cannot be sustained and it is accordingly set aside. At the same time, this Court is also of the opinion that the finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenant is not guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent is opposed to evidence on record and it cannot be sustained. Accordingly the finding rendered by the Appellate Authority on wilful default is set aside. 8. The result of the discussion referred to above is that the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. Accordingly the judgment and decree of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 551 of 1991 is set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of in the following manner. The judgment of the Appellate Authority affirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Controller on the ground of denial of title is set aside. The judgment of the Appellate Authority reversing the order of eviction granted by the Rent Controller on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent is also set aside. The judgment of the Appellate Authority affirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Controller on the ground of denial of title is set aside. The judgment of the Appellate Authority reversing the order of eviction granted by the Rent Controller on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent is also set aside. Consequently the order of eviction granted by the Rent Controller in R.C.O.P. No. 1969 of 1988 on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent is restored. C.M.P. No. 6452 of 1995 is dismissed. No costs. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pleaded time to vacate the premises. The learned counsel for the respondent is heard on that aspect. Accordingly the tenant is given six months time from today to vacate and deliver possession of the premises forming the subject matter of R.C.O.P. No. 1969 of 1988 on the file of the Rent Controller, Madras, to the landlord in that proceedings on condition (a) the tenant filed an affidavit of undertaking before this Court on or before 10.3.1999 undertaking to abide by the time schedule fixed above; and (b) the tenant pays the entire arrears of rent, if any, as on date, to the landlord on or before 10.3.1999 and continues to pay the future rents commencing from February 1999 on or before 10.3.1999 and likewise pays, the rents for the subsequent months. Failing compliance of anyone of the conditions referred to above will result in the order of eviction being put into execution forthwith without any further reference to this Court.