JUDGMENT : - Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. : This second appeal is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and is directed against the judgment and decree dated July 24, 1989 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 2nd Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 226 of 1987 thereby reversing those dated December 23, 1986 passed by the learned Munsif, 5th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 346 of 1981. 2. The only question that arises for determination in this second appeal is whether an agreement for sale of property is enforceable if such an agreement was made during the pendency of a suit for partition and the defendant was at that point of time restrained by an order of injunction from transferring the disputed property. 3. The learned trial Judge granted a decree for specific performance of contract subject to the decision of the pending suit for partition. The learned trial Judge further directed the defendant to apply for permission to sell the property within a specified period. In case of default, the plaintiff was given liberty to get the deed executed after obtaining permission of the court where the partition suit is pending. 4. Being dissatisfied, the defendant preferred an appeal before the first appellate court which has set aside the decree for specific performance and instead passed a decree for refund of earnest money with interest. According to the learned first appellate court below, the agreement was not enforceable. 5. Mr. Ghosh, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has contended that a sale during pendency of a suit is valid and operative between the parties but the transferee will acquire title to the property subject to the decision of the pending suit. According to Mr. Ghosh, even if a sale deed is executed in violation of an order of injunction prohibiting such transfer, the vendee will no doubt acquire title to the property although the vendor will face the consequences for violation of the order of injunction. But, Mr. Ghosh continues, an agreement for sale in violation of the order of injunction or during the pendency of a suit in which any right to such property is specifically in question cannot be said to be void so as to disentitle the plaintiff from enforcing such agreement. 6. Mr. But, Mr. Ghosh continues, an agreement for sale in violation of the order of injunction or during the pendency of a suit in which any right to such property is specifically in question cannot be said to be void so as to disentitle the plaintiff from enforcing such agreement. 6. Mr. Shaw appearing on behalf of the defendant/respondent has on the other hand supported the judgment and decree passed by the court of appeal below and has contended that in view of specific order of injunction granted by court against his client, the said agreement is opposed to law and cannot be enforced. In support of such contention Mr. Shaw relies upon a Division Bench decision of Patna High Court in the case of Karunamoy vs. Kumar Pashupati, reported in AIR 1952 pat 139 . 7. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nagubai vs. B. Shama Rao, reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 , upon which Mr. Ghosh has placed strong reliance, the law is now settled that the effect of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to wipe out a sale pendente lite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. As between the parties to the transaction, however, it is perfectly valid and operates to vest title of the transferor in the transferee. Therefore, the learned court of appeal below erred in law in holding that an agreement pendente lite cannot be given effect to. 8. Now comes to the other question viz. whether an agreement to transfer is void being violative of an order of injunction prohibiting such transfer? 9. The law relating to transfer in violation of an existing order of injunction has undergone a total change in recent time. Previously, the consistent view of almost all the courts in India was that an order of injunction does not in any way militate against the right, title and interest in the property of the party against whom such injunction has been ordered unlike an order of attachment which makes the property in custodia legis. The order of injunction, as held in those decisions, does not suspend any right of a person nor does it deprived him of that right but only aims at prohibition to act in a particular manner. The order of injunction, as held in those decisions, does not suspend any right of a person nor does it deprived him of that right but only aims at prohibition to act in a particular manner. The person obtaining an order of injunction, according to those decisions, gets an additional advantage of prosecuting the offender and also of attaching and selling his properties as laid down in order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. This would, as pointed out in those cases, work as a deterrent against indulging in the act of violation of the order of injunction and therefore if a transfer is made in violation of an order of injunction, the transferee acquires title of the transferor and such transfer is not void. The aforesaid view has been totally upset by a recent 'decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh and Ors. vs. Harbans Singh and Ors., reported in 1995(6) SCC 50 , where the Supreme Court in clear words has described such alienation in violation of order of injunction as non est and refused to recognise the right of such transferee to be added in the proceeding by taking aid of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code. Therefore, according to the law as it stands today, a transferee by virtue of a so called transfer in violation of order of injunction acquires no title and such transfer is to be treated as non-existent. Such transfer, the Apex Court comments, "would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy". 10. Mr. Ghosh however strenuously contended that even if a transfer in violation of the order of injunction is void, an agreement to such transfer is not, because his client may not execute the decree until the existing order of injunction has been vacated by the court. Mr. Ghosh contends that mere passing of a decree for specific performance does not effect a transfer; transfer is complete on execution of the decree. 11. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties and after going through the materials on record, I am of the view that although a transfer in violation of injunction order is a void one, an agreement to make transfer of the property is not void even though at the time of execution of the agreement there was an order prohibiting transfer. It appears from the evidence that the defendant fraudulently suppressed the order of injunction to the plaintiff and subsequently when such fraud was detected, the defendant applied before court seeking permission to sale. 12. Thereafter for the reason best known to the defendant, he did not press the said application. It will not be out of place to mention here that another defendant of that suit against whom similar order of injunction was passed applied for variation of the order of injunction and the court after revoking the order permitted the said defendant to transfer his share. In my opinion, under the aforesaid circumstances, the defendant should not be permitted to avoid the contract by taking advantage of his own wrong. As pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Chandne W.V. Madden vs. Dr. C.L. Katial and Ors., reported in AIR 1964 SC 978 , a court passing a decree for specific performance can in a given case compel the defendant to apply before appropriate authority for grant of permission in order to convey effective title in favour of the plaintiff. 13. In the case of Karunamoy vs. Kumar Pashupati (supra) relied upon by Mr. Shaw, a Manager, Court of Ward entered into an agreement to grant a lease without the sanction of the Board of Revenue as required under section 39 of the Bengal Court of Wards Act and as such court refused to enforce such agreement being violative of law. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the fact of the present case. 14. Therefore, in view of what has been stated above, the appellate court below erred in law in refusing to enforce the agreement for sale although the execution of the same was proved and it was further proved that the appellant was all along ready to perform her I part of the contract. 15. The judgment and decree passed by the court of appeal below are therefore set aside. The appellant is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of contract. 15. The judgment and decree passed by the court of appeal below are therefore set aside. The appellant is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of contract. The defendant is directed to file before the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, 7th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 21 of 1967 an application for permission to transfer the suit property in favour of the plaintiff subject to the final decision of the said suit within one month and to press the same at the time of hearing. The defendant is directed to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within one month from the date of such permission, if granted. In the event such permission is refused, the plaintiff will be entitled to get a decree for refund of earnest money with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of agreement. 16. The appeal is allowed with costs payable by the respondent which I assess at 100 Gms. Appeal allowed.