Order.- The dispute is between a landlord and cultivating tenants. Proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were initiated and have practically come to a close before the Munsif Magistrate of Nagarkurnool. The landlord will be referred to as the first party and the tenants as the second party. The first party made purchase of the lands at a Court auction in or about the year 1948 and claims to have been in possession ever since. The second party comprising of numerous cultivators state that they have been cultivating the lands and that they are in actual possession. An elaborate investigation made by the Munsif Magistrate resulted in a finding in favour of the landlord, i.e., the first party. During the pendency of the proceedings, the lands in dispute were attached and a Receiver was appointed to be in charge. As a result of the close of the proceedings and the success of the first party, an order was made by the Munsif Magistrate directing the Receiver to deliver possession to the first party. The cultivaters were aggrieved by this order and have filed a revision petition pending the disposal of which they have obtained an order of interim stay of delivery of possession by the Receiver in Cr.M.P.No. 1302 of 1957, being the first of the above petitions. The landlord has moved the second of the above petitions, viz., Cr.M.P.No. 1371 of 1957 for vacating the interim order. The merits of the claim of each party have not been discussed before me Both sides are content with arguing the question of maintainability of the second party’s petition for stay. The learned advocate for the first party argues that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Munsif Magistrate directing delivery of possession. The grounds on which he bases his plea are: (1) The order of the Munsif Magistrate is only of a declaratory type and no question of its enforcement judicially or stay of such enforcement can arise before the High Court. (2) The High Court has not been specifically invested with powers to deal with questions of appointment of Receivers or attachment, though the Munsif Magistrate was competent under the Criminal Procedure Code to make appropriate orders in that behalf. (2) The High Court has not been specifically invested with powers to deal with questions of appointment of Receivers or attachment, though the Munsif Magistrate was competent under the Criminal Procedure Code to make appropriate orders in that behalf. That the final order in proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is only of a declaratory nature and does not embody any executable judicial order or direction is not denied by the second party. When the Receiver appointed by the Munsif Magistrate was directed to deliver possession it was not a judicial order but an administrative direction. It is like a Civil Court ordering its Nazir to deliver certain property which is freed from restraint of attachment. The District Munsif’s direction to the Nazir is only of an administrative type. It is not a judicial order which can be interfered with by any superior appellate or revisional authority. In Zamindar of Devakota v. Kolli Ramaswamy1, a direction by the Magistrate trying a petition under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code to a Tahsildar to hold an auction of the cultivating rights in the lands in question was held definitely to be of an administrative nature. It was held that a direction to a Receiver to hand over possession as in the present case should be deemed to be of an administrative type whose correctness cannot be canvassed before the High Court in a judicial proceeding. As regards the second contention advanced by the first party that the High Court has not been invested with powers to interfere with the lower Court’s orders, even should it be assumed that the direction made by that Court is a judicial order, it gains support from the decision of the Madras High Court in Marudayya Thevar v. Shanmugasundara Thevar and another2. After the close of proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in the lower Court the aggrieved party moved the High Court for appointment of a Receiver. The prayer was rejected on the ground that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code conferring on the High Court powers to appoint a Receiver in such a case. An endeavour was made to rely on section 561-A of the Code which gives the High Court certain inherent powers. But the High Court in the above case held that inherent powers cannot be invoked in a matter under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. An endeavour was made to rely on section 561-A of the Code which gives the High Court certain inherent powers. But the High Court in the above case held that inherent powers cannot be invoked in a matter under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. This decision was followed by a single Judge in Munia Servai v. Thangayya Onturiyar and others1. Certain earlier decisions of two Full Benches of the Madras High Court were cited to the effect that the High Court derives its powers in revisions under specific statutory conferment and cannot make an order in the absence of such powers by invoking inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, viz., in A.T. Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar and others2, and P. Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal3. Those two cases dealt with the power to award costs in criminal revisions by the High Court. The earlier case referred to the existence of a specific provision for costs in sections 148, 433, 488, 526 and 545 and emphasised its absence in regard to revisions. The distinction was regarded as one consciously made. Subsequently the Code was amended by introducing section 561-A investing the High Court with inherent powers. The earlier decision, therefore, came up for reconsideration and the next Full Bench in P. Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal3, came to the same conclusion that inherent powers, cannot be invoked despite the passing of the amendment, as the revisional powers themselves had to be conferred by a statute and were being exercised only by reason of section 435. The decisions are binding on this Court and it is clear that on the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions, the High Court has no jurisdiction to make the orders asked for. The learned advocate for the second party, however, argues that since the last of the above decisions was given an amendment has been made in section 435(1) by introducing the word ‘order’ and as it is only an order of the lower Court that is sought to be revised, this Court has jurisdiction. The context in which the expression ‘order’ occurs has to be noticed. It is used in connection with the topic of execution of any sentence or order. In the unamended section the expression used was only ‘sentence’. The order must be of an executable type and not of a declaratory nature like the final order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is. It is used in connection with the topic of execution of any sentence or order. In the unamended section the expression used was only ‘sentence’. The order must be of an executable type and not of a declaratory nature like the final order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is. There is no point in the contention of the second party. It is needless to go into the merits of the case. The order of interim stay is dissolved and Crl. M.P. No. 1302 of 1957 is dismissed. Crl. M.P. No. 1371 of 1957 is allowed. No leave. A.S.R. ----- Crl. M.P. No. 1302 of 1957 dismissed. Crl. M.P. No. 1371 of 1957, allowed. Interim stay dissolved.