JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Heard Mr. Toraskar appearing for the petitioner Smt. Usha Kejariwal, the learned A.P.P. appearing for the State of Maharashtra as respondent No. 3, Mr. A.G. Nirmal, Sub-Inspector in his individual capacity as respondent No. 2 and the Special Executive Magistrate, Kalyan in his official capacity as respondent No. 1. 2. This petition is filed by the petitioner for quashing chapter proceedings initiated against him by the respondents for his forthwith release and for claiming compensation of Rs. 25,000/- for his illegal detention and for other reliefs. 3. It was contended by the Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is a resident of Kalyan, that he is a law abiding and peace loving citizen, but Bazarpeth Police Station, Kalyan has been using provisions of Criminal Procedure Code to arrest and detain the petitioner as and when they like and they are doing this in contravention of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and the right of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution of India to the petitioner. Further according to him, the petitioner is so illegally arrested and detained at the instance of one Mhatre family whose family members have been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on the charge of murder of Ramesh Beturkar in 1982 and murder of Shakti Beturkar in 1992 in Kalyan. Both these victims of the murders were the family members of the petitioner, and the petitioner was the prosecution witness in the murder case of Shakti Beturkar. It is at the instance of Mhatre family that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been arresting the petitioner every now and then and detaining him without any rhyme and reasons subjecting him all sorts of mental agony and torture. 4. The petitioner has given number of instances of such illegal arrest in his petition. For example, on 24-2-1998 Bazarpeth Police Station arrested the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and produced before the Judicial Magistrate for seeking 14 days custody. However, the Magistrate after finding that there were no reasons to arrest the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code immediately ordered his release on 24-2-1998 itself. Secondly, the petitioner was again arrested on 27-4-1998 at 23.05 hours under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Kalyan on 28-4-1998 for seeking his detention for 7 days. Secondly, the petitioner was again arrested on 27-4-1998 at 23.05 hours under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Kalyan on 28-4-1998 for seeking his detention for 7 days. But the Magistrate, Kalyan after finding that again there were no grounds for detention of the petitioner released him on 28-4-1998. The petitioner has also stated that in 1996 the chapter proceedings were initiated against him by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under section 110(e) and (g) of the Criminal Procedure Code and was called to execute an interim bond under section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner moved this Court by filing Criminal Writ Petition No. 941 of 1996 and Justice Ashok Agarwal and Justice R.M.S. Khandeparkar immediately ordered the release of the petitioner. 5. Lastly, the petitioner was arrested again on 15-7-1998 at 20.30 hours and chapter proceedings under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated against him, he was called upon to furnish interim bond of his good behaviour for three years in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties in the like amount and on his failure to do so, he was detained and he had to file the present petition, in which the learned A.P.P. had to concede that the petitioner was required to release forthwith, and was so released by Justice Pandya on 10-8-1998. Therefore, according to the petitioner, his detention in custody from 15-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 was illegal detention and for all these reasons he has filed this petition claiming the above reliefs. 6. It was also the contention of the petitioner that the Bazarpeth Police Station, Kalyan and respondent No. 1 are illegally invoking their powers and resorting initiation of the chapter proceedings without any basis whatever and harassing the petitioner and his detention for about 25 days from 15-7-1998 as stated above and harassment caused to him earlier by four illegal detention is mala fide, without legal basis for which he is entitled for the reliefs claimed including the relief of compensation of Rs. 25,000/-. 7. It was further contended by the advocate for the petitioner that even though the petitioner is facing some prosecution as per the details given by the petitioner in his petition and which are as under:- 1. I 73/91 Under section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120(b). 2. I 43/92 Under section 324, 34. 3. 25,000/-. 7. It was further contended by the advocate for the petitioner that even though the petitioner is facing some prosecution as per the details given by the petitioner in his petition and which are as under:- 1. I 73/91 Under section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120(b). 2. I 43/92 Under section 324, 34. 3. I 0046/98 Under section 324, 34. 4. N.C. 45/92 Under section 504, 506. 5. 189/93 Under section 323, 504. 6. 13/92 Cri.P.C. 110(e)(g). 7. Local Application 25/93. all these prosecution were the prosecutions of 1991, 1992, 1993 and for good period of 5/6 years there were no prosecution against him up to 1998 when the case under section 324 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against him vide Case No. I 0046 of 1998. However according to the petitioner pendency of all these cases can not and does not give and right to the respondents to arrest him again and again under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and start chapter proceeding against him and all the orders of his forthwith release passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate of Kalyan at the relevant time and by this High Court have clearly show that his arrest and detention were illegal and was not called for and was without any legal and factual basis, and therefore, it was contended by his advocate on the basis of certain authorities that this was a fit case to grant compensation to the petitioner for his illegal detention at least for the last illegal detention from 15-7-1998 to 10-8-1998. 8. 8. The advocate for the petitioner further contended that so far as initiation of the proceedings under sections 151(3) and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code from 15-7-1998 onwards in concerned, there was no compliance to any of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure that show cause notice was not served upon him, that no time was given to him for furnishing interim bond, that thumb impressions were taken forcibly by the police on certain papers, even though, he was in a position to write and put his signature in his own hand writing, that none of his family members were made aware of his arrest/detention, that there was no ground for his arrest and for initiation of chapter proceedings, and therefore, initiation of chapter proceedings against the petitioner and his arrest from 15-7-1998 onwards and his detention are illegal, mala fide and without justification, and he is entitled for the reliefs claimed and protection for any kind of further harassment or mental torture. 9. On the other hand it was contended by the learned A.P.P. that the petitioner was facing as many as seven prosecution under different provisions of Indian Penal Code and considering those prosecution and his activities as extortionist, his detention on all the earlier occasions under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and initiation of chapter proceedings was fully justified. She also contended that when the Chapter proceedings No. 13 of 1998 (which is the subject matter for challenge in this petition) were initiated and the petitioner was produced before the Special Executive Magistrate-the respondent No. 1 on 17-7-1998, the mother of the petitioner and his other relative one Mr. Dinesh Patil were present before the Special Executive Magistrate and they were asked to make an arrangement of furnishing interim bond or sureties. But they did not avail of this opportunity and consequently, the petitioner was required to be detained from 17-7-1998 till he was released on 10-8-1998 by the order of this High Court. She, therefore, contended that the detention of the petitioner from 17-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 was on account of petitioner's failure to furnish bond, and therefore, it could be not be said that the respondents acted mala fide or did not follow the provisions of law in that regard. She, therefore, contended that the detention of the petitioner from 17-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 was on account of petitioner's failure to furnish bond, and therefore, it could be not be said that the respondents acted mala fide or did not follow the provisions of law in that regard. She, therefore, opposed the petition vehemently and further contended that the statements of witnesses were recorded before initiating the present chapter proceedings No. 13 of 1998 and those statements reveal that not only the petitioner was facing earlier prosecutions but there were witnesses who had stated before the police that the petitioner was likely to commit the offences of extortion etc. as defined in section 110 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, according to her, there were no mala fide on the part of the respondents in arresting and detaining the petitioner or initiating the Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998. She also relied upon affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 on record page No. 29, affidavit of respondent No. 2 on record page No. 36 and affidavit of Joint Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai on record page 42 of the petition in compliance to the directions given by Justice Pandya on 25-8-1998. She further contended that since the petitioner has been released forthwith by this Court by order of Justice Pandya on 10-8-1998 nothing remains in this petition in that regard. So far as claim of compensation is concerned, she submitted that deman of compensation was itself illegal and unjust and not maintainable. She further contended that if compensation was awarded, same would result fear in mind of the police in discharging their official duties and this would ultimately result in affecting public peace and tranquillity etc. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the advocate for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State-respondents. It is true that the prayer of the petitioner for grant of compensation, if allowed, would act as deterrent against police officials. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the advocate for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State-respondents. It is true that the prayer of the petitioner for grant of compensation, if allowed, would act as deterrent against police officials. But I am unable to agree with the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. that such a prayer should not be considered only on that count, because, in a society governed by the rules of law, the Constitution of India and the statutory provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, it is for the Court to see that all these provisions made for protecting liberty of the individual against arbitrary exercise of statutory powers are strictly complied with, and that whims and caprices and motives and prejudices of the Police Officers who are the guardians and protectors of law did not and do not mingle with the powers granted to them by the law. 11. It is true that the petitioner is facing prosecution in the following cases which are pending against him since 1991:- 1. I 73/91 Under Section 147,148,149, 302,307,120 (b). 2. I.43/92 Under Section 324,34. 3. I 0046/98 Under section 324,34 4. N.C. 45/92 Under Section 504,506. 5. 189/93 Under section 323,504 6. 13/92 Cr. I.P.C. 110 (e)(g) 7. Local Application 25/93 Out of these seven cases, there is one case of 1991, three cases of 1992, two cases of 1993 and one case of 1998. So far as seriousness of the cases is concerned, there is only one case of 1991 registered under section 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Other cases are registered under sections 324 or 504 of the Indian Penal Code. Sr. No. 6 that is Case No. 13 of 1992 and Sr. No. 7 that is the Case No. 25 of 1993, are the chapter proceedings. Other cases are registered under sections 324 or 504 of the Indian Penal Code. Sr. No. 6 that is Case No. 13 of 1992 and Sr. No. 7 that is the Case No. 25 of 1993, are the chapter proceedings. As against this, the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate in the applications for further remand regarding arrest of the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and annexed with the petition at Exhibits A and B will show that the apprehension of the police and the reasons given by them regarding possibility of the petitioner's committing cognizable offences in view of the forthcoming Parliamentary election as is revealed in Exhibit A and in view of the Shiv Jayanti Utsav as is revealed in Exhibit 'B" did not find favour with the Magistrate and on both these instances the Magistrate ordered immediate and forthwith release of the petitioner and rejected the application of Bazarpeth Police Station for further detention of the petitioner. 12. Record page 19 of the petition shows that all the criminal cases pending against the petitioner as reproduced above were made the basis for arrest of the petitioner on 24-2-1998 under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code for seeking his further detention of 14 days. The order of the Division Bench comprising of Justice Agrawal and Justice Khandeparkar dated 10-9-1996 at annexure 'C' of the petition shows that the Division Bench did not find any satisfactory reason to continue the detention of the and petitioner to the contrary, it was observed that the show cause notice of the chapter proceedings under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code was served upon the petitioner on 13-8-1996 and on the same day he was taken in custody on the ground that he has failed to furnish security. 13. From all these facts, it will be, therefore, clear that it is the pendency of the aforesaid seven cases that his been repeatedly made basis for arrest of the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and for initiating chapter proceedings against him. 13. From all these facts, it will be, therefore, clear that it is the pendency of the aforesaid seven cases that his been repeatedly made basis for arrest of the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and for initiating chapter proceedings against him. Two orders of the J.M.F.C. at Exhibit A and B and order of this Court of the Division Bench show that apart from the seven prosecutions stated above the Bazarpeth Police Station, Kalyan had nothing with them in all the three instances above to arrest the petitioner and seek his further detention and consequently, the Judicial Magistrate as per Exhibits A and B and Division Bench of this Court as per Exhibit C to the petition ordered release of the petitioner forthwith. 14. It is further clear from the record of the petition that when the present petition came before Justice Pandya on 10-8-1998, the learned A.P.P. did not and could not support the detention of the petitioner from 15-7-1998, and therefore, the learned A.P.P. had to concede that the petitioner was required to be released forthwith. 15. It will be therefore clear from the submissions made by the petitioner's advocate and from the record before this Court that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been arresting the petitioner under section 151(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and are initiating chapter proceedings against him only on the ground that he is facing seven prosecutions referred to and quoted to above, including his initiation of the present Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998. It will also be clear from two orders of the J.M.F.C. Exhibits A and B of the petition that there was no immediate cause information or material with the police before arrest of the petitioner on those two occasions and even for initiating of chapter proceedings in 1996 wherein Division Bench of this Court ordered immediate and forthwith release of the petitioner. 16. However, the question that is raised by the petitioner in this petition is that he is entitled for the compensation of Rs. 16. However, the question that is raised by the petitioner in this petition is that he is entitled for the compensation of Rs. 25,000/- for his illegal detention from 15-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 (as per the case of the petitioner), or from 16-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 (as per the case of the police) and second question is, whether the detention of the petitioner in Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998 was illegal, without any basis and without complying requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code and without following the principle of natural justice viz. giving intimation of arrest of the petitioner to his relatives, giving opportunity to the petitioner and his relatives to furnish bond, and third question is, whether consequent upon the decision of the above mentioned two questions, whether the petitioner is entitled for the compensation in addition to the other reliefs claimed in the petition. Fourthly, whether the petitioner can get compensation on the basis of the Division Bench's judgment of this Court reported in 1999 ALL.M.R. (Cri) 134 (Aurangabad Bench) (Chandrabhan Rama Dhengle v. Indirabai Chandrabhan Dhengle others)1, and on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1980 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases 649, (Gopalanachari v. State of Kerala and another)2, judgment reported in 1993(2) Supreme Court Cases 746, (Nilabati Behara v. State of Orissa and others)3. 17. Since according to the Counsel for the petitioner, the aforesaid judgment of this Court and Supreme Court have direct bearing to this case. It is necessary to consider the legal aspect of the case at the threshold. In the Division Bench's judgement of this Court ( Aurangabad Bench) referred to above, the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- was granted to the petitioner Chandrabhan Dhengle by the Division Bench and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 viz., P.S.I. and S.E.M. etc. were ordered to pay said amount and respondent No. 6, perhaps, State of Maharashtra was directed to hold departmental inquiry into the conduct exhibited by the respondents No. 2 to 5. The facts of that case were that Indirabai Dhengle, the wife of Chanrabhan Dhengle i.e. the petitioner, lodged a complaint against her husband for assault and beating. Since the offences were non-cognizable, no action was taken. However, the P.S.I. initiated chapter proceedings against the petitioner/husband before S.E.M. for execution of bond with or without surety from him for keeping peace. The facts of that case were that Indirabai Dhengle, the wife of Chanrabhan Dhengle i.e. the petitioner, lodged a complaint against her husband for assault and beating. Since the offences were non-cognizable, no action was taken. However, the P.S.I. initiated chapter proceedings against the petitioner/husband before S.E.M. for execution of bond with or without surety from him for keeping peace. In that background of the matter, it was held by the Division Bench that initiating chapter proceedings for keeping peace under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the basis of the complaint lodged by the wife of the husband was completely illegal and unjustified and consequently, detention of the petitioner was illegal and he was entitled for compensation. 18. In Gopalanachari's case of the Supreme Court referred to above, the petitioner Gopalanachari, the man of 21 years of age, was in jail from 23-2-1980 and labelled as habitual criminal and was kept in custody under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but on findings that his detention was completely illegal. Justice Krishna Iyer ordered dropping of the proceedings against him with directions not to use section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code, torture some fashion, against the weak and poor merely because they belonging to the 'have not' class and can be easily apprehended as 'habitual' this or that or dangerous or desperate. Justice Krishna Iyer also drew attention of the State Government to the likely misuse of the preventive provisions and expect it to issue suitable instructions to the police minions so that the law will be legitimated by going into action where it must strike and by being kept sheathed where is no need for indiscriminate display. 19. In Nilabati's case the Supreme Court has awarded compensation in proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights in case where custodial death was proved and the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "The Court is not helpless and the wide powers given to the Supreme Court by Article 32, which itself is a fundamental right, imposes a constitutional obligation on the Court to forge such new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which enable the award of monetary compensation in appropriate cases, where that is the only mode of redress available. The power available to the Supreme Court under Article 142 is also an enabling provisions in this behalf. The contrary view would not merely render the Court powerless and the constitutional guarantee a mirage, but, may, in certain situations, be in an incentive to extinguish life, if for the extreme contravention to Court is powerless to grant any relief against the State, except by punishment of the wrongdoer for the resulting offence, and recovery of damages under private law, by the ordinary process. If the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case of every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that which is appropriate in the facts of each case. This remedy in public law has to be more readily available when invoked by the have-nots, who are not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of this rights in private law, even though its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restrain to avoid circumvention of private law remedies, where more appropriate." 20. All the three judgments referred to above by the Counsel for the petitioner show that the courts have been vigilant and/or required to be vigilant regarding fundamental rights of the citizens and if proper and justifiable case is made out by the petitioner, the courts have ample powers and which were exercised to award compensation in case of misuse of statutory provisions by the machinery of the State in detaining the citizens illegally. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court (from Aurangabad Bench) referred to above is a judgment on award of compensation in chapter proceeding for illegal detention, and therefore, in a sense the said judgment has direct bearing upon this case. However, it is necessary to find out whether detention of the petitioner in Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998 either from 15-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 or 16-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 is a detention entitling the petitioner to claim compensation. However, it is necessary to find out whether detention of the petitioner in Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998 either from 15-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 or 16-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 is a detention entitling the petitioner to claim compensation. Such a scrutiny is necessary because the compensation is claimed in respect of this detention, and therefore, even if, it is held by me that on all earlier occasions, the respondent could succeed in seeking further detention of the petitioner and failed to get his further custody and the petitioner succeeded in getting the orders of release forthwith, this exercise is necessary because compensation is claimed only in respect of detention in Chapter Proceeding No. 13 of 1998. 21. In this regard it was submitted by the learned A.P.P. on the basis of record made available that Bazarpeth Police had in April 1998 sought permission of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kalyan to start chapter proceeding under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the petitioner, that the permission was refused, and therefore, in June 1998 the Bazarpeth Police again sought similar permission and same was granted to them by the Deputy Commissioner of Police by their letter dated 13-6-1998. She, therefore, contended that it could not be said that the Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998 were initiated against the petitioner without seeking permission from the seniors or without application of mind. She, further, contented that before obtaining this permission by letter dated 13-6-1998 the Bazarpeth Police had recorded statements of two persons viz. Madhukar Vishwanath Kadam and Subhash Barku Mali regarding extortionist activities of the petitioner and same was evident from the report submitted to the Special Executive Magistrate dated 17-7-1998 with reference to Chapter Proceeding No. 13 of 1998. She, therefore, contended that the petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 not only because of earlier pending 6/7 cases but because of the material collected by the Bazarpeth Police in the form of aforesaid two statements regarding activities of the petitioner requiring initiation of chapter proceeding under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 22. She, therefore, contended that the petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 not only because of earlier pending 6/7 cases but because of the material collected by the Bazarpeth Police in the form of aforesaid two statements regarding activities of the petitioner requiring initiation of chapter proceeding under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 22. She further contended that the allegations of the petitioner that none of his family members were informed about his arrest and about necessity of the petitioner to furnish interim bond either by the Bazarpeth Police or S.E.M., were not only unsupported from the documents on record but to the contradictory to record, and therefore, these allegations were required to be turned down outright. In support she drew my attention to paragraph Nos. 5 and 11 of the petition and to Exhibit 'D' of the petition, the letter written by the petitioner's mother to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kalyan. She, therefore, contended that the said letter and the paragraph Nos. 5 and 11 of the petition falsified the contentions of the petitioner that no intimation of his arrest was given to his relatives or no intimation of requirements of furnishing interim bond was given to his relatives. On the basis of the same fact she further contended that the arrest of the petitioner on 16-7-1998 and his further detention was perfectly legal and if petitioner had furnished surety as ordered by respondent No. 1 immediately on 17-7-1998 or within reasonable time, he would not have been detained any more. Therefore, according to her, the Judicial Magistrate could not be blamed for his detention from 17-7-1998 onwards till petitioner released by this Court on 10-8-1998. 23. As against this it was contended by the petitioner's advocate that there was nothing with the respondents to show that any intimation of arrest of the petitioner was given to his relatives in writing on 15-7-1998 or 16-7-1998. He also contended that roznama of the Chapter Proceeding No. 13 of 1998 did not at all show that the mother of the petitioner or the so called relative was present before the S.E.M. on 17-7-1998 and that they were intimated about the requirements of the petitioner to furnish interim bond of Rs. 10,000/- for six months with one respectable surety from the locality. 10,000/- for six months with one respectable surety from the locality. He also contended that till 20-7-1998 neither the petitioner not his relatives were knowing about the arrest and detention of the petitioner and when the petitioner's mother learnt about this on 20-7-1998 and applied to the Assistant Commissioner of Police for necessary documents and particularly she was not given those particulars but was treated rudely and consequently no attempts could be made either by the petitioner or his relatives to furnish bond before the S.E.M. and seek release of the petitioner. It was further contended that the arrest of the petitioner on 15-7-1998 or 16-7-1998 and further detention under chapter proceeding under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code were totally illegal and there were no circumstances justifying his arrest and further detention and/or initiation of proceedings under section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 24. In view or these rival contentions, the facts are required to be scrutinized from the record of Chapter Proceedings No. 13 of 1998 which was made available by learned AP.P. Smt. Kejariwal. The record which starts from Roznama from 17-7-1998 shows that the show cause notice under section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code was served upon the petitioner and he was asked to furnish surety. The petitioner denied the allegations made against him and at that time the petitioner was accompanied with his mother Shakuntala Beturkar and one relative Dinesh Patil. They were asked to make arrangement to furnish security or surety for Rs. 10,000/- and that they asked for some time. Further Roznama dated 24-7-1998, 31-7-1998, 3-8-1998, 10-8-1998 shows that the petitioner was produced some time but could not furnish interim bond and ultimately on 10-8-1998 he was released pursuant to the order of this Court. 25. Now so far as this Roznama is concerned, the contention of the learned A.P.P. Smt. Kejariwal that on 17-7-1998 the petitioner's mother Shakuntala Beturkar and one relative Dinesh Patil were present before the S.E.M. is not supported. Even though the Rozanama makes a reference about their presence. 25. Now so far as this Roznama is concerned, the contention of the learned A.P.P. Smt. Kejariwal that on 17-7-1998 the petitioner's mother Shakuntala Beturkar and one relative Dinesh Patil were present before the S.E.M. is not supported. Even though the Rozanama makes a reference about their presence. I am not inclined to accept the Roznama in that regard because, if at all the petitioner's mother and relative were present and they were informed about the requirements of furnishing surety, their signatures in token of having received the said information should have been obtained on the Rozanama or separate intimation should have been served upon them to show the compliance regarding giving of intimation and sufficient time and opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to furnish surety or to make arrangement in that regard. Ordinarily there is a presumption about the official acts and record, but in the instant case considering the previous instances, I am not inclined to draw such presumption in favour of the respondents. 26. It is further pertinent to note that the record and proceedings of the Chapter Proceeding Case No. 13 of 1998 contain copy of show cause notice under section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code, order under section 116(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and statement of the petitioner recorded by S.E.M. under section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. All these three important documents bear thumb impression of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that his thumb impression was forcibly obtained in ordinary circumstances. I would not have accepted this contention without recording evidence or without requiring the matter to be proved by the petitioner. However, the Counsel for the petitioner made categorical statement that the petitioner was capable of and was knowing reading, writing and put his signature and this fact of statement was not disputed by the respondent or their learned APP. Obtaining thumb impression from a man who is capable of putting his signature is a circumstance raising strong suspicion. These three documents referred to above bearing thumb impression, therefore, can not support the case of the respondent that the relatives of the petitioner were made aware of regarding detention of the petitioner. 27. Obtaining thumb impression from a man who is capable of putting his signature is a circumstance raising strong suspicion. These three documents referred to above bearing thumb impression, therefore, can not support the case of the respondent that the relatives of the petitioner were made aware of regarding detention of the petitioner. 27. However the contention of the petitioner that none of his family members were made aware or informed about the arrest of the petitioner and he was being required to furnish ad interim bond, cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly in paragraph No. 5 of the petition it has been stated as :-- "The family members of the petitioner was only informed that the petitioner is being arrested under the chapter proceeding." Secondly, in paragraph No. 11 of the petition it has been stated as :-- "The parents of the petitioner approached the office of the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 twice with request to furnish the relevant papers viz., notice, order etc." These two averments, prima facie show that the family members or parents of the petitioner were made aware of the arrest of the petitioner and initiation of the chapter proceeding. Apart from this, the petitioner has filed the documents at Exhibit D to the petition dated 28-7-1998 and signed by the petitioner's mother which is an application for getting urgent copies of the chapter proceeding. In that application the petitioner's mother stated that the petitioner was arrested on 15-7-1998 at about 8.30 p.m. by Bazarpeth Police and she has further stated that she learnt that the chapter proceeding were started against her son by respondent No. 1 and that he has been sent to Kalyan Jail. These positive assertions in the aforesaid application coupled with the two statements made in the petition and reproduced above will show that the relatives of the petitioner were aware of and had learnt about initiation of the chapter proceeding against the petitioner, and they got this knowledge on 16-7-1998 or 17-7-1998. For these two reasons, therefore, the contention of the petitioner is required to be rejected. 28. The next question that arises is, whether the arrest of the petitioner on 15-7-1998 or 16-7-1998 by respondent No. 2 and his detention by respondent No. 1 on failure of the petitioner to furnish ad interim bond was justified ? For these two reasons, therefore, the contention of the petitioner is required to be rejected. 28. The next question that arises is, whether the arrest of the petitioner on 15-7-1998 or 16-7-1998 by respondent No. 2 and his detention by respondent No. 1 on failure of the petitioner to furnish ad interim bond was justified ? In this regard it was submitted by the learned A.P.P. that there was sufficient material before the respondent No. 2 in arresting the petitioner and initiating the chapter proceeding, and according to her, that material is in the form of statements of witnesses Madhukar Kadam and Subhash Mali. She also relied upon 6/7 criminal cases against the petitioner as the basis of this arrest. 29. I am not convinced by this submission made by the learned A.P.P. I have already held and observed that all the attempts of the respondent to arrest the petitioner and detaining him on the basis of pending cases became unsuccessful because of the intervention of the courts viz., the Magistrate and the High Court as stated above. On all these previous occasions the police could not justify the arrest and the further detention of the petitioner as prayed by them and the petitioner was required to be released forthwith on all the previous occasions. Therefore, mere pendency of the criminal cases could not be legal and valid ground for arrest of the petitioner either on 15-7-1998 or 16-7-1998 for the purpose of initiating Chapter Proceeding No. 13 of 1998. So far as statements of Madhukar Kadam and Subhash Mali (which were relied upon by respondent No. 2 in the report submitted to respondent No. 1 on 17-7-1998 for initiating Chapter Proceeding No. 13 of 1998) are concerned, even these statements cannot justify the arrest of the petitioner on 16-7-1998 and his further detention on 17-7-1998 on account of petitioner's failure to furnish ad interim bond. The statements of Madhukar Kadam and Subhash Mali were recorded on 9-4-1998 i.e. about more than three months before the arrest of the petitioner. The delay of three months in the said two statements and arrest of the petitioner will clearly show that there was no case of extreme urgency or emergency when the petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 and chapter proceeding started against him on 17-7-1998. The delay of three months in the said two statements and arrest of the petitioner will clearly show that there was no case of extreme urgency or emergency when the petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 and chapter proceeding started against him on 17-7-1998. The petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 under section 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that any officer in charge of a police station may, in like manner, arrest or cause to be arrested any person, belonging to one or more of the categories of persons specified in section 109 or section 110. Section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the cases in which the security for good behaviour from habitual offenders can be taken. As per the report of respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 1 dated 17-7-1998 the chapter proceedings were initiated under section 110(e) and (g) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (e) of section 110 is about the person who habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences, involving a breach of the peace. Sub-section (g) of section 110 is about the person who is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. 30. If the chapter proceedings against the petitioner are initiated for two reasons i.e. because the petitioner is falling in category of sub-section (e) or (g) of section 110, then it is necessary for the respondent to prove prima facie that the petitioner was so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community or that he was habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of, offences involving a breach of the peace. Admittedly, the respondents are relying on only two statements of witnesses Madhukar Kadam and Subhas Mali but since these statements were recorded in April 1998 they could not have been made basis for the arrest of the petitioner under section 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and initiation of the chapter proceedings under section 110(e) and (g) in the month of July 1998. 31. 31. This is, therefore, the case where the petitioner was arrested on 16-7-1998 without there being any emergency or without there being any basis or information to the police that he is a desperate and dangerous character person creating problems for the security of the community or if he is not being arrested on that particular day or at particular time would have committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of offences involving breach of peace. 32. It is, therefore, clear that the arrest of the petitioner on 16-7-1998 under the aforesaid provisions was totally illegal and uncalled for and so also the initiation of proceedings under section 110(e) and (g) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 33. Having come to the aforesaid finding the question is regarding grant of compensation claimed by the petitioner, if the arrest of the petitioner is found to be totally illegal and uncalled for, then respondents are liable to pay compensation to the petitioner. However, the compensation for the detention from 17-7-1998 to 10-8-1998 cannot be granted because the mother of the petitioner was knowing that the petitioner has been arrested and sent to Kalyan Jail on account of his failure to furnish ad interim bond. If the relatives of the petitioner were diligent , they could have got the petitioner released on furnishing ad interim bond or security immediately on 17-7-1998 or 18-7-1998. But no efforts in that regard were made by the petitioner or his relatives, and therefore, the respondents cannot be held responsible for the detention of the petitioner for all these period. 34. However, since the arrest of the petitioner on 16-7-1998 is found illegal unwarranted and preceded by other 3 or 4 unjustified unsuccessful arrest, he is entitled for the compensation of one day and compensation of Rs. 3000/- would be sufficient in the circumstances of the case. Hence for all these reasons I pass the following order :-- ORDER Petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. Chapter Proceedings against the petitioner are quashed. Respondents to pay jointly and severally compensation of Rs. 3000/- to the petitioner for illegal detention and mental agony and Rs. 1000/- as the costs of the petition. After this order was pronounced learned A.P.P. Smt. Usha Kejariwal prayed for stay of the operation of this order for a period of one month. Advocate for the petitioner has no serious objection. 3000/- to the petitioner for illegal detention and mental agony and Rs. 1000/- as the costs of the petition. After this order was pronounced learned A.P.P. Smt. Usha Kejariwal prayed for stay of the operation of this order for a period of one month. Advocate for the petitioner has no serious objection. Hence this order is stayed for four weeks from today. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed. *****