Order This is a petition to quash the committal order made by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Narasaraopet, in P.R.C. No. 7 of 1956. The argument advanced by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner is two-fold. Firstly, that no offence under section 466, Indian Penal Code, for which the accused is committed is made out on the facts stated in the complaint or found by the learned Magistrate. Secondly, that if at all there is any offence it will be one under section 193, Indian Penal Code, which cannot be taken cognizance of except on a complaint in writing of the Court as contemplated by section 195(1)(b), Criminal Procedure Code. To appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel in this behalf, it is necessary to make a brief statement of facts. The accused Mupparaju Brahmayya is the village munsiff of Mupparajuvaripalem and lived in the same house in Mupparajuvaripalem with his father-in-law, Botla Anantaramayya. Anantaramayya had a brother, Govindayya, who died leaving behind him his first wife, Seetamma and a grand-daughter, Ramasubbamma by his second wife, Laxmidevamma. The complainant, Pinnika China Ramachandraiah, is the brother of Laxmidevamma and the orphan Ramasubbamma is maintained and looked after by him. There was previously a partition between Govindayya and Anantaramayya. But Govindayya’s contention seems to be that sometime before the death of Anantaramayya there was a re-union and both of them lived together. They were thus in joint possession of the property. This is, however, disputed by the first wife Seetamma and the grand-daughter, Ramasubbamma who complained that after the death of Govindayya they were forcibly dispossessed by Anantaramayya and his son. They aver that Govindayya had executed a will on 26th June, 1946, where under he conveyed in his property a life interest to Seetamma and subsequent to her death absolute interest to Ramasubbamma and that as a result they were in possession of the property after Govindayya’s death but before long they were dispossessed by Anantaramayya and his son. A registered notice was issued by Seetamma to Anantaramayya and his son in June, 1953, calling upon them to deliver back possession of the properties left by Govindayya. In response to this notice Anantaramayya claimed property on the basis of re-union. Consequently, the widow brought a pauper suit in the Sub-Court, Narasaraopet, which was originally numbered as O.P. No. 38 of 1953 and later on as O.S. No. 19 of 1954. In response to this notice Anantaramayya claimed property on the basis of re-union. Consequently, the widow brought a pauper suit in the Sub-Court, Narasaraopet, which was originally numbered as O.P. No. 38 of 1953 and later on as O.S. No. 19 of 1954. In order to disprove the contention that Anantaramayya was in possession of the property belonging to Govindayya the widow applied for the copies of extract of No.14 account of the village of Puchanutula, hamlet of Mupparajuvaripalem, for the years 1942 to 1950 but to her disappointment the copies that were given after some delay on 22nd September, 1953, disclosed that for the year 1949 which was the year in which Govindayya died Anantaramayya paid land revenue even for Govindayya’s land. It appears after sometime when the suit was still pending before the Sub-Court, the complainant received a registered cover on 15th October, 1955, from one M.V. Kondayya of Vinukonda and this contained 17 sheets of brown paper on which were found entries of chitta No.13 of the village of Mupparajuvaripalem in the handwriting of the accused as the village munsif showing the account from 8th January, 1949, to 25th March, 1949. These papers contain the endorsements and signatures of village karnam, P. Surayya as well, who acted as village munsif from 18th February, 1949 to 11th March, 1949. Further there were endorsements of the Revenue Inspector showing that it was checked by him. To all intents and purposes it purports to be the official record maintained in the due discharge of. duties. These accounts reveal that the payment was in fact made by Govindayya and not Anantaramayya in relation to Govindayya’s land. It may also be noted at this stage that the case of the accused has been that account No.13 as orginally maintained was lost, as a result of which he had to prepare afresh the said accounts under the specific orders of the Tahsildar after referring to the list of daily collections of land revenue supplied by the karnam. He did not, however, categorically admit that the signatures on Exhibit P-19, which is produced by the complainant purporting to be the original, are his. He merely states that the signatures therein resemble his signature. He did not, however, categorically admit that the signatures on Exhibit P-19, which is produced by the complainant purporting to be the original, are his. He merely states that the signatures therein resemble his signature. The committing Magistrate came to the conclusion that Exhibit P-19 was the original account duly prepared and signed by the accused and the karnam and checked by the Revenue Inspector and that the subsequent document which is prepared is a spurious one with false entries to support the claim of his father-in-law that he was living joint with Govindayya and was managing and paying the kist before Govindayya died. In this way the learned Sub-Magistrate was of the opinion that an offence triable by the Sessions Judge was committed and therefore, there was sufficient grounds for committing the accused to sessions. Now the question is whether on the facts stated by the prosecution there were sufficient grounds for committing the accused within the meaning of section 209, Criminal Procedure Code. An order of commitment under section 213 can be quashed by this Court only on a point of law. As already pointed out, the petitioner has raised two points of law. Firstly, it is urged that on the facts stated or found, no offence under section 466, Indian Penal Code, is made out. Section 466, Indian Penal Code, it may be noticed relates to the forging of a document of the description given therein. Section 463 read with section 464, Indian Penal Code, brings out the ingredients of forgery. Forgery, according to section 463, Indian Penal Code, is making a false document with the intent stated in that section and section 464 shows the cases where a person is said to make 1 false document. Section 463 read with section 464, Indian Penal Code, brings out the ingredients of forgery. Forgery, according to section 463, Indian Penal Code, is making a false document with the intent stated in that section and section 464 shows the cases where a person is said to make 1 false document. That section reads thus: "A person is said to make a false document- First, who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or Secondly, who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such allegation; or Thirdly, who dishonestly or fraudulently caused any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration." The third part being irrelevant to the facts of the case, I have to consider how far the other two parts apply to it. In order that a document should be a false document within the meaning of the first part of section 464, Indian Penal Code, it must appear that it was made with the intention of inducing the belief that such document was made by or by the authority of one who did not make it or give such authority. In other words, the document must be purported to have been made, signed, or sealed by a person who did not in fact make it. It is essential that the signature, seal or date of the document should be false. In other words, the document must be purported to have been made, signed, or sealed by a person who did not in fact make it. It is essential that the signature, seal or date of the document should be false. It would therefore follow that section 466, Indian Penal Code, will not apply to cases where a public officer or a person acting for a public officer whose duty it is to make entries in public books knowingly makes a false entry; but it would certainly apply to cases where the document was forged by some unauthorised person with a view to make it appear that it was duly issued by a public officer. Thus, the mere fact that a document contains false recitals or statements would not make it an offence of forgery within the meaning of section 463, Indian Penal Code. The second part of section 464, Indian Penal Code, relates to unlawful alteration of a document in any material part by cancellation or otherwise without any lawful authority with dishonest or fraudulent motive, whether it has been made or executed by him or by any other person. This part does not cover a case where a separate document has been prepared by the person under lawful authority. The alteration should be in the document which had already been made or executed whether it be by way of cancellation or in any other manner and such alteration must be without any lawful authority. Having regard to the facts of the present case, it is clear that it does not fall under any of the component parts of section 464, Indian Penal Code. The signature or seal or execution of the document is not purported to be made by the person who has not made it at all nor is it made with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was made by or by the authority of some other person. It cannot also be said that it is an alteration without lawful authority by cancellation or otherwise of a document already executed in its material part. Thus there is much force in the argument that a charge under section 466, Indian Penal Code, was wholly unwarranted. It cannot also be said that it is an alteration without lawful authority by cancellation or otherwise of a document already executed in its material part. Thus there is much force in the argument that a charge under section 466, Indian Penal Code, was wholly unwarranted. It is then argued that an error in framing a charge or even in committing the accused without any charge will not be material as these defects can be cured later on by the trial Judge and that if it is evident that on the facts of the case some offence has been made out for which the accused should be put on trial, the order of committal should be sustained. The committing Magistrate has not observed nor is it argued before me that the facts disclosed make out a case under sections 477 and 477-A which are the only other offences mentioned in the complaint The offence that may possibly be said on the facts of the case to have been committed is one under section 193, Indian Penal Code. But it is argued that section 195(1)(b),Criminal Procedure Code, stands as bar in taking cognizance of this offence. That section reads thus: "195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance (a) ******* (b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or (c) ** * * * * *". In order that the case comes within the ambit of this provision, the alleged offence should be committed in or in relation to any proceeding in Court. The alleged offence with regard to which criminal complaint pending civil suit was filed is said to have been committed long before the civil proceedings were started. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the alleged offence can be said to have been committed in relation to the proceeding in the civil Court. The words ‘in relation to’ are of very wide import. As observed in Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, In re1 and Ramachandra Rango v. Emperor2, they are wide enough to cover proceedings in contemplation. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the alleged offence can be said to have been committed in relation to the proceeding in the civil Court. The words ‘in relation to’ are of very wide import. As observed in Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, In re1 and Ramachandra Rango v. Emperor2, they are wide enough to cover proceedings in contemplation. The section therefore covers cases where false evidence is fabricated for a contemplated suit. All that is necessary to attract its provisions is that the offence should have relation to such proceedings. In other words, it should have been designed to affect or must have affected the proceedings though that offence might have come to light in the course of the proceedings itself. In Indrachand, In re,3 Beaumont, C.J., elaborately dealt with this aspect of law. The learned Chief Justice observed that the crucial date for purpose of seeing whether section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, applies is the date of filing the complaint. Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, shall not apply and the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence if the offence purporting to be under section 193, Indian. Penal Code, is in respect of proceedings in a Court of law which though contemplated were never started. That section (195, Cr.P.C.) would certainly apply if the proceedings in the Court in or in relation to which the offence is alleged to have been committed have started and the complaint must be by the Court in which those proceedings are pending. Even if the civil proceeding is disposed of by the order of the Court before the prosecution is launched, section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, will still have its application. It is so even where the suit has ended as a result of withdrawal, without being heard. Thus it is clear that if a complaint is lodged after the civil proceeding had been started in relation to which the offence was committed, no Court shall take cognisance of the same except on the complaint in writing by such Court or a Court to which such Court is subordinate. In this view of the law on the subject, it is difficult to hold that the offence of section 193, Indian Penal Code, as revealed by the facts of the case, can be taken cognizance of without the requisite complaint. In this view of the law on the subject, it is difficult to hold that the offence of section 193, Indian Penal Code, as revealed by the facts of the case, can be taken cognizance of without the requisite complaint. The learned counsel for the respondent makes a distinction between the cases where the plaintiff has fabricated false evidence and those where the opposite party has done so and argues that it is only in cases of the first category that section 195 will have its application. Reliance has been placed on Mohaniraj, In re4. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In that case where the sale-deeds which contained some false recitals were executed it was never contemplated by any of the parties to the sale-deeds that there will ever be a civil proceeding in relation to the same. As observed above section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, would have its application only if the offence is in relation to a contemplated civil proceeding, in other words, if it is designed to affect such proceeding. It was therefore rightly held in the case relied on that section 195 has no application as no civil proceeding was ever in contemplation of the parties when the false recitals were made. It has also been argued that even where the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require a complaint under section 195 and the others do not, it is not open to one to prosecute for the latter offences only to obviate the necessity of a complaint by the Court as contemplated by section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. There seems to be some divergence of opinion on this point. It is however, clear that if there is a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts, the ingredients of which are not the same as the ingredients of an offence which is enumerated in section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, section 195 will not be a bar to the trial of that offence; but the provisions of section 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to mere devices. Learned counsel has failed to show in this case any offence of such description which the facts of the case would make out. It is clear when prima facie there are no grounds for committal, the accused cannot be subjected to unnecessary harassment of a trial. Learned counsel has failed to show in this case any offence of such description which the facts of the case would make out. It is clear when prima facie there are no grounds for committal, the accused cannot be subjected to unnecessary harassment of a trial. It is the duty of this Court to interfere with such committal order. I, therefore, allow this revision, quash the order of committal and discharge the accused. This order will not stand in the way of the complainant to move the civil Court, if he could do so under law. A.S.R. ----- Revision allowed: Committal order quashed.