The petitioner herein was last posted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1 and Assistant Sessions Judge, Silchar and he was placed under suspension on 22.11.97 in contemplation to hold an enquiry and thereafter earlier to it on 10.9.96 a show cause was issued to the petitioner while he was Chief Judicial Magistrate at North Lakhimpur and the main allegation against him was as follows : “(i) That as Chief Judicial Magistrate he granted bail under section 437 CrPC to the accused/petitioner avoiding other legal aspect including the case diary. (ii) While he was temporarily in-charge of Sessions Judge, North Lakhimpur on the leave of the District and Sessions Judge he granted anticipatory bail in a large number of cases and even on the last date of holding the post. The cases are mentioned specifically in Annexure 1 to the writ application.” 2. The petitioner filed an application praying that he may be allowed sometime to submit the explanation and to give him time to inspect the documents. That was done. Thereafter the explanation was submitted by him in details which is Annexure III to the writ application. After considering the explanation the authority issued charge sheet to him on 29th of September, 1997 and considering the gravity of the matter placed him under suspension. The charges are available at Annexure IV to the writ application. The main charges are that he granted bail both anticipatory as well as regular bail as many as in a number of cases without applying the judicial mind and in a most mechanical manner. In a case of pre-arrest bail under section 376 where there was a statement by the victim girl, it was held at the time of granting bail that the victim girl was a consenting party to the offence. The finding of the learned Judge is as follows : “The victim girl consented to the sexual and intercourse with the accused and she was voluntarily agreed the commission of sexual intercourse although at the initial stage refused.” There was a statement of the victim girl but that was not considered by the learned Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate. The accused was arrested on 5.6.96 and produced before the Judicial Officer on 7.6.96 and on that day itself bail was granted. The charge sheet in its the entirety is quoted below to appreciate the matter: “Charges 1. The accused was arrested on 5.6.96 and produced before the Judicial Officer on 7.6.96 and on that day itself bail was granted. The charge sheet in its the entirety is quoted below to appreciate the matter: “Charges 1. That while you had been functioning as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, you granted bail in the following cases arbitrarily without applying judicial mind: (i) GR Case No. 1117/89 (NLP PS Case No. 729/89 (U/s 342/379/34IPC) -The accused persons were absconding and on 4.7.96, the case was withdrawn to your file, and granted bail to one of the accused on surrender. But no reason had been stated in the order dated 4.7.96. (ii) GR Case No. 1293/95 (NLP PS Case No. 567/95 U/s 409 IPC. The accused was produced under arrest on 9.1.96 and you remanded in jail custody till 22.1.96, but you entertained the petition on 10.1.96 and granted bail to the accused on medical ground without proper verification. (iii) GR Case No. 971/95 (BPR PS Case No. 345/95 (U/s 457/427/385/5067 34 IPC) The accused persons were produced before you under arrest on 15.8.95 and they were remanded to the jail custody till 29.8.95. But later on, you entertained the bail petition moved by one of the accused on the same day i.e. 15.8.95 and granted interim bail till 21.8.95 on medical ground without any verification. The interim bail was made absolute on 22.8.95 by you. (iv) GR Case No.777/96 (NLP PS Case No. 437/96 U/s 498AIPC). Accused Nasimuddin Ahmed appeared before you on 7.8.96 and prayed for granting bail on medical ground, you granted bail to him on the same day but no other reason had been stated by you on the order sheet. (v) GR Case No.540/96 (DKA PS Case No. 142/96 (U/s 376 IPC). In this case you granted bail to the accused who was directly implicated in an offence under section 376 IPC and the statement of the victim girl was also in the record. The accused was arrested on 5.6.96 and produced before you. You granted bail on 7.6.96 on the ground that the victim girl consented to the sexual intercourse with the accused and she had volunteered although at the initial stage she refused. The accused was arrested on 5.6.96 and produced before you. You granted bail on 7.6.96 on the ground that the victim girl consented to the sexual intercourse with the accused and she had volunteered although at the initial stage she refused. (vi) GR Case No.785/96 (NLP PS Case No. 443/96 U/s 409 IPC) - One of the accused was produced before you under arrest on 2.8.96 and other accused were produced before you under arrest on 3.8.96. But on 5.8.96 you enlarged them on bail on the ground that the Investigating Officer has recorded the statement of official witnesses as well as the accused and almost major part of the investigation was completed. (vii) GR Case No.511/96 (BPR PS Case No. 150/96 U/s 409/468 IPC)-The main accused surrendered before you on 6.6.96 and you enlarged him on the same day on the ground of ill health and that the Addl PP also did not object in granting of bail. (viii) GR Case No.99/95 (DKA PS Case No.24/95 U/s 409 IPC). The main accused surrendered before you on 21.4.95 and you enlarged him on bail on medical ground on the same day without proper verification. (ix) GR Case No.767/96 (BPR PS Case No. 224/96 U/s 468/420 IPC). The accused persons were produced before you under arrest on 3.8.96 and they were sent for 24 hours police custody although the Investigating Officer prayed for 14 days custody. On 4.8.96, they were produced from police custody and you rejected the prayer for further police custody and remanded them to the jail custody. But subseque­ntly, on the same date, the accused persons, on prayer were released on interim bail. 2. That while you had been functioning as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur and were in-charge of the Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, during that period, you granted pre-arrest/anticipatory bail in the following cases injudiciously and without following judicial norms: (i) Criminal Misc Case No. 12/96 - You granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner/accused who was a permanent resident of Dibrugarh and accused in Dibrugarh PS Case No.572/95 U/s 408 IPC on the ground that the petitioner/accused was suffering from Bronchitis and hypertension and also for the fact that a single message was received by North Lakhimpur Police Station to arrest him. You did not call for the Case Diary/Report from the concerned Police Station and also did not verify the alleged suffering of the accused from the Bronchitis etc. (ii) Criminal Misc Case No.5/96, Criminal Misc Case No.6/96- These two cases relate to Dhakuakhana PS Case No. 231/95 U/s 302/365/34 IPC. After giving 2-3 dates for production of Case Diary, you granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner/ accused on the ground that there was no direct implication of the accused in the commission of the crime, although their names had been mentioned in the FIR and the deceased was forcibly taken away by the accused to some unknown place but the dead body was lying in the courtyard of the complainant. (iii) Criminal Misc Case No.26/96 - This case relates to Bihpuria PS Case No.73/96 U/s 406/409IPC. You granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner/accused on the ground that there was delay of 3 days in respect of the FIR by the Chief Judicial Magistrate although the FIR was filed on 15.3.96. (iv) Criminal Misc Case No. 51/96- This case relates to North Lakhimpur PS Case No.388/96 U/s 457/354/323/366/511 IPC. You granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner/accused on the ground that he is the named accused in the instant case and secondly it was revealed that he attempted to commit rape but the offence could not be completed. The words 'commit rape' were cut and word 'kidnap' was put by you in your order dated 17.7.96. But there was no reason as to why the accused was granted anticipatory bail. (v) Criminal Misc Case No.50/96 - This case relates to North Lakhimpur PS Case No.378/96 U/s 457/354/511/376 IPC. You granted anticipatory bail on 18.7.96 to the petitioner/accused on the ground that his name was mentioned in the FIR and there was direct allegations of attempt to commit rape but later on the victim gave statement that petitioner/accused committed rape on her. But you did not reflect in the order any special reason as to why you granted anticipatory bail and that too without consulting the Case Diary. Therefore, you are guilty of misconduct and you have failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in violation of the provision of Rule 3 of the Assam Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. You should submit your written statement of defence within one month from the date of receipt of this communication. Therefore, you are guilty of misconduct and you have failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in violation of the provision of Rule 3 of the Assam Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. You should submit your written statement of defence within one month from the date of receipt of this communication. You are also informed to intimate this Registry within 10 (ten) days of receipt of this communication, if you desire to inspect the documents which have relevance with the issues under enquiry. Your written statement stating whether you desire to be heard in person should be submitted to the undersigned within the period specified.” Along with charge sheet, statement of allegations were annexed. Thereafter the order of suspension was passed. 3. The written statement was filed which is Annexure VI and thereafter the Inquiry Officer was appointed and the enquiry was proceeded. An order was passed on 4.4.98 by the Inquiry Officer which is quoted below : “04.04.98. Presenting Officer, Shri FUA Laskar, present with two witnesses. Delinquent Officer, Shri Dilip Kumar Das is absent. Today is the date of the proceeding. Shri Dilip Kumar Das (Delinquent Officer) must have got the information about the holding of the hearing of the proceeding today, as a letter to the effect was posted sufficiently ahead of time. Seen the letter of Shri Dilip Kumar Das (Delinquent Officer) received through Registrar (I&E) dated 17.3.98. Seen also an another letter dated 31.3.98 received from Shri Dilip Kumar Das on 2.4.98. Shri Dilip Kumar Das has prayed for holding a preliminary hearing on the points raised in the petition. If that is so, Shri Dilip Kumar Das should have appeared today itself. However, the points raised by Shri Dilip Kumar Das in his petition have been considered after hearing the Presenting Officer. The very fact that the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to draw up this disciplinary proceeding in respect of some bail matters as-spelt out in the statement of allegations against the delinquent officer Shri Dilip Kumar Das who was functioning as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur at the relevant time is itself indicative that such matters can form the subject matter of a disciplinary proceeding and the proceeding consequently has reached the stage of hearing. Shri Dilip Kumar Das has raised this point that he is protected under Judicial Officers' Protection Act. Shri Dilip Kumar Das has raised this point that he is protected under Judicial Officers' Protection Act. In my opinion, the Judicial Officer Protection Act provides the immunity to the Judicial Officers in civil and criminal liability, and such immunity does not extend to disciplinary proceeding. The plea of the Delinquent Officer as has been disclosed in his petition that bail matter being judicial orders and not administra­tative orders cannot be a subject matter in a departmental proceeding is, in fact, the subject matter of this proceeding and that is what the proceeding is all about. And therefore, decision on such matters can be arrived at after completion of the inquiry. In such circumstances, framing of a preliminary issue like civil cases is not called for Presenting Officer Mr. Laskar has already prayed for examination of President of N. Lakhimpur Bar Association. Let the President of N. Lakhimpur Bar Association be accordingly summoned. Fix 2.5.98 for hearing of the proceeding. Let witnesses in attendance be again summoned.” 4. The prayer made in this writ application are that the inquiry proceeding be quashed along with all the letters and show causes issued from time to time. Earlier to it an order was passed on 16.3.98 and that order is also challenged (Annexure XII) which is quoted below : “Annexure XII: The Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1964) 16.3.98. Disciplinary proceeding drawn up against Shri Dilip Kumar Das, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur, N. Lakhimpur, now Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Assistant Sessions Judge No. 1, Silchar (under suspension) is fixed on 4.4.98 for hearing. Shri FUA Laskar, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonitpur, Tezpur, Presenting Officer is requested to produce evidence in respect of the charges framed against Shri Dilip Kumar Das. Copy of the witness list be furnished to the Presenting Officer as well as to the delinquent. The Presenting Officer will intimate the undersigned whether he also proposes to examine any witness from the North Lakhimpur Bar Association in view of document No. 5. Hearing shall take place at my Court Chamber on that day at 10 AM. Intimate the order.” 5. The Presenting Officer will intimate the undersigned whether he also proposes to examine any witness from the North Lakhimpur Bar Association in view of document No. 5. Hearing shall take place at my Court Chamber on that day at 10 AM. Intimate the order.” 5. I have heard Shri AK Phukan, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Shri DP Chaliha, learned Advocate for respondent Nos 2,3,4,5 and 6 and Shri Goswami, learned Advocate for respondent No.l. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of all the respondents, that is, respondent Nos 2 to 6 and record has also been produced. Shri AK Phukan makes the following submissions: (i) That no disciplinary proceeding can be initiated on the basis of erroneous judicial order passed by a Judicial Officer. (ii) That the petitioner demanded from the authority as on what ground the certain cases mentioned in Annexure I were later on dropped in the charge sheet and that order was not made available to the petitioner. He submitted that the same standard should be applied in other cases which were the subject matter in the disciplinary proceeding. (iii) That the petitioner filed an application before the inquiry authority claiming that he is not competent to hold the inquiry inasmuch as he is protected by the Judicial Officers' Protection Act and that plea was rejected by the authority in a most perfunctory manner. He has been asked to enquire certain charges and he is not competent to decide that objection and the objection should have been referred to proper authority. (iv) That the charge sheet does not disclose any prima facie offence against him hearing/demanding an enquiry at the hand of the High Court. 6. Shri Chaliha, learned Advocate for the respondents joined in issue with regard to all the points. 7. Before we proceed further one thing which must be cleared here is that the High Court can take action against a Judicial Officer on the administrative side for judicial impropriety. It can not be accepted as a proposition of law that for a judicial impropriety no action can be taken on the administrative side. 7. Before we proceed further one thing which must be cleared here is that the High Court can take action against a Judicial Officer on the administrative side for judicial impropriety. It can not be accepted as a proposition of law that for a judicial impropriety no action can be taken on the administrative side. Judicial impropriety must be of an exceptional nature causing/bringing a situation where the confidence of the society in the whole system is eroded and there is a such situation or in such a situation alone the High Court can take action even for judicial impropriety in judicial matter. Otherwise there will be a chaotic situation. A Judicial Officer shall cause detriment by doing mischief and that no action can be taken by the High Court, such deviation/aberration of the Judicial Officer must be noticed and action can be taken. Thus the first contention of Shri Phukan shall stand rejected. But although such action may be taken on administrative side the High Court must adopt a cautious and prudent approach. It has been accepted by a catena of judicial decisions that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India the nature and scope of the High Court to control the subordinate judiciary vested under Article 235 is exclusive in nature. The Article 235 of the Constitution of India provides as follows : “Article 235 : The control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. The High Court has been vested with the disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate Courts under Article 235.” 8. Article 235 of the Constitution of India provides that the word 'control' is accompanied by the word 'vested', as such the High Court has the power to suspend the service of a member of judiciary with a view to hold disciplinary pro­ceeding. The High Court has been vested with the disciplinary jurisdiction over the subordinate Courts under Article 235.” 8. Article 235 of the Constitution of India provides that the word 'control' is accompanied by the word 'vested', as such the High Court has the power to suspend the service of a member of judiciary with a view to hold disciplinary pro­ceeding. Transfer or promotion and confirmation of such promotion to the officer inferior to District Judge and transfer of District Judge, recall of District Judge posted at outside cadre post or on deputation. Confirmation of.the District Judge who have been on promotion. Premature or compulsory retirement of the subordinate Judicial Officers. The controlling power has been vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India and is a complete control subject to the public interest at large including dismissal, removal and posting of District Judge, the High Court is vested with the power in the imposition of all punishment. 9. Shri Phukan places following decisions regarding the contention that the petitioner is entitled to protection under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850. Section 1 of the Act provides for non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith, and of officers executing warrants and orders. That section is quoted below : “1. Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith, and of officers executing warrants and orders-No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector'or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same.” 10. The immunity granted to a Judicial Officer is exclusively wide so that judicial officer may act independently and sincerely. The immunity granted to a Judicial Officer is exclusively wide so that judicial officer may act independently and sincerely. If there is any abuse of such judicial power by anyone, this protection cannot be used as a shield in proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act and the act does not give any protection to officer concerned from disciplinary control by superior authority. This protection I came up for consideration in AIR 1981 SC 755 (Rachapudi Subba Rao vs. The Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh). That was an appeal before the Supreme Court against an order whereby the Andhra Pradesh High Court convicted the appellant for committing gross contempt of Court under section 12 read with sections 10 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1951 and he was sentenced to undergo one month imprisonment and in paragraph 9 the Supreme Court has pointed out as follows : “9. As pointed out by this Court in (sic) the section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a Judicial Officer in his judicial capacity. In the first category fall those acts which are within the limits of his jurisdiction. The second category encompasses those acts which may not be within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Officer, but are, nevertheless, done or ordered to be done by him, believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done.” 11. A bare perusal of section 1 will show that this protection is not available to a Judicial Officer facing a disciplinary proceeding at the hand of the higher authority or his employer. So this contention of Shri Phukan has no force. Shri Phukan places reliance on AIR 1971 SC 1132 (Shri CK tiephtary, Senior Advocate & others vs. Shri OP Gupta & others). That matter also arose out of a contempt proceeding and that was with regard to some criticism made with regard to the judgment passed by the Apex Court and the application was filed by the Attorney General of India under Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in that case has pointed out what is misbehaviour. This case does not help the petitioner. 12. The next case relied on is AIR 1965 SC 1651 (Anowar Hussain vs. Ajoy Kumar Makherjee & others). That was a case for compensation for false imprisonment. The Supreme Court in that case has pointed out what is misbehaviour. This case does not help the petitioner. 12. The next case relied on is AIR 1965 SC 1651 (Anowar Hussain vs. Ajoy Kumar Makherjee & others). That was a case for compensation for false imprisonment. That was a case where in an action for false imprisonment a subordinate Judge granted to the respondent a decree for Rs.5,000. In appeal the High Court affirmed the decree. Being aggrieved an appeal was filed before the Apex Court. The Supreme Court held that Judicial Officers' Protection Act (1850) is not available in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court further held in paragraph 8 that- “The statute is clearly intended to grant protection to Judicial Officers against suits in respect of acts done or ordered to be done by them in discharge of their duties as such officers. The statute, it must be noticed protects a Judicial Officer only when he is acting in his judicial capacity and not in any other capacity. But within the limits of its operation it grants large protection to Judges and Magistrates acting in the discharge of their judicial duties. If the act done or ordered to be done in the discharge of judicial duties is within his jurisdiction, the protection is absolute and no enquiry will be entertained whether the act done or ordered was erroneously, irregularly or even illegally or was done or ordered without believing in good faith, that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. If the act done or ordered is not within the limits of his jurisdiction, the Judicial Officer acting in the discharge of his judicial duties is still protected, if at the time of doing or ordering the act complained of, he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act. The expression 'jurisdiction' does not mean the power to do or order the act impugned, but generally the authority of the judicial officer to act in the matter; Tayen vs. Ram Lal, ILR12 Allahabad 115”. This case also is of no help in deciding the present controversy. 13. The next case relied on AIR 1979 SC 193 (Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court & another vs. LVA Dikshitulu & others etc). This case also is of no help in deciding the present controversy. 13. The next case relied on AIR 1979 SC 193 (Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court & another vs. LVA Dikshitulu & others etc). That is a case with regard to the power of the High Court under Article 235 of the Con­stitution of India and that aspect of the matter has already been considered in the earlier part of the judgment. In paragraphs 38 and 72 the Supreme Court stated that what are the powers of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. 14. The next case relied on 1973 ALR 59 (Mahindra Lal Bhuyan vs. Md Sultan & others), where this Court pointed out that the protection of a Judicial Magistrate doing judicial duties is absolute. He is protected even if he acts without jurisdiction while in good faith. There also this Court pointed out that this protection is available in prosecution or in a suit for compensation. A disciplinary proceeding is neither a suit nor a prosecution. So this case does not help the petitioner. 15. The next branch of argument of Shri Phukan is that even the charges as levelled are accepted in toto, they do not disclose any misconduct on the part of the officer for departmental enquiry and in this connection he relied on the following decisions: (i) (1996) 4 SCO 539 (Kashi Nath Roy vs. State of Bihar) wherein the Supreme Court considered the matter arising put of an application filed by a Judicial Officer of the State of Bihar to expunge certain remarks made against him by the High Court while disposing a revision application. The prayer of the Judicial Officer to expunge the remarks were rejected by the High Court. The Supreme Court laid down the law as follows : “6. As embedded in the criminal jurisprudence obtaining in this country, Courts exercising bail jurisdiction normally do and should refrain from indulging in elaborate reasoning in their orders in justification of grant or non-grant of bail. For, in that manner, the principle of "presumption of innocence of an accused", gets jeopardised, and the structural principle of "not guilty till proved guilty" sets destroyed, even though all sane elements have always understood that such views are tentative and not final, so as to affect the merit of the matter. For, in that manner, the principle of "presumption of innocence of an accused", gets jeopardised, and the structural principle of "not guilty till proved guilty" sets destroyed, even though all sane elements have always understood that such views are tentative and not final, so as to affect the merit of the matter. Here the appellant has been caught and exposed to a certain comment and action solely because in reasoning he had disclosed his mind while granting bail. This may have been avoidable on his part, but in terms not such a glaring mistake or impropriety so as to visit the remarks that the High Court has chosen to pass on him as well as to initiate action against him, as proposed. 7. It cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate and revisional Courts have been set up on the pre-supposition that lower Courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in decision making, both on facts as also on law, and they have been knit up to correct those orders. The human element in justicing being an important element, computer like functioning can not be expected of the Courts; however hard they may try and keep themselves precedent-trodden in the scope of discretions and in the manner pf judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by or pointed out to a superior Court, here and there, in an appropriate case, and in a manner befitting, maintaining the dignity of the Court and independence of judiciary, convey its message in its judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear, and result orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the kind exhibited in the afore extraction is not in keeping with institutional functioning. The premise that a Judge committed a mistake or an error beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to inflict condemnation the Judge Subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional grounds.” 16. The Supreme Court pointed out that in that case if there are gross and unpardonable mistake or impropriety which can be gathered or which are reflected from the orders passed by a Judicial Officer, the High Court can take action on the disciplinary side. The Supreme Court pointed out that in that case if there are gross and unpardonable mistake or impropriety which can be gathered or which are reflected from the orders passed by a Judicial Officer, the High Court can take action on the disciplinary side. The last sentence of paragraph 6 and 7 the Supreme Court pointed out if there exists something ejse and have exceptional grounds the High Court can take disciplinary proceeding against him. 17. The next case relied on by Sim Phukan is AIR 1999 SC 1018 (Modan Mohan Choudhury vs. State of Bihar & others). That also was a case from an order by a Judicial Officer in granting a bail and using such material the officer was compulsorily retired. The Additional District Judge in that particular case granted anticipatory bail in a case under section 307IPC and the Supreme Court pointed out that alone can not be made the basis for compulsory retirement and the Supreme Court further pointed out that the order might be wrong, but it was an order which was passed bonafide. That is not the position in this case. In this particular case there are series of allegations as noted in the charge sheet and the learned Magistrate granted bail without application of mind and even in some cases with looking to the case diary. So this case does not help the petitioner. 18. The next case relied on is (1998) 5 SCO 493 (RC Sood vs. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan & others). That was a case where an officer of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service was involved in a disciplinary proceeding. A proceeding was initiated against the Judicial Officer of Rajasthan. The first resolution which was passed by the Full Court initiating departmental proceeding was quashed by the Supreme Court by judgment dated 22.11.94 and thereafter the second disciplinary proceeding was initiated and that was impugned before the Supreme Court. There is a background with regard to this matter. Earlier the same set of charges were levelled against the petitioner and on 31.1.94 the then Chief Justice passed the following order which is quoted in page No. 497 : “I have gone through the report submitted by the Additional Registrar, Vigilance, Shri Behari Lal Gupta, in the matter of complaint filed against the Registrar, Shri RC Sood. Earlier the same set of charges were levelled against the petitioner and on 31.1.94 the then Chief Justice passed the following order which is quoted in page No. 497 : “I have gone through the report submitted by the Additional Registrar, Vigilance, Shri Behari Lal Gupta, in the matter of complaint filed against the Registrar, Shri RC Sood. The report submitted by Shri Gupta appears to be clear, cogent and categorical. He has dealt with all the charges that have been levelled in the complaint against Shri Sood. All the witnesses have testified to the good conduct, integrity and lightness of Shri Sood. There is no grain of truth in the allegations levelled against Shri Sood. It appears that this complaint is filed against Shri Sood out of malice. I put it down as the handiwork of some mischief mongers. Thus the complaint is filed and no action need be taken against Shri Sood.” 19. This matter was reopened by the Full Court at a subsequent point of time and the three Judges Committee submitted a report on 4.1.95 which is available at page No. 499 of the judgment, that is quoted below : “The Committee, though had a short time at its disposal has been able to collect only a part of the materials, but on the basis of the part of the materials too, as discussed above, we are of the view that prima facie Shri RC Sood, has failed to maintain absolute integrity and to maintain devotion to the duty and dignity of his office. The Committee is also of the opinion that a regular enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 may be held against Shri RC Sood.” 20. Two submissions were made before the Supreme Court: (i) This complaint could not be reopened by the Full Court or by the Chief Justice subsequently without fresh circumstances or by way of fresh evidence which can warrant and such action there was no such firesh materials; (ii) It was further submitted that the fact of the impugned disciplinary proceeding by issuing a charge sheet and the liability sought to be thrust in an after thought fact with malice and such proceedings were liable to be quashed as malicious in law. Both these contentions were accepted and accordingly the disciplinary proceeding was quashed. 21. Both these contentions were accepted and accordingly the disciplinary proceeding was quashed. 21. The Supreme Court pointed out that in a proper case the High Court always on judicial side can examine allegation on administrative side taken by the Full Court. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law and that is I am doing by disposing this writ application. In this connection we may have a look at AIR 1988 SC 1395 (Ishwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & another)) wherein the same situation arose. There certain disciplinary proceeding was initiated against a probationary Judicial Officer by which the service of the person was terminated as he was a probationer and that was done in terms of Rule 10 (3) of Punjab Judicial Service Rules, 1983. The Division Bench rejected the petition and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed die appeal found that the charge Nos 1 and 2 have not been proved. It was further found that the other two charges were not established. The Supreme Court further found that the report of Vigilant Judge was not satisfactory holding that he was not fit to be a Judicial Officer. In paragraph 14 the Supreme Court pointed out as follows: “14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect Judicial Officers. An honest strict Judicial Officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil Courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side no Judicial Officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If Judicial Officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field die subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. Having regard to facts and circumstances of the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by SH Mehalawat and others were motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the Vigilance Judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All that was said against him was that he had acted improperly in granting adjournments.” 22. The Supreme Court pointed out in that paragraph that the High Court should not encourage anonymous complaint to hold the field and the vexatious complaints made of the lawyers and the litigants and the same may also be ignored but if a complaint has some substance that must be examined by the High Court, that what is required in this particular case and that in view of the fact a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated. So, the contention of Shri Phukan falls through. 23. The next contention of Shri Phukan with regard to the validity of the orders dated 16.3.98 and 4.4.98 (Aniiexure 12 and 13). There is nothing wrong in the order dated 16.3.98 (Annexure 12) which has been quoted above. It is a normal order passed by the Inquiry Officer fixing the date of hearing. With regard to the order dated 4.4.98, it is the contention of Shri Phukan that it can not be assumed by the Inquiry Officer that the delinquent officer must have got the information. The contention of Shri Phukan is correct that a delinquent officer must be properly informed regarding the date of hearing well in tieae. 24. The next contention is that whether delinquent officer was court feel in rejecting the preliminary points raised by filing petition. 25. The first question is regarding the protection available to him. That aspect of the matter Has already been discussed and I have held that such a protection is not available to a Judicial Officer. There is no infirmity in that part of the order. Accordingly, there is no merit in this writ application and the same is dismissed. 25. The first question is regarding the protection available to him. That aspect of the matter Has already been discussed and I have held that such a protection is not available to a Judicial Officer. There is no infirmity in that part of the order. Accordingly, there is no merit in this writ application and the same is dismissed. The stay order passed earlier shall stand vacated. However, the enquiry proceeding shall be completed by ffie authority within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the ordex. It is needless to say that the petitioner shall co-operate with the enquiry authority. If he causes delay that period shall be added to the period of six months. The record shall be sent by Special Messenger as early as possible. 26. The question whether disciplinary proceeding can be taken or not, when there is serious charges against the delinquent officer indicating culpability in course of a judicial proceeding, it came for consideration befpre the Apex Court which is reported in AIR 1992 SCW 1118 (Union of India & others vs. AN Saxena) and in paragraph 8 the Supreme Court has pointed out as follows : “8. The imputations made against the officer were extremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established misconduct and misbehaviour. In such a case, it could not be said that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to action taken or purported to be done in, the course of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely, a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not betaken (6, 8 paras).” 27. In AIR 1992 SC 165 (All India Judges Association vs. Union of India & others), the Supreme Court in paragraphs 56 and 59 has pointed out as follows: “56. Burger, CJ. In AIR 1992 SC 165 (All India Judges Association vs. Union of India & others), the Supreme Court in paragraphs 56 and 59 has pointed out as follows: “56. Burger, CJ. of the American Supreme Court once said: “A sense of confidence in the Courts is essential to maintain the fabric of ordered liberty for a free people and it is for the Subordinate Judiciary by its action and the High Court by its appropriate control to ensure it.” It is useful to remember what President Lincoln often said: “If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens you can never regain their respect and esteem.” “59. We would like to part with matter by recalling a statement of Edmund Burke: “All persons possessing a portion of power ought to be strongly and lawfully impressed with an idea that they act ift trust, arid that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author and Founder of Society.”