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1999 DIGILAW 2292 (MAD)

The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh v. Batchu Veerabhadra Rao

1999-11-30

BASI REDDY

body1999
Judgment.- This is an appeal by the State Government against the acquittal of the respondent of an offence under section 16(1) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (herein called the Act). The accusation against the respondent was that on April 29, 1957, he had exposed for sale 36 tins of adulterated groundnut-oil in his wholesale shop in Samalkot Bazaar. The facts of the case are not in dispute and are as follows: Sri Rama Oil Company is a partnership firm doing wholesale business in groundnut-oil at Samalkot. The respondent is one of the partners. P.W. 1 has been working from October 10, 1956, as the Sanitary Inspector of Samalkot Municipality. He had been appointed as Food Inspector under the Act. On April 24 1957, P.W. 1, accompanied by the Sanitary Maistry (P.W. 2), went to the shop of Sri Rama Oil Company. The respondent was in the shop and was in charge of it. There were 36 tins of groundnut-oil exposed for sale. They were all sealed but bore no labels. P.W. I told the respondent who he was and informed him that he would take a sample of the groundnut-oil for analysis. The respondent told P.W. 1 that he did only wholesale business and wanted P.W. 1 to take a whole tin; but on P.W. 1 insisting on his giving a sample, the respondent broke open a tin and gave P.W. 1, 24 tolas of groundnut-oil, for which the latter paid six annas. P.W. 1 then followed the procedure prescribed by sections 10 and 11 of the Act and sent the sample to the Public Analyst who, after analysis, sent his report stating that the sample of groundnut oil contained excessive amount of free fatty acid and was unfit for human consumption. Thereupon P.W. 1 launched the present prosecution against the respondent before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Kakinada. At the trial the Sanitary Inspector and the ‘Maistry’ gave evidence as P.Ws. 1 and 2 and deposed to the above facts. When examined by the Magistrate under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, the respondent stated as follows: “I purchased and brought that groundnut-oil from Damodarayya & Co., of Vijayawada. I sell the tins as they are. I do not sell retail. That oil was received in 36 lbs. tins with scaled lids. 1 and 2 and deposed to the above facts. When examined by the Magistrate under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, the respondent stated as follows: “I purchased and brought that groundnut-oil from Damodarayya & Co., of Vijayawada. I sell the tins as they are. I do not sell retail. That oil was received in 36 lbs. tins with scaled lids. Likewise I sell according to tins in the same state in which they are bought. I have not committed the offence.” It would appear that the plea of the respondent was not an after-thought as it is borne out by P.W. 1 who deposed that when he questioned the respondent after taking the sample, the latter told him straightaway that he had purchased the tins from Damodarayya & Co., of Vijayawada and was selling them wholesale. He also produced the bill Exhibit D-1 which showed that on April 15, 1957, Sri Rama & Co., had purchased 36 tins of groundnut-oil from Damodarayya & Co., of Vijayawada. Thus the plea of the respondent amounts to this, namely, that he was selling the oil in the condition in which he had bought it and he did not know that it was adulterated. Another plea raised on behalf of the respondent was that he was not liable inasmuch as he was only one of several partners of Sri Rama & Co., and it was the company that was doing the wholesale business. The learned Magistrate has acquitted the respondent on the sole ground that “an individual partner of the company cannot be charged under this Act.” Although the Magistrate has referred to the relevant section, viz., section 17 of the Act, he has misread and misconstrued the section. The section, so far as is material, runs as follows: “17. The learned Magistrate has acquitted the respondent on the sole ground that “an individual partner of the company cannot be charged under this Act.” Although the Magistrate has referred to the relevant section, viz., section 17 of the Act, he has misread and misconstrued the section. The section, so far as is material, runs as follows: “17. Offences by Companies: (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: * * * * * Explanation: For the purposes of this section (a) ‘company’ means any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals.....” It will be seen that under this section not only the company but also every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, shall be liable to prosecution. In the present case the evidence of P.W. 1 and the statement of the respondent establish beyond question that at the time P.W. 1 visited the shop and took the sample of groundnut-oil, the respondent who is one of the partners of the Firm of Sri Rama & Co., was in charge of the shop and was transacting business on behalf of the firm. The Court below has fallen into a grave error in holding that the company alone and not the individual partner could be prosecuted under the Act. It remains to be considered whether the alternative plea set up by the respondent is tenable. The plea was that he was not aware that the oil in question was adulterated. Such a plea cannot be entertained in view of the express provisions of section 19 of the Act which specify what defences are open and what are not, to a person charged with an offence pertaining to the sale of adulterated food. The plea was that he was not aware that the oil in question was adulterated. Such a plea cannot be entertained in view of the express provisions of section 19 of the Act which specify what defences are open and what are not, to a person charged with an offence pertaining to the sale of adulterated food. (The term ‘sale’ takes in amongst other things the sale of any article of food for analysis, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article; vide section 2 (xiii) of the Act). “Section 19: Defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecutions under this Act.-(1) It shall be no defence in a prosecution for an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food to allege merely that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or quality of the food sold by him or that the purchaser having purchased any article for analysis was not prejudiced by the sale. (2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence if he proves- (i) that the article of food was purchased by him as the same in nature, substance and quality as that demanded by the purchaser and with a written warranty in the prescribed form, if any, to the effect that it was of such nature, substance and quality; (ii) that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold it that the food was not of such nature, substance and quality; and (iii) that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it: Provided that such a defence shall be open to the vendor only if he has submitted to the Food Inspector or the local authority a copy of the warranty with a written notice stating that he intends to rely on it and specifying the name and address of the person from whom he received it, and has also sent a like notice of his intention to that person; Provided further that the warranty given by a person resident in any area in which this Act is not in force, shall be a defence to the vendor only if the vendor proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he had taken reasonable steps to ascertain and did in fact believe in, the accuracy of the Statement contained in the warranty. (3) Any person by whom a warranty as is referred to in sub-section (2), is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence.” Therefore the aforesaid plea is of no avail to the respondent since he cannot be heard to say that he was ignorant of the adulterated nature of the oil sold by him; and it was not the respondent’s case that he had a written warranty as prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 19. It follows that the acquittal of the respondent is bad in law and cannot be allowed to stand. I, therefore, allow the appeal by the State, convict the respondent under section 16 read with section 7(1) of the Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 250; in default, he will suffer two months’ rigorous imprisonment. A.S.R. ----- Appeal allowed: Accused convicted.