Order.- This is an application by the accused for quashing the proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge (Sessions Judge), Secunderabad, in C.C. No. 2/1 of 1958. Before dealing with the points and contentions raised in this application, it is necessary to state the stage at which the calendar case is before the learned Special Judge. That Court took cognizance of the offence on 31st January, 1958. On behalf of the accused, appearance was filed on 14th February, 1958. The charge was framed on 20th March, 1958. The charge was under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d) of the Act, (Act II of 1947), Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161, Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty and the case was posted for examination of the prosecution witnesses on 25th August, 1958 and thereafter to 1st September, 1958. On the latter date, the counsel for the accused presented M.P. No. 15 of 1958 to drop further proceedings on account of certain alleged illegalities in investigation and initiation of the proceedings, thereby challenging the validity of the offence under section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. On that, the learned Special Judge passed an order dismissing his petition as he considered it ill-conceived and only meant to delay proceedings. In his opinion, irregularities in investigation would not affect the competency or jurisdiction of the Court or the validity of proceedings and he also held that that was not the stage to come up with these objections. It is later on this application purporting to be under section 561-A and section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, has been filed. Before proceeding to refer to other points raised in this application, one raised by the learned Public Prosecutor in the nature of preliminary objection, may be disposed of. He contended that this petition is not for revising an order in M.P. No. 15 of 1958 filed before the the Special Judge, but should be taken to be one solely under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, and that since by sections 3-A and 0 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, section 350 and Chapters XXXI and XXXII of Criminal Procedure Code alone are made applicable to proceedings before the Special Judge appointed under that Act, the inherent powers of aCourt exercisable under section 561-A cannot be invoked. But, however, the learned Public Prosecutor concedes that while exercising jurisdiction as an appellate Court or sitting in revision, the High Court can act under section 561-A in so far as there is a justification for it. The distinction that is sought to be made by the learned Public Prosecutor, viz., that the inherent powers are exercisable when appeals or revision petitions are pending, but not while calling for the record and exercising the powers vested in the Court, is to my mind not so distinct as to make any difference in the treatment of cases arising in appeals or revisions or when the record is called for and looked into by the High Court under section 435, Criminal Procedure Code. In this view I am unable to agree with the learned Public Prosecutor. An application to quash the proceedings would, therefore, lie to High Court and could be dealt with by it at any stage. Mr.T.V. Sarma, the learned counsel for the accused had on the other hand to offer comments on the attitude of the learned Special Judge in summarily disposing of the application filed before him without himself going into the allegations made therein either with regard to the defective investigation or the legal points which are sought to be made for questioning the proceedings as ab initio illegal. Any preliminary objection or point which goes to the root of the case as is now well-settled, should be inquired into at the earliest stage and that this is the case even if it be after some stages are reached during the trial admits of no doubt. It must, therefore, be observed that it is rather not satisfactory to dispose of an application or petition of this sort which raises preliminary points merely on the ground that petition is ill-conceived or that this is not the stage for the Court to go into these matters It thus becomes necessary for this Court to consider whether there is substance in what has been alleged and whether the learned Special Judge is precluded by reason of these objections from conducting the further stages of the trial. The first and main contention of Mr.T.V. Sarma is that though there is nothing to be said against the charges framed, the investigation by the Circle Inspector of the Special Police Establishment is not one in accordance with section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is mandatory. According to him a person below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, cannot investigate offences under section 161 or under section 165 or under section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-section (2) of section 5, Prevention of Corruption Act, unless he has obtained orders of the Magistrate of the First Class. It is further contended that such a person below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, cannot make arrest in connection with these offences without a warrant. From this, the learned counsel points out that the Circle Inspector should not only obtain an order from the Magistrate of the First Class to investigate, but should, if he should become capable of investigating into a cognizable offence, also be armed with a warrant so that he may have powers of arrest. He points out that otherwise, a Circle Inspector who investigates into an offence should comply with section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In answer to this, the learned Public Prosecutor has placed before this Court, a communication from the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Hyderabad Division, to the First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad, requesting to permit Shri K.C.G. Sarma, Inspector of the Special Police Establishment to investigate into this particular case under section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and also for permission under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code and produced the order of the First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad, dated 17th August, 1957, according the necessary permission. But this permission is attacked on the ground that any permission or order mentioned in clause (c) of section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, could not be made mechanically, but must be after due consideration of the relevant matters. But this permission is attacked on the ground that any permission or order mentioned in clause (c) of section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, could not be made mechanically, but must be after due consideration of the relevant matters. This contention loses all its force when it is remembered that the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, had given a succinct account of all the happenings relating to this case which consist of laying a trap, the presence of respectable witnesses and of the decoy and the recovery of the money consequent upon the search, and further that the case relates to D. Manikya Rao, Station Master, Kachiguda Railway Station, who demanded and accepted illegal gratification. It also specifies why the Superintendent of Police was unable to take up investigation himself; and that shows the reason for the request. The First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad, while granting the permission, mentions that he accorded it in view of the facts mentioned in the letter referred to. Thus it cannot be said that the First Class Magistrate was simply granting the request because he could not do otherwise or he felt that he should comply with a request which cannot be denied or that he was bound to always grant permission without considering the relevant matters. On the other hand, it should be taken that he saw reasons, that the Superintendent of Police did not only place before him the facts as well as the aspect in regard to the permission for investigation by the Circle Inspector but was possessed of the relevant particulars. He also felt that as the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, was unable to investigate, he found it necessary to grant the permission. These matters therefore undoubtedly establish that this according of permission by the First Class Magistrate has been done after due deliberation. Then the further question whether the Circle Inspector who was acting under the orders of the First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad, to investigate into this case, is one under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, admits of little doubt as the communication of the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, makes mention of this provision also. Then the further question whether the Circle Inspector who was acting under the orders of the First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad, to investigate into this case, is one under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, admits of little doubt as the communication of the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, makes mention of this provision also. Even though what has been said above is enough to meet the contentions of the learned counsel for the accused, it is necessary to notice in this case that the Circle Inspector who investigated belongs to the Special Police Establishment which is governed by the Police Establishment Act (XXV of 1946). In such a case an Officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police of the Delhi Special Police Establishment authorised by the Inspector-General of Police of that Establishment can investigate into these offences as provided for under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is found that on 6th July, 1956, the Notification No. 7555 A.D.B. also published in the S.P.E. Gazette, dated January, 1950, page 10, has made the necessary authorisation under section 3 of the said Act. Therefore, this investigation by that Officer is governed by the Proviso to section 5-A of the Corruption Act. The only condition in such a case of investigation is that the investigating officer should have sent a report of the investigation to a Magistrate of the First Class. I have been satisfied that this requirement has also been complied with in this case. For these reasons, the investigation which has been attacked by the learned counsel for the accused as either illegal or vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, remains affected by neither. Mr.T.V. Sarma, the learned counsel for the accused, has referred to the trap laid by the Circle Inspector on 10th August, 1957, in pursuance of the information given on 9th August, 1957. He concedes that as a result of the trap, the offence, if any, had been committed. But he contends that the offence so committed cannot subsequently be investigated by the very person who laid the trap. It may be observed that actually the F.I.R. was given on 11th August, 1957, while the permission which the First Class Magistrate gave to the Inspector of Police to investigate was granted on 17th August, 1957. But he contends that the offence so committed cannot subsequently be investigated by the very person who laid the trap. It may be observed that actually the F.I.R. was given on 11th August, 1957, while the permission which the First Class Magistrate gave to the Inspector of Police to investigate was granted on 17th August, 1957. The witnesses were examined by the Circle Inspector only on 18th August, 1957. Thus it could be seen that the investigation started as a result of the F.I.R. on nth August, 1957 and proceeded under the orders of the First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad. This procedure by itself is not therefore open to attack; but what is found fault with and relied upon as vitiating the investigation is that the same Circle Inspector who laid the trap also investigated. It is not uncommon that a police officer who happens to be present at the time of the commission of an offence of being on ‘bandobust’ duty, has also to be present when certain happenings where the offence has been committed have taken place, is found investigating the crime. Therefore the question is whether witnessing the commission of an offence, precludes an investigation by him of the same offence. The answer cannot but be in the negative. Viewed in this light, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the laying of a trap or the apprehension of a person while committing an offence precludes or prevents the same officer from investigating the offence. At any rate there is nothing in law or procedure or otherwise which vitiates such investigation. The learned counsel wanted also to make a point, out of the act that a Circle Inspector is not an officer above the rank of a Station House Officer, and that therefore there was a violation of the provisions of section 551, Criminal Procedure Code. This is met by the learned Public Prosecutor by pointing out that the Circle Inspector of the Special Police Establishment is also to be taken as a Station Officer for certain purposes and that authority therefor can be found in sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Police Establishment Act (XXV of 1946). I find that this provision of the enactment answers the point, and that therefore this contention also fails. I find that this provision of the enactment answers the point, and that therefore this contention also fails. Yet another contention of the learned advocate for the accused that the police officer who laid the trap is not entitled to act under section 154 or section 157, Criminal Procedure Code, merits no separate treatment, as this argument is a restatement of the same points dealt with in another form. In the result on a consideration of all the relevant points and arguments raised by the learned counsel for both sides, the conclusion that there are no merits in this application is irresistible. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. A.S.R. ----- Petition dismissed.