Order This is an application to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 6 of 1957 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge’s Court, Vijayawada. The facts of the case out of which the present application has arisen are as follows: Accused 1 (A.D. Parthasarathi), in his capacity as a Lower Division Clerk, Narasaraopet Central Excise Circle Office, was in charge of the Stock of T.P. 1 permit-books intended for issue to the various Central Excise Officers for being used as transport permits and issued by them as such to bona fide persons applying for licence to transport tobacco. The case of the prosecution is that two of the books containing twenty-five permits in each were found missing in the Central Excise Circle Office, that they had not been issued for use to any Range, that the said Sri A.D. Parthasarathi, the Lower Division Clerk, sold these books to the other accused for a consideration of Rs.400 and that seven out of the permits in these books were detected to have been used for the transport of non-duty paid tobacco after the blanks therein had been filled in and the signature of the Central Excise Officers forged thereon. In addition, accused 2 to accused 8 got authorisation letters prepared with the help of accused 9 who is an artist, by forging the signatures of the supposed consignors of the tobacco. Thus, accused 2 to accused 8 successfully transported tobacco on the said bogus and forged T.P. 1 permits, to the licensed premises of P. Ch. Venkatasubbiah of Markapur, Bonthala Rangasubbayya of Cumbum, B. Sanjeevayya of Vinukonda and Sri B.V. Seshayya of Markapur and received payments for the tobacco by signing on the account-books of these persons. The prosecution alleged a conspiracy amongst accused 1 to accused 9 for the purpose of obtaining blank T.P. 1 book forms and filling them in and forging the same and using them as genuine to enable them to transport tobacco without paying the duty thereon and without obtaining valid permits authorising such transport. The charge-sheet avers that accused 1 to accused 9 are liable to be tried under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, read with section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 (Prevention of Corruption Act). The charge-sheet avers that accused 1 to accused 9 are liable to be tried under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, read with section 5(2) of Act II of 1947 (Prevention of Corruption Act). Apart from this, accused 1 is sought to be prosecuted under section 5(1)(c) and (d)of Act II of 1947 in addition to offences under sections 420, 466 and 467, Indian Penal Code. Accused 2 to accused 8 are said to have abetted the offences committed by accused 1, the Lower Division Clerk, under section 5(1)(c) and (d) of Act II of 1947 and sections 466 and 467, Indian Penal Code. They are also proceeded against under sections 420, Indian Penal Code, apparently for cheating the purchasers of the tobacco by making representations that the tobacco in question was brought there under valid permits after necessary duty had been paid thereon. The learned Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, was appointed asa Special Judge under the provisions of section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (II of 1952) to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Subordinate Judge (hereinafter referred to as the Special Judge) apparently framed a number of charges against the accused and the present petition is directed against the taking cognizance of these offences by the Special Judge and also he frame of the charges. The following points have been urged before me in main: (1) The investigation in this case is illegal as under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, read with sections 196-A and 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the sanction of the Magistrate having jurisdiction is necessary before any investigation is carried out by a police officer. The objection is two-fold. Firstly, under section 196-A(1) there should be a complaint by or under authority from the State Government or by some officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, and there is no such complaint in this case. The objection is two-fold. Firstly, under section 196-A(1) there should be a complaint by or under authority from the State Government or by some officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, and there is no such complaint in this case. Secondly, if the case fell under section 196-A(2), where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence or a cognizable offence not punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government, or a District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the State Government by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings, no Court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120-B and, in this case, no such authority or consent is forthcoming. To this contention, the learned Public Prosecutor replies that as the criminal conspiracy in this case was not only to commit non-cognizable offences such as those under sections 466 and 467 but also an offence under section 420, Indian Penal Code, which is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, the requirements of section 196-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code, need not be complied with. It is further contended that as the offence alleged against accused 1 is under section 165, Indian Penal Code, which is also cognizable and which is punishable with three years imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code and to an enhanced punishment of seven years under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the sanction contemplated by section 196-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code, is not necessary. At the outset, it must be noticed that, if the prosecution is in respect of criminal conspiracy to commit offences which come within the purview of section 196-A, the appropriate sanction or consent, as the case may be, has to be obtained. It is not the case of the prosecution that either the sanction of the State Government or other authority under section 196-(1) or the consent of the State Government or the District Magistrate authorised in that behalf, had been obtained. It is not the case of the prosecution that either the sanction of the State Government or other authority under section 196-(1) or the consent of the State Government or the District Magistrate authorised in that behalf, had been obtained. A careful perusal of section 196-A leaves no room for doubt that, where the object of the conspiracy is to commit (1) an illegal act other than an offence or (2) a legal act by illegal means, then a complaint in respect of that offence should be made by order or under authority from the State Government or some officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf. In this case, I am, however, of opinion that section 196-A(1) does not apply at all. The only question that remains to be considered in this respect is whether section 196-A (2) applies. It is clear that the offences mentioned in the charge-sheet, namely, sections 466, 467, Indian Penal Code, are non-cognizable. Consequently, in respect of a prosecution for a simple conspiracy to commit these offences under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, the consent contemplated by section 196-A (2) is a pre-requisite to any Court taking cognizance of that offence. In this case, no such consent has been produced. In fact, the learned Public Prosecutor conceded that no such consent was obtained. In the circumstances, the Special Judge is clearly precluded from taking cognizance of the said offence, namely, of criminal conspiracy to commit the offences under sections 466 and 471, Indian Penal Code, which are non-cognizable. At the same time, I must make it clear that as section 196-A, Criminal Procedure Code, does not apply to a case of criminal conspiracy to commit an offence under section 420 which is a cognizable offence punishable with seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, it was perfectly competent for a criminal Court to take cognizance of the said offence, without any sanction or consent as section 196-A would not be applicable to such a case. In this connection, a further question has been raised, namely, whether the Special Judge appointed under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act could take cognizance of offences under section 120-B read with sections 466, 467 and even 420 which do not fall within the ambit of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Special Judge is not one of the Criminal Courts recognised by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Special Judge is not one of the Criminal Courts recognised by the Code of Criminal Procedure. His powers are conferred by and confined to section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XLVI of 1952) and delimited to certain offences specified in sections 6 and 7 of the said Act. As the offences under sections 466, 467 and 420 committed by persons who are not public servants, are not the subject-matter of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the learned Subordinate Judge, in my opinion, acting as a Special Judge, would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences. It is also significant to note in this connection that even the offences under sections 466, 467 and 420, Indian Penal Code, committed by public servants do not amount to criminal misconduct within the meaning of section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and as such cannot be taken cognizance of or tried by the Special Judge unless the offences could be brought under section 5(1)(d)of the said Act. Therefore, reading the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure together, the following conclusions appear to be inevitable in the present case: (1) The Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of or try the offence of Criminal conspiracy to commit offences under sections 466, 467 and 420,, Indian Penal Code. (2) Even where the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, in respect of criminal conspiracy to commit offences under sections 466, 467 and 471 Indian Penal Code, which are non-cognizable, the consent in writing of the State Government or the District Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf is a condition precedent, under section 196-A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to that Court taking cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy. The main contention that has been urged before me which requires to be considered is that the first charge framed by the Special Judge, is an omnibus charge involving as many as 203 offences rolled into one, in direct violation of the provisions of sections 234, 235 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I have read the charge and I fully agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the charge is bad for duplicity and for misjoinder of persons and offences. I have read the charge and I fully agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the charge is bad for duplicity and for misjoinder of persons and offences. In view of the finding given by me earlier, the learned Special Judge should first of all eliminate all offences which he has no jurisdiction to try from the charge-sheet and confine the charges to be framed by him to those properly arising under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act alone read with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and then follow the rules laid down in section 233, Criminal, Procedure Code, for framing charges by framing a separate and distinct charge for each distinct offence and where there is a plurality of accused in a charge by conforming to the limitations laid down in section 239, Criminal Procedure Code, It is further contended that where conspiracy is alleged and it is also alleged by the prosecution that the offence intended to be committed by the conspirators had in fact been committed, then the accused should be tried not for the conspiracy but for the main offence, using the conspiracy as the basis of a charge, of abetment, if necessary. In support of this contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision in In re Venkataramiah1. The following passage at page 132 of the report is relevant: “Where the matter has gone beyond the stage of mere conspiracy and offences are alleged to have been actually committed in pursuance thereof, these two sections are wholly irrelevant. Conspiracy, it should be borne in mind, is one form of abetment (see section 107, Indian Petal Code) and where an offence is alleged to have been committed by more than two persons such of them as actually took part in the commission should be charged with the substantive offence, while those who are alleged to have abetted it by conspiracy should be charged with the offence of abetment under section 109, Indian Penal Code. The Explanation to section 109 makes this quite clear. The Explanation to section 109 makes this quite clear. An offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in pursuance of the conspiracy, and the abettor by conspiracy is made punishable (under, section 109) with the punishment provided for the actual offence.” I entirely agree with the position of law enumerated above and I consider that in this particular case, the use of section 120-B is wholly out of place. The proper section to apply is section 109, Indian Penal Code, read with the appropriate sections which, in this case, are sections 420, 466, 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code. In that view of the matter, the application of section 196-A(1) goes out altogether and an ordinary criminal Court exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure could certainly take cognizance of the substantive offences in question without the fulfilment of the requirements laid down in section 196-A (2), Criminal Procedure Code, where the latter section would otherwise have been applicable. It is also contended before me that the investigation in this case was defective in view of the fact that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, a person below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, could not investigate and that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, non-cognizable cases could not be investigated into without the requisite permission under section 155(2) of the said Code. It is seen from the records that the permission under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, had been applied for and obtained and the learned Public Prosecutor states that the Inspector-General of police, Delhi Special Police Establishment, had given the authorisation under the proviso to section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. There is not much substance in this contention-Even if there is some defect in the investigation of the case, it cannot, in my opinion, in any way, affect adversely the interests of the accused, having regard to the fact that investigation is done at a stage far anterior to the point of time when a charge is framed against the accused when alone the trial against him begins. Apart from this, I am not satisfied that there has been any defect in the investigation of this case. In the result, the charge framed by the learned Special Judge is quashed and he is directed to frame fresh charges on the lines indicated by me above. Apart from this, I am not satisfied that there has been any defect in the investigation of this case. In the result, the charge framed by the learned Special Judge is quashed and he is directed to frame fresh charges on the lines indicated by me above. I must make it clear that this does not preclude the prosecution from proceeding with the charges triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court having jurisdiction to try them. A.B.K. ----- Charge framed by the Special Judge quashed: Directions issued.