Subba Rao, C.J.-Sri Abdul Kasim, b.a., ll.b., was practising as a First Grade Pleader in Hyderabad having enrolled himself as a pleader on 22nd March, 1925. His name was duly entered in the Register of Pleaders maintained by the Hyderabad High Court. He was renewing his Pleadership Certificate from year to year. His Pleadership Certificate was last renewed for the year 1941-42. He was appointed as Munsif-Magistrate on 26th September, 1942 and thereafter he did not renew his Pleadership Certificate. While he was working as Munsif-Magistrate, Nilanga,. several complaints were lodged against him by eight pleaders of Nilanga complaining that he was corrupt and inefficient. Thereupon, the High Court initiated proceedings against him for disciplinary action and directed the Sessions Judge, Bidar, to make an enquiry and submit a report. On 11th August, 1954, the Sessions Judge submitted his report, on the basis of which the following charges were framed against him: (1) Acceptance of illegal gratification and issuing orders under influence. (2) Complicity and conspiracy with S.P.O.; (3) Alteration and scratching of orders, raising suspicion in the mini of the litigant public; (4) Inefficiency and poor knowledge of law; (5) Intervention in a Police case resulting in the absconding of the accused; and (6) Collecting illegal and improper costs without authorisation and without submitting accounts. The Munsif-Magistrate filed a written statement denying all the charges and he elected to have an oral enquiry. The enquiry was conducted by Mr. Justice Deshpande, one of the Judges of the Hyderabad High Court. He found, on the evidence that, although direct taking of bribes had not been proved, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he was likely to take bribes, that charges Nos. 2 and 3 were established, that either the Munsif-Magistrate lacked knowledge of law or that he was personally interested in the case and that charges 5 and 6 were not established. The learned Judge expressed the view that the Munsiff was not fit to be kept in service but should be made to retire compulsory under rule 9(iv)of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The learned Judge expressed the view that the Munsiff was not fit to be kept in service but should be made to retire compulsory under rule 9(iv)of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court, sitting along with Vithal Rao Deshpande and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ., as Administrative Bench considered the report, gave a hearing to the Munsiff and accepted the findings of Deshpande, J. Having regard to those findings and having regard to the previous enquiries, wherein he was found guilty of bribery, they held that the officer was fit to be dismissed from service. The Government, by their order, dated 5th July, 1956, dismissed him from service on the basis of the finding of the Administrative Bench after consulting the Public Service Commission and after giving an opportunity for the officer to represent his case. The question is whether Sri Abdul Kasim, who was dismissed from service for bribery and inefficiency, should be allowed to practise in the State as a First Grade Pleader. On merits, there cannot be two opinions. A pleader who abused his position as a Judicial Officer and who was dismissed for taking illegal gratification and for inefficiency, obviously, should not be allowed to soil the atmosphere of the legal profession which it should be the aim of any society to keep pure and unsullied. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the pleader does not contend that, in the circumstances, the pleader is entitled to practise in the Courts of the State but questions the jurisdiction of this Court to take disciplinary proceedings under section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act on the ground that the pleader is not at present holding a pleader’s certificate. The material and relevant part of section 13 reads: “The High Court may also, after such inquiry as it thinks fit, suspend or dismiss any pleader or Mukhtar holding a certificate as aforesaid. ******* (f) for any other reasonable cause”. The contention is that the High Court’s jurisdiction to take action against the pleader under section 13 of the Act is conditioned by his ‘holding a certificate as aforesaid’. ******* (f) for any other reasonable cause”. The contention is that the High Court’s jurisdiction to take action against the pleader under section 13 of the Act is conditioned by his ‘holding a certificate as aforesaid’. It is said that though Sri Abdul Kasim was enrolled as a pleader in the High Court and though he held a pleader’s certificate and renewed it from year to year till 1941-42, he ceased to get it renewed thereafter, that, at present, he does not hold a certificate and that, therefore, he is not holding a certificate within the meaning of that section. The short question, therefore, is whether the pleader is holding a certificate within the meaning of section 13. Sections 6 and 7 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, throw considerable light on the interpretation of the phrase ‘pleader holding a certificate ‘. The material provisions of sections 6 and 7 are as follows: Section 6.-“The High Court may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Act as to the following matters (namely): (a) the qualifications, admission and certificates of proper persons to be pleaders of the subordinate Courts and of the Revenue Offices situate within the local limits of the appellate jurisdiction and in the case of a High Court not established by Royal Charter, in respect of which the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, is not in force, of such Court. Section 7.-On the admission, under section 6, of any person as a pleader or Mukhtar, the High Court shall cause a certificate, signed by such officer as the Court, from time to time, appoints in this behalf to be issued to such person, authorising him to practise upto the end of the current year in the Courts and in the case of a pleader also the Revenue Offices, specified therein. At the expiration of such period, the holder of the certificate, if he desires to continue to practise shall, subject to any rules consistent with this Act which may, from time to time, be made by the High Court in this behalf, be entitled to have his certificate renewed by the Judge of the District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he then ordinarily practises or by such officer as the High Court from time to time appoints in this behalf. On every such renewal, the certificate then in possession of such pleader or Mukhtar shall be cancelled and retained by such Judge or Officer”. Section 6 enables the High Court to make rules prescribing the qualifications of pleaders, the conditions for their admission into the profession and the issue of certificates to enable them to practise. Under section 7 of the Act, after admission, the High Court causes a certificate duly signed by the officer appointed in that behalf to be issued to the pleader authorising him to practise up to the end of the current year in the Courts. The second paragraph of that section enables the holder of the certificate at the expiration of the current year to have his certificate renewed in the manner prescribed. The third paragraph prescribes for the cancellation of the earlier certificate on renewal. Pursuant to the power conferred under section 6, the High Court of Hyderabad made rules in respect of the aforesaid three matters. Under rule 11: “the High Court on receiving such application may order that the applicant be admitted as a First Grade or Second Grade Pleader, and upon the applicant being admitted as a First Grade or Second Grade Pleader, the Registrar of the High Court shall cause his name to be entered in a register and shall issue to the applicant a certificate as required by section 7 of the Legal Practitioners Act. Such a certificate granted by the High Court shall be taken to authorise the enrolment in all the Courts subordinate to the High Court and the Revenue Secretariat”. Rule 12 provides for the renewal of the certificates by the Judicial Officer presiding over the Court in which the applicant ordinarily practises. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that admission to the profession is not synonymous with the issue of a certificate, though without a certificate a person cannot practise as a pleader. The two are different processes. Admission to the profession is regulated by rule 11, whereunder the applicant’s name is entered in the register. Rules 11 and 12 provide for the issue of the initial certificate and the renewal thereof every year to enable the pleader registered topractise in the Courts. The two are different processes. Admission to the profession is regulated by rule 11, whereunder the applicant’s name is entered in the register. Rules 11 and 12 provide for the issue of the initial certificate and the renewal thereof every year to enable the pleader registered topractise in the Courts. A pleader who is admitted into the profession and who has secured the initial certificate mentioned in the first paragraph of the section, is entitled as of right to get it renewed every year following the procedure prescribed. The scheme of the Act, therefore, discloses that, on admission as a pleader an initial certificate enuring for a year is issued to him and the holder of the certificate is entitled as of right to get it renewed. Till it is cancelled or renewed, he continues to be the holder of that certificate, for his right to renew the certificate depends upon his holding the certificate, though the authorisation to practise expired at the end of the year. That this should be the meaning attributable to the words “holding a certificate” in section 13 is supported by the words in the second paragraph of section 7, which enable the holder of a certificate, after the expiration of the period, to get it renewed thereafter. Though the authorisation to practise given under the certificate is only for one year and though the term has run out, he is described as the holder of the certificate for the purpose of renewal. We, therefore, hold that a pleader admitted into the profession and whose name is entered in the register maintained for the enrolment of pleaders and to whom an initial certificate is issued for one year is a pleader holding a certificate within the meaning of section 13 of the Act. We are fortified in this interpretation of the provisions by an unreported decision of the Madras High Court decided as early as 1924. Therein, it was expressly held that it was a matter of no moment that the pleader had not renewed his sanad and that the High Court could take disciplinary action against him under section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. This judgment stood the test of time. Another Special Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of three Judges in In the matter of a Pleader, Gudivada1, followed the Full Bench judgment. This judgment stood the test of time. Another Special Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of three Judges in In the matter of a Pleader, Gudivada1, followed the Full Bench judgment. There, as here, disciplinary action was taken against a pleader, who did not renew his sanad. Adverting to an argument similar to that raised before us, Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed at page 127: “The respondent was registered as a legal practitioner under rule 9 of the rules framed under the Act. As a pleader he is required to renew his sanad each year and while he remains on the register he is entitled to issue of a sanad subject to good conduct..........The Act applied to a holder of a certificate although he had not taken the necessary steps to have it renewed for the year in which his conduct was called into question. A solicitor in England is in the same position as a pleader here. He has to take out a certificate each year entitling him to practise but he can be struck off the rolls even if he has not renewed his certificate”. Not only are we bound by the aforesaid two decisions but we also agree with the aforesaid observations. The consequences that flow from adopting the opposite view are grave and alarming and would be subversive of the legal profession. A pleader who holds the initial certificate but does not care to get it renewed would continue to be on the register of pleaders though his moral delinquency has been demonstrably established, as in this case, by his being dismissed by a properly constituted authority having found him guilty of bribery. We are also satisfied that such a dismissal is a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 13(f) of the Legal Practitioners Act. Learned counsel then contends that the petitioner was enrolled under the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act, that under that Act there was no provision for dismissing a pleader not actually practising and, therefore, no action could be taken against him under section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, in derogation of a right vested in him under the old Act. The Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, was extended to the Hyderabad State by Act III of 1951. The Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, was extended to the Hyderabad State by Act III of 1951. Reliance is placed upon sections 4 and 6 of the Act in support of the aforesaid contention. Section 4 reads: “Any reference in any Act or Ordinance specified in the Schedule to a law which is not in force in a Part B State shall, in relation to that State, be construed as a reference to the corresponding law if any in force in that State”. Section 38 of the Legal Practitioners Act says: “Except as provided by sections 4, 5, 7, 16, 25, 27, 32 and 36, nothing in this Act applies to Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys admitted and enrolled by any High Court under the Letters Patent by which such Court is constituted, or to Mukhtars practising in such Court or to advocates enrolled under section 41 of this Act and except as provided by section 36, nothing in this Act applies to persons enrolled as Advocates of any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926)”. Under section 4, any reference in any Act to a law, which is not in force in a Part B State, shall be construed as a reference to the corresponding law in that State. Under section 38 of the Legal Practitioners Act, vakils enrolled by any High Court under the Letters Patent are not governed by the provisions of the Act except those mentioned in that section. Basing on the said provisions, it is contended that the words ‘any High Court under the Letters Patent’ in section 38 should be read as the High Court of Hyderabad constituted under the Royal Charter issued by the Nizam. Assuming without conceding that the Letters Patent can be equated to the Royal Charter, there are two insurmountable objections to this argument (i) a pleader enrolled by the High Court of Hyderabad does not come under any one of the categories of Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys-for the Act itself makes a distinction between a pleader and the said three categories........and (ii) the High Court of Hyderabad did not enrol pleaders under the Royal Charter but only under the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act. Section 38 applies only to Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys enrolled by the High Court under the Letters Patent and does not relate to pleaders enrolled under the Legal Practitioners Act by any High Court. This argument, therefore, does not avail the petitioner. Nor can we find any force in the argument of the learned counsel based on section 6 of Act III of 1951. The material part of that section reads: “If immediately before the appointed day, there is in force in any Part B State any law corresponding to any of the Acts or Ordinances now extended to that State, that law shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, stand repealed: Provided that the repeal shall not affect. ******* (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed”. Relying upon this section, it is argued that the petitioner’s right to practise under the provisions of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act is saved, notwithstanding the repeal of the Act. The question is whether the petitioner had acquired any right to practise in the High Court of Hyderabad untrammelled by any further restrictions and uncontrolled by any regulations other than those that existed at the time when he was enrolled as a pleader. It is not necessary to consider the question in this case whether the privilege conferred upon a pleader to practise in a Court subject to certain conditions is a right within the meaning of the said proviso, nor the question whether the provisions governing disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court over pleaders practising in the Courts confer a right on a pleader, for the provisions of the two Acts are practically similar in scope and content. Whether we call it a right or a privilege, the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act does not confer on him any right or privilege which is larger in content than that conferred under the Legal Practitioners Act. Sections 6, 7, 12 and 13 of Act XVIII of 1879 correspond to sections 12, 14, 16 and 17 of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act. Rule 15 of the Rules made by the High Court of Hyderabad under Act XVIII of 1879 correspondents to section 14 of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act. Sections 6, 7, 12 and 13 of Act XVIII of 1879 correspond to sections 12, 14, 16 and 17 of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act. Rule 15 of the Rules made by the High Court of Hyderabad under Act XVIII of 1879 correspondents to section 14 of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act. A comparison of these provisions indicates that the provisions relating to enrolment, issue of certificate and the vesting of disciplinary jurisdiction are similar under both the Acts. There is, therefore, no scope for the argument that under the provisions of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act, the petitioner, not having renewed his certificate, was not amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court, notwithstanding his moral delinquency. There are, therefore, no merits in this argument. The petitioner has been dismissed from the office of Munsif-Magistrate by the Government on the ground of moral turpitude and inefficiency. Except stating that a writ is pending in the High Court to quash that order, nothing las been said on the merits. We must, therefore, hold that the pleader is not a person who could be retained on the register of pleaders prepared by the Hyderabad High Court. We, therefore, direct that the name of the pleader be removed from the register of pleaders. A.B.K. ----- Removal from register of pleaders ordered.