Judgment 1. The plaintiff in O.S.No.189 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur is the appellant. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge at Tiruvallur dated 16th October, 1986 made in A.S.No.48 of 1985 in confirming the judgment and decree of the District Munsif Court 31.1.1985 made in O.S.No.189 of 1982. The unsuccessful plaintiff before the two courts below is the Appellant. 2. Heard Mr.N.Jayabalan for the appellant and Mr.V.K.Jagopalan for the Respondent. 3. For convenience, the parties to this second appeal will be referred as arrayed before the trial court. 4. The plaintiff is the son of the second defendant. The first defendant is the alienee of the suit property. The plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The suit property, it is claimed is the absolute property of the plaintiff and the same was bequeathed in his favour under a registered will dated 11.12.1967 while the plaintiff was minor. The plaintiff further alleged that his father the second defendant in collusion with the first defendant had sold his separate properties under a registered sale deed dated 11.7.1978 (Ex.B-12) that the sale is void and inoperative, that the plaintiff issued a notice on 19.2.1982 asserting his right, that the defendant took signature on a quarter sheet of blank paperwhile assuring to getting a job, that the first defendant in his reply stated that the plaintiff had given consent for the sale after receipt of consideration of Rs.500, that the plaintiff sent a rejoinder and there after filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 5. 5. The first defendant resisted the suit contending that the second defendant is living with the plaintiff, that out of the sale consideration, the property has been purchased for the benefit of the plaintiff, that loan due to a third party was discharged by the first defendant, that only to settle down at Mukkarambakkam and to discharge his family debts the suit property was sold on 11.7.1978 in favour of the first defendant, that subsequently the plaintiff affirmed the sale after receipt of valid consideration on attaining majority and promised to execute the deed that the sale was for legal necessity and for family benefit and that the plaintiff having affirmed the sale cannot seek for a declaration of title nor he could avoid the same. 6. The trial court framed three issues. The plaintiff marked Exs.A-1 to A-7, while the defendant marked Exs.B-1 to B-12. The plaintiff examined himself, besides four other witnesses. The first defendant had examined himself as D.W.1. The trial court dismissed the suit in its entirety, while holding that the plaintiff had affirmed the sale after his attaining majority under Exs.B-1 and B-2 and the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the sale, besides holding that the first defendant had acquired valid title to the suit property. 7. On appeal, the first appellate court found that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are true disbelieved and rejected the case of the plaintiff that his signature had been obtained in Exs.B-1 and B-2 which are on stamp papers. The first appellate court also found that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are binding on the plaintiff as they are valid. The challenged to Exs.B-1 and B-2 had been negatived by the two courts below and it is not as if, it is a quarter sheet of paper, but they have been typed on stamp papers and the plaintiff had admitted the signature in Ex.B-1 and Ex.B-2, besides, it has been further proved that the plaintiff and affixed his signature after having read and understood the contents. 8. That apart, the first appellate court also found valuable properties have been purchased in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.B-12, which is a nanja land and it has been further held that no case has been made out for interference. Being aggrieved, the present second appeal has been preferred. 9. 8. That apart, the first appellate court also found valuable properties have been purchased in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.B-12, which is a nanja land and it has been further held that no case has been made out for interference. Being aggrieved, the present second appeal has been preferred. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr.N.Jayabalan, vehemently contended that the sale of the minors property by the second defendant is void and it has been effected without securing prior permission of the court and in contravention of Sec.8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. It was further contended that the plaintiff had repudiated the sale deed that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are in admissible in evidence and therefore, the two courts have mis-directed themselves in relying upon Exs.B-1 and B-2 and holding that the plaintiff had affirmed the sale after attaining majority. 10. It is not in dispute that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and when he was a minor his father, the second defendant without securing the permission of the court had alienated the suit property. It is true that on the date when the sale was effected by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant, the plaintiff was a minor and his separate property had been alienate by the second defendant, the natural guardian without the previous permission of the court. 11. It terms of Sec.8(3) such disposal of immovable property belonging to the minor by a natural guardian in contravention of Sub-sec.(1) or Sub-sec.(2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. Therefore, it is evident that the sale of the plaintiffs property by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant is voidable at the instance of the plaintiff, the erstwhile minor. It is always open to the minor to avoid the said sale on his attaining majority. 12. It is well settled and it has been repeatedly held that any transfer of immovable property mentioned in Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.8 belonging to the minor with out the previous permission or the court is not binding on the minor irrespective of the fact whether it was necessary or for an evident advantage to him and such a transfer is voidable at the instance of the minor or person claiming under the minor. On the date, when the sale deed was effected, as already held the plaintiff was a minor. 13. Admittedly, in the present case, the plaintiff had sought for a mere declaration of title and for recovery of possession and he has not chosen to set aside the alienation. As pointed out by the court below, the plaintiff had not set aside the sale. 14. The plaintiff was born on 13.4.1962. He attained majority in 13.4.1980. Within three years from the date of attaining majority, the plaintiff had to avoid the sale. In the present case, the plaintiff on 27.11.1989 executed Exs.B-1 and B-2 confirming the sale after receipt of consideration. Thereafter on 19.2.1982, the plaintiff caused a notice under Ex.A-4, challenging the alienation effected by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. Thereafter the suit has been filed. 15. The main defence put forward by the contesting defendant being that in plaintiff on attaining majority under Exs.B-1 and B-2 dated 27.11.1980 had affirmed the sale on receipt of valid consideration and therefore, he cannot maintain the suit or challenge the sale as voidable. The plaintiff challenged Exs.B-1 and B-2 as fabricated and brought up under vitiating circumstances and not binding on the plaintiff. 16. However, the two courts have held that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are true and binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiffs version that on a quarter sheet of paper, the first defendant had extracted his signature under some false representation or pretext is believed by the very same document Exs.B-1 and B-2. The plaintiff had admitted the signature in Exs.B-1 and B-2. The attestors to Exs.B-1 and B-2 have also deposed that the plaintiff had affixed his signature after reading and understanding the contents. 17. On the date when Exs.B-1 and B-2 were signed, the plaintiff was a major and it is not as if he had no competence nor it could be stated that the plaintiff was handicapped either physically or mentally nor it is the case of the plaintiff that he was under compulsion nor a fraud has been played. The plaintiff had no coincident case. 18. Once Exs.B-1 and B-2 are accepted, the plaintiff has to fail. It is true that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are not deeds of ratification. The plaintiff had no coincident case. 18. Once Exs.B-1 and B-2 are accepted, the plaintiff has to fail. It is true that Exs.B-1 and B-2 are not deeds of ratification. But Exs.B-1 and B-2 are agreement of confirmation executed by the plaintiff with reference to the alienation effected by his father, the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. Ex.B-1 and B-2 instruments of consent dated 27.11.1980. It is on a stamp papers for the value of Rs.250 respectively, It has been attested by two witnesses. It refers to the sale deed in question and also the schedule of the suit property under Ex.B-1. 19. Thus as seen from Ex.B-1, the plaintiff had affirmed the sale executed by his father the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. Exs.B-1 and B-2 had been marked without any objection and the contents of it had been proved. In fact, the plaintiff had admitted his signature in the said documents. They had also been marked. It is the case of the defendant that the plaintiff had received Rs.500 and thereafter executed B-1, which evidence has been accepted by the two courts below So also Ex.B-2. Thus it is obvious that the plaintiff after attaining majority had affirmed the sale executed by his father. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ex.B-1 a document of confirmation or instrument of consent is inadmissible as it amounts to extinguishment of the plaintiffs right. Under Ex.B-1 the plaintiff had merely affirmed or confirmed the sale effected by his father during his minority. A reading of Ex.B-1 would show that the plaintiff had affirmed the sale by his father after attaining majority. A perusal of Ex.B-1 would show that there is no relinquishment of any interest or alienation of interest or extinguishment of interest in immovable property under Ex.B-1. But it is only a confirmation of alienation made by the guardian. 21. Therefore, the contention that Ex.B-1 requires registration cannot be sustained in law. An alienation by the guardian of the minor is valid until it is set aside by the minor. So on the date when the affirmation letter Ex.B-1 was signed by the plaintiff and till then the plaintiff had not chosen to challenge or invalidate the same. A mere affirmation will be sufficient and it is not necessary that a deed of ratification is required. 22. So on the date when the affirmation letter Ex.B-1 was signed by the plaintiff and till then the plaintiff had not chosen to challenge or invalidate the same. A mere affirmation will be sufficient and it is not necessary that a deed of ratification is required. 22. As already pointed out, the plaintiff within three years of his attaining majority could avoid the sale and till he seeks to avoid the sale by his guardian it is valid. So on the date when Ex.B-1 is executed the alienation by the guardian is valid. Ex.B-1 is a mere affirmation of the transaction already effected by the guardian of the erstwhile minor. There is no requirement for a deed of ratification being executed as contended by the counsel for the appellant. It is sufficient, if an affirmation in a definite form is made by the-----minor after attaining majority affirming the sale. 23. Ratification means confirmation or adoption of the instrument or an alienation or a transaction purported to have been made when in fact, there was no authority to make such an instrument or alienation subsequent confirmation or ratification of the instrument or alienation would bind the person so ratifying personality. 24. Therefore, in terms of Ex.B-1, it follows that the plaintiff after attaining majority had ratified the alienation by affirming the same. Where the act of the second defendant when once been affirmed by the plaintiff on attaining majority, it is deemed that whole of the transaction, namely, the alienation by the second defendant is deemed to have been affirmed. On the date, when Ex.B-1 was executed it was open to the plaintiff either to affirm the alienation by his father second defendant in favour of the first defendant or he could have taken steps to avoid the same. In the present case, the erstwhile minor on attaining majority had affirmed the sale by executing Ex.B-1. 25. As already pointed out till the sale is set aside, it is valid. In the present case on the date, when Ex.B-1 came to be executed, the sale has not been set aside and it is valid. In Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others , 1988 T.L.N.J. 195 Srinivasan, J. as he then was held thus. In Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others Nainar Mohamed Rowther and another v. Minor Vijayasankar and two others , 1988 T.L.N.J. 195 Srinivasan, J. as he then was held thus. “I am of the opinion that this exposition of law was statutorily a proved by the Legislature in introducing Sub-sec.3 of Sec.8. Sub-secs.2 and 3 of Sec.8 have to be read together in order to decide the validity of an alienation effected by a guardian without obtaining the permission of the court. While Sub-sec.2 enjoins upon the guardian not to alienate without the prior permission of the court. Sub-sec.(3) makes it clear that any alienation effected in contravention of Sub-sec.(2) is voidable at the instance of the minor. If as contended by learned counsel for the appellants, the transaction continues to be void till ratification is made by the minor, the language of Sub-sec.(3) would have been entirely different. The section would have read that the transaction is not valid until and unless ratified by the minor. When Sub-sec.(3) expressly says that a disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of Sub-sec.(1) or Sub-sec.(2) is voidable at the instance of the minor, it is very clear that the transaction is valid Until it is set aside by the minor.” 26. Thus, it follows that on the date of affirmation the sale was valid as there was no requirement for executing a ratification deed or release deed as sought to be contended by the counsel for the appellant. When once Ex.B-1 is found to be true and binding, it automatically follows that the plaintiff cannot on a later date institute the suit and try to avoid the sale. It may be that be seeking for a declaration the plaintiff had sought to avoid the same. But on that score, it cannot be held that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in the suit. Having affirmed the alienation on attaining majority the plaintiff is bound by Ex.B-1 so also Ex.B-2. As an after thought, the plaintiff had come out with the suit. 27. But on that score, it cannot be held that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in the suit. Having affirmed the alienation on attaining majority the plaintiff is bound by Ex.B-1 so also Ex.B-2. As an after thought, the plaintiff had come out with the suit. 27. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to seek for setting aside the alienation as the very relief of declaration of title would be appropriate and more than sufficient, In this respect, the two courts have commented that the plaintiff had not instituted the suit to set aside the alienation. 28. However, this Court is unable to sustain the view expressed by the two courts below as the very institution of the suit by the erstwhile minor is a manifestation of his unequivocal intention to get rid of the alienation or the repudiation of the transaction. It is not essential to seek a relief to set aside the alienation as such. This view of mine is supported by the view taken by Rathnam, J. in Perianayagam v. Rajendran , (1988)1 L.W. 198 . 29. In the said case, the learned Judge held that they very suit for recovery of possession is sufficient as it is a manifestation to avoid the alienation, which is voidable. In this respect, it has been held thus: “Even though Ex.B-1 is statutorily declared to be a voidable transaction, there must be some manifestation, by an act or omission of an unequivocal intention, on the part of the minors or the erstwhile minors avoiding or repudiating the transaction for, only then, such avoidance will result in rendering the transaction void since its inception. It is in this connection a reference may be made to a pass in Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th Ed., page 387 to the following effect: “A valid agreement is one which is fully operative in accordance with the intent of the parties. A void agreement is one which entirely fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the declared will of the parties being wholly destitute or legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands midway between these cases. It is not a nullity, but its operation is conditional and not absolute. By reason of some defect in its origin it is liable to be destroyed or cancelled at the option of one of the parties to it. A voidable agreement stands midway between these cases. It is not a nullity, but its operation is conditional and not absolute. By reason of some defect in its origin it is liable to be destroyed or cancelled at the option of one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this power, the agreement not only ceases abinition. The avoidance of it relates back to the making of it. The hypothetical or contingent efficacy appears, as if it had never existed. In other words, a voidable agreement is one which is void or valid at the election of one of the parties to it.” Adverting to the manner of the avoidance of a voidable transaction, Trevelyan on the Law relating to Minors, 4th Edn., page 202 observers as follows: “A transaction which is voidable the instance of the minor may be repudiated by any act or omission of the late minor, by which he intendeds to communicate the repudiation or which has the effect the repudiating it; for instance, a transfer of land by him avoids a transfer of the same land made by his guardian before he attained the age of majority. It is not necessary that the should bring a suit; but a suit to set aside the acts of his guardian during his minority amounts of course to an express repudiation.” It is thus seen from the passages above that the avoidance or repudiation by a minor whatever be its form, renders the transaction so repudiated void since its inception.” I am in respectful agreement with the above exposition of law by Rathnam, J. However, this will not, in any manner affect the ultimate decision in this appeal. 30. As already held, Ex.B-1 is binding and the plaintiff had voluntarily affirmed the alienation which is valid till it is avoided. On the date when the deed of affirmation or consent was executed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was a major and he had validly affirmed the alienation already effected by his natural guardian. A confirmation is more than alienation in terms of Sec.8 and till this alienation is terms of Sec.8 and till this alienation is set aside, as held by this Court, the alienation is valid. Therefore, by mere affirmation, the plaintiff had chosen to affirm the alienation effected by his natural guardian in favour of the plaintiff. 31. A confirmation is more than alienation in terms of Sec.8 and till this alienation is terms of Sec.8 and till this alienation is set aside, as held by this Court, the alienation is valid. Therefore, by mere affirmation, the plaintiff had chosen to affirm the alienation effected by his natural guardian in favour of the plaintiff. 31. It is not the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the findings of the two courts below with respect to Ex.B-1 or Ex.B-2 is perverse or the two courts have failed to advert or consider any material portion of the evidence. Ex.B-1 and Ex.B-2 are found to be valid as it is a voluntary act of the plaintiff and a valid confirmation of earlier sale. If follows that the plaintiff having affirmed the alienation cannot avoid the same by instituting the present suit. 32. For all the above reasons, this Court holds that no case has been made out for interference and the second appeal fails. 33. The second appeal is dismissed, but without costs.