Chandra Reddy, C.J.- This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the dismissal of the petitioner by an order of the District Superinten dent of Police, Visakhapatnam, dated 25th March, 1953, as confirmed by the order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair, on 12th June, 1953. The petitioner was working in the Police Department. At the material time, he was a Head Constable attached to Sarvakota Police Station in Pathapatnam Taluq of Srikakulam District. On 20th December, 1951, a requisition was sent to the petitioner who was then in charge of the Police Station, in the absence of the Sub-Inspector of Police, by the Medical Officer in charge of the Local Fund Dispensary at about 8 p.m., to be present at the dispensary for recording the dying declaration of a girl who was involved in a lorry accident. Though he received the intimation, he neither attended the hospital nor made any arrangement to record the dying declaration. This was brought to the notice of the authorities concerned by the Station Writer some time in March, 1952. We are not here concerned with the developments regarding the investigation into the crime resulting in the death of the girl mentioned above. On 12th May, 1952, a memo. was served on the petitioner containing a charge in that he failed to take steps for recording the dying declaration referred to supra and asking him to offer an explanation. An explanation was submitted by him to the effect that he was not on duty at the relevant time and the Station Writer was acting for him. An enquiry was made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and a report was made to the District Superintendent of Police. The District Superintendent of Police on the material before him including the explanation furnished by the petitioner and the evidence adduced, came to the conclusion that the charge against him was substantiated, that his explanation was unconvincing and that he should be punished with dismissal from service. Consequently, he was called upon to show cause against the proposed punishment. The petitioner sent his answer. Not satisfied with it, the District Superintendent of Police dismissed him by his order referred to above and this was confirmed on appeal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair, in C.No. 177 App.1/53, dated 12th June, 1953. Consequently, he was called upon to show cause against the proposed punishment. The petitioner sent his answer. Not satisfied with it, the District Superintendent of Police dismissed him by his order referred to above and this was confirmed on appeal by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair, in C.No. 177 App.1/53, dated 12th June, 1953. It is to quash these orders that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is invoked. In support of this petition, the only point urged is that the Deputy Superintendent of Police not being vested with the powers of a Magistrate, had no authority to make the enquiry, inasmuch as section 50 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (XXIV of 1859) contemplates an enquiry only by an officer ‘exercising the powers of a Magistrate’. We do not think we can accede to this contention. Section 50 of the Madras District Police Act is in these terms: “Any charge against a Police Officer above the rank of a constable under this Act shall be enquired into and determined only by an Officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate.” To know who are the officers that can exercise the powers of a Magistrate, we have to turn to section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the aforesaid Act reads: “The Inspector-General of Police shall be appointed a Justice of the Peace; he shall also have the full powers of a Magistrate throughout the General Police District, but shall exercise these powers subject to such orders as may from time to time be issued by the State Government. The State Government may vest any District Superintendent of Police with all or any of the powers of a Magistrate within such limits as they may deem proper; but such Superintendent shall exercise the powers with which he shall be so invested only so far as may be necessary for the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the detection, apprehension and detention of offenders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate, and as far as may be necessary for the performance of the duties assigned to him by this Act.” It is seen from section 7 that it is only the Inspector-General of Polio; that has to be appointed a Justice of the Peace with all the powers of a Magistrate. It is left to the discretion of the Government to invest any of the District Superintendents of Police with all or any of the powers of a Magistrate. Therefore, every District Superintendent of Police does not exercise magisterial powers. Such powers should be specifically conferred on him by the Government. Further Deputy Inspectors-General are not included in that section. This makes it plain that it is not these sections govern departmental inquiries. We will show presently that they bear on charges of different kind. It is section 10 that is applicable to such inquiries. That section contemplates an enquiry by the three types of officers enumerated therein. It is a self-contained provision in regard to the departmental action to be taken against the delinquent officer. If we accept the argument of the petitioner, it will lead to an anomaly. Section 10 authorises the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General and the District Superintendents of Police to exercise the powers of dismissal, suspension, or reduction to a lower post, or time-scale, or to a lower stage in time-scale, for reasons stated therein, such as remissness, negligence in the discharge of duties or being otherwise unfit for the same. That does not lay down the condition that the officers imposing any of the punishments indicated therein should exercise magisterial powers. The only requirement is that the inquiries should be subject to the rules framed under the Act and the provisions of the Constitution, that section itself not prescribing any procedure applicable to the inquiry. There does not seem to be any further restriction on the authority. While that section empowers Deputy Inspectors-General and all District Superintendents of Police to dismiss, suspend or reduce to a lower post, or time-scale, or to a lower stage in time-scale, any officer of the Subordinate Police, section 7 does not take in Deputy Inspector-General of Police, which means the power vested in the Deputy Inspector-General of Police is taken away by sect ion 50 read with section 7. It is also to be noted that it is not every District Superintendent of Police that could exercise magisterial powers under the latter section. It is only officers selected by the Government for the purpose that could be invested with powers of a Magistrate. In other words, the power conferred on certain categories of officers is curtailed by force of section 7 of the Act. It is only officers selected by the Government for the purpose that could be invested with powers of a Magistrate. In other words, the power conferred on certain categories of officers is curtailed by force of section 7 of the Act. This interpretation will be importing a restriction into section 10 which is not warranted by the language and creating repugnancy between these two sections. It is a cardinal rule of construction of statutes that the provisions of a statute should be so read as to harmonise them and not to create a conflict. We do not think that there is any such conflict between these sections. In our opinion, the scope of section 10 is different from that of section 50. The two sets of sections deal with different subjects. Section 10 deals with departmental enquiries for punishing subordinate police officials for remissness and negligence in the discharge of their duties, while section 50 and the group of sections that precede it beginning from section 44 concern themselves with offences created under the Act. The expression ‘charge under the Act’ is significant. It denotes that it is only an offence created under the Act that is required to be enquired into by an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate. A perusal of these sections establishes that some offences are created under this Act and a machinery is provided for dealing with them. The punishment for each of those offences is provided there. This section read in conjunction with sections 44 to 47 clearly establishes that it is only proceedings of a judicial nature that should be enquired into and determined by officers coming within the purview of section 7 of the Act, and a departmental enquiry envisaged by section 10 of the Act does not attract the provisions of section 50 read with section 7 of the Act. It is argued by Sri Ramanarasu that the offences created by the Act are triable only by Magistrates as is apparent from sections 44 to 48. Each of these sections speaks only of persons being convicted by a Magistrate. If so, how can section 50 require an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate to enquire into a charge against a police officer ? In such a situation, this provision is redundant. In fact, there will be repugnancy or conflict between this provision and the sections preceding it. If so, how can section 50 require an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate to enquire into a charge against a police officer ? In such a situation, this provision is redundant. In fact, there will be repugnancy or conflict between this provision and the sections preceding it. We do not think we can give effect to this argument. A careful reading of these sections will remove any misapprehension in this behalf. Sections 44 to 47 are applicable to trial of offences committed by all police officers, while section 50 relates to a police officer above the rank of a constable. The intendment of this section is to confer a privilege on a police officer above the rank of a constable of being tried by a superior officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate. Subordinate police officers could be tried by any Magistrate which includes a Second Class Magistrate. The Legislature evidently thought it desirable that officers of a particular status should be tried by superiors who are invested with the powers of a Magistrate under section 7. Thus, the ambit of section 50 is different from that of sections 44 to 47 and consequently there is no question of there being any conflict between the two sets of sections. Nor could section 50 be described as being redundant. This view of ours is in consonance with the principles enunciated by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahendra Singh v. State1. The provisions that fell to be considered by the Full Bench are analogous to those of the Madras District Police Act. Sections 7 and 35 of the Act before the learned Judges in the Allahabad case correspond to sections 10 and 50 of the Madras District Police Act. After an elaborate discussion, the learned Judge reached the conclusion that a departmental enquiry does not come within the range of section 35 of that Act and that it attracts only section 7 of that Act. To the same effect is the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Shiva Nandan v. State of West Bengal2. The opinion expressed by Kapur, J., in Punjab State v. Bhagat Singh3 is in conformity with the doctrine of the above two cases. It follows that the enquiry conducted in this case is not vitiated by any defect in the procedure followed by the Enquiring Officer. The opinion expressed by Kapur, J., in Punjab State v. Bhagat Singh3 is in conformity with the doctrine of the above two cases. It follows that the enquiry conducted in this case is not vitiated by any defect in the procedure followed by the Enquiring Officer. No other point has been raised before us. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee is fixed at Rs. 75. A.B.K. ----- Petition dismissed.