Judgment.- The appellant in these three appeals is the original complainant in this case. She filed a complaint under the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act (VI of 1949), against ten persons. The first accused is her husband. The second accused in the alleged second wife of the first accused. Accused 3 and 4 are the father and mother respectively of accused 1. Accused 5 is the brother of accused 1. Accused 6 and 7 are the parents of accused 2, the alleged second wife. Accused 8 is the brother’s son of accused 4, i.e, the mother of accused 1. Accused 9 is the sister’s husband of accused 7, the mother of accused 2. Accused 10 is the purohit who is said to have officiated at the second marriage ceremony. The learned Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed and who enquired into the same, discharged accused 8 and after trial acquitted accused 2, 6. 7 and 10. He, however, convicted accused 1, 3, 4, 5 and 9 and sentenced accused 1 to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500 in default to Rigorous Imprisonment for three months, accused 3 to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100, accused 5 to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 in default to simple imprisonment for one month each and accused 9 to a fine of Rs. 200 in default to simple imprisonment for two months. Against their convictions, accused 1, 3, 4 and 5 preferred an appeal to the Court of Session, West Godavari, in Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1956, and accused 9 preferred a separate appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1956). These two appeals were heard by the learned Sessions Judge of West Godavari who directed the appellants before him to be acquitted. The net result of all these proceedings therefore is that all the accused were acquitted except accused 8 who had been discharged even earlier. Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1956 has been preferred by the complainant in respect of the acquittals by the Magistrate of accused 2, 6, 7 and 10. The net result of all these proceedings therefore is that all the accused were acquitted except accused 8 who had been discharged even earlier. Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1956 has been preferred by the complainant in respect of the acquittals by the Magistrate of accused 2, 6, 7 and 10. So far as this appeal is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has stated before me that he is not pressing the appeal against accused 2, 10 and 7 so that Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1956 need only be considered in respect of the acquittal of accused 6. Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 1956 has also been preferred by the complainant against the acquittal of accused 1 and 3 to 5 in Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1956 on the file of the Court of Session of West Godavari. Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1956 has been preferred against the acquittal of accused 9 by the Court of Session in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1956 on the file of the said Court. The matter had been argued before me at some length and before I consider the relative merits and demerits of the contentions raised before me, it would be necessary to state the facts out of which these proceedings have arisen. The complainant was married to accused 1 in 1943. She joined her husband in or about 1949 and had been living with him as his wife until two years prior to the complaint which was filed on14th October, 1955. The cause for the separate living has been stated in the complaint to be due to accused 1 insisting on a granary belonging to the maternal grandfather of the complainant being given away to accused 1 for good and, in order that this desire of his should be fulfilled, he intended that by sending away the complainant to her parents’ house he would be exercising pressure to bear on them so that she might prevail on the grandfather to hand over the granary to accused 1. During this period of separation, accused 1 and his relatives, i.e., his parents, accused 3 and 4, his brother accused 5, accused 8 and others apparently conceived the idea of getting accused 1 married to accused 2 the daughter of accused 6 and 7. During this period of separation, accused 1 and his relatives, i.e., his parents, accused 3 and 4, his brother accused 5, accused 8 and others apparently conceived the idea of getting accused 1 married to accused 2 the daughter of accused 6 and 7. It is also alleged that in consideration of accused 2 and her parents agreeing to the marriage, accused 5 secured the transfer in favour of accused 2, the minor represented by the guardian accused 6, of some properties under the sale-deed, Exhibit P-1, executed by Sripada Suryanarayana and Kadathala Suryakantham. It is alleged that the sale consideration was provided by accused 5. It is further alleged that accused 1 as well as the complainant belong to the village of Rayavaram in East Godavari district, while accused 2 and her parents are the residents of Anaparthi, East Godavari district. It is stated in the complaint that the marriage of accused 1 with accused 2 took place on 10th June, 1955, in the village of Inaparru in West Godavari district in the house of accused 9 and that having come to know of the intended marriage,the complainant sent P.Ws. 4, 6 and 7 to Inapparru to verify the rumour and also, if possible, to stop the marriage. Accordingly, it is alleged that P.Ws. 4, 6, and 7 reached Inapparru sometime in the evening of 10th June, 1955 and taking the assistance of P.Ws. 2 and 3, proceeded to the house of accused 9 where the stage had been set for the celebration of the marriage, and there found that the ceremony of Kallagollu was proceeding. Seeing this, they remonstrated with the persons present, that accused 1 was already married and as such could not marry again during the continuance of the first marriage, but accused 9 who apparently was an influential man of Inapparru insisted on the marriage ceremonies being gone through and completed. Apparently, these witnesses, i.e., P.Ws. 4, 6 and 7 stayed on and witnessed the marriage and returned to Rayavaram. Hence, the complaint. Apparently, these witnesses, i.e., P.Ws. 4, 6 and 7 stayed on and witnessed the marriage and returned to Rayavaram. Hence, the complaint. As regards Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1956, apart from the merits, an objection has been taken to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that as the order of acquittal by the Magistrate of accused 6 was passed on 31st December, 1955 and as the amendment Act (XXVI of 1955) which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and provided a right of appeal to private complainant in cases ending in acquittal came into force only on 1st January, 1956, the appeal against the order of acquittal made on 31st December, 1955, was incompetent, as on the date of the order there was no right of appeal provided under law. In support of this contention raised as a preliminary ground by the learned counsel for the 6th accused, the decision reported in Dayal Singh v. Prasadi1, has been relied on. wherein their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court held that the right given by section 417(3), Criminal Procedure Code, as amended can be availed of by a complainant whose complaint, though filed prior to the commencement of Act XXVI of 1955, ended in an acquittal subsequent to the enforcement of that Act but is not available to a complainant whose complaint had ended in an acquittal prior to the enforcement of that Act. In support of this conclusion, their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court pointed out that there is no justification for regarding the provision (section 417(3)) as being retrospective, there being no indication to this effect in the amending provision. A reference to section 116 of Act XXVI of 1955 shows that the amendments made by that Act would apply to all proceedings pending in any criminal Court on the date of the commencement of the Act, so that unless the proceedings were pending on the date the Act came into force, it would not, in my opinion, be applicable to those proceedings. But, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the proceedings must be deemed to be pending although so far as the trial Court was concerned there has been termination thereof. But, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the proceedings must be deemed to be pending although so far as the trial Court was concerned there has been termination thereof. He argues that proceedings are regarded as pending until all rights of altering or interfering with the proceedings in appeal or in revision by a higher or superior Court are extinguished. He also contends that when a revision or appeal is preferred, the continuance is established and the whole matter is reopened. In my considered opinion, the mere fact that when a revision is filed against an acquittal, which revision cannot be entertained as a matter of right but, when admitted, may re-open the proceedings, would not make the earlier proceedings pending on the date the Act dame into force, for in determining what proceedings were pending on the date the Act came into force the test has to be with reference to that date. The mere fact that for a certain purpose on a subsequent day by the taking of certain action the proceedings could be continued, would not affect the question one way or the other. In this particular case, accused 6 was acquitted on 31st December, 1955 and that acquittal so far that Court was concerned became final, there being no provision for appeal vesting in favour of the complainant. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to extend the operation of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, XXVI of 1955 to cases which are not actually pending on the date the Act came into force but which might become pending by reason of a certain action being taken subsequently, as by filing a revision petition or otherwise, express provision would have been made to this effect in the Act. There being no such provision, such a contention cannot be subscribed to. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Delbert Evans v. Davies & Watson1. This decision merely states that during the time between the conviction of an accused person on an indictment and his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the case must be regarded as sub judice and any improper statements published in the interval might justifiably give rise to proceedings for contempt of Court. This decision merely states that during the time between the conviction of an accused person on an indictment and his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the case must be regarded as sub judice and any improper statements published in the interval might justifiably give rise to proceedings for contempt of Court. Their Lordships of the King’s Bench Division were considering the liberty of the Press in commenting on proceedings of a Court of law during the period between the disposal of the case and the filing of an appeal. The right of appeal is admitted to exist in the case and apparently an appeal was actually preferred thereafter. This case could have no application to the facts of the present case where no appeal could validly have been presented on that date against the order of acquittal. A similar question arising under the Income-tax Act (X of 1922) as amended in 1926 came up for consideration by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth Mills v. I.T. Commissioner, Delhi2. In that case, their Lordships held, relying on the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co v. Irving3, that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships held that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality, orders which when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, they held that if the section in question before them were to apply to orders which were final on the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided. Applying these principles, what we find in this case is that the order of acquittal by the Magistrate against accused 6 had become final, there being no right of appeal on that date vesting in the complainant. To give the complainant the right of appeal which was not in existence on the date the order became final, would clearly amount to interference which would only be justified when there is an express provision to that effect, of which I find no indication whatsoever in the new Act. To give the complainant the right of appeal which was not in existence on the date the order became final, would clearly amount to interference which would only be justified when there is an express provision to that effect, of which I find no indication whatsoever in the new Act. Reliance is also placed upon a passage in “The Interpretation of Statutes” by Maxwell in support of the proposition that vested rights are not affected by legislation, unless the new law specifically states so. The passage may here be extracted: “It is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past transactions, or impair contracts, that the rule in question prevails. Every statute, it has been said which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation. Where vested rights are affected, prima facie it is not a question of procedure. There is nothing in the Act of 1938 which is intended to alter past rights which became vested before the new Act came into operation by reason of the parties acting upon and being entitled to act upon, the law as it stood before the new Act came into operation”. In view of the law which is fairly well-settled, I have no difficulty in holding that Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1956 is not competent and must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. As regards Criminal Appeals Nos. 170 and 171 of 1956 no objection has been raised to their maintainability as apparently these appeals have been preferred against the orders of acquittal made by the learned Sessions Judge of West Godavari whose judgment was pronounced on 21st March, 1956 (a date subsequent to 1st January, 1956, when the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act introducing a right of appeal to a private complainant against an order of acquittal has become law.) These appeals would, therefore, have to be disposed of on their merits. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that cases relating to bigamy should be viewed on a different footing from other criminal cases involving murder and other felonies. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that cases relating to bigamy should be viewed on a different footing from other criminal cases involving murder and other felonies. In other words, what the learned counsel for the appellant wanted to state was that the rule as to presumption of innocence and the rule as to the burden of proof should not be applied to case; of bigamy with the same strictness and rigour as are applied to other criminal cases, the dispute in bigamy cases being more in the nature of a civil matter. I am unable to appreciate the new approach sought to be suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. The only question that arises for consideration in these appeals is whether or not offences made punishable under section 4(2) and 4(4) of Act VI of 1949 read with section 494, Indian Penal Code, have been committed. In other words, whether the persons accused of these offences are guilty of the offences charged and, if so whether they should not be convicted and sentenced. In other words, what is being decided upon in these proceedings is the guilt or innocence of the persons arraigned as accused in these cases. That being so, there is no reason why the ordinary rules of criminal jurisprudence should not be applied to these cases. The material portion of section 4 of the Madras Act VI of 1949 is as follows: “4. (2) If a party to a marriage which is void under sub-section (1) has completed eighteen years of age at the time of the solemnization of such marriage, he or she shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 494 or section 495 of the Indian Penal Code, as the case may be. 4. (4) Whoever performs or conducts, or abets the performance or conduct of, any marriage which is void under sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both, unless he proves that he had reason to believe that the marriage was not void under sub-section (1)”. 4. (4) Whoever performs or conducts, or abets the performance or conduct of, any marriage which is void under sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both, unless he proves that he had reason to believe that the marriage was not void under sub-section (1)”. Section 494, Indian Penal Code, reads: “Whoever, having a husband or wife, living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine............” Before a decision is reached on the question whether any of the offences disclosed by these sections have been committed or not, the main fact in issue to be found is whether the second marriage said to have been performed on 10th June, 1955, between the second accused and the first accused has in fact taken place or not. In determining this issue, the correct approach to adopt is to examine whether on the evidence adduced by the prosecution the charges in question have been made out or not. It is only when it can be said that the prosecution has prima facie proved the guilt of the accused on the charges that the necessity for going into the truth of otherwise of the defence witnesses, the credibility of their evidence and the inferences that have to be drawn therefrom need be taken into consideration. At the outset, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the consideration of the evidence adduced in this case both by the Magistrate as well as by the Sessions Judge, is far from satisfactory. After having been taken through these judgments, I feel there is considerable force in the contention. For, while the learned Magistrate’s observations are in main pro-prosecution, I find that the learned Sessions Judge’s observations are insistently pro-accused. In this connection my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to a decision of the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra1, in support of the proposition that unless there are compelling reasons, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of the Court below in a case of acquittal. In this connection my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to a decision of the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra1, in support of the proposition that unless there are compelling reasons, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of the Court below in a case of acquittal. In this case, the majority of the Judges comprising the Court took the view which has been stated by Bose, J., in the following terms: “The only question in the appeal is whether the High Court had in mind the principles we have enunciated about interference under section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, when it allowed the appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of the appellant. It is, in our opinion, well-settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong”. To this, the learned counsel for the appellant replies by stating that this principle is not applicable to a case where the trial Court’s view did not find favour with the appellate Court and the matter came up for consideration of the High Court in an appeal against the order of the appellate Court for when the case came up before the High Court, there are already divergent views as regards the evidence adduced in the case. It is further pointed out that in this particular case, the Magistrate who tried the case and who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses in the witness-box and observing their demeanour and noticing the way of their giving evidence and other factors connected with it, believed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and convicted some of the accused persons, whereas the learned Sessions Judge on appeal, took a different view on the evidence and acquitted those accused persons who had been convicted by the Magistrate. It is true that the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court were made in connection with an interference with the appreciation of evidence by the lower Court and in that view since the trial Court’s appreciation is in favour of the appellant, the principles contained in the decision may not logically be extended to the present case. It is true that the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court were made in connection with an interference with the appreciation of evidence by the lower Court and in that view since the trial Court’s appreciation is in favour of the appellant, the principles contained in the decision may not logically be extended to the present case. Accordingly, I have taken the trouble of going through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in order to satisfy myself whether that evidence could support the conviction of the accused in these cases by the Magistrate, for if I were to take the view that the conviction was sound and that consequently the acquittal by the Sessions Judge is wrong, there should be no difficulty in giving a proper disposal to the appeals. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence of each of the witnesses.) * * * * This is all the evidence for the prosecution in proof of the alleged marriage between accused 1 and 2. It may be seen from the evidence of these witnesses that P.W. 4 who was the only person interested in the well-being of P.W. 1, had picked up P.Ws. 6 and 7 casually and he is said to have taken them with him both to Ana-parthi in the first instance and later to Inaparru. P.W. 2 is again a casual witness in the sense that he was met more or less perchance near the tank by P.W. 4 whose acquaintance with him could not have been much, even according to P.W. 2, and all that P.W. 4 enquired of P.W. 2 was about the house of 9th accused. It was not as though P.W. 4 was seeking the assistance of P.W. 2 to stop the marriage. P.W. 3 as admitted by himself, was a stranger to P.W. 4 and had seer him for the first time that evening at Inaparru. He was sitting at the temple when he was called by P.W. 2 and just went with them to the house of 9th accused to see the happenings. P.W. 3 as admitted by himself, was a stranger to P.W. 4 and had seer him for the first time that evening at Inaparru. He was sitting at the temple when he was called by P.W. 2 and just went with them to the house of 9th accused to see the happenings. It is surprising that P.W. 4 who had taken all the trouble of going to the village of Inaparru in West Godavari district from his own village Rayavaram in East Godavari district, with the express purpose of stopping the marriage, did not move his little finger to get into touch with the elders or with the local authorities, like the Village Munsif or the President of the Panchayat Board to seek their intercession in the prevention of the obviously bigamous and illegal marriage. This conduct of P.W. 4 in taking none of these steps, casts considerable doubt on the evidence given by him regarding his visit to Inaparru on the evening of Friday, the 10th June 1955. Another circumstance which also throws considerable doubt on the truth of the prosecution case is that although P.W. 4 knew on the morning of Thursday the 9th that the marriage was going to take place at Inaparru on the night of the following day, he took no steps whatsoever immediately to prevent the intended marriage, but waited till the next day to go to Inaparru, giving the impression that he was perhaps going, if at all he went, to attend the wedding but not to prevent it. There is again the circumstance that P.W. 4 accompanied by P.Ws. 6 and 7 who were absolutely ineffective witnesses did precious little on reaching the house of 9th accused and seeing that the wedding ceremony was in progress, to prevent the wedding. All that he admits having done was to inform 9th accused that accused 1 was already married and that this was a bigamous marriage and so it should not go on, as if an influential person even according to the prosecution witnesses, like 9th accused would be scared away or would desist from his so-called illegal activity on the mere word of P.W. 4 who was practically a stranger to him. It is the prosecution case that the alleged marriage took place in the house of the 9th accused. It is the prosecution case that the alleged marriage took place in the house of the 9th accused. It is also admitted that 9th accused was once the Village Munsif of the place and was an influential elder in the village of Inaparru and yet we have the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 to say that none of the villagers or even the neighbours and relations of accused 9 had attended the wedding, evidence which it is impossible to believe in the circumstances of the case. The prosecution have it that the object of performing the marriage at Inaparru was secrecy, so that the bigamous marriage might be performed without the intervention of interested parties, which pre-supposes that 9th accused must have taken reasonable steps to keep back the information of the bigamous character of the wedding that is going to take place in his house from the knowledge of the village. This being the case, it is not understood why none of his relations had been invited, nor even the elders of the village. Even taking the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 at their face value, they do not establish that a Hindu marriage had taken place on 10th June, 1955, between accused 1 and accused 2 at the house of P.W. 9 in the village of Inaparru. Strangely enough, none of these witnesses depose to the details of the ceremonies at the alleged marriage. For example, there is nothing in their evidence to establish that there was a sacred fire or akhandam or that there was sapthapadhi which is the most essential part of a Hindu marriage ceremony. There is no reference in their evidence to the charting of mantras, to the performance of the various other ceremonies connected with the marriage, the feeding of guests, the burning of lights and the presence of my decorations. In other words, their evidence does not show that there were any indications of the ostensible evidence of a wedding having taken place. According to some of these witnesses, the wedding had taken place in another hall and they could not see what was happening there. In other words, their evidence does not show that there were any indications of the ostensible evidence of a wedding having taken place. According to some of these witnesses, the wedding had taken place in another hall and they could not see what was happening there. Even after they had been asked to get out by accused 9, these five witnesses stayed on at the threshold hanging to the door-step as if they had no other business nor enough prestige and dignity to continue to remain there even after they had been ordered out. Even assuming that P.Ws. 4, 6 and 7 having come to Inaparru for the express purpose of preventing the marriage could stay on at the place, it is not understood how P.Ws. 2 and 3 who did not have their evening meal that evening continued to remain there just as if to witness the wedding. So much so, both in law and in fact, I am not satisfied that any marriage had taken place between accused and accused 2 as alleged by the complainant in her complaint and on the evidence of these witnesses, which, in my opinion, is so vague, unnatural and inconclusive that no judicial decision could be properly passed thereon. Taking all these facts and circumstances into consideration, it is a reasonable thing to expect that if a wedding of this kind had taken place in a small village like Inaparru, there would certainly have been some publicity and some noise and bustle and would have been attended by persons connected with 9th accused who are near and dear to him. The evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 and 6 and 7, is, in my opinion, extremely artificial and carries no conviction whatsoever. This is, in my opinion, a case which fails for want of credible evidence establishing the factum of the bigamous marriage. In the view I have taken, it is unnecessary to go into the the other details of the case such as the delay in filing the complaint, the real nature of the transaction represented by Exhibit P-1 and the various other infirmities on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents. It is unnecessary to go into the question of the credibility of the defence evidence in this case. It is unnecessary to go into the question of the credibility of the defence evidence in this case. The complainant having thus failed to establish beyond doubt that the second marriage has taken place between accused 1 and accused 2, Criminal Appeals 170 and 171 of 1956 must fail and are therefore dismissed. A.S.R. ----- Appeals dismissed.