C. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) IN all these writ petitions, common questions of law and facts arise and as such they are being disposed of by this common order. In the writ Petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners pray for quashing of the notice issued by the Inspector appointed under the child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation)act, 1986 whereby, it has asked the petitioners to deposit various amounts on account of the fact that child labour were engaged in their establishment. It is the stand of the petitioners that the Inspector straightaway cannot make demand of the amount indicated in the notice without giving the petitioners opportunity to be heard in the matter. ( 2 ) STAND of the respondents is that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997-II-LLJ-724) (SC) said mode is permissible. This question pointedly came up for consideration before a learned Single judge of this Court in the case of Prabhudas kishoredas Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State ofm. P. and Ors. decided on March 5, 1998 vide W. P No. 4809/1997, dated March 5, 1998 and in the said case, it has been held as follows:"7. The question that falls for determination is whether the Competent Authority is justified in raising the demand without issuing any show cause to the petitioner indicating that there is violation of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, it is liable as has been envisaged in the Act. As is apparent from Annexure P-7 series, the demand has been made by the competent Authority/inspector solely on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court. Needless to emphasise the Apex Court had never intended that straightaway demand could be raised without hearing the employer who is likely to be affected. Their lordships have held that if there is violation of the provisions of the Act the employer is liable to pay Rs. 20,000 as compensation per child. But there has be to be an adjudication process for determining the violation of the provisions of the Act. Their lordships have held that if there is violation of the provisions of the Act the employer is liable to pay Rs. 20,000 as compensation per child. But there has be to be an adjudication process for determining the violation of the provisions of the Act. At this juncture, I may refer to the decision rendered in the case of Amolakchand Jain v. State, W. P. No. 927/1997, disposed of on October 18, 1997 wherein, this Court considering the fact that opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner therein to explain the position, quashed the impugned demands on that ground and granted liberty to the Competent Authority to issue fresh order in accordance with law after hearing the employer in question. " ( 3 ) THE plea taken by the respondents in the present case is one and the same as in the aforesaid case. Following the aforesaid, I find that the demand notice is not sustainable and the same stands quashed. Respondents are further restrained from taking any consequential action in pursuance of the demand notice. As the demand notice has been quashed only on the ground that petitioners were not being given opportunity before passing the same, I do hereby direct the petitioners to appear before the Competent authority on April 26,1999 on which date the competent Authority shall hand over the notice of show cause to the petitioners. Petitioners shall be given liberty to file its objection and explanation and the authority concerned shall decide the matter in accordance with law and pass a speaking order. ( 4 ) IN the result, all the Writ Petitions stand allowed with the aforesaid direction. No cost. .