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1999 DIGILAW 222 (CAL)

PREMANANDA DAS v. MERY SAMUEL

1999-04-28

DIBYENDU BHUSAN DUTTA

body1999
D. B. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) -THE instant revisional application is directed against order No. 24 dated 26th November, 1990 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, second court, Sealdah in Title Execution Case No. 1 of 1995. ( 2 ) THE opposite parties filed Title Suit No. 523 of 1986 in the second court of Munsif, Sealdah against the petitioner for declaration of their tenancy right under the petitioner in respect of one room of premises No. 40a, Darga Road, P. S. Baniapukur at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- payable according to English Calendar month and also for injunction. Subsequently in 1992, the petitioner landlord filed a suit for eviction being Title Suit No. 407/92 in the self-same court against the opposite parties. Both the suits were heard analogously and the learned Munsif was pleased to decree the petitioner's suit and dismissed the opposite parties' suit. The opposite parties preferred two appeals being Title Appeals No. 89 and 91 of 1993 against the said two decrees. The two appeals were heard analogously and were dismissed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Sealdah. The degree holder petitioner put the decree into execution before the second court of Munsiff, Sealdah in Title Execution Case No. 1 of 1995. Being aggrieved, the opposite parties preferred two second appeals being second appeals Nos. 191 and 192 of 1996 against the said decree of dismissal of the first appeals before the High Court which was pleased to admit the second appeals on 8. 9. 95. On 17. 9. 96 an application for stay of the execution of the decree passed by the learned Munsiff, second court at Sealdah, filed at the instance of the appellant opposite parties in the second appeals, was heard by the High Court. During the hearing of the stay petition, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner decree holder that the arrear of damages calculated at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day as claimed by the decree holder petitioner for use and occupation of the disputed premises from 14th May, 1986 to 31st August, 1996 amounted to Rs. 37,600/ -. On behalf of the appellant judgment debtors, time was prayed for depositing the said arrears of damages and the High Court was pleased to grant a conditional stay by its order dated 17. 9. 37,600/ -. On behalf of the appellant judgment debtors, time was prayed for depositing the said arrears of damages and the High Court was pleased to grant a conditional stay by its order dated 17. 9. 96 on the following terms.-" (I) The appellants-petitioners shall deposit in the Executing Court Rs. 20,000/- within three weeks from this days and shall deposit the balance amount of Rs. 17,600/- towards the above arrears within three weeks from the date of re-opening of the civil court after puja vacation, (ii) The petitioners shall go on depositing the charge and damages for user of the suit premises from the month of September onwards month by month within 15th of the following month at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day, (iii) On breach of any such condition, the stay order shall stand automatically vacated. Otherwise, on compliance, further proceedings of the Title Execution Case concerned shall remain stayed till the disposal of the instant appeal. " ( 3 ) BY the self-same order, the High Court also gave the decree holder the liberty to withdraw the amount without furnishing any security and made it clear that this order will not prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties before the High Court or before the Executing Court. ( 4 ) THE decree holder petitioner filed an application before the Executing Court for vacating the stay of the execution case alleging default on the part of the judgment debtor opposite parties in depositing the amount as directed by the High Court by its order dated 17. 9. 96. The Executing Court heard that application exparte and, on the basis of an information slip filed by the decree holder in support of his allegation of default, was pleased to hold that the judgment debtors has not been depositing the amount in terms of the order of the High Court granting the conditional stay and, in such view of the matter, was pleased to vacate the stay by order dated 31. 10. 98. The judgment debtor opposite party filed a petition on 26. 11. 98 before the Executing Court for recalling the writ of possession and also for stay of the further proceeding of the execution case before the self-same learned Munsiff who had earlier vacated the stay of the execution case and directed the execution case to be proceeded with further. 98. The judgment debtor opposite party filed a petition on 26. 11. 98 before the Executing Court for recalling the writ of possession and also for stay of the further proceeding of the execution case before the self-same learned Munsiff who had earlier vacated the stay of the execution case and directed the execution case to be proceeded with further. The said application was heard by the same learned Munsiff. It was submitted on behalf of the judgment debtor before the Executing Court that they did not get any opportunity to show that they had complied with the directions of the High Court by depositing the two instalments of Rs. 20,000/- and Rs. 17,600/- as per condition No. (i) imposed by the High Court in its order dated 17. 9. 96. It was also submitted before the Executing Court that the High Court did not specifically direct further damages to be deposited in the Executing Court and as such on a bonafide mistake the judgment debtor went on making the deposits in the suit in place of the execution case. The decree holder opposed the said application for recalling of the writ and for stay of the execution case on the ground that by depositing the damages in the suit and not in the execution case the judgment debtor has violated the condition of the stay granted by the High Court and as such, the execution case was liable to be proceeded with. The Executing Court found that besides making the deposit of Rs. 37,600/- in two instalments as directed by the High Court, the judgment debtor went on depositing in the suit in place of the execution case the further damages at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day from the month of September, 1996 onwards and was satisfied that the act of making the deposits in the suit rather than in execution case was bona fide and in such view of the matter, was pleased to allow the application of the judgment debtor by staying the execution proceeding as well as recalling the writ of possession by the impugned order. ( 5 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the two instalments that were required to be deposited by the judgment debtor in terms of condition No. (i) of the conditional stay order of the High Court were deposited before the Executing Court within the time specified in that condition. ( 5 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the two instalments that were required to be deposited by the judgment debtor in terms of condition No. (i) of the conditional stay order of the High Court were deposited before the Executing Court within the time specified in that condition. The controversy lies with regard to the compliance with the condition No. (ii) of the said conditional order of stay granted by the High Court. Unlike condition No. (i), condition No. (ii) as referred to above does not precisely specify the court before which the current damages were required to be deposited. But it is not disputed on behalf of the judgment debtor that if the two conditions are read together it would at once make it clear that the current damages were meant to be deposited also in the Executing Court in which the arrear damages were directed to be deposited by condition No. (i ). Admittedly, the current damages were, in fact, deposited month by month at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month within the time specified in the condition No. (ii) of the relevant order and in fact there has not been any instance of even a single default having been made by the judgment debtor in making such deposit. Admittedly, in some of the challans by means of which current damages were being deposited by the judgment debtor, the particulars of the suit and not the execution case were mentioned by the judgment debtor and it is on the basis of this fact that it is urged on behalf of the decree holder petitioner that the deposits covered by those particular challans were not valid deposits in strict compliance with the condition No. (ii) with the result that the judgment debtor can be said to have committed a breach of the conditions of making the deposit of current damages in the Executing Court in relation to those particular deposits thereby entailing an automatic vacation of the stay in terms of the said order of the High Court and as such it was urged by Mr. Asit Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the learned Executing Court acted illegally and without jurisdiction in condoning that breach and reviving the say, in violation of the High Court's order. ( 6 ) MR. Tarun Kr. Asit Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the learned Executing Court acted illegally and without jurisdiction in condoning that breach and reviving the say, in violation of the High Court's order. ( 6 ) MR. Tarun Kr. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, submitted that the mere fact that the particulars of the suit were mentioned in some of the challans did not make the deposits covered by those challans invalid. Omission to mention the particulars of the execution case in those challans, according to Mr. Banerjee, could at best amount to an inconsequential technical irregularity which was quite within the inherent jurisdiction of the Executing Court to condone and as such the Executing Court did not act illegally or with any material irregularity in reviving the stay which was earlier vacated by itself when materials were not placed to suggest that there was no default in making the deposits month by month. Moreover, Mr. Banerjee submitted that in view of paragraph 14 of the affidavit in opposition used on behalf of the opposite party this court could very well in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction condone the act of bona fide mistake on the part of the opposite party in mentioning the particulars of the suit and not the execution case in the relevant challans even if it is found that the Executing Court was incompetent to condone the same. ( 7 ) THE decree which is now sought to be executed by the decree holder is under challenge before the second appeal which has been admitted by the High Court and is awaiting disposal. If pending the disposal of the appeal the decree is allowed to be executed, it would put the opposite parties out of the suit premises wherein they are admittedly still living and in the event of a successful result of the second appeal, restitution proceeding would have to be initiated for putting them back to possession. On a reading of the order dated 17. 9. On a reading of the order dated 17. 9. 96 whereby the High Court granted the stay of the execution, it is clear that the High Court allowed the opposite parties to reap the benefit of the stay only if they pay off the arrear damages that had already accrued for use and occupation of the suit premises at the rate claimed by the decree holder and also go on paying the current damages month by month at the said rate. Their obligation was thus to go on making the deposits. The High Court by the aforesaid order did also give the liberty to the decree holder to withdraw the amount to be deposited by the judgment debtor by way of damages without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. The fact remains that the decree was put into execution in the very court by which the suit was decreed. The suit having already culminated in the passing of a decree and the said decree having been challenged in the second appeal, the suit can be said to have ceased to have its independent existence. But nevertheless the execution case did arose out of that suit and is pending in the very court in which the suit was earlier disposed of. Deposits in court are required to be made by means of challans passed by the court. The trial court's identity was at the material point of time merged in that of the Executing Court and the deposits were being made in the same Executing Court. The mere fact the particulars of the execution case were not mentioned in some of the challans in relation to the current damages could not, in my view, tantamount to a real breach of the condition of the stay order of the High Court. The deposits were being made before the court at a time when only the execution case was pending before it and not the suit. No motive can by any strentch of imagination be imputed to the judgment debtors in their act of making the disclosure of only the number of the suit and not the number of the execution case particularly when they were making the deposits month by month at the rate and within time and before the particular court as specified by the High Court. The mere omission to disclose the particulars of the execution case in the relevant challans could not render the deposits covered by those challans not having been made before the Executing Court. The omission in this behalf could not be anything but inadvertant and it would be, indeed, too much to hold that simply by reason of such inadvertant omission, the judgment debtor committed breach of the condition subject to which the stay of the execution was granted by the High Court. A court exists for doing justice and it goes without saying that mere technicalities cannot stand in the way of a court of law doing substantial justice. Indeed, having regard to the facts and circumstances discussed above. I have no hesitation to hold that by making the deposits covered by the impugned challans upon mentioning only the particulars of the suit therein and not the particulars of the Execution case, the judgment debtor-opposite parties can be said to have substantially complied with the condition of stay and can not at all be said to have committed any breach of the condition of the stay so as to entail the vacation of the stay. The learned court below, in my view, in reviving the stay of the execution did what was expected to be done by a court of justice. By doing so, the court below simply prevented the abuse of the process of the court and cannot be said to have usurped the jurisdiction of the second appellate court. There was, indeed, no point for the opposite parties to approach the second appellate court for condoning the breach by reason of omission to mention the particulars of the execution case in relation to certain deposits. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I really do not find any substance in the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to condone the omission, even if there be any, such, in reviving the stay which was vacated by earlier. It vacated the stay on the assumption that the judgment debtor did not make any deposit as directed by the High Court. It vacated the stay on the assumption that the judgment debtor did not make any deposit as directed by the High Court. But when the facts were placed before the Executing Court, it discovered the fact that deposits were all made at the rate, in the court and within the time specified by the High Court and the inadvertant omission to mention the particulars of the execution case in some of the challans was so insignificant as to be taken cognizance of by a court of justice and accordingly, I must hold that no exception could be taken to the revival of the stay and recalling of the writ of possession by the Executing Court which was just and proper. In the result, the revisional application fails and is hereby dismissed on contest but in the circumstances without any costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given expeditiously. Application dismissed .