SHITLA PD. SRIVASTAVA, J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitu tion of India has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated 29-7-1988 passed by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner No. 8, Dharam Deo Rai and respondent Nos. 2 to 4, namely, Indra Deo Rai, Kalap Nath Rai, and Kedar Rai and the real brothers. The petitioner No. 8 was allotted three chaks. His first chak was at Plot No. 238, second chak was at plot No. 52 and his third chak was at Plot No. 380. All these three chaks were on the original holding of the petitioner No. 8 but he was not satisfied, therefore, he filed objection against the chaks allotted to him. The Consolidation Officer on 7-3-88 dismissed the objection filed by the petitioner No. 8, therefore, he filed an appeal which was also dismissed on 13-4-87. He also filed a revision against the order of the Settlement Officer Con solidation. The petitioner No. 8 got chak on plot No. 52 which is adjacent to land belonging to the petitioners as well as respondents Nos. 6 to 10. These respon dents after obtaining the permission from the Settlement Officer Consolidation pur chased the chak of the petitioner No. 8 which was on plot No. 52 on 12- 6-87. The sale-deed was executed during the penden cy of the revision. In this sale-deed, half share in chak was of petitioner Nos. 1 to 6 along with the respondent Nos. 7 to 10 and half share belong to the petitioner No. 7 along with the respondent Nos. 5 and 6. It is further stated that during the pendency of the revision, the respondents also ob tained a sale-deed in respect of the two remaining chaks of the petitioner No. 8. This sale-deed was executed on 28-10-1987. It is stated that after the sale-deed was executed in favour of the petitioners by the petitioner No. 8, he had left no interest in the land and petitioner No. 8 also gave assurance to the petitioners that he will have his revision dismissed for non-prosecution and the petitioners were con vinced and had no reason to disbelieve the statement of the petitioner No. 8. It is stated that some forged compromise was executed on 7-1-1988 and before the Assis tant Director of Consolidation, an ap plication was filed by the petitioners against the compromise that the respon dent No. 8 had already executed a sale^ deed in favour of the petitioners. The Court passed an order, put up with the filed concerned but no order was passed on the application and the revision was al lowed on 30-1-1988 on the basis of the forged and farzi compromise. It is stated that the petitioners were not heard by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation, there after the petitioners filed an application for setting aside the order dated 30-1-88 and they were also advised to file the writ petition against the same order/the writ petition was dismissed in the month of March, 1988. The petitioner No. 8 was not in the village and when he came to know about the fraud committed by the respon dents before the Asstt. Director of Con solidation, he filed an application before the Asstt. Director of Consolidation on 11 -3-1988, alleging that there was no com promise and the order has been obtained by the contesting respondents by commit ting fraud on the Court. It is stated that both the applications, one filed by the petitioners for recalling of the order dated 30-1-1988 and other filed by the petitioner No. 8 were taken together and both were rejected on 29-7-88. The order dated 29-7-1988 has been challenged by the petitioners in the present writ petition. 3. The ground of attack is that a fraud was played on the Court by filing a forged compromise, which was illegal, therefore, the Asstt. Director of Consolidation should have considered this aspect of the case, but he has dismissed the revision on the ground that the earlier order has been challenged by the petitioner in the High Court by filing writ petition which has been dismissed summarily, therefore, the resjudicata will apply. The submission of the petitioners is that when the High Court has dismissed the writ petition in limine then that order will not be binding on the petitioners, and the principles of res judicata will not apply. 4. The petitioners contention is that both the applications could not have been dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The submission of the petitioners is that when the High Court has dismissed the writ petition in limine then that order will not be binding on the petitioners, and the principles of res judicata will not apply. 4. The petitioners contention is that both the applications could not have been dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The applications were to decide the order dated 30-1-1988, against which the writ petition was filed, therefore, the subject matter before the Asstt. Director of Con solidation was two applications and the prayer made therein and if the writ peti tion was dismissed against the same order, therefore, there was no bar on the Asstt. Director of Consolidation to consider the applications on merits, he should not have rejected the same on the principle of res judicata. 5. The parties have exchanged counter and rejoinder-affidavits. From a perusal of the judgment of the Asstt. Director of Consolidation, impugned in the present case, it is apparent that he had rejected the applications for restoration on the principle of res judicata, therefore, the question for determination in this case is as to whether the order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine against the order dated 30-1-1988 will operate as resjudicata, while deciding the two applications filed for recalling and restoration of the same order. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the principle of res judicata will not apply in the present case as before the High Court in the earlier petition the order dated 30-1-1988 was challenged on merit whereas in two applications aforesaid, the question was as to whether the application for recall should be allowed and the matter may be heard or not. It is further submitted that in the application filed by Bhrigu Nath on 11-2-88 it was stated that the petitioner had sold the property and he had not filed any compromise, therefore, the order dated 30-1- 1988 is ex pane order and it should be recalled as the petitioners, Bhrigu Nath and others were not heard at the time of hearing of the revision. It is further submitted that the application which was filed by Dharam Deo Rai for recalling the order dated 30-1-1988 on 11-5-88 was also to the same effect that the compromise is a forged document, there fore, these compromise is illegal and the order dated 30-1- 1988 is ex pane. The petitioners have filed these two applica tions along with the writ petition. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the matter in issue before the Deputy Director of Con solidation while disposing of these two application was not merit of the order of the Asstt. Director of Consolidation rather it was as to whether there was any proper compromise or not and before the High Court in the earlier writ petition the order dated 30-1-1988 was challenged on merit, therefore, if that petition has been dismissed, it shall be deemed to have con sidered the matter of fraud and forgery committed by the respondents. It was sub mitted that the order dated 30-1-1988 was passed on the basis of the alleged com promise which the petitioners has chal lenged by way of the application for recall. 7. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that Dharam Deo Rai who was himself a party in the compromise and on the basis of which the order dated 30-1-88 was passed never filed restoration application rather petitioners Deo Nath Rai got the restoration application filed on behalf of Dharam Deo ijlai, through Sri Riaz Ahmad, Advocate. Dharam Deo Rai filed another application and affidavit on 13-5-1988 through Sri Surya Nath Singh, Advo cate and denied the filing of the restora tion application dated 11-5-1988. It is fur ther stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 filed writ peti tion before the High Court challenging the order dated 30-1-1988 on the same plea and the writ petition was dismissed, therefore, the principle of resjudicata will apply in this case. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. I have perused the record. Learned Counsel for the) petitioners has placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 1328 Hiphnak Singh v. Union of India and Ors. on the principle ofresjudicata. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. I have perused the record. Learned Counsel for the) petitioners has placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 1328 Hiphnak Singh v. Union of India and Ors. on the principle ofresjudicata. He has also placed reliance on (1989) 3 SCC 433 , Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal, espe cially paragraph 24 of the said judgment that the dismissal Jin limine will not create a bar in filing a fresh writ petition. The decision reported in (1996) 7 SCC 542 Union of India and Anr. v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation Ranchi and Ors. and (1997) 9 SCC, Union of India v. Sube Ram and Ors. , have also been cited for the same purpose by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 9. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that under the High Court Rules especially Chapter XXXII, Rule 7 when the application has been rejected, no second application on the same ground is maintainable. For that purpose, he has placed reliance on 1993 (I) UPLBEC 448, U. S. Tripathi v. Banaras Hindu University. His submission is that the petition was dismissed by the High Court with the observations that no merit, it amounts that the points were decided on the principle of merger, therefore, the judgment of the I High Court which was final, the principle of res judicata will apply It was further submitted by Sri Sankatha Rai that though Dharm Deo Rai had filed the writ petition against the order dated 30-1-1988 and the petitioner was respondent in tie earlier writ petition which was dismissed, therefore, the judgment was binding on him and he had no right to file application for recall. 10. Sri Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioners in reply submitted that the principle of merger is not applicable in the writ jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on the decision reported in (1986) 4 SCC146, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. and (1997) (6) SCC 78. He has further submitted that no such ground has been taken by the petitioners. 11. After hearing the learned Coun sel for the parties at length, it is necessary to see the relevant provision of resjudicata i. e. Section 11 of the C. P. C. Section 11 of C. P. C. is quoted below: "11. and (1997) (6) SCC 78. He has further submitted that no such ground has been taken by the petitioners. 11. After hearing the learned Coun sel for the parties at length, it is necessary to see the relevant provision of resjudicata i. e. Section 11 of the C. P. C. Section 11 of C. P. C. is quoted below: "11. Res judicata.-No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and sub stantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigation under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been substantially raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. " 12. The issue in the present case is as to whether there was any compromise by the respondent No. 8 before the Asstt, Director of Consolidation after executing the sale-deed of his property. It is true that the Deputy Director of Consolidation decided the revision on the basis of the compromise and that order was chal lenged by way of the writ petition. The applications for recall of the order were also filed. In the writ petition the question was as to whether the order passed by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation on 30-1-1988 is illegal and should be quashed. The petition was dismissed in limine and in the application filed by the petitioners as well as Dharam Deo Rai, it was mentioned that the compromise was a forged one, there fore, it should not have been considered by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation after dismissal of the writ petition, these two applications were taken into considera tion and they were subsequently rejected by him on the principle of res judicata. From the judgment it is apparent that before the Asstt. Director of Consolida tion, there was no memo of writ petition filed by the petitioner in the High Court rather only two applications for recall were there. The Asstt. Director of Con solidation merely on the information given by the learned Counsel for the respondents that earlier writ petition has been dismissed held that the principle of res judicata will apply in this case. 13. The Asstt. Director of Con solidation merely on the information given by the learned Counsel for the respondents that earlier writ petition has been dismissed held that the principle of res judicata will apply in this case. 13. A bare perusal and the interpreta tion of Section II of the C. P. C. would show that if the Court wants to apply the prin ciple of res judicata, it must have before it two suits, one decided earlier and other which is for consideration or the pleading of two suits or issues to be determined in two suits and findings given in the earlier suit. Then only the Court can come to the conclusion as to whether the subsequent suit is barred by the provisions of res judicata or not. In the instant case, it is true that the applications were there and the Court has mentioned! the statements con tained in these two applications, but the Asstt. Director of Consolidation has not mentioned the pleadings or the ground of attack of the judgment dated 30-1-1988 which was taken by the petitioners in the earlier writ petition, therefore, I am of the view that the findings recorded by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation rejecting the applications on the principles of res judicata is not justified. If a point was raised regarding the principles of res judicata, it was the duty of the Asstt. Direc tor of Consolidation to have perused the writ petition and the judgment given by the High Court but it has not been done by the Asstt. Director of Consolidation. I think it a fit case in which the order of the Asstt. Director of Consolidation rejecting the applications should be quashed and the matter may be sent back to him to restore the two applications to their original num bers and after giving opportunity to the parties to file the pleading of the writ petition and the judgment of the High Court thereafter he will pass the orders afresh keeping in view the ingredients of Section 11 of the C. P. C. , after hearing the parties again. 14. I accordingly quash the order dated 29-7-1988 and direct the Asstt. Director of Consolidation to restore the aforesaid two applications to their original numbers and decide the same afresh, as per observations made in the body of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. 14. I accordingly quash the order dated 29-7-1988 and direct the Asstt. Director of Consolidation to restore the aforesaid two applications to their original numbers and decide the same afresh, as per observations made in the body of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .