Judgment :- The defendant in O.S. No. 823 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif, Tindivanam, who had succeeded before the trial Court and lost before the first appellate Court is the appellant. The sole appellant died and his legal representatives had been brought on record by order dated 30th August, 1995 made in C.M.P. No. 10850/95. 2. For convenience, the parties will be referred as arrayed before the trial Court. 3. At the time of admission, the following two substantial questions of law were framed by this Court:— 1. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in the view it took that Ex. A.12 is not hit by the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Registration Act? And 2. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in its conclusion that the right of the appellant to obtain specific performance is barred by limitation and she cannot resist the suit for recovery of possession? 4. The plaintiff instituted the suit for redemption of the mortgage under Ex. A1 dated 27.07.1966. According to the plaintiff the property originally belonged to one Ramanathan who had mortgaged the property under Ex. A1, that the plaintiff had purchased the equity of redemption from the said Ramanathan under Ex. A12 dt. 12.05.1972, that on 27.07.1966 under Ex. A5 on the date of mortgage itself an agreement was entered between the mortgagor and mortgagee by which the mortgagee was inducted in possession to be in enjoyment of the mortgaged property in lieu of interest, that the plaintiff after the purchase caused a notice demanding redemption and that as the defendant had declined, the suit has been instituted. 5. The defendant/mortgagee resisted the suit contending that in terms of Ex. A5, it has been agreed between the mortgagor and mortgagee that the mortgagor will sell the property only to the mortgagee, if the mortgagor proposes to sell, that the mortgagee has got a right to purchase the property in terms of the agreement, that the sale of equity of redemption in favour of the plaintiff is not valid, not true, unenforceable, and not binding on the defendant, that the defendant has got the right of pre-emption to purchase, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as the sale in his favour is not valid. 6. 6. The trial Court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence held that the sale in favour of the plaintiff is not true, not valid, that it is not a bona fide transaction, that the defendant is entitled to purchase the property, that the defendants right to purchase the property is barred by limitation, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1979 and in the light of the said finding, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred A.S. No. 30 of 1984 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Tindivanam. 7. The first appellate Court held that the sale deed executed by the mortgagor, namely Ex. A12 is valid, true and the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the mortgaged properties. The first appellate Court held that the defendants claim to sell the property is barred by limitation as the defendant had not taken any steps to enforce the agreement, besides holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1979 by granting a decree for redemption on condition that the plaintiff deposits a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on or before 19.01.1978 and granted three months time to the defendant to surrender possession from the date of such deposit and granted a preliminary decree. Being aggrieved, the defendant has preferred the Second Appeal. 8. Admittedly, till this date, the defendant has not taken any steps to enforce the agreement Ex. A5 dated 27.07.1966. Apart from the fact that the lower appellate Court held that the right to enforce Ex. A5 is barred by limitation, there is no requirement to decide the second question of law in this Second Appeal as the defendants right, if any under Ex. A5 has been lost as no action has been taken by the defendant to enforce the said agreement, The two Courts below held that Ex. A5 is barred by limitation. 9. It is also to be pointed out that the defendant had not filed cross objections as against the finding recorded by the first appellate Court. The defendant has been resisting the suit for redemption and his attempt is to delay the redemption and continue* in possession indefinitely. The second question of law in fact was not canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The defendant has been resisting the suit for redemption and his attempt is to delay the redemption and continue* in possession indefinitely. The second question of law in fact was not canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant. The second question of law in this Second Appeal has to be answered against the appellant. 10. As regards the first question of law Mr. A.K. Kumarasamy, learned counsel for the appellants submitted detailed arguments and contended that Ex. A12 sale deed is invalid and confers no right on the plaintiff to redemption and it is unenforceable as the said sale deed Ex. A12, under which the plaintiff had purchased the equity of redemption had not been registered within four months from the date of execution of the sale deed. 11. Mr. A.K. Kumarasamy, learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the notice exchanged between the mortgagor Ramanathan and the mortgagee under Ex. A6. It is being pointed out by Mr. Kumaraswamy that as seen from Ex. A6, the mortgagor Ramanathan had caused legal notice through his advocate setting out that an agreement was concluded between the mortgagor and the plaintiff on 13.02.1971 that the sale deed was executed by him on 12.05.1971, but it has not been registered or had not been presented for registration. 12. Mr. A.K. Kumaraswamy relying upon Ex. A6 and also referring to Ex. A12 sale deed dated 12.05.1972 contended that when the sale deed has been executed on 12.05.1971, it should have been presented for registration within four months from that date and as Ex. A12 has been registered only on 30.08.1972, Ex. A12 is invalid, inoperative and will not confer any right. 13. It has to be pointed out that Ramanathan died and his son had been examined as a witness. Ramanathans son had deposed about the execution of the sale deed by his father and also identified the signature of the executant on Ex. A12. It is, therefore, evident that Ex. A12 has been executed by Ramanathan during his life time and it has been presented for registration before the registering authority on 30.08.1972. 14. Though in the legal notice caused by him, the mortgagor Ramanathan has stated that the sale deed was executed on 12.05.1971 a perusal of Ex. A12. It is, therefore, evident that Ex. A12 has been executed by Ramanathan during his life time and it has been presented for registration before the registering authority on 30.08.1972. 14. Though in the legal notice caused by him, the mortgagor Ramanathan has stated that the sale deed was executed on 12.05.1971 a perusal of Ex. A12 would show that the sale deed was executed by him only on 12.05.1972 and it has been presented for registration on 30.08.1972. After completion of the registration, the sale deed has been released and produced by the plaintiff in the present suit. 15. Mr. Kumarasamy pointed out that the date of execution of the sale deed Ex. A12 has been corrected and also pointed out that there is over-writing with respect to the year on which Ex. A12 had been executed. Ex. A12 is dated 12th May, 1972. The executant of Ex. A12 had affixed his signature at the end of each page and also affixed the date of execution as 26.08.1972, immediately below his signature. 16. Admittedly, the said Ex. A12 sale deed has been presented by the executant Ramanathan on 30th August, 1972 before the Registrar. According to Mr. Kumarasamy that the year 1971, which was the date of execution of the sale deed as set out in Ex. A6 notice, the year of execution has been altered from 1971 to 1972 by correcting the last letter ‘to’. 17. Taking advantage of this, the learned counsel for the appellant and placing reliance upon Ex. A6 contended that the sale deed has been executed on 12th May, 1971 and therefore, it should have been presented within four months from 12.05.1971. Per contra, it is contended by the counsel for the respondent that the sale deed is dated 12th May, 1972 and the executant Ramanathan had signed it on 26.08.1972 and had presented the same for registration on 30th August, 1972. 18. Though there is correction in the year, the executant had not only written the date, month and also the year below his signature indicating that the sale deed has been executed on 26.08.1972. The date of execution is 26.08.1972. Even the document Ex. A12 sale deed bears the date 12th May 1972. This factual matrix is pressed into service by Mr. The date of execution is 26.08.1972. Even the document Ex. A12 sale deed bears the date 12th May 1972. This factual matrix is pressed into service by Mr. Kumarasamy, the learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contention that the sale deed executed by Ramanathan in favour of the plaintiff is invalid, in-operative and void. 19. In this respect, the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, which provides that no document, other than a Will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution. 20. According to Mr. Kumarasamy, the sale deed not being presented within four months from the date of execution set out in Ex. A6 notice, ExA12 sale deed is invalid, inoperative and will not confer right on the plaintiff to seek for redemption. 21. Rule 32(1) of the Registration Rules provides that a Registering Officer may require that the date of execution shall be entered in a document presented for registration whenever it is not found therein. 22. Sub Rule (ii) of Rule 32 provides that the date of execution of a document is the date on which it is signed by the party and the date which a document bears at its head is not necessarily the date of its execution though it is prima facie so. It is relevant to extract Rule 32 (ii) which, reads thus:— “ The date of execution of a document is the date on which it is signed by the party and the date which a document bears at its head is not necessarily the date of its execution though it is prima facie so.” 23. On a consideration of this statutory rule, this Court holds that the date of execution of a document is the date on which it is signed by the party and the date which the document bears is riot necessarily the date of its execution. In the present case, the date of execution of the document is the date on which the vendor Ramanathan had signed. As already stated the signature and the execution of Ex. A12 by Ramanathan had been proved. The signature of the vendor Ramanathan has also been proved by examining his son. Ramanathan was not alive for being examined and his son has been examined. 24. As already stated the signature and the execution of Ex. A12 by Ramanathan had been proved. The signature of the vendor Ramanathan has also been proved by examining his son. Ramanathan was not alive for being examined and his son has been examined. 24. Ex. A12 has been executed on 26.08.1972 by the executant Ramanathan affixing his signature and dating it, though the document bears the date 12th May, 1972. It has to be accepted there is correction with respect to the year of document which bears 1971. The letter 1971 has been altered as 1972 by correcting the last of the numerals. On that score, it cannot be said that the document has been executed even on 12th May, 1971. If the executant Ramanathan had not affixed the date immediately below his signature, which is the date of execution i.e. , 26.08.1972 much could be said against the plaintiff. The date of execution is the date on which the executant has affixed his signature and in the present case, it was established that Ramanathan has executed the document on 26.08.1972 and had presented the document for registration on 30th August, 1972 as seen from the endorsement made on Ex. A12. 25. “Execution of a document” means voluntary execution i.e. , signing of the document of the executants free Will. As provided in the statutory rule, it follows that the date of execution of Ex. A12 is the date on which Ramanathan had affixed his signature viz. 26.08.1972 and it is the date of execution of Ex. A12. Ex. A12 has been presented for registration on 30th August, 1972. Therefore, it follows that the registration in the present case is valid. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the document has been presented after four months from the date of execution can neither be sustained nor can be appreciated. 26. That apart in the present case, the Certificate of Registration endorsed on Ex. A12 is prima facie evidence that the requirements of the Registration Act have been complied with. That being so, when such endorsement finds place on Ex. A12, the burden is on the defendant to prove any act or omission, which would invalidate the registration and rests on the defendant, who challenges the registration. 27. A12 is prima facie evidence that the requirements of the Registration Act have been complied with. That being so, when such endorsement finds place on Ex. A12, the burden is on the defendant to prove any act or omission, which would invalidate the registration and rests on the defendant, who challenges the registration. 27. In this respect a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Voleti Venkata Rama Rao v. Kasapragada Bhaskararao and others ( AIR 1962 A.P. 29 ) held thus:— “As already noted, the endorsement on Ex. Bl made by the registration officer is in the terms of Sec. 40(2). Under. Sec. 60, the certificate of registration is to be endorsed after the provisions of Sec S. 34, 35, 58 and 59 have been complied with. Sub-S.(2) of Sec. 60 provides that such certificate shall be signed, sealed and dated by the registering officer and shall then be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by the Act and that the f acts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in Sec. 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. The fact that a document has endorsed on it a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence that the requirements of the Act have been complied with, and after such endorsement the burden of proving any act or omission which would invalidate the registration rests on the person who challenges the registration. While it is, no doubt, true that mere registration is not in itself proof of the due execution of a document, the certificate endorsed by the registration officer on the document is admissible to prove that the executant was of sound mind.” The certificate so affixed is prima facie evidence that Ex. A12 is duly registered. 28. It is to be pointed out that Ramanathan though caused a notice Ex. A6 giving a different date of execution of the document, nothing has been suggested by the defendant to show that the very same document has been presented subsequently by altering the date nor such a question has been suggested to the witness. 29. 28. It is to be pointed out that Ramanathan though caused a notice Ex. A6 giving a different date of execution of the document, nothing has been suggested by the defendant to show that the very same document has been presented subsequently by altering the date nor such a question has been suggested to the witness. 29. It is also equally well settled that with the consent of the parties, the date of document could very well be altered and presented for registration within four months of such altered date and the executant or any one claiming through him is estopped from setting up alteration as answer to the claim of the purchaser under the said document. 30. In the present case, even assuming that the year which the document Ex. A12 bears has been altered, it is obvious and it is axiomatic that the parties to Ex. A12 have altered the date and the defendant; in the present suit cannot make a hue and cry, nor the defendant could take advantage of the said alteration and contend that the plaintiff has not purchased the equity of redemption or that the sale deed is invalid or inoperative. 31. In this, respect the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Chandra Chakravarti v.. Surendra Kumar Roy (1912)15 I.C. 460) held that by consent, the parties to document altered date of document and presented same for registration within 4 months of such altered dated, executant is estopped from setting up alteration as answer to claim of other party under the document. It has been held thus:— “The mortgagee accepted the deed with the altered date; so it must be taken that as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee the alteration was consented to; and as between them, the mortgagee would take effect only from the later date to which the document had been altered. That being the fate of things in our opinion it is not open to the defendant the lessees, to complain. Supposing it is to be assumed for the purposes of argument that the deed was wrongly registered, there being no fraud, the mortgagor would be estopped from setting up this alteration in the deed as answer to the cl aim of the mortgagee. Supposing it is to be assumed for the purposes of argument that the deed was wrongly registered, there being no fraud, the mortgagor would be estopped from setting up this alteration in the deed as answer to the cl aim of the mortgagee. In our view, the appellants having taken their leases subsequent to the alteration, in the absence of any fraud, cannot stand in any better position than the mortgagor and are equally estopped from taking the objection which they rely upon.” 32. Ultimately, the Court must take judicial notice of the signature of the Registering Officer and the endorsement made under Section 60 of the Registration Act. In terms of Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Certificate of Registration should be presumed to be genuine. 33. Further, as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Rukmani Animal v.. Ka Ki Ankama Naidu and others (AIR 1926 Madras 744=23 L.W. 664), the onus of showing that the document was really executed on a different date is on the defendant, who alleges or puts forward such a case. In AIR. 1926 Madras 744, it has been held thus:— “In case where a document has been executed and registered and the question arises as to the date it bears, there can be little doubt that the presumption is that the document was executed on the date it bears. If any authority were needed for this proposition I may refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Siagh Dudhuria. “ 34. In Krishnan v. Sivalinga Gounder and another (1996-1-L.W. 622), it has been held thus:— “Even though it can be presumed that a document was executed on that date on which it purports to have been executed and bears the date, that is only a weak presumption. When the execution is challenged, and the allegation is that it is ante-dated, it is for the person claiming under the document to prove that it was executed on the date which it bears. Even the weak presumption will apply only between the parties to the transaction and not against the third person. When the execution is challenged, and the allegation is that it is ante-dated, it is for the person claiming under the document to prove that it was executed on the date which it bears. Even the weak presumption will apply only between the parties to the transaction and not against the third person. In (1916) 44 I.A. 72 = (1917) 5 L.W. 717 ( Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh Dudhuria ), it was held thus:— “It is general, though not a conclusive presumption that a document was made on the date of the date it bears, so that for what it is worth the plaintiff starts with that in her favour; but her case does not rest there, for, such oral evidence as there is on the point supports the presumption, and was not seriously challenged by the cross-examination. It has been suggested that the plaintiff should have called other witnesses to the date of execution. But her advisors had no reason to apprehend that this contention would be advanced. It is not pleaded in the written statement, it is not raised in the issues and the judgment of the first court certainly does not suggest that it was given prominance even at the trial.” 35. It is also equally well settled that registration by itself in all cases is not proof of execution. But in the present case, there is evidence to prove the execution of Ex. A12 by the vendor Ramanathan on 26.08.1972 as deposed by PW 1 and as deposed by PW 3 the son of the executant. Thus there is proof of execution and the plaintiff had proved the execution of sale deed Ex. A12 as well as the date on which it has been executed and presented for registration. 36. The attempt on the part of the mortgagee to persuade this Court to hold that the document Ex. A12 has been executed on 12.05.1971 itself is out of frustration and it is an attempt to defeat the lawful claims of the plaintiff. As already pointed out there is substantial evidence by which the plaintiff had established the date of execution of Ex. A12 and the date of presentation and also proved that the document Ex. A12 has been registered within the period prescribed and Ex. A12 is a valid sale and consequently the plaintiff is entitled to seek for redemption. 37. As already pointed out there is substantial evidence by which the plaintiff had established the date of execution of Ex. A12 and the date of presentation and also proved that the document Ex. A12 has been registered within the period prescribed and Ex. A12 is a valid sale and consequently the plaintiff is entitled to seek for redemption. 37. As already pointed out the defendant has no right as he has not chosen to enforce the alleged agreement in his favour and had allowed it to become barred by limitation. Both questions of law are answered against the appellants. 38. In the circumstances, this Second Appeal fails and it is dismissed, but without costs.