JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed by the wife, second petitioner and two sons of late Shri Sukhdev Singh, who was said to have died on 15.3.1989. During his life time, the deceased Sukhdev Singh was said to have been running a business by forming an "association of persons" bearing the name M/s. Kangra Iron and Steels Syndicate Kangra, in the year 1950. Concedingly, he has a flourishing business for some time but after about 10 years the business came to a stand-still and ruined compelling, according to the petitioner, the deceased to sell almost all his assets to clear liabilities and debts in addition to mortgaging the house before his death. So far as the issues raised in the case on hand are concerned, the determination of which do not require the other details except noticing the fact that on account of the business activities carried on by late Shri Sukhdev Singh when he was alive he incurred liabilities under the Income Tax Act in respect of the assessment year 1960-61 to the tune of Rs. 12,868/- and in respect of assessment year 1961-62 to the tune of Rs. 26,494/- as disclosed in Annexure PA and PB filed with the writ petition. The wife, the second petitioner herein was also said to be one of the member of the Association of Persons, which carried on the business though, it is now claimed in the affidavit filed by the first petitioner, her son, that she had no knowledge and was ignorant about any of the business activities, she being an illiterate. Efforts appears to have been taken at various points of time for enforcing the recovery of but outstanding dues with interest and penalty recoverable thereon on account of the delay and it did not yield fruitful results. Reference is made by the petitioners in this petition about some enquiries at some point of time by the officers and recommendations, which were said to have been made to issue Non-recovery Certificate but that was not done so and, therefore, the recovery proceedings were kept alive and pursued apparently on account of the fact that the deceased has left behind him house property, which is said to be a residential house and which is claimed to be also subject to a mortgage. The defaulted amount with accumulated interest and penalty has got multiplied to the tune of Rs. 1,48,509/-. In 1995 when notices were issued, the first petitioner as also the second petitioner did not properly respond and even when a notice was issued on 20.12.1995 to call upon the petitioner to show cause as to why a warrant of arrest be not issued, as in respect of earlier letters the response was, refusal to receive, which necessitated the issue of a warrant of arrest dated 31.1.1996 to enforce the personal attendance and presence of the first petitioner, who, it is now claimed, was constrained under pressure to give a statement agreeing to clear the arrears by 15.3.1996. Though the petitioner would claim that the petition under Section 220(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has been filed before the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala, admittedly, it was allowed to be dismissed for non-appearance and non-prosecution. It is in such circumstances, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition seeking fog, the following reliefs: "(i) The respondents be restrained from recovering the Income Tax arrears for the years 1960-61 and 61-62 from the petitioners and the same may kindly be waived. (ii) The respondents be directed not to arrest or harass the petitioners in any manner. (iii) The records of the case may be summoned. (iv) The respondents be directed not to proceed against the residential house of the petitioners for recovery of the arrears." 2. Before even adverting to the contentions of parties on either side, it would require our observations to be made even on the tenability of the nature of the prayer sought for within the scope of this writ petition. This Court is not concerned and cannot deal with the question of any waiver because that is the jurisdiction of the Authorities functioning under the Act and unless they move those authorities, there is no scope for their coming to this Court with any such reliefs. The next relief sought for is for a direction not to arrest or harass the petitioners, in any manner. It would be considered hereinafter whether they are liable to be arrested and if they are liable to be and such arrest would be in accordance with law, it is futile for anyone including the petitioners to claim of any harassment. The next relief sought for is for a direction not to arrest or harass the petitioners, in any manner. It would be considered hereinafter whether they are liable to be arrested and if they are liable to be and such arrest would be in accordance with law, it is futile for anyone including the petitioners to claim of any harassment. The respondents in their reply would submit that the object was not to arrest the petitioners and it was not given out that they will be arrested. As indicated earlier, since they were avoiding facing even the enquiries and disclosing the particulars sought, the arrest warrant appears to have been issued, which has become, in our view, mainly essential on account of the behaviour and attitude of the petitioners ^ themselves exhibiting a defiant and indifferent attitude to notices issued. As to the question of arrest. Rule 81 contained in Schedule-II to the Act prohibits the arrest and detention of a woman. Consequently, the question of arrest of the second petitioner would not arise. So far as the other petitioners are concerned Rule 85 of the very Schedule would indicate that if at any time after the certificate is drawn up by the Tax Recovery Officer the defaulter dies, the proceedings under the Schedule can be pursued as if the legal representatives were the defaulters except in respect of arrest and detention. So far as the other reliefs sought for in the nature of a direction not to proceed against the residential house of the petitioners for recovery of the arrears are concerned, the legality and propriety of the same has to be and is being considered, hereinafter. 3. Mr. Vinay Kuthiala, learned Counsel for the petitioners, while elaborating the contentions raised in the petition has confined his submissions only to the immunity of the petitioners and the property of the original defaulter-assessee late Shri Sukhdev Singh, namely, the house, which admittedly is in the hands of the petitioners by relying upon the provisions contained in Rule 10 read with Section 21 of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976 (Act No. 31 of 1976), by which clause (ccc) was ordered to be inserted in Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 10 in the Schedule-II to the Act stipulate that all such property as is by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), exempted from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court shall be exempt from attachment and sale under this Schedule. Consequently, the question that arises and has been urged also before us is as to whether the house property in question, admittedly belonging to the defaulter, which is in the hands of the petitioners, is one which can be said to be exempt from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. For this purpose, as indicated earlier, the provision ordered to be inserted by virtue of Section 21 of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act is strongly relied upon and which reads as follows: “21. Amendment of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.—In Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),— (a) in sub-section (1^ in the proviso,— (ccc) one main residential house and other buildings attached to it (with the material and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment) belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and occupied by him : Provided that the protection afforded by this clause shall not extend to any property specifically charged with the debt sought to be recovered." 4. Per contra, Mr. Indar Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the Income-tax Department, while pursuing the stand taken in the replies filed contended that the provisions contained in the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976, including Section 21, which provides for insertion of clause (ccc) in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure will have no application, whatsoever, to recovery proceedings under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and that the said provisions have limited role and application only in respect of proceedings initiated under the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976 and not even to all or any proceedings initiated before the Civil Court and the Code of Civil Procedure applicable as such to those proceedings before the Civil Court, arising in matters other than the one falling within the purview of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976. 5. 5. Even the learned Counsel for the petitioners apparently anticipating the stand that may be taken for the respondents invited our attention to the decision reported in 1999 (1) Sim. L.C. 117 (M/s. Himachal Lithographers and others v. Punjab and Sindh Bank, Shimla), rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, wherein the applicability of the amendment introduced by the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976 came to be considered in respect of a suit filed by the Punjab and Sindh Bank against the defaulter, who has borrowed loan from the said bank. The Division Bench has considered even the decision of the apex Court reported in 1996 (4) SCC 372 (Kiran Bala v. Surinder Kumar), strongly relied upon before us also by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his stand, as noticed above, to claim exemption of the property in question from the recovery proceedings under the Act, and held that the said decision will have no application to the type of. cases on hand considered by the learned Judges of the Division Bench. In paragraph 12 of the judgment of the Division Bench, it has been specifically held that clause (ccc) to sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as inserted by Section 21 of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act would apply only to the execution of the decrees to which the Act applies and it has no general application. It is this specific conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench, which is virtually put into controversy and contest by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In order to substantiate his contentions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners endeavoured much and even at length to impress upon us by submitting that the judgment of the Division Bench did not properly consider the ratio of the Supreme Court decision, reported in 1996 (4) SCC 372 (supra) and that the amendment introduced by the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act being similar and identical to the one, which prevailed in Punjab and which came to be considered by the Supreme Court, the ratio must be applied and that the judgment of the Division Bench will not govern this case before us. It was also further contended before us for the petitioners that the provisions of Section 21 had the effect of incorporating in the Code of Civil Procedure clause (ccc) and, therefore, it applied by virtue of the provisions contained in the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, itself, very much to the present case, and, therefore, the property is exempt. To support his claim about the applicability of principle of legislation by incorporation as also the manner in which a proviso has to be construed and the question as to the inconsistency or otherwise of two amendments, one effected by State Legislature and another by the Parliament, several decisions have been brought to our notice. We are of the view that they are not only irrelevant but besides the point that is really is issue before us and, therefore, we refrain from making any reference to the same. In our view the only relevant decisions are the one reported in 1999 (1) Sim. L.C. 117 and 1996 (4) SCC 372 (supra). Since the petitioners have not staked claims . based on clause (c) to Section (1) of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even the decision brought to our notice and reported in 1992 (2) Sim.L.C. 172, State Bank of India v.Shri Balak Raj Abrol and another, has no relevance. 6. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the above referred two decisions and the relevant provisions of law. The decision reported in 1999(1) Sim. L.C. 117 (supra) has been taken on appeal by the petitioners, who have lost in this Court, by filing a petition for Special Leavel to Appeal (Civil) No. 14581 of 1998 and though initially notice appears to have been ordered and interim orders of stay have also been granted, ultimately, on 9.11.1998 their Lordships of the apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition and vacated the interim orders also. We are conscious of the fact that though on that account alone the decision of the Division Bench cannot be elevated to the status of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the seal of approval affixed by rejecting Special Leave Petition could, in our view, atleast constitute a seal of approval of the Division Bench judgment to the extent that it has become final so far as this court is concerned. Therefore, in our view, it is not permissible for the petitioners to resurrect the points urged before and rejected by the Division Bench in the earlier decision once over again before us. We are in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges of the Division Bench and the contentions to the contra placing reliance upon once over again the decision reported in 1996 (4) SCC 372 (supra), which as earlier been indicated was also considered by the Division Bench is an attempt and an exercise only in futility. 7. We are also of the further view that it is not permissible to consider the amendment introduced by virtue of Section 21 of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, as if the said amendment was an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure in its general application in the State. If that be the position the amendment would have been an amendment to the C6de of Civil Procedure as a State amendment. That is not what has been done in this case. The matter would be made clear if reference is made to some of salient features of the Act and provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976. The said Act by the very name of it could be seen to be an Act to provide for the reduction of debt in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The debt though not specifically defined must be of a debtor, vis-a-vis, a creditor and the definition of debtor as contained in Section 2(xiv) means a person who received a loan as defined under the said Act. The Act provides its own special provisions as to the regulations of the debt, mode of recovery of debt and manner in which the reduction of the debt is envisaged and, therefore, it purports to amend the law relating to Provincial Insolvency Act and Code of Civil Procedure etc. Consequently, it could be seen that the very object of these amendments is not meant to be by way of general amendments to either the Provincial Insolvency Act or to the Code of Civil Procedure generally in the State of Himachal Pradesh but to the applicability of those laws to matters or proceedings arising and dealt with under the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976. Chapter III under the caption suits and decrees, provides for Forum of suits, debtors right to sue, amendment of decree, accounting and determination of the amounts due and rate of interest on decrees etc. and Chapter IV under the caption execution of decrees, likewise provides for the restriction on attachment of agricultural produce, protection of agricultural land of debtor from sale or transfer, procedure to be followed where several decree are executed simultaneously, trees protected from sale etc. Section 14 reads that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 save in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act, thereby while making the Code of Civil Procedure as such applicable to the proceedings under the Debt Reduction Act, the State Legislature thought fit to indicate certain additional protections, in addition to those already contained. Instead of enacting its own provisions in the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, the State Legislature adopts those provided in that by a process of reference and incorporation, and thereby adopts the Code to be applied to proceedings under the Debt Reduction Act. The amendments envisaged in Section 21 is of the Code of Civil Procedure, as adopted to be applied by virtue of Section 14 of the Debt Reduction Act, in its applicability to proceedings under the Debt Reduction Act and not to the Code of Civil Procedure in its general application in the State, in respect of all other matters falling outside the Debt Reduction Act. Consequently, the amendment to Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contained in H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, must be construed in the context of Section 14 of the Act adopting and applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only to all proceedings under the Debt Reduction Act. Hence, it is inevitable that the operation of Section 21 including clause (ccc) inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure must be read as though it is only for the limited purpose of proceedings arising under the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976, and not to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh in respect of the proceedings other than those contemplated and arising under the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976. This view taken by the earlier Division Bench does not suffer any infirmity so as to warrant even any re-thinking on this question, by ourselves or by a Larger Bench of this Court. Consequently, we see no merit whatsoever in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the objections to the recovery proceedings, therefore, cannot be sustained. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 8. However, we make it clear that the house property which has been left behind by defaulter late Sh. Sukhdev Singh is liable and cannot be said to be exempt, even in the hands of the petitioners from being proceeded against for the recovery of the dues in accordance with the provisions contained in the Income-Tax Act and Schedule-II to the Act thereof. No costs. The interim order of stay, if any, shall stand vacated. Petition dismissed.