Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioner has challenged his order of detention passed under section 3 subsection 2 of Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 passed by the detaining authority on 24/07/1998. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has been found and held to be a "dangerous person" within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the said Act, and on a consideration of the totality of the material before him, the detaining authority has achieved subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue are prejudicial and adverse to the maintenance of public order, and that therefore, he is required to be detained under the provisions of the said Act. ( 3 ) THE first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the material placed before the detaining authority and considered by it, as disclosed from the grounds of detention, consists of three criminal cases and the statements of three witnesses (made under the conditions of confidentiality ). Out of the three criminal cases in which the detenue is said to be involved, only one is pending trial and two are under investigation. In the context of this material before the detaining authority, the contention raised is that this material is not sufficient (or insufficient) to enable the detaining authority to achieve the necessary subjective satisfaction as to the detenue being a "dangerous person" and/or that his activities are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The sum and substance of the contention is that the material is either insufficient in number, insufficient in quantity or of poor quality, and that therefore, the net weight carried by such material is insufficient to enable the detaining authority to achieve the necessary subjective satisfaction. However, such a contention cannot be entertained for the simple reason that this would amount to requiring this Court to reassess, and reassess objectively, the material before the detaining authority. However, such a contention cannot be entertained for the simple reason that this would amount to requiring this Court to reassess, and reassess objectively, the material before the detaining authority. In other words, such a contention requires this Court to reexamine the material, reassess the material, judge its evidentiary value, and judge whether and to what extent it should contribute to the mental process of reasoning on the part of the detaining authority, and then to hold as to whether, if the Court were sitting in the place or in the mind of the detaining authority, it would come to the same conclusion or not. It does not require any lengthy discussion of law to state that such a contention cannot even be considered. It is well settled law that the material placed before the detaining authority has to be appreciated by the latter, only with a view to achieve or not to achieve subjective satisfaction. The phrase "subjective satisfaction" itself means satisfaction of the person who makes the assessment. It does not mean a satisfaction which may or may not be achieved by any other person making an independent assessment. Therefore, it is not open to this Court to reassess or reevaluate the material which was available to the detaining authority, with a view to ascertain whether such material was sufficient or insufficient for the purpose of achieving such necessary subjective satisfaction. ( 4 ) IF at all any authority is required on this contention, a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : S. B. Majmudar and P. M. Chauhan, JJ) in the case of Ashwinkumar Hargovandas Soni reported at 1989 (1) GLH (UJ) 17 clearly laid down the principle that if there is slightest material to support the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority about the need to detain the detenue under the relevant provisions of the Act, this Court, not being the Court of appeal, cannot review and revise such decision. ( 5 ) THE next ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is in the context of the assertion made in the grounds of detention. In this context, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the detenue is alleged to be carrying on the specified activities in conjunction with and in association of, certain associates. However, the names of such associates have not been disclosed in the grounds of detention. In this context, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the detenue is alleged to be carrying on the specified activities in conjunction with and in association of, certain associates. However, the names of such associates have not been disclosed in the grounds of detention. According to learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, this would amount to suppression of relevant and material data and would therefore deprive the detenue of his right to make an effective representation. It is therefore urged that the impugned order requires to be struck down on this ground. ( 6 ) WHAT is required to be appreciated in the context of this contention is the manner and the mode of the narration resorted to by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention. From a broad perspective of the grounds of detention, it is found as under. Para 1 is formal. Para 2 is a general and composite recital of all the activities indulged in by the detenue. This narration is (in the context of such activities) of a descriptive nature, and encompasses the activities of the detenue in two fields. The first field is where the activities of the detenue have resulted in three specific criminal incidents registered as Crime Register Nos. 79 and 145/98, the first incident having resulted in a criminal case pending trial whereas the second incident is pending investigation. The third criminal incident is identified as Criminal Register No. 151/98 which is also pending investigation. ( 7 ) THE third para of the grounds of detention narrates other anti social activities indulged in by the detenue, and as a part of the same para recites the incidents narrated by the three deponents, who have each given a statement in relation to the detenue and his associates, under conditions of confidentiality as to their identity. ( 8 ) THEREFORE, it is contended in this context by learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenue is engaged in anti-social activities in conjunction with his associates, and when the identity of such associates is not disclosed to the detenue, it adversely affects his right of making an effective representation. However, on the facts of the case, such a contention would not survive. Firstly, three specific criminal incidents identified by Criminal Register numbers as disclosed hereinabove are obviously based on the relevant F. I. Rs. in each case. However, on the facts of the case, such a contention would not survive. Firstly, three specific criminal incidents identified by Criminal Register numbers as disclosed hereinabove are obviously based on the relevant F. I. Rs. in each case. Learned counsel for the respondents has emphatically asserted both from the affidavit-in-reply as also from the record that the copies of the said F. I. Rs. have been supplied to the detenue, and this fact is not disputed by learned counsel for the detenue. Such F. I. Rs. obviously disclose the names of the associates of the detenue in each of the three cases. Thus, atleast in this limited context, it cannot be said that the names of the associates of the detenue have been withheld from the latter. ( 9 ) SO far as three statements of witnesses/victims are concerned, there is no doubt that these statements also speak of the activity of the detenue along with the detenues associates. However, since these statements have been recorded under conditions of confidentiality, and since the grounds of detention specifically mention that the identities and identifying factors as to the persons who have made such statements have been kept confidential and not supplied to the detenue, by virtue of powers conferred on the detaining authority under section 9 (2) of the said Act, the detenue cannot as of right claim that the identities of his associates who had participated in the three incidents narrated by the three witnesses must be disclosed to him. No such right accrues or flows in favour of the detenue by virtue of section 9 of the said Act. Thus, on the facts of the case, this contention cannot be accepted. ( 10 ) THE next contention sought to be raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the statements of the three witnesses considered and relied upon by the detaining authority, are extremely vague and nothing specific can under such statements be attributable to the detenue. ( 10 ) THE next contention sought to be raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the statements of the three witnesses considered and relied upon by the detaining authority, are extremely vague and nothing specific can under such statements be attributable to the detenue. I am not inclined to accept this submission for the simple reason that on a plain reading of each of the three statements, I find that the activities indulged in and resorted to by the detenue in conjunction with his associates in question are sufficient in their scope and ambit to draw a necessary conclusion as to whether or not the detenue actually indulged in those activities or not on the given date. It is neither for the detenue nor for the detaining authority to determine as to how and in what manner such voluntary statements may be made, can be made or should be made. Such voluntary statements although made under conditions of confidentiality, are necessarily in the language and according to the mode of presentation which is natural to the person making the statement. The contents of such statement can not be added to, substracted from or modified at the will of the officer recording such statement. The only test in the context of the present contention can be as to whether on the sum total consideration of the statements, it would lead to a general conclusion that on a given day, at a given point of time and given place, did or did not the detenue behave with the person making the statement as recorded in such statement. If the answer to such query is in the affirmative, as it is on the facts of the present statements, such statements cannot possibly be called vague. This contention therefore also fails. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, the last contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner which is not the least of contentions requires consideration. In this context, learned counsel for the detenue urged that the activities of the petitioner can at its highest level be said only to be likely to affect the law and order situation, but would not affect or impinge upon public order. In this context, learned counsel for the detenue urged that the activities of the petitioner can at its highest level be said only to be likely to affect the law and order situation, but would not affect or impinge upon public order. ( 12 ) BY now, it is a well settled principle in a number of decisions laid down by the Supreme Court that, in the context of various laws pertaining to detention without trial, that what is required to be ascertained by the Courts is as to whether the activities of the detenue affect merely the law and order situation, which can otherwise be taken care of by resorting to the relevant anti-crime statutes i. e. normal criminal law and criminal procedure of the land, or as to whether the activities of the detenue are such which cannot be checked or controlled by such normal laws and normal procedures, and the only manner of doing so would be by resorting to the specific statutes pertaining to detention without criminal trial. In this context, the Supreme Court has held without doubt, as also in the context of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, that it is certainly permissible for a detaining authority to pass orders for detention of a particular person, provided such activities are of a particular nature and character. ( 13 ) THE crux of the entire matter is what should be the nature and character of the activities of the person concerned so as to justify the order of detention passed under section 3 of the said Act. ( 14 ) IT is not necessary to go into the oft-repeated case law laid down by the Supreme Court as to the subtle but extremely important distinction between the activities which affect merely law and order and activities which impinge upon public order. Once this distinction is kept in mind with necessary clarity, the conclusion can be directly addressed. ( 14 ) IT is not necessary to go into the oft-repeated case law laid down by the Supreme Court as to the subtle but extremely important distinction between the activities which affect merely law and order and activities which impinge upon public order. Once this distinction is kept in mind with necessary clarity, the conclusion can be directly addressed. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court has laid down in the case of Harpreet Kaur reported in AIR 1992 SC 979 (and particularly in para 14 thereof) that " it is the degree and extent of the reach of the objectionable activity upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of `law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to `public order. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of `public order ". The order of detention under the Act would be valid if the activities of a detenue affect `public order but would not be so where the same affect only the maintenance of `law and order. ( 16 ) THESE observations make it obligatory upon a Court examining the validity or otherwise of the detention order to focus its attention on the crucial distinction between the disturbance of law and order and activities prejudicial to public order. ( 17 ) THE question which arises at such a juncture is as to how and in what manner is the Court to make the necessary approach. To my mind, the approach would be to raise a question or questions as to whether the detenue or the activities of the detenue have the propensity, or likelihood or the possibility of affecting the maintenance of public order, and/or whether such activities adversely impinge upon maintenance of public order or not? If the answer to such a question is in the affirmative or positive, the impugned order of detention must be upheld. If the answer to such a question is in the affirmative or positive, the impugned order of detention must be upheld. If the answer is in the negative, or if the answer is restricted to a conclusion that the activities complained of affect merely law and order, which can be controlled by applying the normal criminal law of the land, then obviously the answer to the question would be in the negative and consequently, the impugned order of detention cannot be upheld. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, the vital aspect of the entire matter would be as to how, in what manner, on what basis and from which perspective, can either of these questions be answered? On what basis, by application of which test and on appreciation of what material, can the Court answer or is required to answer these questions? ( 19 ) THIS itself has been determined by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions, but with greater emphasis by the observation made at the end of para 14 in the decision in the case of Harpreet Kaur (Supra ). The last sentence in the said para provides the valid perspective by observing as under. "facts of each case have, therefore, to be carefully scrutinised to test the validity of an order of detention. " ( 20 ) THUS in the ultimate analysis, in my opinion, to judge whether the activities of a detenue merely affect law and order or also adversely impinge upon the maintenance of public order, is a question which can be answered only from the facts of each individual case. Necessarily in the context of such an inquiry, the facts of each individual case could only mean on the facts available from the material taken into consideration by the detaining authority. . ( 21 ) IN the premises aforesaid, I address myself to the facts of the instant case. Necessarily in the context of such an inquiry, the facts of each individual case could only mean on the facts available from the material taken into consideration by the detaining authority. . ( 21 ) IN the premises aforesaid, I address myself to the facts of the instant case. ( 22 ) ON a collective reading, consideration, evaluation, and appreciation of the material on record before the detaining authority, and as discussed in the grounds of detention, the only conclusion I can reach is that the activities of the detenue are of a minor criminal nature, and that such activities can be controlled and taken care of by the application of normal criminal law of the land, and I do not find how such activities can justifiably be said to adversely affect the maintenance of public order. I therefore find that the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained and is required to be quashed and set aside. ( 23 ) ACCORDINGLY, the impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside and the detenue is directed to be released forthwith unless otherwise required. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. Direct service permitted. .