Judgment This is an appeal against the Order of the Sessions Judge, Nellore, directing the prosecution of the appellant under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for an offence under section 211, Indian Penal Code. The allegation against the appellant is that he filed a complaint against respondents 1 and 2 who were his partners, falsely alleging that the 2nd respondent, son of the 1st respondent, entered his premises a month prior to the complaint and stole a cheque-book which contained his signatures in blank and thereafter utilised one of the cheques to draw out a huge sum of Rs.92,000 and odd with a view to cheat or misappropriate the amount. The police, after investigation, reported that the charges against the accused were false in that there was ample evidence of witnesses whose statements they had recorded to show that the cheque-book was given to respondent 2, who was a partner along with 12 others, for the purposes of carrying on the K.C. Canal Contract Works and that he had utilised these cheques for business purposes and the same was entered in the pass-book. The police further reported that several witnesses had stated that the cheque-book was given to the 2nd respondent by the appellant. The 2nd respondent has also made a similar statement that P.W.1 gave the cheque-book with signatures on blank cheques for purposes of paying the wages of the coolies, etc., that the 2nd respondent produced not only the cheque-book, but also the pass-book of P.W.1 and stated that they were given to him in the beginning when they started business with the appellant’s signature and that the cheque-book and pass book were seized and sent to the Court. The police report thereafter states that from the statements recorded there is no evidence to show that the chequebook was stolen or that the 2nd respondent had stolen it. They have also stated that there is no evidence of misappropriation and in the result they reported that it was an entirely false case reported by the appellant to put the powers into action to achieve his ends and consequently requested that the case may be treated as false. The Magistrate thereafter closed the case. The appellant then filed a private complaint before the Third Additional First Class Magistrate, Nellore. The Magistrate thereafter closed the case. The appellant then filed a private complaint before the Third Additional First Class Magistrate, Nellore. In that he again made the allegation that he put his signatures on some blank cheques so that there may not be any obstruction to the contract work and kept the same in his house for giving to the and respondent; that when the payment of the bill was about to be made for Rs.92,668-4-0 in respect of the complainant’s mile in the middle of July, both the respondents came to him a few days prior and were talking to the appellant on the pretext of verifying the accounts and while he was busy with the accounts, they took away the cheque-book containing the blank cheques duly signed without the knowledge of the appellant. Later on the 16th July a letter was received from another partner named Vema Vengala Reddi to the effect that the bills were being made ready. Thereupon the complainant was about to start for Kurnool to receive the amount and searched for the cheque-book therefor, but could not find it. Afterwards when he went to Kurnool and made enquiries in the Bank on the 18th, he was informed that the 2nd accused on the 16th itself presented a cheque containing the signature of the complainant and took away Rs. 92,668. He further stated that in the notice given to him the complaint made by him was referred to as false and therefore he filed this complaint against the accused for investigation of offences under sections 379, 403, 409 and 410, Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate examined the complainant in which he said that he kept the chequebook with him and had written in blank cheques the name of the 2nd respondeat and signed it without giving them to him and without noting the amount and that while looking at the accounts in detail, the respondents took the cheque-book, then drew the money and were attempting to abscond. He only discovered the loss of the cheque-book when he went to the Bank to draw money with another chequebook and that on enquiry he came to know that on 24th July, 1955, 2nd accused had drawn Rs.90,600 and that accused I and 2 returned Rs.75,000 on 30th July, 1955, for which he gave a receipt. The balance was said to have been spent away by the accused. The balance was said to have been spent away by the accused. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on 12th December, 1953, with the observations that this a matter for civil litigation and there was no dishonest intention even if the cheques were used. He further observed that he did not agree with the police report that the case is false without a full investigation and examination of all the witnesses and held that the case was one of rendering of accounts between the parties and that he saw no grounds to proceed with the complaint. The respondents have thereafter filed a petition under section 476 on 21st June, 1956, for sanctioning the prosecution of the appellant under section 211, Indian Penal Code, before the Sessions Judge, Nellore, alleging that on the complaint filed by the complainant the police registered it as Crime No. 246 of 1955 under sections 379 and 420, Indian Penal Code and both the Circle Inspector and Station House Officer of Nellore investigated the offence and found it to be false and while they were about to file a complaint against the complainant for an offence under section 182, he rushed to Court with a private complaint against the respondents with the very same allegations. The Sessions Judge after giving notice to the appellant and after giving him an opportunity to file a counter against the allegations made against the respondents, said that he had no hesitation in holding that the complaint of the respondent against the petitioners that they stole the cheque-book containing blank cheques with his signatures with a view to cheat him or misappropriate the amounts is false. He relied for this finding not only on the case diaries of investigation on the report filed by the appellant against the respondents, but also on perusing the counter of the appellant in which he admitted that the pass-book was left with the 2nd respondent. He further relied on the evidence of the Agent of the Andhra Bank that prior to this several huge amounts were drawn by the 2nd respondent without any dispute by the appellant at the time. Having reached this conclusion he considered that the appellant has deliberately come forward with an allegation of theft against the respondents, which in his view should not be countenanced or allowed to go without any action. Having reached this conclusion he considered that the appellant has deliberately come forward with an allegation of theft against the respondents, which in his view should not be countenanced or allowed to go without any action. He thought that it was a fit case for prosecution of the appellant under section 211. Learned advocate for the appellant has urged the following four contentions: (a) that there was no decision that the complaint was a false one; (b)that the complaint should have been filed in the First Class Magistrate’s Court which, though abolished on 15th December, 1955, was re-established on 1st April, 1956; (c)that even if the complaint could be filed in Court to which an appeal lies, it should have been filed in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge; (d)that there has been a long delay of four and half months and this delay is fatal; (e)that there has been no finding that the prosecution is in the interests of justice; and (f)that there is no decision that the complaint is a false one which is based on any legal evidence on record. I find no force in the first and second contentions, because the language of section 195(b)does not preclude a complaint being filed in any Court when the offences specified therein are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceedings in any Court on the written complaint of such Court or of such of the Courts to which such Court is subordinate. Admittedly the First Class Magistrate’s Court is subordinate to the Sessions Court and an appeal from the judgment or order of that Court would lie to the Court of Sessions, Besides this, the re-establishment of a Court does not make it the successor Court and in any case section 476-A can also be pressed into service. There is also no substance in the contention that the Additional Sessions Judge’s Court is the Court to which the First Class Magistrate’s Court is subordinate. The First Class Magistrate’s Court is subordinate to the Court of Sessions and not to any particular Judge. Under section 9 a Court of Session is appointed for every Sessions Division and the State Government is empowered to appoint a Judge of such Court and also Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges. The First Class Magistrate’s Court is subordinate to the Court of Sessions and not to any particular Judge. Under section 9 a Court of Session is appointed for every Sessions Division and the State Government is empowered to appoint a Judge of such Court and also Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges. It is clear therefore that there can only be one Sessions Court for one Sessions Division, though it may have several Judges. It would not, therefore, be proper to use the expression Court of the Sessions Judge or the Court of the Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. Where an appeal lies from a Magistrate to a Court of Sessions, the Additional Sessions Judge can also hear that appeal. Under sub-section (2) or section 193, Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges can only try such, of those cases as the State Government by general or special order direct them to try or as theSessions Judge of the Division by general or special order may make over to them for trial and similarly under section 409 an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge can only hear such appeals as the State Government may by general or special order direct or as the Sessions Judge may make over, provided that no appeals shall be heard by an Assistant Sessions Judge unless the appeal is of a person convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of the second or third class. This being the law, the Sessions Judge could entertain the application under sections 476 and 476-A. With respect to the third contention that there has been a long delay, learned advocate relies on the authority of A. Hyder Saheb v. State1, where Bhimasankaram, J., held that the power conferred by section 476 can be exercised by the Court only in the course of the judicial proceeding or at its conclusion or so shortly thereafter as to make it really the continuation of the same proceeding in the course of which the offence is committed and that delay in that case rendered the exercise of the power improper. He relied for this proposition on the case of Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor1. It may be stated that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Aiyakannu Pillai’s case1, was based on the language of section 476 prior to its amendment in 1923. He relied for this proposition on the case of Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor1. It may be stated that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Aiyakannu Pillai’s case1, was based on the language of section 476 prior to its amendment in 1923. The section as it now stands has omitted the words, "brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding" and the words "whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise" have been substituted so that, after the amendment, the section has conferred a right upon the party to move the Court for necessary action and has also dispensed with the necessity to do it during the continuance of the proceedings. Burn, J., in Maromma v. Emperor2, dealing with a delay of six months observed at page 101 that all the decisions prior to 1923 in this respect had no application to the present provisions of section 476. Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in Uggirala Danaiah and others v. State3, after examining the change in the language of section 476, said that it is on the language of the section as it stood prior to the amendment that Aiyakannu Pillai’s case1 was based and expressed the view that after the amendment it could not be stated as a matter of law that action could be taken under section 176 either during the course of the judicial proceeding or immediately after its closure, though it may be an ingredient in determining whether prosecution should be launched or not. The observations of Bhimasankaram, J., were also considered as not laying down a proposition of law that delay in launching the proceedings under section 476 vitiates the proceedings. In this case the application was filed four months after the dismissal of the complaint which is explained as due to the respondent not knowing about the actual date of dismissal of the complaint, he not being served with notice, as also due to the possibility of a revision being filed by the appellant against that order. Further, the Court was also abolished immediately after the complaint was dismissed, as a result of which the respondent was likely to take sometime to consider the course he has to pursue. In these circumstances, I do not think that there has been any undue delay. Further, the Court was also abolished immediately after the complaint was dismissed, as a result of which the respondent was likely to take sometime to consider the course he has to pursue. In these circumstances, I do not think that there has been any undue delay. It is again contended that the Sessions Judge should be of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made, but no such opinion has been expressed and that this defect is incurable. The Sessions Judge in his order expressed the following opinion: " Considering the fact that the respondent deliberately came forward with a false complaint of theft against the petitioners, who are said to be respectable persons, it is certainly a thing which should not be contenanced or allowed to go without any action. I therefore think that this is a fit case to sanction the prosecution of the respondent under section an, Indian Penal Code." No doubt the Sessions Judge had not used the actual words of the section, namely, that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made; but in my view there is no charm in this incantation where the Judge has used language which leaves no doubt that the prosecution was in the interests of justice. It is not a question of a mere inference alone. In In re Chilukuri Ramayya4, a Bench of the Madras High Court remitted the proceedings to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate where the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had used language in effect giving his opinion that a prosecution was expedient in the interests of justice. It was not a similar language as in this case and therefore that case is distinguishable on that ground. The case of Namberumal Chetty v. Nainiappa Mudali5, was also distinguished in that case by the special wording of the order. In this case (Namberumal Chetty’s case5), the proceedings were embodied in a single document which served the dual purpose of a. complaint and also a finding, and Curgenven, J., observed that it was no reason why the particulars stated therein should not be held sufficient to comply with the requirements of the section, although in that form. In this case (Namberumal Chetty’s case5), the proceedings were embodied in a single document which served the dual purpose of a. complaint and also a finding, and Curgenven, J., observed that it was no reason why the particulars stated therein should not be held sufficient to comply with the requirements of the section, although in that form. The following observations in the case of Bhutan Chandra Pradhan v. Emperor6, were approved: " The learned Judge’s order shows that in his opinion the appellant had given false evidence before him. That order by itself and in view of the proceedings started under section 476 carries the implication that the learned Judge must have felt that the ends of justice required that an inquiry before a Magistrate should take place." See also Kailashpati v. Nand Lal1, and Naurang Rai v. Emperor2. In my view this ground also fails. Lastly, it is urged that there is no decision that the complaint is a false one, nor such a finding, if any, was based on legal evidence. It may be observed that a perusal of the order leaves no doubt as to the finding. The Sessions Judge stated that he had no hesitation in holding that the complaint of the respondent against the petitioners that they stole the cheque-book containing blank cheques with his signatures with a view to cheat him or misappropriate the amounts is false. The only argument which remains is that this finding is not based on any legal evidence. In support of this, certain observations of the Full Bench in the case of Bapu v. Bapu3, have been relied upon. The facts of that case show that the petitioner, Adimulam Pillai had filed a complaint against one Krishna Ayyar and his wife charging them with criminal breach of trust in respect of some jewels entrusted to them at a marriage which took place in his house. The Magistrate suspected that the case was false and directed the police to hold a preliminary enquiry under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code. The Inspector reported that the case was entirely false. Thereupon Krishna Ayyar applied for sanction to prosecute Adimulam for preferring a false complaint, an offence punishable under section 211, Indian Penal Code and the Magistrate granted the sanction. The Inspector reported that the case was entirely false. Thereupon Krishna Ayyar applied for sanction to prosecute Adimulam for preferring a false complaint, an offence punishable under section 211, Indian Penal Code and the Magistrate granted the sanction. No doubt on the particular facts of the case, their Lordships observed that the conclusion of the Magistrate was based entirely on the report of the police. Another Full Bench of the same Court in King Emperor v. Karri Venkanna Patrudu4, expressed the view that the words of section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are very wide and an order may be based on materials which have not been strictly made legal evidence. Oldfield, J., observed at page 446: "Turning to the merits, I observe that the argument derives no support from the wording of section 476. Proceedings thereunder are totake place, when the Court is of opinion that there is ground for ‘enquiry’; and I do not feel entitled to introduce the requirement that this opinion shall have been formed on the whole of the evidence or at any particular stage in its production. The opinion has to be supplemented by ‘ any enquiry which may be necessary’; but that means only ‘necessary’ in the reasonable and judicial exercise of the Court’s discretion. It has in fact been held that no preliminary enquiry is necessary, even when there is no evidence on record contradicting the case, in respect of which sanction on a charge under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code has been granted, Baperam Sarma v. Gowri Nath Dutt5; and that the enquiry need not be held in the presence of the accused and need not include cross-examination by him of the witness, Chita Sadoo v. Bhoobun Chukerbutty6 and Queen Empress v. Matabadal7 approved in Abdul Ghafur v. Raza Hussain8. A fortiori an accused is not entitled as of right to insist on all his evidence being taken in the substantive proceeding before sanction is granted against him. And there is nothing in the wo ding of the section inconsistent with this conclusion. For it postulates, not any decision by the Court that a case has been established even prima facie, but merely its adoption of an opinion that there is ground for enquiry. And there is nothing in the wo ding of the section inconsistent with this conclusion. For it postulates, not any decision by the Court that a case has been established even prima facie, but merely its adoption of an opinion that there is ground for enquiry. No doubt that must be the opinion, as distinguished from its mere surmise or assumption; and we are accordingly entitled to satisfy ourselves that it has not acted on no evidence or perversely. But we cannot on the view I take go further and attempt to fix the quantity or nature of the material on which the Court’s opinion is to be formed, or restrict its exercise of the general discretion, which the Legislature has conferred, in the way proposed by the accused". Sadasiva Aiyar, J., at pages 449-450 expressed his view thus: ‘I also agree with the opinion of Ayling, J., in In re Kachi Madar Labbai9, that the words of section 476 are very wide and that an order under it may be based on materials which have not been strictly made legal evidence". Seshagiri Aiyar, J., no doubt dissented from these observations, but the majority of the Full Bench gave section 476 a wider connotation. That apart section 476 was amended and the words "committed before it" have been substituted by the words "appears to have been committed before it "and the words" in the course of a judicial proceeding" have been substituted by the words "in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court". Similarly section 195 also has been amended by substituting the words "alleged to have been committed in" for the words, "is committed in". The effect of these amendments is to give a wider scope to both the sections and the Court can now complain in respect of offences which appear to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, that is, the proceedings of the Court need not necessarily be judicial. The Court gets jurisdiction to enquire and complain only where the offence appears to have been committed in or in relation to any proceedings in that Court, and this may be done either on the application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, that is, suo motu and that too after such preliminary enquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary. What the Court has, therefore, to decide under this section is whether an offence of the kind contemplated under the section appears to have been committed and in the interests of justice it should further enquire into it. It is not always obligatory on the part of the Court to make a preliminary enquiry; but that would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If a prima facie case has already been made out even in the course of the proceedings before it or where there is sufficient documentary evidence on the record it may be that no preliminary enquiry is necessary nor is it necessary to record oral evidence and it will be perfectly competent for the Court to direct a complaint to be filed without taking any such evidence. In this case a preliminary enquiry has been held, notice was given to the respondent who appeared through an advocate and he filed a counter and Exhibits D-1 to D-10, which were marked, the case-diaries containing the statements of the witnesses were sent for and filed, the cheque-book and the pass-book which were seized from the 2nd respondent were also filed and the fact that the appellant wrote out the name of the respondent in the cheque-book and signed it leaving blank only the amount in words and figures, were all considered. After considering all these the Sessions Judge directed a complaint to be filed against him before the First Class Magistrate. It cannot, therefore, be said that he has acted only on a police report and not on any evidence. The statements in the case-diaries in the investigation of the theft case against the respondent could be used. It has been held in Subbayya and others v. Peta Veerayya1, by a Bench of the Madras High Court that when a statement has not been made in the course of investigating the offence in respect of which the trial is held, neither the main part of section 162 nor the proviso has any application. There is, therefore, no statutory bar to their being used in the case. At this stage it would not be proper to comment upon these documents or on the merits as it is likely to prejudice the case of the appellant. Suffice it to say that the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge has been properly exercised. There is, therefore, no statutory bar to their being used in the case. At this stage it would not be proper to comment upon these documents or on the merits as it is likely to prejudice the case of the appellant. Suffice it to say that the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge has been properly exercised. This appeals fails and is accordingly dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Appeal dismissed.