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1999 DIGILAW 2262 (MAD)

State v. Pokker

1999-11-30

K.T.KOSHI, M.S.MENON, N.VARADARAJA IYENGAR

body1999
Koshi, C.J.- This is a reference made to this Court by the learned Sessions Judge, Tellicherry. The circumstances under which the reference happened to be made are as follows. One Moideen Beary filed a complaint before the Judicial Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod, against the respondents before us for alleged commission of offences punishable under sections 324 and 447, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sub-Magistrate examined the complainant (section 200, Criminal Procedure Code) and registered a case under the said sections against seven of the accused persons and declined to proceed against the remaining three. Later, before the enquiry started it was found that the occurrence that gave rise to the complaint had taken place beyond the jurisdiction of the Kasaragod Sub-Magistrate. The place of occurrence lay within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Magistrate, Hosdrug. Being appraised of these facts the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tellicherry, withdrew the case from the file of the Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod and transferred it to the file of the Sub-Magistrate, Hosdrug, for disposal according to law. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate purported to act under section 528(2), Criminal Procedure Code. The complainant then moved the District Magistrate, Tellicherry, in revision (Criminal Revision Case No. 1 of 1957) to quash the entire proceedings that had taken place before the Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod, as also the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tellicherry, transferring the case to the Court of the Sub-Magistrate, Hosdrug. According to the complainant the Sub-Magistrate of Kasaragod had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or to decide that the case need be proceeded only against seven out of the ten accused persons. It was also contended before the District Magistrate that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate transferring the case laid before a Court having no jurisdiction (territorial) to receive and try it, was illegal. Though the revision was opposed by the present respondents the District Magistrate accepted the contentions raised before him on behalf of the complainant and referred to the decision in Sowbagiammal v. Raphael1, as authority for accepting them. In that case Somasundaram, J., held that when a complaint is laid before a Court which has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it, what the Magistrate concerned had to do was to return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court (Vide section 201, Criminal Procedure Code). In that case Somasundaram, J., held that when a complaint is laid before a Court which has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it, what the Magistrate concerned had to do was to return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court (Vide section 201, Criminal Procedure Code). However, in the operative part of his order the District Magistrate did not give effect to the rule enunciated in the above decision or to the provision of section 201, Criminal Procedure Code, but thought that a re-transfer to the Court of the Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod, “would involve a further illegality as the transfer is to a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it”. He, therefore, quashed the entire proceedings in all the three Courts, namely, the Sub-Magistrate’ Court, Kasaragod, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s Court, Tellicherry and the Sub-Magistrate’s Court, Hosdrug, and directed the complainant to file a fresh complaint before the proper Court. This, however, was done even though the complainant definitely pointed out to the District Magistrate that the proper course for him would be to send the case to the Sub-Magistrate,Kasaragod, with a direction to him to return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court. In Calender Revision the learned Sessions Judge of Tellicherry found that the course adopted by the District Magistrate, that is, to quash the entire proceedings in relation to the case was ultra vires of his powers. During the course of his comments on the District Magistrate’s order the learned Sessions Judge remarked: “The proper course the District Magistrate, in these circumstances, should have adopted was to order a re-transfer of the complaint to the Court of the Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod, for being returned to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court having jurisdiction for fresh enquiry. There is nothing illegal in this course as the learned District Magistrate seems to think as the complaint is sent to the Kasaragod Sub-Magistrate not for trial but only for return to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court as enjoined by section 201, Criminal Procedure Code. The quashing of the entire proceedings including the complaint filed and direction to file a fresh complaint made by the District Magistrate seem to be without jurisdiction and beyond the powers given to him by law.” Prima facie the learned Session Judge’s view is right. The quashing of the entire proceedings including the complaint filed and direction to file a fresh complaint made by the District Magistrate seem to be without jurisdiction and beyond the powers given to him by law.” Prima facie the learned Session Judge’s view is right. It not only accords with the view expressed by Somasundaram, J., in Sowbagiammal v. Raphael1, but also conforms to the view taken by Horwill, J., in District Magistrate v. Abdul Kareem2. However, when this reference was heard by Kumara Pillai and Joseph, JJ., they found a conflict between these two Madras decisions on the one hand and a Division Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court reported in Amarendra v. Raghunath3, on the other and thought that it would be advisable to have an authoritative decision of a Full Bench of this Court on the question whether, regard being had to the provisions of section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s order of transfer of the case from Kasaragod Court to Hosdrug Court would not be regular. Pursuant to their order of reference the case came up before us and we heard arguments from Mr. Pereira, the learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. M. Bhaskara Menon, advocate, whom we requested to act as amicus curiae. It would appear that the respondents were represented by counsel before the Division Bench, but by the time the case came up before us their counsel withdrew from the case. Hence our request to Mr. Bhaskara Menon to assist us and we feel thankful to him for the assistance he rendered to us by his arguments. Section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “346. Hence our request to Mr. Bhaskara Menon to assist us and we feel thankful to him for the assistance he rendered to us by his arguments. Section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “346. (1) If, in the course of an inquiry or a trial before a Magistrate in any district outside the presidency-towns, the evidence appears to him to warrant a presumption that the case is one which should be tried or committed for trial by some other Magistrate in such district, he shall stay proceedings and submit the case, with a brief report explaining its nature, to any Magistrate to whom he is subordinate or to such other Magistrate, having jurisdiction, as the District Magistrate directs.” Assuming that section 346(1) Criminal Procedure Code, would apply also to a case of want of territorial or local jurisdiction for a Magistrate to try a case, obviously the present case had not reached the stage where that course could have been adopted. To apply section 346(1) evidence recorded during the course of an enquiry or trial must warrant a presumption that the case is one which should be tried or committed by some other Magistrate. It is not known how even before recording the evidence as in the instant case it will be proper for a Magistrate to report under section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Somasundaran, J., has referred to this aspect in his decision in Sowbagiammal v. Raphael1. That was also a case where the absence of territorial jurisdiction was found cut before the enquiry or trial commenced. The learned Judges in the Calcutta decision have referred to the decision of Horwill, J., in District Magistrate v. Abdul Kareem2and dismissed the view taken thereon the present question as obiter. We wonder whether that observation is correct when two points arose for decision in that case and though a decision on either point according to the view the learned Judge took, would have disposed of the case, he chose to pronounce upon both the points. Whatever that be, while in the Calcutta case the question whether action should be taken under section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code arose after the entire prosecution evidence was recorded and the stage was reached for framing the charge, in this case as pointed out earlier the provision in section 346(i), Criminal Procedure Code, cannot obviously apply as no enquiry or trial had even commenced. Further, we are inclined to agree with the view Somasundaram, J., expressed in Sowbagiammal v. Raphael1that section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, has no reference to a case where a Court is wanting in territorial or local jurisdiction and that when that fact is disclosed resort should be had to section 201, Criminal Procedure Code, whatever be the stage the case had then reached. In his order Somasundaram, J., has referred to the provisions corresponding to section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, in the previous Codes of 1861 and 1872 to establish that the section has no application to want of territorial or local jurisdiction and also pointed out with reference to section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, the anomalies that would result by adopting the view taken in the Calcutta case. No doubt the learned Judge does not refer to the Calcutta decision, but a reading of the decision clearly shows that his attempt was to meet the arguments in the Calcutta case. All that the learned Judges say in the Calcutta case is that certain words in section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, may reasonably be construed to indicate that cases of want of local or territorial jurisdiction are also included within the scope of section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, but a reference to recognised commentaries on the Code like Sohoni Mitra and others would show that up till the date of that decision the operation of section 346 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, was never extended to cases of want of territorial jurisdiction-with reference to which there is a special section (section 201, Criminal Procedure Code)-but was always limited to cases where a Magistrate was not competent to try the case having regard to column 8 of schedule 12, or because he appeared to be personally interested (section 556) or was one in which he is declared otherwise incompetent to deal with (sections 337, 482 and 487). We have not also met with any subsequent decision applying the provisions in section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, to case of absence of territorial or local jurisdiction. Amarendra v. Raghunath2refers to an old Madras case, Munisami In re,3 but that was a case where for want of territorial jurisdiction the Magistrate discharged the accused and did not act either under section 201 or section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Amarendra v. Raghunath2refers to an old Madras case, Munisami In re,3 but that was a case where for want of territorial jurisdiction the Magistrate discharged the accused and did not act either under section 201 or section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code. The actual decision was that the order of discharge was wrong and that it should be set aside. All that the body of the judgment states is that if the Magistrate had no jurisdiction, he should have sent the accused before a Magistrate having jurisdiction. The passage need not necessarily refer to section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, though the head-note points out that resort should have been had to that section. The learned Judge might as well have had in mind section 201, Criminal Procedure Code, and not section 346(1). On the whole we would agree with the Madras view that section 346(1), Criminal Procedure Code, has no reference to cases of absence of territorial jurisdiction and that in such cases what the Magistrate concerned should do is to act under section 201, Criminal Procedure Code. Before concluding it may also pointed out that the course adopted in the Calcutta case for the High Court to transfer the case under section 426(1)(i), Criminal Procedure Code, to the Court which had dealt with the case up till the date they issued the rule, even though it had no territorial jurisdiction to try it,is opposed to the rule enunciated in Peary Lall v. Komal Kishore4, with the Privy Council cited with approval in Ledgard v. Bull5, that the power of transfer of a case given to a higher Court is to transfer a ease from a Court having jurisdiction to receive and try it. The two cases now referred to related to Civil cases, but a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court applied the rule to Criminal cases as well; see Queen Empress v. Mangal Tekohand6. The two cases now referred to related to Civil cases, but a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court applied the rule to Criminal cases as well; see Queen Empress v. Mangal Tekohand6. On the authority of these three decisions and others a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court consisting of two of us had in State v. Pyloth1held that the High Court is competent to transfer a case under the Civil Procedure Code as well as under the Criminal Procedure Code only from a Court having jurisdiction to receive and try it and that the question of the transfer of a case from a Court which has no jurisdiction to receive and try it is not merely a matter of procedure, but one of jurisdiction. This accords with the view the Madras decisions cited earlier laid down. Before us both the Public Prosecutor as also Mr. Bhaskara Menon agreed that the Sessions Judge’s view that it was beyond the District Magistrate’s powers to quash the entire proceeding before the Courts subordinate to him was right. We agree with that view. It is only the High Court that can in a proper case under its revisional jurisdiction or its inherent powers, quash the proceedings of the subordinate Courts. In the result we accept the learned Sessions Judge’s reference, set aside the District Magistrate’s order in Criminal Revision Case No. 1 of 1957 and direct the Sub-Magistrate, Hosdrug, to send back the complaint to the Covin of the Sub-Magistrate, Kasaragod (through proper channel) to be retuned to the complainant as per the provision in section 201, Criminal Procedure Code. This course would mean that if and when the complaint is represented before the Court of the Hosdrug Sub-Magistrate, it will be open to him, if so advised, to proceed against all the ten accused persons and not merely against the seven persons sought to be proceeded against by the Kasargod Sub-Magistrate. This would also enable the enquiry or trial to take place before a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offences complained of were committed (section 177, Criminal Procedure Code). M.C.M. ----- Reference accepted.