Order.- While Criminal Case No. 204/5 of 1957 on the file of the Munsif-Magistrate, Bhongir, under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was pending, the attached properties were leased to the present petitioner as he happened to be the highest bidder at an auction held by that Court. Subsequently, this petitioner applied for writing off the amount due under the lease alleging that the crops have failed. In other words, he applied for remission of a portion of the lease amount as for no fault of his the crops did not yield and pay. The learned Munsif-Magistrate thereupon appointed a Nazir to inspect the field and make his report. A panchanama made use of by the Nazir was to the effect that had other crops been cultivated, there would not have been failure of crop, thereby indicating want of proper care or negligence on the part of the present petitioner as the only basis for his suffering. The learned Munsif-Magistrate passed an order rejecting the request of the petitioner. Against this order the present petitioner filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge of Nalgonda who dismissed it on the ground that no revision lies against this administrative order of the learned Munsif-Magistrate. The present application is against this order of the learned Sessions Judge. Mr. Venkatadri Sastry for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the order passed by the learned Munsif-Magistrate rejecting the application for remission or condonation of collection of the amount due under the lease is a result of an ‘enquiry’ comprised in section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that that order must be construed as one made under sub-section (8) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, that the local inspection of the Nazir is analogous to that provided for under sub-section (2) of section 148, Criminal Procedure Code, which resulted in such an inspection as coming under section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, the learned counsel not only would maintain that a highest bidder at an auction of the attached properties which is the subject-matter of dispute under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, could have the locus standi to file an application before a Court and demand as of right remission for loss or destruction of crops, but the Court while passing any order on such a petition is acting judicially and any order passed in respect of such a petition could be revised. To my mind such a contention, is unsustainable as well as ill-conceived. The position arising in a case like this may be simply stated as contractual, being merely one that would subsist between a lessor and the lessee. It needs little effort or any elaborative discussion or persuasion that any landlord can lease the properties owned by him on agreed terms and that the terms of lease can be varied only with the consent of the landlord. No different considerations could therefore arise if the Court steps into the shoes of the landowner and derives powers by reason of attachment to lease the properties: nor can it be said with propriety that since a Court leased the property, the concession asked for by the lessee could be demanded as a matter of right and enforced by process of law. It is not as though presiding officers in Courts in whatever they do act judicially; but there are matters in which the officer who is the Court acts in the capacity as persona designata or as persons concerned with administrative functions. Such instances are not wanting especially when properties in the custody of the Court have to be looked after or husbanded or dealt with. But it might be as contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that an order passed under sub-section (8) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is a judicial order, but that pertains only to emergency orders connected with the disposal of properties or articles which are liable to speedy decay or deterioration. But that it is not the case here. This is purely and simply a case of lease of land on terms which form the subject-matter of an agreement between the parties. In giving a lease or accepting the offer of a highest bidder in an auction, it cannot be said that a judicial act is being performed. But that it is not the case here. This is purely and simply a case of lease of land on terms which form the subject-matter of an agreement between the parties. In giving a lease or accepting the offer of a highest bidder in an auction, it cannot be said that a judicial act is being performed. It merely makes a landlord or any other lessor simply to act according to the code which he has provided for himself or itself in leasing land. That apart the mere fact that the Court happens to be in the shoes of the landowner or has been given certain powers to act as a landowner in respect of leasing the attached property would not alter the situation or convert the acceptance of the highest bidder or the grant of a lease into a judicial act. This act remains purely an administrative one, and when it is the Court that is concerned as the lessor, it does so acting for the landlord and therefore it cannot be strictly even said that this act of the learned Munsif-Magistrate is one in his capacity as persona designata. It is also necessary to consider this matter from another aspect. It is not as though every person who somehow comes to have a dealing with the property in dispute under proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, that has a right to go before a Court as such with an application asking every grievance of his to be adjudged by the Court. If that be the case, then when a watchman who has been asked to look after the attached property or be in charge of articles could have a cause. But that is not contemplated in the whole procedure adumbrated in the Criminal Procedure Code. The reference by the learned counsel to certain provisions of the Code, which I have mentioned above, is altogether misconceived. The definition ‘enquiry’ in section 4, Criminal Procedure Code, is in contra-distinction to ‘trial’ and is not meant to cover the cases of consideration of remissions in regard to lease amounts or the inspection of fields to find out whether the allegations as to the yield or the raising of a particular crop are true or not. The definition ‘enquiry’ in section 4, Criminal Procedure Code, is in contra-distinction to ‘trial’ and is not meant to cover the cases of consideration of remissions in regard to lease amounts or the inspection of fields to find out whether the allegations as to the yield or the raising of a particular crop are true or not. Nor could it be said that the Nazir was making a local inspection as provided for under sections 148 and 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was, therefore, essential for the learned Munsif-Magistrate to have ascertained whether the petitioner has locus standi to go before his Court and file an application. I am of the view that the learned Munsif-Magistrate must have dismissed the application in limine as the petitioner has no locus standi to seek a remedy in the form of a judicial order on an application in these possession proceedings with which he has no concern whatsoever. Any administrative order should ex facie be made to appear distinctive as not to give scope for further proceedings. The subsequent revision applications, it goes without saying, are therefore wholly incompetent. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is dismissed with costs which is fixed at Rs. 50. A.S.R. ----- Petition dismissed.