D. B. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revisional application under section 115 CPC is directed against order No. 44 dated 10. 2. 99 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, First Court, Alipore, in Title Suit No. 2 of 1995, striking out the defendant against delivery of possession under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. ( 2 ) THE suit was for eviction of a monthly premises tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent, amongst others. The defendant petitioner filed an application under section 17 (2) (2a) (2b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act without disputing either the relationship of landlord and tenant the rate of rent (Rs. 5000/- per month) and praying for determination of the rent in arrear. The trial Court held that the defendant was defaulter in payment of rent for 14 months from February, 1993 to October, 1993, for the months of July, 1994 to September, 1994, December 1995 and January 1996. The total arrear was thus determined at Rs. 73,000/- including a sum of Rs. 3000/- due by way of statutory interest. The trial Court by order No. 17 dated 22. 2. 96 disposed of the defendant petitioner's application under section 17 (2) (2a) (2b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act directing the defendant company to deposit the said amount of Rs. 73,000/- by 14 monthly instalments of Rs. 5000/- each beginning from March 1996 and another monthly instalment of Rs. 3000/- by the 15th of each month and also directed the defendant to deposit the current rent month by month. Admittedly the defendant did not pay the first instalment in March, 1996 as directed by the trial court's order. The defendant, however, started depositing the instalments from April, 1996 onwards and in all paid Rs. 45,000/- in nine monthly instalments from April, 1996 to December, 1996 towards the arrear rent. The defendant did not pay any current rent as contemplated under section 17 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, following the disposal of the application under section 17 (2) (2a) (2b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The plaintiff came forward with an application under section 17 (3) on 22. 1. 98. The defendant took several adjournments of the hearing of the said application under section 17 (3) and its last prayer was rejected 1. 9. The plaintiff came forward with an application under section 17 (3) on 22. 1. 98. The defendant took several adjournments of the hearing of the said application under section 17 (3) and its last prayer was rejected 1. 9. 98 and the trial court was pleased to pass an exparte order dated 1. 9. 98 striking out the defence under section 17 (3 ). Against this exparte order the defendant petitioner moved the High Court in revision being C. O. No. 3045 of 1998 and His Lordship, Samaresh Banerjea, J by an order dated 24. 12. 98 held that the trial Court acted with material irregularity in not granting the adjournment on 1. 9. 98 and hearing the matter ex parte and in such view of the matter, the said order was set aside with a direction upon the trial court to hear out the application under section 17 (3) afresh after hearing both parties and to dispose of the same within certain time from the date of communication of the order without giving any unnecessary adjournment to any of the parties. After the matter came back to the trial Court, the defendant filed written objection on 9. 2. 99 against the application under section 17 (3) alleging that it was trying heart and soul to improve its financial position and expressed its readiness to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- within two months towards the arrear rent and thereafter to pay month by month from March, 1999 at the rate of Rs. 5000/- towards arrears besides current rent. During the fresh hearing of the application under section 17 (3) it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant persistently made either late deposits or did not at all make any deposits and that too without any valid and sufficient cause and that the plea of the defendant for detentions of time on the ground of financial stringency was not at all sufficient. Upon consideration of the record, the trial Court found that the defendant has not paid the arrears and current rent in compliance with the court's order in spite of getting chances and that the defendant was guilty of wilful laches in not making such deposits. Upon consideration of the record, the trial Court found that the defendant has not paid the arrears and current rent in compliance with the court's order in spite of getting chances and that the defendant was guilty of wilful laches in not making such deposits. In such view of the matter, the trial court was of the view that the defendant was not entitled to get any further tine for depositing the arrear and current rent and accordingly by its order dated 10. 2. 99, the trial Court allowed the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) and struck out the defence against delivery of possession. ( 3 ) MR. Ashis Bagchi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged only one point in assailing the impugned order. It is submitted that the trial Court acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that there was wilful laches on the part of the petitioner in not depositing the arrears and current rent and that such a finding was based on surmise and conjecture and not borne out by the records of the case. Mr. Bagchi referred to paragraph 14 of the present revisional application in which the defendant petitioner has expressed its readiness to pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- within six weeks from the date of the order towards the arrear rent and also to clear up the arrears by making payments at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month in addition to payment of current monthly rent and submitted that this Court should give the defendant an opportunity even at this stage to pay the arrears and current rent in the manner suggested in the said paragraph. ( 4 ) MR. Bhaskar Ghosh, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff opposite party submitted that the finding of the trial Court to the effect that there was wilful laches on the part of the defendant in making deposits of the arrear rent and current rent is amply borne out by the record of the case and that till March, 1999, the total dues on account of the arrear instalments granted by the trial court's order dated 22. 2. 96 as also towards the arrear current rent amounted to Rs. 2,18,000/- apart from statutory interest. Mr. 2. 96 as also towards the arrear current rent amounted to Rs. 2,18,000/- apart from statutory interest. Mr. Ghosh placed strong reliance on two decisions reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010: M/s. B. P. Khemka Pvt Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and a special Bench decision of our High Court reported in 1987 (2) CLJ 297 : Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy and contended that the defendant does not deserve either condonation of the defaults it had already made in depositing the arrear or any extension of the time to make up the arrears at this stage. ( 5 ) IN B. P. Khemkha's case (supra), the Supreme Court authoritatively pronounced that the provisions for striking out the defence under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is directory and not mandatory. The Supreme Court held that the Court is vested with discretion to order either striking out the defence or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and the interest of justice. It was also held that when the court has the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment of deposit of rent as required by a provision in any Rent Restriction Act then the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment of deposit and that such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. The question is whether this discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit was arbitrarily exercised by the trial Court when it refused to condone the delay and extend the time and struck out the defence of the defendant. The order determining the arrear rent under section 17 (2) 2 (A) 2 (B) and directing the defendant to make the deposits by instalments was made as far back as on 22. 2. 96. At the time when this determination was made by the trial Court, the rent payable at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month had already fallen into arrear for as many as 14 months. the said order dated 22. 2. 96 remained unchallenged by the defendant. The fact remains that the first instalment which was due to be deposited towards arrear in the month of March, 1996 was not deposited by the defendant. 5000/- per month had already fallen into arrear for as many as 14 months. the said order dated 22. 2. 96 remained unchallenged by the defendant. The fact remains that the first instalment which was due to be deposited towards arrear in the month of March, 1996 was not deposited by the defendant. No material is forthcoming to explain as to why the first instalment could not be deposited by the defendant in the month of March, 1996. From April 1996 onwards, the defendant, however, went on depositing the monthly instalments towards the arrear and continued to do so till December, 1996. But it defaulted in making the deposits of the remaining six (6) instalments towards arrear as determined by the Court's order dated 22. 2. 96 as also the deposits of the current rent month by month due from February, 1996 onwards. No deposit was at all made by the defendant throughout the year 1997 and it is not the case of the defendant that prior to the filing of the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) in January, 1998 the defendant had ever approached the trial Court with any reason to explain the default it had made in making the first instalment within the specified time or in making the deposits of the current rent month by month or in making the deposits of the remaining instalments in terms of the Court's order dated 22. 2. 96. It is also not the case of the defendant that before the filing of the application under section 17 (3), it had approached the court for either condoning the default or extension of the time for making the deposits towards arrear and current rent. Admittedly, the defendant took several adjournments of hearing of the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) and from the order of the High Court dated 24. 12. 98 [vide annexure 'b'] it would appear that its last prayer for adjournment on 1st September, 1998 was made on the ground of illness of its officer who was looking after the case. Nothing could be placed on behalf of the defendant before me to suggest the reasons why throughout the year 1998, it did not either make any deposit towards current rent or approach the court below for extension or condonation of the defaults which had already been made. Nothing could be placed on behalf of the defendant before me to suggest the reasons why throughout the year 1998, it did not either make any deposit towards current rent or approach the court below for extension or condonation of the defaults which had already been made. The C. O. 4035 of 1998 was disposed of by the High Court on 24. 12. 98 and it was only after the application under section 17 (3) was remanded to the trial court for re-hearing that the defendant appears to have filed its written objection for the first time against the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) [vide annexure 'c' to the revisional application]. Regarding the alleged plea of financial constraint, the only averments made by the defendant are to be found in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that written objection. The relevant averments are evidently as vague as possible. The averment in paragraph 2 reads as "that the defendant is trying heart and soul to improve its financial position", while the averment in paragraph 3 reads as ". . . and to save the industry from moribund condition. . . . . . . . . ". What exactly the defendant's financial position was which it was trying to improve as per paragraph 2 is not clear. The expression "to save the industry from moribund condition" in paragraph 3 of the written objection is hopelessly lacking in essential particulars so as to give a fair idea as to what the condition was. No attempt is said to have been made on behalf of the defendant company to establish its financial constraint before the trial court when it proceeded to dispose of the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) after its remand. Incidentally, from paragraph 16 of the Supreme Court decision in Khemka's case (supra) it will appear that the default in that case was not one of non-payment of the arrears of the rent for the subsequent period. Incidentally, from paragraph 16 of the Supreme Court decision in Khemka's case (supra) it will appear that the default in that case was not one of non-payment of the arrears of the rent for the subsequent period. The default there pertained to belated payments of rent only for two months and as such the Apex Court found it to be a default in the technical sense than in the real sense and hence of an inconsequential nature and it was only in such circumstances that the Apex Court held that the defaults there were not of such a serious nature as to warrant the court refusing to exercise its discretion and to feel constrained to strike out the defence. It is needless to comment that the situation in our present case is totally different. ( 6 ) IN Krishna Gopal Ghosal's case (supra), the defendant tenant had fully complied with the order for deposit passed by the Court in terms of section 17 (2a) (B) of the Act. The defendant tenant had also been depositing current rent in terms of the second part of sub section (1) of section 17 of the Act. He had, however, made certain delayed deposits in respect of the current rent. The rent for October and November, 1979 and May, 1980 were deposited respectively on 23. 11. 79, 13. 11. 80 and 17. 6. 80 but along with the said delayed deposits he did not apply for condonation of delay or for extension of time. On 12. 3. 82 the plaintiff landlord filed an application under section 17 (3) of the Act and at that stage, on 17. 6. 82, the defendant filed an application for treating the deposits for those three months as valid deposits by extending the time and condoning the delay on the allegation that he was financially handicapped and as such could not arrange for money in order to deposit the rents in time. The trial Court dismissed the defendant tenant's petition for condonation of delay and for extension of time for depositing the rent for the aforesaid three months and the order was yet to be made upon the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) of the Act. The defendant petitioner being aggrieved by the order of rejection of his prayer for condonation of delay moved a revisional application before a learned single Judge who issued the rule. The defendant petitioner being aggrieved by the order of rejection of his prayer for condonation of delay moved a revisional application before a learned single Judge who issued the rule. The rule was referred to the Division Bench and the Division Bench referred the same for disposal by a larger Bench whereupon the Special Bench was constituted. The Special Bench formulated the following points for its decision, (1) whether the court had any jurisdiction to condone the delay or to extend the time for depositing or payment of sums specified in sub section (1) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and, if so, (2) whether poverty or financial handicap of the defendant tenant is a ground for condonation of delay of extension of time in making deposit or payment under sub section (1) of section 17 of the Act and following the decisions of the Supreme Court in B. P. Khemka's case (supra) and two Division Bench decisions of our High Court in Ramendra Krishna Bose v. Manjushree Bhattacharya, 1978 (1) Cal LJ 393 and Sitala Devi v. Roy Bahadur, 76 CWN 435 and also a single Bench decision in Sk. Shajahan v. Shyama Devi, 1977 (2) Cal LJ 545, the Special Bench answered both the points in the affirmative. The Special Bench held that for exercising the Court's power to condone the delay or to extend the time for delayed deposit of payment of rent under section 17 (1), the Court is bound to take into consideration the circumstances of each particular case. The Special Bench set aside the order complained of and directed the trial Court to again take up the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) and the defendant's petition for condonation of delay and to consider, in accordance with law, whether in the facts and circumstances of that case, the defendant's prayer for condonation of delay ought to be rejected and his defence ought to be struck off or his prayer for condonation ought to be allowed and the plaintiff's application under section 17 (3) ought to be rejected. In this connection, it would be very much pertinent to quote the following observations of the Special Bench in regard to the two categories of tenants: "when voluntarily and by his own laches a tenant deposits the rent or pays rents beyond the time fixed by section 17 (1) of the said Act, the Court would certainly refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of such a defaulting tenant and would reject his prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposit. Therefore, in the event a tenant persistently and repeatedly makes late deposits or does not at all deposit or pay rent without any valid and sufficient cause, his plea of condonation of delay or for extension of time on the ground of his poverty may not be considered a sufficient ground for exercising Court's descretion in favour of a habitual defaulter. On the other hand, a tenant who had been regularly depositing or paying rent under sub section (1) of section 17 of the said Act, due to financial or economic difficulties makes delayed deposit or payment of rent on a single or a few occasions the court may consider the said circumstance of the tenant ro be an unforeseen one warranting exercise of Court's power to condone the delay in making the said deposits or payments. " obviously, the defendant petitioner belongs to the former category of tenants as contemplated above by the Special Bench. ( 7 ) THUS, having regard to the extent of massive defaults in making the deposits of the instalments towards the arrear rent in terms of the trial Court's order dated 22. 2. " obviously, the defendant petitioner belongs to the former category of tenants as contemplated above by the Special Bench. ( 7 ) THUS, having regard to the extent of massive defaults in making the deposits of the instalments towards the arrear rent in terms of the trial Court's order dated 22. 2. 96 under section 17 (2a) (2b) of the Act as also the period of defaults in making the deposits of the current rent as contemplated under later part of section 17 (1) of the Act with particular reference to the conduct of the petitioner company as discussed above vis-a-vis the nature and character of the plea of financial handicap and the stage at which it was introduced, I have no hesitation to hold that the plea of financial handicap is not at all a bonafide plea so as to merit any serious consideration by the trial court nor do I find any sufficient reason to take exception to the impugned order whereby the trial Court was pleased to find the defendant guilty of wilful laches for the defaults in making the requisite deposits and refused to condone the delay and grant any further time for making the deposits of arrears and current rent and was accordingly pleased to allow the application under section 17 (3 ). In this view of the matter, no interference with the impugned order is called for here. The revisional application therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order is, however, made as to costs. Application dismissed.