Chandra Reddy, C.J.- The constitutionality of rule 9(6) of the rules framed under the Hyderabad Abkari Act No. I of 1316-F., (hereinafter called the Act) is put in issue in these writ petitions. The petitioners are the excise contractors holding licences for sale of toddy in various parts of Telangana area of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Apart from the monthly rentals, they had also to pay tree-tax in respect of trees allotted to them for tapping purposes. All the rentals and other taxes due from them seem to have been paid and nothing in that respect is outstanding in some cases while they are outstanding in others. However, they appear to have indulged in illicit tapping which led the Abkari Department to impose penalties on them in various sums. As the demands in this behalf remained unfulfilled, the Department started proceedings to recover them as arrears of land revenue. Some petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash these imposts as being illegal and unauthorised, while others prayed that the respondents should be directed by the issue of a writ of mandamus to forbear from collecting the penalties. It is urged in the forefront of the arguments that it was not within the competence of the Government to have framed rule 9 authorising the Abkari officials to make the levy in question since the Legislature has not conferred any power on the Government in that behalf. It is only in a case where authority is specifically vested in the rule-making body that a rule empowering the department concerned to impose a penalty could be framed. As substantiating this, some decisions are also cited to us. We will have to answer the points raised in this case with reference to the material statutory provisions in the Act. Before we refer to the relevant sections of the statute, it is useful to extract rule 9(6) which is now impugned. It runs as follows: “If any shop-keeper or his servant before depositing the fixed tree-tax and proprietary right of the allotted sendhi and toddy trees, clears the stems of the said trees or taps them or extracts sendhi from them, the Excise Superintendent may, in addition to the fixed tree-tax, impose a penalty in respect of such trees extending to Rs. 10 per tree. 10 per tree. If only the stalks of leaves have been cut down, a penalty amounting to half of the amount of the tree-tax shall be imposed. If the shop-keeper or his servant fails to pay forthwith the amount of tree-tax or fine, the Excise Superintendent shall have the right to prosecute the shop-keeper or his servant in a Court of law. If the shop-keeper pays the amount immediately the shop-keeper may be allowed an opportunity to utilise such trees. In such case numbering of the said trees shall be immediately done. If rough work is done on the trees before depositing the fixed tree-tax and proprietary right, the period of tapping shall be three and a half months from the date of numbering and if the trees are under tapping the period of tapping shall be determined by guessing the date of tapping according to the condition of the tree which shall not exceed three and a half months.” The rule-making power is derived under section 3 of the Act. Section 3 (omitting the portions unnecessary for the purpose of this enquiry) reads: “3. For the purpose of this Act and the administration of abkari, the (Government) may- (2) make by notification rules in respect of following matters: (c) determining the number, description and form of licenses for a particular place or area and determining the officer who shall have the powers of imposing or cancelling such licenses and the conditions subject to which the licences will be granted; (l) prescribing the powers and duties of the Excise Officers; (s) relating to any other matter for purposes of this Act.” We shall first determine the question with reference to clause (c) of sub-section (2). That clause empowers the State Government to frame rules touching inter alia the conditions subject to which the licence could be granted. The whole scheme of the Act is to realise the abkari revenue by the system of licensing. No trade in sendhi or toddy can be carried on without the requisite licence which could only be granted subject to the payment of certain duties. Section 10 lays down that none could, among other things, tap abkari tree or draw sendhi therefrom without the necessary permit. No trade in sendhi or toddy can be carried on without the requisite licence which could only be granted subject to the payment of certain duties. Section 10 lays down that none could, among other things, tap abkari tree or draw sendhi therefrom without the necessary permit. Under section 15 the Collector or other officers authorised by the Government could grant licence on payment of such duty or fee as may be levied or prescribed by the Government. Section 5 gives power to Government to fix duties inter alia in regard to matters catalogued in section 10 including tapping abkari trees or drawing sendhi therefrom, It is thus plain that it is only under a licence that tree-tapping could be done and a fee is leviable in respect of the trees to be tapped. Without the payment of such a fee or tax, tapping of trees is prohibited by the statute. Rule 9(6) is only designed to give effect to this policy as disclosed in the sections referred to above. It is said in clear terms in sub-rule 6 that if any shop-keeper or his servant before depositing the tree-tax clears the stems of the said trees or taps them or extracts sendhi from them he will render himself liable to pay a penalty. Thus, the intendment of this rule is evidently to prevent tapping of trees or extraction of sendhi without complying with the terms of the licence. It has to be noted that the rule occurs in the group of rules which are headed “Special Conditions relating to Sendhi shops approved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh” and they are shown to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 3 and 15 of the Act. We may also refer to the fact that this rule is made part of the licence. The form of the licence for tapping excise trees approved by the Government contains a clause which says: “It shall be binding on the licensee to comply with the Abkari Act I of 1316-F., and rules in force and which shall be in force in future.” There can therefore be no room for doubt that this rule pertains to the conditions of licence. Every licensee is expected to keep the terms of the licence, one of them being payment of the tree-tax. Every licensee is expected to keep the terms of the licence, one of them being payment of the tree-tax. It is only to enforce these terms and to make evasion unprofitable and burdensome that the rule permitting the departmental officials to impose a penalty upon contractors who are guilty of infraction of the terms of the licence is framed. Assuming clause (c) is not comprehensive enough to take in such a power, it looks to us that clause (s) invests the Government with such an authority. That clause is couched in wide language. It enables the Government to make rules in regard to all matters which are not covered by the other clause; to carry out the purposes of the Act. This is a general and residuary provision to embrace each and every purpose of the Act which is not specifically mentioned in the earlier paragraph of the section. It is broad enough to clothe the Government with power to make a rule of this type. To exclude it from the expressions of that clause is to unduly restrict the meaning and to cut down its content. As we have remarked, the primary object of this enacted legislation is to derive revenue by auctioning the right to trade in liquors, toddy and sendhi being within its compass. The vesting of such a power in departmental authorities is essential for the prevention of evasion of the terms of the licence and for the expeditious realisation of taxes and duties. Such a power is ancillary or incidental to the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. It is one of the essential elements in giving effect to the policy underlying that Act. The legislative practice has been to leave it to the State Government to impose penalties as ancillary to the power of taxation. Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, makes a provision for the levy and collection of duty. That section says that: “There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods, etc.” There are several rules made under the Act called “The Central Excise Rules, 1944” providing penalties for infringement of any of the rules. These rules are framed to carry out all the purposes of the Act. These rules are framed to carry out all the purposes of the Act. Again, under the Mineral Concession Rules framed under the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act of 1948, there is an express provision authorising the levy of penalty in rule 41(16) of the Rules. The statutes and the rules referred to above disclose only the legislative practice, as we have already said in regard to such matters. That the Act has in view imposition of penalty is also evident from the definition of “abkari revenue” in section 2(1). “‘Abkari revenue’ means revenue derived or derivable from any duty, fee, tax, fine or confiscation imposed or ordered under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law for the time being in force relating to liquor.” It is also profitable to turn to section 7(1) of the Act which enacts: “All duties, taxes, fines, fees and other moneys payable to Government under any of the provisions of this Act or any licence or permit issued under it, and all amounts due to Government by any grantee of a privilege or by any licensee under this Act or by any person on account of any contract relating to the excise revenue may be recovered from the lessee or his surety or every such person who may have occupied the business relating to such lease to the extent of the amount due from him to the lessee in respect of the period of occupation of such person, as if they were arrears of land revenue.” It is apparent that fines and other moneys payable to Government come within the contemplation of the section. We will presently deal with the point whether penalty within the purview of rule 9(6) is comprehended within those expressions. In view of the language of these two sections, the legitimate conclusion is that the Act implicitly recognises such an authority. In our opinion, these two provisions are sufficient to imply such a power granted to Government to put into effect the legislative policy indicated above. The legislative intent can be gathered from the words used and investing the rule-making body with such an authority could be implied as necessarily arising from the language of the enactment, though not expressed. In our opinion, these two provisions are sufficient to imply such a power granted to Government to put into effect the legislative policy indicated above. The legislative intent can be gathered from the words used and investing the rule-making body with such an authority could be implied as necessarily arising from the language of the enactment, though not expressed. It was contended for the petitioners that the word “fine” has reference only to fines imposed in criminal Courts and cannot take in a penalty levied by the departmental officials. We do not think this argument merits any serious consideration. The statute would not talk of fines as being leviable and collectable by the department from the licensees if they have any relation to those to be inflicted by criminal Courts. The fines levied by the criminal Courts will be collected by those Courts in the manner prescribed in section 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not within the scope of abkari officials to realise the fines levied by the criminal Courts. Moreover, the concept of abkari revenue included in section 2(1) of the Act by any stretch of imagination could not embrace a fine levied by a criminal Court. Therefore, the word “fine” would have a bearing only on the amounts that could be levied and collected by the Abkari Department. That apart, we are not pointed to any section in the Act which refers to the infliction of a fine as such on any licensee. That being so, the expressions employed would be otiose if we accept the connotation attributed to the word “fine” in the two sections. In our judgment, the word “fine” is used as synonymous with penalty. These expressions are interchangeable. Moreover the meanings of the word “fine” as given in the Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary are: “a fee paid on some particular occasion; a composition by money payment; a money penalty”. Similarly, the meanings of penalty in the same Dictionary are “punishment; suffering or loss imposed for breach of a law; a fine or loss agreed upon in case of non-fulfilment of some undertaking; a fine”. Likewise, in the Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings of “fine” is “a sum of money paid by incoming tenant in consideration of small rent” and “penalty” is said to mean “punishment, esp. (payment of) sum of money, for breach of law, rule or contract”. Likewise, in the Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings of “fine” is “a sum of money paid by incoming tenant in consideration of small rent” and “penalty” is said to mean “punishment, esp. (payment of) sum of money, for breach of law, rule or contract”. We think that both these words are used to convey the same conception and the enacted legislation in question has employed the word as connoting a penalty also. Even otherwise, the import of the clause in section 7(1) “other moneys payable to Government under any of the provisions of this Act or any licence or permit” etc., is wide enough to include any penalty within its range. De hors these considerations, the licensees having agreed to abide by the terms of the licence, one of which is embodied in the impugned rule, it is not open to them to disregard them on the ground of lack of authority to promulgate the rules. Now turning to the citations made by the petitioners, namely, Raghavalu Naidu v. Corporation of Madras1, and Huzrat Syed v. Commissioner of Wakfs2, we do not feel that either of them renders any real assistance to the petitioners. In Raghavalu Naidu v. Corporation of Madras1, section 129 of the Madras City Municipal Act and the bye-laws made thereunder fell to be considered by a Bench of the Madras High Court. Section 129 of that Act contained a provision for refund of nine-tenths of the tax levied by the Corporation on timber in the event of its being exported beyond the city. A bye-law was made by the Corporation that an application for such a refund should be made within 48 hours before the date of the intended export out of the city, etc. The plaintiff’s application for refund of the tax permissible under that that section was rejected as it did not comply with requirements of the bye-law. In appeal against the judgment of Beasley, C.J., dismissing the suit Reilly and Cornish, JJ., upheld the claim of the plaintiff in the view that the bye-law was not validly passed since the statute had not empowered the Corporation to make a bye-law in regard to refund of taxes. They further said that the bye-law was inconsistent with the enactment and therefore ultra vires by reason of its abridging the rights to a refund of tax derived from section 129 of the said Act. They further said that the bye-law was inconsistent with the enactment and therefore ultra vires by reason of its abridging the rights to a refund of tax derived from section 129 of the said Act. That case does not present any analogy here. The source of authority of the Government to make rules under the Act is the statutory provisions already referred to, nor is there any conflict between the offending rule and the material sections of the controlling statute. In Huzrat Syed v. Commissioner of Wakfs1, Justice Sinha had to deal with section 40 of Bengal Wakf Act. That section provided: “In the case of any wakf of which there is no mutwalli or where there appears to the Board to be an impediment to the appointment of a mutwalli, the Board, subject to any order of a competent Court, may appoint for such period as it thinks fit a person to act as mutwalli.” The rule which was framed under the Act and sought to be struck down empowered the Board to appoint a mutwalli when there was a dispute between two or more rival claimants to the vacancy, etc. The learned Judge expressed the opinion that this rule was ultra vires because section 40 did not grant power to the Board to appoint a mutwalli temporarily when there were two rival claimants. We are not concerned with the correctness of the interpretation of section 40 of the Act. It is sufficient for our purpose that the situation in our case is dissimilar to the one in the cited case. We are not concerned with the correctness of the interpretation of section 40 of the Act. It is sufficient for our purpose that the situation in our case is dissimilar to the one in the cited case. Another point sought to be made was that if section 3 of the Act purported to vest such a power in the Government there was no necessity to introduce section 13-A. Section 13-A which was inserted by Act XXIII of 1953 recites: “When sendhi yielding abkari trees are tapped without licence, the tax due shall be recoverable where practicable from the tapper or if it cannot be so recovered, from the occupier, if any, of the land or if the trees do not belong to the occupier of the land or if the land is not occupied, from the person, if any, who owns or is in possession of the trees unless he proves that the trees were tapped without his knowledge.” It is submitted that the legislature would not have thought ofadding this provision unless it was conscious of the lacuna. The answer to it is, the scope of the section is different from the ambit of the relevant clauses of section 3 and rule 9(6) framed under section 3 cannot cover a case falling under section 13-A. This section is a very comprehensive one with far-reaching consequences including within its sweep the occupiers of the land on which the trees illegally rapped stand and even the owners thereof, if the offending tapper is not detected, unless the two latter, categories of persons prove that the tapping was done without their knowledge, whereas the powers conferred under section 3 and as expressed in rule 9 (6) have a restricted scope applying only to shop-keepers or their servants. Therefore, the subsequent insertion of this section does not denote the lack of rule-making power prior to it. Alternatively, a contention was pressed upon us that this is repugnant to the main provisions of the Act. While sections 31 and 33 make it an offence to contravene the provisions of section 10 and any rule made under section 3 for the trial of which the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are attracted by reason of section 40, this rule legalises such a violation by collecting a penalty in addition to the tree-tax. While sections 31 and 33 make it an offence to contravene the provisions of section 10 and any rule made under section 3 for the trial of which the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are attracted by reason of section 40, this rule legalises such a violation by collecting a penalty in addition to the tree-tax. In support of this proposition, a passage from Craies on “Statute Law”, occurring at page 300 (5th Edition) was called in aid: “A bye-law must not alter the general law by making that lawful which the general law makes unlawful or that unlawful which the general law makes lawful”. Our attention was also drawn to Eng Hock v. Emperor1. There it was laid down that a rule under which a consumer of electricity upon whose premises the seal of a meter was placed was made punishable if that seal was broken in contravention of rule 29 which prohibited the breaking of such a seal without giving the licensee not less than 48 hours’ notice in writing was ultra vires and invalid. Rule 106 subjected the consumer to punishment irrespective of whether he was in any way responsible for the breaking of the seal; it purported to make the consumer liable for the act of a stranger. In such a situation, it was held that it was unreasonable and repugnant to the general principles of law and was in excess of the powers conferred under the Act and it was also inconsistent with some of the provisions of that Act. The learned Judges held that the rules made under the enactment should not on the pain of invalidity be unreasonable or in excess of the statutory power authorising them nor inconsistent with the statute or the general principles of law. No exception can be taken to this dictum. It cannot be disputed that a person cannot be held criminally liable for the wrongful act of a stranger committed without his knowledge. To hold otherwise would be a grave encroachment on the ordinary rights of an individual. However, the doctrine of that case can have no application here as there is nothing in the rule which is unreasonable or inconsistent either with the provisions of the enacted legislation or opposed to general principles of law. Nor does the rule in any way seek to alter the law underlying the statute. However, the doctrine of that case can have no application here as there is nothing in the rule which is unreasonable or inconsistent either with the provisions of the enacted legislation or opposed to general principles of law. Nor does the rule in any way seek to alter the law underlying the statute. While sections 31 and 33 enact criminal sanction, rule 9(6) contains a different kind of sanction, namely, impost of penalty. They are two separate and distinct remedies. The objectives of the two sanctions are different. While section 10 aims at punishing the culprit and vindicating public justice, the object of the other is to protect the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the expenditure involved in the investigation of the loss resulting from the fraud of the licensees. Both the sanctions are imposed to ensure compliance with the statutory rules and conditions and to discourage fraudulent attempts at evasion of taxes and duties by making it unremunerative. They are independent remedies and both of them can be availed of. In respect of the same act, there can be both a criminal, civil or fiscal sanction. The subsistence of a penal provision does not stand in the way of a parallel provision for the levy of a penalty. This seems to be the general feature of fiscal enactments. The two sets of remedies are essential to work out the Act and they are not mutually exclusive. The department is not put to option to choose either of the two alternatives. The two sets of proceedings may be started simultaneously. In our opinion, there is no principle known to law which renders existence of such concurrent sanction obnoxious. There is a very interesting and illuminating discussion on the subject by Justice Brandeis in Helvering v. Mitchell2. The controversy there was whether an acquittal on a criminal charge was a bar to civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature and arising out of the same facts which formed the basis of the criminal proceedings. The learned Judge took the view that the doctrine of double jeopardy did not preclude the imposition of both a criminal and civil sanction in respect of the same act or omission and acquittal on a charge of wilful attempt to evade income-tax did not exonerate him from other liabilities contemplated by the concerned enactment. The learned Judge took the view that the doctrine of double jeopardy did not preclude the imposition of both a criminal and civil sanction in respect of the same act or omission and acquittal on a charge of wilful attempt to evade income-tax did not exonerate him from other liabilities contemplated by the concerned enactment. In dealing with this problem, the following remarks were made by the learned Judge which are apposite in this context: “The remedial character of sanctions imposing additions to a tax has been made clear by this Court..... They are provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud.” This pronouncement was referred to and followed by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Sivagaminatha v. I.T.O., II Circle, Mathurai3. It was laid down thereinter alia that the penalties imposed under sections 28, 51 to 53 of the Income-tax Act embrace both civil and criminal proceedings and that the invocation of one was not a bar to availing the other. These rulings also furnish an answer to the point raised in W.P. No. 927 of 1957 that the petitioner having been acquitted on the charge of illicit tapping by a criminal Court is not liable to the impost of a penalty in respect of the same set of facts. Acquittal cannot be pleaded in bar of the proceedings being started under rule 9(6) as it does not constitute res judicata. The finding of a criminal Court does not bind either a civil Court or the fiscal authorities. It has been held in several cases that a proceeding in a criminal Court is not even admissible as evidence and would not relieve a civil Court from the task of investigating into the facts. See Macherlappa & Sons v. Government of Andhra Pradesh1. We, therefore, reject the argument in this regard as an unsubstantial one. The second paragraph of rule 9(6) does not make illicit tapping a legal one. The clause "if the shop-keeper pays the amount immediately the shop-keeper may be allowed an opportunity to utilise such trees" which was to some extent responsible for the argument of the petitioners, has not the effect that is ascribed to it. The second paragraph of rule 9(6) does not make illicit tapping a legal one. The clause "if the shop-keeper pays the amount immediately the shop-keeper may be allowed an opportunity to utilise such trees" which was to some extent responsible for the argument of the petitioners, has not the effect that is ascribed to it. It only means that if the sums that have become due are paid, the licensee will be afforded an opportunity to tap those trees on payment of requisite tree-tax. In other words, the trees would be allotted to him after observing the necessary formalities and he can make use of them in future. In such an event, there is no question of making an unlawful act a lawful one. The process envisaged inthe latter part of the rule is only in respect of tapping of trees for the subsequent period. The intendment of the rules seems to be not to create a permanent disqualification of a person committing a breach of the rules. Another argument to be noticed is that assuming rule 9(6) is intra vires, while that rule empowers the department to make the levy it does not cast an obligation on the licensees to make that payment. Choice is left to him either to pay the penalty and the fixed tree-tax or to incur the penal consequences. If the penalty is not paid, the department could only initiate criminal proceedings, but they are not entitled to collect the amount by proceeding against the properties. We are not impressed with this argument. The creation of a right in the department to collect the amount involves a corresponding obligations on the person subjected to the penalty to pay it. It is not a futile provision enabling the guilty person to escape the payment under the refuge of option to choose either of the two courses. In fact, the prosecution for infraction of the conditions of licence does not exonerate the defaulting party from liability to pay penalty and all other sums payable under the Act or the license. That aside, the rule only authorises the Revenue Department to prosecute the defaulter for failure to comply with the demand and does not leave a loophole to the delinquent to avoid payment of the penalty. We cannot therefore give any weight to this submission. That aside, the rule only authorises the Revenue Department to prosecute the defaulter for failure to comply with the demand and does not leave a loophole to the delinquent to avoid payment of the penalty. We cannot therefore give any weight to this submission. It was next maintained that the Act does not prescribe any mode of recovering penalties and that the only remedy of the department is to approach a civil Court for the realisation of these amounts; at any rate, it could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue and the department can only proceed against the properties offered as security, if any. Section 7 which lays down the procedure for recovery of excise dues, etc., is inapplicable to penalties leviable under the offending rule as there is no specific mention of penalties in that section. It is further urged that section 7 as it stood prior to the amendment in 1953 did not lay down any procedure for the realisation of the amounts due to Government and the present section 7 cannot have any retrospective effect. The latter part of the argument overlooks the existence of section 43 which did prescribe a procedure for collection of abkari dues or lease moneys or moneys due to Government. We have already interpreted the phrase "moneys payable to Government". Moreover, in several of the cases, the levies are prior to the subsequent amendment, secondly, section 7 as amended governs all the cases before us because the amounts are sought to be recovered subsequent to the date of amendment. Section 7 does not deal with the mode and method of the imposition of penalty but concerns itself with the collection of the amounts and as such applies to every case of collection subsequent to the coming into operations of the section. Therefore, the contention in this behalf is inadmissible. Coming to the first part of the argument, there can be little doubt that the machinery devised by the section can be utilised for the recovery of penalties also. We have already considered the matter while dealing with the point bearing on the impost of "fines and other moneys payable to Government under the provisions of the Act or any licence" occurring in that section, and said that these expressions take in penalties also. It is not necessary to cover the same ground again. We have already considered the matter while dealing with the point bearing on the impost of "fines and other moneys payable to Government under the provisions of the Act or any licence" occurring in that section, and said that these expressions take in penalties also. It is not necessary to cover the same ground again. Another point presented is that as the rule in dispute does not lay down any procedure governing enquiries relating to illicit tapping it should be declared illegal as being very unreasonable and arbitrary. We cannot subscribe to the proposition so stated. A statute cannot be struck down merely because it does not provide for inquiry by a quasi-judicial tribunal as in a Court of law. All that is required is that a party should be afforded an opportunity to place all the material he relies upon and the evidence against him should be adduced in his presence. This is the effect of a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. T.R. Varma1. In this case, despite the contention of the petitioners it appears that the parties had such opportunities. In some cases they remained ex parte while in the others they availed themselves of it and the officials concerned proceeded to make the levy only after being satisfied that those parties indulged in illicit tapping. In a writ petition, we cannot adjudicate upon the truth or otherwise of the relative assertions, as it is not within the province of this Court to go into questions of fact. Further, it is unlikely that the parties would not have availed themselves of the other remedies available to them under the Act or approached this Court earlier if there was any truth in their allegations that they had no knowledge of the proceedings at the stage of levy of the penalty. Lastly, it was maintained that the rule questioned now vests unfettered discretion in the Excise Superintendent in imposing a penalty upto a maximum of Rs. 10 per tree and without giving a right of appeal to the aggrieved party to challenge its propriety. This grievance can have obviously no relation to orders passed subsequent to the enactment of Abkari Appeal and Revision Rules in 1955. 10 per tree and without giving a right of appeal to the aggrieved party to challenge its propriety. This grievance can have obviously no relation to orders passed subsequent to the enactment of Abkari Appeal and Revision Rules in 1955. Rule 3 thereof provides: "(1) an appeal from an order passed by the Excise Superintendent- (a) in matters relating to- (i) auction; (ii) rentals; (iii) contracts of abkari shops; (iv) allotment of abkari trees; and (v) other administrative matters-shall lie to the Deputy Excise Commissioner; and (b) in matters relating to recovery of abkari revenue to the Collector concerned. (2) An appeal from an order passed by a Deputy Excise Commissioner shall lie to the Excise Commissioner". A second appeal is competent to the Board of Revenue under sub-rule 3 of rule 3. Revisional power also is granted to the Government or to the Excise Commissioner under rule 4. Even with regard to a period anterior to the amendment in question, the answer of the Government Pleader is that, there was a right of appeal available to the dissatisfied party under section 45 of the Act which was deleted in January, 1954. This topic need not detain us any further as no such ground was taken in the writ petitions. It is only at the fag-end of the arguments that this point was raised. Hence, the respondent had no opportunity to traverse this. Moreover, in regard to impositions prior to 1954, it is not explained as to why the correctness of that order was not challenged all these years. This Court will not normally exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 when the party is not diligent enough to pursue his remedies within a reasonable period and no explanation is furnished as to what prevented him from approaching this Court for the issue of those writs for more than three years. For all these reasons we think that none of the contentions on behalf of the petitioners can prevail. There remains the objection put forward on behalf of the respondent that a writ of mandamus will not issue when there is an adequate alternative remedy available to a party. Section 41 of the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain suits for the recovery of amounts illegally collected by Government. That section surely covers a case of refund of illegal taxes. Section 41 of the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain suits for the recovery of amounts illegally collected by Government. That section surely covers a case of refund of illegal taxes. There is authority for this proposition-Union of India v. Vittappa Kamath1. A High Court will not issue a writ of mandamus for an action at law to rights of a party. Vide Indian Tobacco Corporation v. State of Madras2. However, we need not pursue this topic any further as we have found that all the points urged on behalf of the petitioner lack substance. In the result, these petitions are dismissed with costs. We fix the Advocate’s fee at Rs. 75 in each. W.P. No. 1166 of 1957: In this case, two additional contentions have been raised, namely, that the petitioner having been prosecuted in a criminal Court and acquitted, it is not open to the department to levy a penalty in regard to the same set of facts and secondly that there is a conflict between the general conditions embodied in rule 29 and the special conditions enacted in rule 9. As regards the first point it has already been disposed of while dealing with Writ Petitions Nos. 530 of 1957, etc. There is no force in the second one also because all the licenses are subject both to special as well as general conditions. The general conditions there bear on one aspect of the matter and the special conditions on a different one. There is, therefore, no force in the argument that there is any conflict between the two. Even if there is any such conflict, it is the special conditions that should prevail and we are here concerned only with the latter. The argument in this behalf is also devoid of any substance and has to be rejected. In the result, this writ petition has to be dismissed with costs as in other writ; petitions, i.e., W. P. Nos. 530 of 1957, etc., batch. A.S.R. ----- Petitions dismissed.