Manohar Pershad, J.-These are two appeals-Appeal No. 234 of 1956 on behalf of accused 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9, and Appeal No. 5 of 1957 on behalf of the State against the order of acquittal of accused 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 of all the charges as also against the acquittal of accused 2 under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The facts leading to these appeals are: The accused belong to the Kapu community at Gundugolanu and are closely related to each other. There were longstanding ill-feelings between the families of A-1 to A-3 and the families of the three deceased brothers, Mamillapalli Ramamurthy, Mamillapalli Satyanarayana and Mamillapalli Audiseshaiah. On 8th May, 1956, at about 7 a.m., the accused partook in a rioting, as a result of which three persons died and two were injured. A week prior to the occurrence, Mamillapalli Subbarao, son of the deceased Satyanarayana committed theft of a purse containing Rs. 100 belonging to one Apparao in a marriage celebration in the house of Vagwala Chinnaiah and when that was reported to the deceased Satyanarayana, he returned the money to Appa Rao. A day prior to the date of the occurrence, i.e., on 7th May, 1956, the deceased Satyanarayana had gone to the tank at 6 a.m., in the morning to fetch water. A-10 taunted him by telling P.W. 15 who was at the tank that a thief was coming. In the same evening some of the accused persons going in the city bus abused the deceased brothers and on the same night A-2’s wife and mother-in-law abused the members of the deceased’s family. Early in the morning, on 8th May, 1958, the three deceased brothers and P.W. 1, son of the deceased Audiseshaiah, went to the Vindyavasitank near the Vinayaka temple to wash their faces. P.Ws. 3 and 6 also joined them a1 the temple. The deceased brothers complained to P.Ws. 3 and 6 that the accused were taunting them. P.Ws. 3 and 6 promised to enquire into it and asked them to go home. While the deceased brothers and P.Ws. 1 and 3 and 6 were returning to their houses as they reached the junction of the four streets all the accused rushed on them from three different directions, A-2, 4, 8 and 9 from the north, A-1, 3,5 and 6 from the south and A-7 and A-10 from the east. While the deceased brothers and P.Ws. 1 and 3 and 6 were returning to their houses as they reached the junction of the four streets all the accused rushed on them from three different directions, A-2, 4, 8 and 9 from the north, A-1, 3,5 and 6 from the south and A-7 and A-10 from the east. The accused were armed with sticks and spears. They attacked the deceased brothers and inflicted injuries as a result of which, Ramamurthy, Satyanarayana and Audiseshaiah died and P.W. 2 received injuries. A-1, A-2 and A-7 too got injured. The matter was reported to the village Munsif, who after recording the statement of the informant Exhibit P-1 issued the report, Exhibits P-21 and 25. The appellants and the acquitted accused Nos. 1, 3, 6, 7 and 10 were charged with various offences. All of them were charged with offences, of rioting armed with deadly weapons punishable under section 148. Further A-1 A-6 and A-10 were charged for the murder of Ramamurthy under section 302 Indian Penal Code. A-2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 were charged for the murder of Satyanarayana under section 302. A-2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 were charged for the murder of Audiseshaiah under section 302. A-1 was further charged for voluntarily causing hurt with a. spear to one Mamillapalli Sitharamachandrarao under section 324, Indian Penal Code. A-6 was further charged for voluntarily causing hurt to Mamillapalli Sattemma under section 323, Indian Penal Code. All the accused were also charged constructively for the above offences read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution produced 31 witnesses. The accused denied the charges, but did not produce any defence evidence. On the evidence produced, the learned Sessions Judge found A-2 guilty under section 304, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Satyanarayana and sentenced him to five years’ R.I. He was further convicted under section 304 and sentenced to five years’ R.I. for the murder of Audiseshaiah. A-4 was held guilty under section 324, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to one year’s R.I. A-5 and A-8 were held guilty under section 326, Indian Penal Code and each sentenced to R.I. for three years. A-8 was further convicted under section 323, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six months’ R.I. A-9 was convicted under section 323 and sentenced to six months’ R.1. The sentences on accused Nos. A-8 was further convicted under section 323, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six months’ R.I. A-9 was convicted under section 323 and sentenced to six months’ R.1. The sentences on accused Nos. 2 and 8 were ordered to run concurrently. A-2, 4, 5, 8 and 9 have now come up in appeal. The State also has filed an appeal against the acquittal. Sri Munikanniah, learned Public Prosecutor, contended first that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in holding that there was no unlawful assembly and the accused had no common object and that there was over helming evidence on behalf of the prosecution to show not only that there was unlawful assembly of more than five persons but also their common object was to murder the deceased. He next contended that the finding of the Sessions Judge that A-2 was guilty under section 304 was erroneous in law. He further urged that the Court below has fallen into an error in holding that the deceased were the aggressors, even though the prosecution evidence sufficiently establishes that the accused were the aggressors and the fact that three persons on the side of the deceased party died and only one of the accused was seriouslyinjured supports the prosecution story. It is further urged that the Court below has erred in holding that the story given by the prosecution witnesses was parrot-like, and that there was improvement in their versions from stage to stage. It is next contended that the lower Court has fallen into an error in perusing the case diaries and relying on the depositions of the prosecution witnesses given before the police when the portions of their depositions were not put to them and no exhibits marked. It is lastly urged that the prosecution evidence is not only strong but sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused and the Court below has erred in acquitting the accused. Sri R.V.Ramarao, learned counsel for some of the accused, contended that when the learned Sessions Judge has acquitted five of the accused persons he was not justified in convicting the appellant on the very same evidence even when he found in paragraphs 10 to 13 of the judgment that the deceased party men were the aggressors and the eye-witnesses had given varying versions of the occurence from time to time and the evidence produced does not fully support the medical evidence. It is next urged that when the learned Sessions Judge has held that the deceased party men were the aggressors erred in coming to the conclusion that the accused had no right of private defence, when as a matter of fact accused 1, 2, and 7 suffered injuries. It is next contended that the learned Sessions Judge failed to note that the appellant had no motive to attack the deceased. Adverting to the argument relating to the unlawful assembly and the common object it is contended that the Court below has rightly held that there was neither unlawful assembly nor any common object to murder the deceased. Lastly, it is contended that the prosecution evidence is highly interested, artificial and discrepant. Sri Adavi Ramarao, on behalf of the other accused, contended that the version given in Exhibit P-1 is quite different from the statements recorded in Exhibits P-10 and P-19 and the evidence produced in Court. This, he urges, is sufficient to throw doubt on the entire prosecution case. It is next contended that the provisional charge-sheet does not assign any part to each accused and does not refer to the attack against each deceased, whereas the final charge gives the details and in that also A-2 has been merely made liable constructively, that the prosecution evidence is not supported by the medical evidence and that the Court below having taken these facts into consideration had acquitted the accused and there is no reason why this Court should come to a different conclusion. It is next contended that the finding of the Court below that there was no unlawful assembly and no common intention is correct and there is no reason why this finding should be disturbed in appeal against acquittal. Adverting to the argument relating to section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and section 145, Evidence Act, it is contended that it is not correct to say that the depositions recorded before the police were not put to the witness. As a matter of fact, he contends, that attention of each one of the witnesses was drawn to their previous depositions and those statements have been proved by P.W. 31 the Inspector of Police. As a matter of fact, he contends, that attention of each one of the witnesses was drawn to their previous depositions and those statements have been proved by P.W. 31 the Inspector of Police. It is also pointed out to us that the usual practice in the Madras and Andhra High Courts has been to read out the portion of the witnesses’ depositions before the police and then prove the depositions by the evidence of the Inspector of Police and it is not the practice to mark these portions as exhibits. It is lastly contended that the prosecution evidence is most untrustworthy. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel, a reference to the evidence is necessary, but, before discussing the evidence, we would 1 ike to dispose of the legal point involved in these appeals. We would first take up the question of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code and section 145, Evidence Act. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, reads thus: “(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872) and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 32, clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.” Section 145, Evidence Act, runs as follows: “A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” Under section 162(1), statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation is inadmissible in evidence. The first proviso to that section permits the use of the previous statement only for a limited purpose, i.e., for the purpose of contradicting a witness as provided by section 145 of the Evidence Act. Under the Evidence Act, the previous statement of a witness can be used under section 145 to contradict the witness, under section 155 to impeach his credit and under section 157 to corroborate his testimony. The proviso to section 162 provides for the admissibility of the previous statement for the purpose of contradicting. The effect is thus 10 limit considerably the provisions of the Evidence Act is regard to matters convered by it. The reason for such restriction is obvious. Statements are often recorded hurriedly in the midst of crowd subject to frequent interruptions and suggestions from bystanders. They are not prepared in a way of deposition and not read over too; nor are they signed by deponents. Statements are not recorded in full and there is no guarantee that they do not contain much more or much less than what the witnesses have said. It would follow that in order that the proviso might apply, it is essential that the witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been reduced into writing as referred to in section and that statement used for the purpose of contradicting such witness under section 145, Evidence Act. It would follow that in order that the proviso might apply, it is essential that the witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been reduced into writing as referred to in section and that statement used for the purpose of contradicting such witness under section 145, Evidence Act. The previous statement, therefore, can only be used for the purpose of contradicting such witness and not for any other purpose such as corroborating a prosecution witness or contradicting a defence witness; nor can it be used as substantive evidence in favour of or against the accused. Section 145 provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing without its being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which arc to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The Lahore High Court in the case of Dharam Singh v. Emperor1, Gopi Chand v. Emperor2, Muzaffar Khan v. Emperor3, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Eqbal Ahmed v. Emperor4, and the Calcutta High Court in Sunil Chandra v. The State6, have held that if the object is to contradict the previous statement of a witness recorded before the police, then the proper procedure is if the witness is in the witness-box to ask him whether he had made such a statement before the police and if he denies to have made any such statement and if it is intended to contradict him, the relevant portion of the record contrary to his statement in Court must be read to him and the witness should be given opportunity to reconcile the same. It is further held by the Calcutta High Court in Sunil Chandra Roy v. The State5, that the best way of putting a statement is to put it in the actual words in which it stands recorded within quotation marks. So far as the Madras High Court is concerned, our attention was not drawn to any direct authority laying down any procedure under section 145, Evidence Act. So far as the Madras High Court is concerned, our attention was not drawn to any direct authority laying down any procedure under section 145, Evidence Act. Sri Adavi Ramarao drew our attention to the cases of Ponnusamy Chetty v. Emperor6, In re Nadipalli Bangaru Raju and others7, and Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab8, and contended that it is not necessary that the record of the statement to the witness should be marked within inverted commas or marked exhibits and is also not necessary in case of the denial of the witnesses to further give him opportunity to explain his statement and the same could be proved by producing the investigating officer and that is sufficient compliance with section 145, Evidence Act. Ponnusamy Chetty v. Emperor6, was a case of omission. The point raised in that case was whether a statement made by the witness to the police in an investigation under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, could be filed or exhibited or, in short, used when the witness was under examination in an enquiry under Chapter 18, Criminal Procedure Code, in order to show that while giving evidence the witness has made assertions which he did not make when he was examined by the police. Burn, J., held that it could not be used in order to prove omission. Incidentally, his Lordship has referred to section 145 and observed that in order to contradict a witness by the writing his attention must be called to those parts of writing. The other case relied upon is In re Nadipalli Bangaru Raju and others7, in which there is no discussion of section 145, Evidence Act. but it relates to section 155(3) which refers to impeaching the credit of a witness. In that case, the defence wanted to show that a witness has made a statement in Court, which was contradictory to what he had told to a police officer. but it relates to section 155(3) which refers to impeaching the credit of a witness. In that case, the defence wanted to show that a witness has made a statement in Court, which was contradictory to what he had told to a police officer. Burn and Horwill, JJ., while considering the question under section 155(3), Evidence Act, held: “Where the defence seek to show that a witness has made a statement in the Court which is contradictory to what he had told a police officer, the proper way of contradicting him is to ask the police officer, whether that was so and to permit if necessary the filing of such portions of the record in the case diary as will support the police officer’s statement......The only way to prove that the statement made in Court was not made to the police officer is to ask the police officer himself when he is in the witness-box. It is improper to file the whole of the entry in the case-diary of the police officer relating to the statement of a witness made in the course of investigation and to make a free use of the whole statement whether it was strictly relevant to the alleged contradiction or not.” Section 155, Evidence Act, lays down that the credit of a witness may be impeached inter alia by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted, but it does not lay down the manner in which the former statement is to be proved. The mode of proof of such a statement in writing when it is sought to be tendered in evidence for contradicting a witness is provided in section 145 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that section 155 is controlled by section 145 and is not independent of it. We are supported in this view by the case of Gopichand v. Emperor1. It would follow that so far as the Madras High Court is concerned, it does not appear that there was any other procedure. Of course, there is difference of opinion in the various High Courts as to whether the statement before the police can be used to show that the witness omitted to state a particular fact and whether omission and contradiction are identical. Of course, there is difference of opinion in the various High Courts as to whether the statement before the police can be used to show that the witness omitted to state a particular fact and whether omission and contradiction are identical. The Patna High Court in Badri Chaudhry v. Emperor2, held that the statement cannot be used at large for purpose of showing that the statement did not corroborate or assist the story as put forward in the First Information Report. In a subsequent case, the same High Court in Iltaf Khan v. Emperor3, held that if the contradiction consists in the fact that a statement made at the trial was not made in any part of the statement to the police such a contradiction can be proved. The same High Court in Deo Lal v. Emperor4, held that the omission of some detail in the note of a statement to a police officer is not always a sure indication that such detail was absent from the statement and that a Court should never use such an absence as a contradiction without taking the evidence to prove that no such thing was stated. In the case of Ponnusami Chetty v. Emperor5, The Madras High Court held that omission and contradiction can never be identical and a statement to a police officer cannot be used during an enquiry or trial in order to show that a witness is making statements in the witness-box which he did not make to the police. The Lahore High Court in the case of Hazara Singh v. Emperor6, and Mohinder Singh v. Emperor7, has held that all omissions are not necessarily contradictions, but it must be left to the Court in each particular case to decide whether omission is a contradiction or not. If it amounts to a contradiction, the Court shall allow cross-examination on that point. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Emperor v. Aseruddin8, held that the deposition of a witness to the effect that he did not make any statement to the police is not a statement within section 162 of the Code. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Bali and others v. State9, has held that an omission is not a contradiction unless what is actually said contradicts what is omitted to be said. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Bali and others v. State9, has held that an omission is not a contradiction unless what is actually said contradicts what is omitted to be said. It was further observed that the test to find out whether the omission is a contradiction or not is to see whether one can point to any sentence or assertion in the statement under section 162 which is irreconcilable with the deposition in Court and if the statement under section 162 can be reconciled with the deposition in Court and can stand with it, there is absolutely no conflict but if what is actually said is reconcilable with what is omitted and impliedly negatives its existence, omission under section 162 may amount toa contradiction. From the above discussion, it would appear that all the High Courts are unanimous on the point that if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must before the writing could be proved be called to hose parts which are to be used for purpose of contradicting him. In our opinion, the proper procedure would therefore be to ask a witness first whether he made such and such statement before the police officer. If the witness answers in the affirmative, the previous statement in writing need not be proved and the cross-examiner may, if he so chooses, leave it to the party who called the witness to have the discrepancy, if any, explained in course of re-examination. If, on the other hand, the witness denies having made the previous statement attributed to him or states he does not remember having made any such statement and it is desired to contradict him by the record of the previous statement cross-examiner must read out to the witness relevant portion or portions of the record which are alleged to be contradictory to his statement in Court or give him an opportunity to reconcile the same if he can. The best way of putting a statement is to put it in the actual words in which it stands recorded within quotation marks. The best way of putting a statement is to put it in the actual words in which it stands recorded within quotation marks. In the light of this, if we were to see the instant case, we find that though questions have been put to the witnesses referring to certain portions of their depositions before the police, but their attention has not been drawn to these particular portions in their statement which are alleged to be contradictory. If their attention had been drawn to those portions the question would not have been in. the present form but would have been in the actual words of the witness himself within quotation marks. Further it does not appear that any opportunity was given to the witness to reconcile. Sri Adavi Ramarao very rightly conceded that questions put do not appear to be in the actual words of the witness but contended that those questions were put referring to their statements in the case-diaries, copies of which were with the pleader and the practice has never been to put those questions within quotation marks. He further urged that it was also the practice all along to put the question to the witness and if he denied having made such a statement, and if there was any contradiction, the same was proved by calling the Investigating Officer. As discussed above, the questions not being put in the actual words, it is not sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 145, Evidence Act. Even if we assume that the attention of the witnesses was in fact drawn to the particular portions in their depositions, we have to see whether in the instant case, there are any serious omissions or contradictions and if there are contradictions whether they are vital. We therefore directed the learned counsel for the parties to prepare a chart showing the contradictions and omissions in the deposition of the witnesses. In P.W. 1’s statement, only one portion of his statement is shown as contradictory. This relates to whether on the date of the occurrence the witness and the three deceased were washing their faces and talking to each other near the corner of Bapanayya’s cattle-shed. No doubt, the witness stated so before the police and P.W. 31 also says that he had stated so and this witness has denied this fact. There is thus a contradiction in his statement. No doubt, the witness stated so before the police and P.W. 31 also says that he had stated so and this witness has denied this fact. There is thus a contradiction in his statement. In P.W. 2’s statement, 4 items are shown. The first is whether the witness told the police that he went to the scene of the occurrence after hearing the cries of A-2 near the house of Venkateshwar Rao. P.W. 31 stated that he did not say so. It is therefore only a case of omission. The second item relates to the fact of the accused coming on the scene and attacking the deceased. Before the police, the witness had stated that the accused came from different directions and attacked. P.W. 31 admits that P.W. 2 stated before him that A-2 stabbed Ramamurthy and Satyanarayana and after this the other accused Nos. 3 to 10 rushed to the scene of offence and simultaneously from all directions east, south and north. In cross-examination, the witness has denied having ever made such a statement to the police. This is no doubt a contradiction. The other items show only omissions. Now the question is whether the contradictions are vital. The contradictions as pointed above are only in the statements of P.Ws. 2 to 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 and there is no contradiction in the statement of the other witnesses We shall discuss the nature and effect of these contradictions, while discussing the evidence. The omissions shown are not serious as to amount to contradictions. They therefore cannot be availed of as contradictions by the accused even for the limited purpose permitted under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. After this we go to the merits of the case. We would first deal with the death of Ramamurthy which is the subject-matter of charge No. 2. The prosecution case is that A-1 A-6 and A-10 attacked the deceased Ramamurthy and caused his death. P.Ws. 1 to 10 one and all speak to this. After this we go to the merits of the case. We would first deal with the death of Ramamurthy which is the subject-matter of charge No. 2. The prosecution case is that A-1 A-6 and A-10 attacked the deceased Ramamurthy and caused his death. P.Ws. 1 to 10 one and all speak to this. P.W. 1 says that A-1 speared the deceased Ramamurthy on the left side of his abdomen and A-10 stabbed Ramamurthy twice with a spear first on the left upper arm and secondly on the abdomen and A-6 stabbed him with a spear on his left hand P.W. 2 stated that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy with a spear on his abdomen, that A-6 stabbed him on his left hand and that A-10 stabbed him with a spear on his left hand and also on his groins. P.W. 3’s version is that A-1 stabbed the deceased Ramamurthy with a spear in the left side of his abdomen. He does not say anything about A-6 and A-10 inflicting injuries on Ramamurthy P.W. 4 says that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy, but he does not specify the place where he stabbed. P.W. 4 further states that A-10 speared the deceased Ramamurthy on the left arm and the loins and A-6 stabbed on his left arm. P.W. 5 says that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy on his abdomen and after seeing the incident he ran away. He does not state anything about A-6 and A-10 P.W. 6 states that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy on his abdomen, that A-10 stabbed him on the left arm and groins and A-6 on the left upper arm. P.W. 7 says that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy with a spear on the left side of his abdomen, A-10 stabbed him on his left hand and on his left groins and A-6 on the left upper arm. P.W. 8 also deposes in a similar manner. P.W. 9 says that A-1 stabbed Ramamurthy on the left side of his abdomen, that A-10 stabbed him on the left hand, on the dorsal aspect of the palm and that A-6 stabbed him, but he does not say the part of the body where he stabbed. P.W. 10 says that A-1 stabbed the deceased on the left side of the abdomen, that A-10 stabbed him with a spear on the left upper arm and also in his groins and that A-6 also stabbed. P.W. 10 says that A-1 stabbed the deceased on the left side of the abdomen, that A-10 stabbed him with a spear on the left upper arm and also in his groins and that A-6 also stabbed. The Court below while discussing the evidence in para. 14 of its judgment has held that though the evidence relating to the stabbing by A-1 is consistent, the evidence relating to the part played by A-6 and A-10 is discrepant inasmuch as some witnesses stated that A-10 stabbed Ramamurthy on the loins, whereas others have stated that he stabbed him on the groins, and again some witnesses have stated that A-10 stabbed him on the hand while others have stated on the upper arm. The Court below has further observed that it is not clear from the evidence as to which of the two accused A-6 and A-10 caused injury which cut brachial artery as shown to be the cause of death by the doctor. The Court below further observed that the version given by these witnesses before the police so far as A-10 and A-6 are concerned is different. We are reluctant to accept the view of the Court below. It may be noted that in a fight like this where so many people are involved, it is very difficult to note all the details with precision. The witnesses have stated that A-6 and A-10 took part in the beating of Ramamurthy, but so far as A-6 is concerned, it may be observed that in both the dying declarations of Satyanarayana and Audiseshaiah, there is no mention at all of A-6. This creates a doubt as regards his participation, though not of his presence. Wetherefore think it just to give him the benefit of doubt. But so far as A-10 is concerned there cannot be any doubt about his participation. The fact that a witness stated that the blow was on the groins or on the loins, in our opinion, is not such a discrepancy so as to completely ignore the statement. We do not find any other discrepancy in their statements recorded before the police also. In their statements before the police they have stated that A-10 speared Ramamurthy. The fact that no detail-were mentioned before the police would not amount at all to a contradiction so as to ignore their testimony. The Court below in para. We do not find any other discrepancy in their statements recorded before the police also. In their statements before the police they have stated that A-10 speared Ramamurthy. The fact that no detail-were mentioned before the police would not amount at all to a contradiction so as to ignore their testimony. The Court below in para. 15 of its judgment has discussed another circumstance relating to the accused Nos. 1, 6 and 10 and that is that other two deceased, viz., Satyanarayana and Audiseshaiah have not stated how Ramamurthy met his death though all the three brothers were together when they were attacked. Taking these into consideration, the Court has held that Exhibit P-1 is a doubtful document and acquitted the accused. We are not inclined to agree with the view of the trial Judge also. P.W. 21, the Village Munsif, has stated that since he had already recorded the statements of Audiseshaiah and Satyanarayana, he took down only such details from P.W. 1 as related to the death of Ramamurthy alone. The Court below has entertained a doubt as to when Exhibit P-1 came into existence. The Village Munsif says that he sent the report Exhibit P-21 to the police after he recorded the statements of P.W. 1, the deceased Audiseshaiah and Satyanarayana. He further says that while he was writing the report, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Eluru came to the scene of offence, and he handed his printed report Exhibit P-25 along with 7 statements recorded by him, to the Sub-Inspector at 10 a.m. It is true that Exhibit P-1 was not sent to the Court immediately after it was recorded and it was sent only on the 11th, i.e., three days after it was recorded, but it is not denied that the statements were recorded on that date alone. Exhibit P-1 under these circumstances cannot be a suspicious document. We therefore hold A-1 and A-10 guilty under the charge. A-1 was also impleaded in another charge, viz., charge 8 for causing hurt to P.W. 1 with a spear. The wound certificate issued by the Medical Officer, P.W. 18 in regard to the injury caused to P.W. 1 is marked as Exhibit P-11, which says that P.W. 1 had one injury on him on the palmar aspect on the linear side of the palm of the right hand. The wound certificate issued by the Medical Officer, P.W. 18 in regard to the injury caused to P.W. 1 is marked as Exhibit P-11, which says that P.W. 1 had one injury on him on the palmar aspect on the linear side of the palm of the right hand. P.W. 1 states that when he was struggling with A-1 to snatch the spear he got an injury on his right palm. P.W. 2 also says that he received injury on his right palm. P.Ws. 3, 4, 6 and 7 to 11 say that when A-1 attempted to stab P.W. 1 with a spear, the latter caught the spearhead with his hand. P.W. 5 does not say anything about the injury. From the evidence discussed above, it is clear that P.W. 1 got the injury, while he was struggling with A-1 to snatch the spear from his hand. This is clear from the statement of P.W. 1 himself. It cannot, therefore, be said from this evidence that A-1 hit the deceased with a spear. In such circumstances, as has been pointed out by the lower Court, the injury on the palm of P.W. 1 is accidental rather than intentional. A-1, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be held guilty under this charge. A-6 also was charged separately for having voluntarily causing hurt to P.W. 2 with the stick portion of the spear. The wound certificate given by the doctor, P.W. 18 is Exhibit P-12. This shows that P.W. 2 had two injuries on her, viz., (1) a contusion on the back of the left upper arm in the middle and (2) pain and tenderness on the internal side of the elbow. P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 4, P.W. 6, P.W. 7, P.W. 8, P.W. 9, P.W. 10, P.W. 11 one and all depose that when P.W. 2 intervened and entreated the accused not to beat her husband Audiseshaiah, A-6 pushed her back and beat her with the stick portion of the spear on the elbow of her left hand. P.Ws. 3 and 5 have not spoken to this fact. This fact does not find place in any of the statements recorded by the Village Munsif immediately after the occurrence. There is no mention of this in the dying declaration of the two deceased persons, viz., Satyanarayana and Audiseshaiah. P.Ws. 3 and 5 have not spoken to this fact. This fact does not find place in any of the statements recorded by the Village Munsif immediately after the occurrence. There is no mention of this in the dying declaration of the two deceased persons, viz., Satyanarayana and Audiseshaiah. Even in Exhibit P-1, which gives a detailed description of the entire occurrence, there is no mention of this. If it was a fact, as is said, that P.W. 2 was injured, the Village Munsif who has recorded the statements of all the injured persons both on the prosecution and on the accused side would have recorded her statement also. The prosecution witnesses, one and all have deposed that only one blow was given by A-6 whereas, the doctor’s certificate discloses two injuries. Having regard to all these facts it becomes doubtful whether A-6 hit P.W. 2. We therefore, cannot hold him guilty under this charge. We nextproceed to the other charge which relates tothe death of the deceased Satyanarayana. The prosecution case is that A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6 and A-8 attacked the deceased and caused his death. This is spoken to by P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11. P.W. 1 says that when Satyanarayana went to the door of Bangarayya, A-2 attacked him suddenly and speared him on the left side of his abdomen and when he came to the eastern street, holding pressed the injured portion with his hands, A-4 and A-5 both stabbed him with a spear on his back and A-5 and A-8 stabbed him with spears on his left hand. Then the deceased Satyanarayana went inside the yard of Bapanayya and fell down. P.Ws. 2 and 3 only state that A-2 stabbed Satyanarayana with a spear on his abdomen near the door of Bangarayya’s house. P.Ws. 4, 5, 6 to 11 give the details as spoken to by P.W. 1. The wound certificate Exhibit P-6 shows that the deceased had four injuries on him. 1. Incised wound on the left loin; 2. Incised wound on the outer side of front of the left elbow; 3. Incised wound on the inner side of the left elbow with the muscles exposed and the veins cut; and 4. Incised wound on the back in the middle of the lumbo-sacral region. 1. Incised wound on the left loin; 2. Incised wound on the outer side of front of the left elbow; 3. Incised wound on the inner side of the left elbow with the muscles exposed and the veins cut; and 4. Incised wound on the back in the middle of the lumbo-sacral region. In the dying declaration, Exhibit P-20, the deceased has stated that A-2 stabbed him in the abdomen, A-4 stabbed him on the back and A-5 and A- 3 stabbed him on the left elbow. There is no mention of A-6 in this statement. Though all the prosecution witnesses one and all have spoken to the fact of A-6 also giving a blow. the absence of his name in the dying declaration though not unnatural having regard to his scared condition raises nevertheless a doubt as to his participation. We, therefore, give the benefit of doubt to A-6 and hold A-2, A-4. A-5 and A-8 only guilty under this charge. The Court below has also held them guilty but convicted on different counts. A-2 has been convicted under section 304, Indian Penal Code, instead of section 302, Indian Penal Code, on the ground, that the occurrence was the result of a sudden fight and that the offence comes under Explanation IV to section 300, Indian Penal Code, being culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A-4 was convicted under section 324 and A-5 and A-8 under section 328, Indian Penal Code. We are reluctant to agree with the view of the trial Court. There is nothing on record to show that the occurrence was the result of a sudden fight in the sense that the accused had not come prepared for the fight. The evidence discussed above, goes to prove that A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6 and A-8 were not only present on the scene of the occurrence but also that they were armed with spears and seeing the deceased partymen coming who were unarmed they attacked them. All this would go to show that they were members of an unlawful assembly and had come there with the common object to commit murder. These and the other accused have been separately charged under section 148, Indian Penal Code also but the Court below has acquitted them all of this charge holding that there was no unlawful assembly. We cannot agree with the view of of the Court below. These and the other accused have been separately charged under section 148, Indian Penal Code also but the Court below has acquitted them all of this charge holding that there was no unlawful assembly. We cannot agree with the view of of the Court below. Unlawful assembly is an assembly of five or more persons the common object of the persons comprising that assembly being to commit any offence. There can be no doubt and the evidence on record clearly establishes that all the ten accused had come there fully armed with deadly weapons and took part in the attack in pursuance of their common object to commit murder. As discussed above there is some doubt as to the actual participation of A-3, A-6 and A-7. The offence under section 148, Indian Penal Code, is therefore fully substantiated and A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are guilty of the said offence. Being thus members of the unlawful assembly, these accused are constructively liable for the acts of any one of them under section 149, Indian Penal Code. In the case of Gajanand v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: “Under section 149, the liability of the other members for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or behaviour, at or before the scene of action. If such knowledge may not reasonably be attributed to the other members of the assembly then their liability for the offence committed during the occurrence does not arise.” In the light of this observation and the evidence discussed above, it cannot be said that there was no unlawful assembly and A-4, A-5, A-8 would not be equally liable along with A-2. What has been said of A-2, A-4, and A-5, and A-8 can equally apply to the other accused, A-1, A-9 and A-10 also who took part in attacking the other two deceased persons and inflicting injuries. They are also members of an unlawful assembly and therefore they would be held liable in the same way. The question of sentence, however, remains to be considered. They are also members of an unlawful assembly and therefore they would be held liable in the same way. The question of sentence, however, remains to be considered. A-2 has been sentenced to five years R.I. under section 304, Indian Penal Code, A-4 to one year’s R.I. under section 324, Indian Penal Code and A-5 and A-8 10 three years’ R.I. under section 326, Indian Penal Code. We cannot agree with this either. When the accused were members of an unlawful assembly, they would all be equally liable. The next question is whether they should be sentenced under section 302 or section 304, Indian Penal Code. Section 304, Indian Penal Code, would only be applicable if the case comes within any of the exceptions of section 300, Indian Penal Code. The Court below has held that it comes within Exception IV of section 300, Indian Penal Code. Exception IV reads: “Culpable homicide is no murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” It follows therefore that there should be three things (1) sudden fight; (2) absence of premeditation; and (3) no undue advantage. To bring the case within this exception all these facts must be proved. Further, this exception would apply only where there is no wish to kill. In the instant case, there is no evidence that there was any sudden fight in the sense that neither of the parties had come prepared. The evidence discussed above shows that the accused party-men were fully armed with spears and the deceased party-men were unarmed and as soon as they saw the deceased party-men coming, they attacked them having come to the scene from different directions. This clearly proves that the attack was premeditated. The fact that they were members of an unlawful assembly and came to the scene of the occurrence and attacked the deceased with spears shows further they had come with the common object to kill. This case therefore cannot come within the exception. We therefore hold A-2, A-4 and A-5 and A-8 guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code. We next proceed to consider charge No. 6 which relates to the death of Audiseshaiah. A-2 to A-4 and A-7 to A-9 are charged for this offence. Except P. Ws. This case therefore cannot come within the exception. We therefore hold A-2, A-4 and A-5 and A-8 guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code. We next proceed to consider charge No. 6 which relates to the death of Audiseshaiah. A-2 to A-4 and A-7 to A-9 are charged for this offence. Except P. Ws. 3 and 5, the other eye-witnesses have one and all spoken to this incident. The gist of their evidence is that A-2 first attacked Audiseshaiah and stabbed him on the left side of his abdomen with a spear, then A-3, A-4, A-7, A-8 and A-9 attacked him and speared him and beat him with sticks. The wound certificate is Exhibit P-7 which discloses six injuries. Apart from this there are two dying declarations made by the deceased Audiseshaiah. The first is Exhibit P-19 recorded by the Village Munsif at 7-30 a.m. In this, there is no mention of A-4 and A-6. We are not concerned with A-6 as he is not charged on this count. The other declaration is Exhibit P-10 which was recorded at 4-15 on the same day, i.e., 8th May, 1956. In this, there is no mention of A-3 and A-7. The Court below has given the benefit of doubt to A-3, A-4 and A-7 and absolved them from the liability. In the first dying declaration, which was recorded just within half an hour of the incident excepting A-4 he had mentioned the names of the other accused and in the statement recorded in the evening he has included the name of A-4 and omitted the names, of A-3 and A-7. What we have to consider is whether having regard to the discrepancy in the dying declarations, benefit of doubt could not be given to A-3, 4 and A-7. On behalf of the prosecution, it is urged that it may be that due to the effect of the injuries or the condition in which the deceased was, the deceased might have omitted to mention the names. Whether it was due to the injuries or other circumstances the fact is that in the first dying declaration, there is no mention of A-4 and in the second, there is no mention of A-3 and A-7. This is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt and it is always safe to give the benefit of doubt to the accused in such cases. This is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt and it is always safe to give the benefit of doubt to the accused in such cases. We therefore agree with the opinion of the Court below that so far as A-3, A-4 and A-7 are concerned they cannot be held liable for this charge. In the result, A-2, A-8 and A-9 would be held liable under this charge. The Court below (para. 22 of its judgment) has convicted A-2 under section 304, Indian Penal Code and convicted A-8 and A-9 under section 323, Indian Penal Code. We are very reluctant to accept the view of the trial Court. The reason given by the trial Court holding A-2 guilty under section 304 is that the occurrence took place in the sudden fight. While discussing charge 4, we have held that there was no sudden fight. In view of the reasoning given in that connection, we hold A-2 guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The question of A-8 and A-9 remains to be considered. No doubt, the fatal injury was caused by A-2, but A-8 and A-9 would be equally responsible for the murder as members of an unlawful assembly. The contention of Sri Adavi Ramarao is that the provisional charge-sheet does not assign any parts to each accused and does not refer to the attack against each accused, whereas the final charge-sheet gives the details and in that also A-2 has been merely made liable constructively; and that this fact and the fact that the prosecution evidence is not supported by medical evidence is sufficient to weaken the prosecution story. We are not prepared to accept this contention of the learned counsel. It is a fact that the provisional charge-sheet does not specify the part played by the accused but this omission is neither material nor fatal. The final charge-sheet gives the details, and the charge framed by the Court is very clear and there is no defect in it so that it may be said that the accused had no opportunity to meet the situation. The mere fact that in the charge-sheet, A-2 has merely been made liable constructively, does not make any difference. The greatest attack on the prosecution on behalf of the accused is that there are contradictions in the depositions of the witnessess made before the police and those in Court. The mere fact that in the charge-sheet, A-2 has merely been made liable constructively, does not make any difference. The greatest attack on the prosecution on behalf of the accused is that there are contradictions in the depositions of the witnessess made before the police and those in Court. From the chart filed by the parties, it is no doubt clear that there are some contradictions in the statements of the witnesses recorded before the police and in Court, but the question is whether those are vital. There is no contradiction in the statement of P.W. 1 which is vital. In the statement of P.W. 2 the only point of contradiction worth mentioning is the fact that the witness stated before the police that the accused came to the scene of the incident from different directions and the witness denies in Court that he ever made such statement. This is no doubt a contradiction, but in our opinion, not a vital one. The first contradiction shown in the statement of P.W. 3 is his coming on the scene of the incident. Before the police he stated that he came after hearing the ‘galata’. In Court he has denied having made such a statement. The fact whether he came to the scene of the incident after hearing the ‘galata’ or he heard the galata later, is not a material contradiction. The other three contradictions shown in the chart refer to Wagala Sadashiv Satyanarayana and the deceased Ramamurthy holding back Audiseshaiah and his son and asking them not to go and quarrel with their cousins. Similar contradictions are shown in the statements of P.Ws. 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11. Inasmuch as they have denied all this in Court later on that may constitute a contradiction. However, that may be relevant only in considering the question whether the accused were the aggressors or the deceased. But the evidence of the prosecution witnesses discussed above does not lead us to the conclusion that the deceased and their partymen were the aggressors. This contradiction therefore does not become material. Another contradiction shown in the statement of the witness is wit 1 regard to the deceased Satyanarayana holding a stick. As there is nothing on record that the deceased Satyanarayana used a stick, though a contradiction, is not vital. This contradiction therefore does not become material. Another contradiction shown in the statement of the witness is wit 1 regard to the deceased Satyanarayana holding a stick. As there is nothing on record that the deceased Satyanarayana used a stick, though a contradiction, is not vital. The contradiction in the statement of P.W. 12 is that before the police the witness had stated that A-2, A-6 and A-8 who were sitting on the pail suddenly entered the house saying that Audiseshaiah was coming and bolted the door. In the Court, the witness has denied that he stated the accused had bolted the door. This also, in our opinion, is not a material contradiction. In the statement of P.W. 17, the contradiction shown is that he stated before the police that he was asked by Audiseshaiah to come and inform the village munsif, whereas in Court he has not so stated. This fact also is not material. The contradictions, therefore, relied upon by the accused, in our opinion, are not vital so as as to affect the veracity of their statements in Court. Another serious attack on the prosecution evidence by the accused’s counsel is that the prosecution witnesses have repeated the incidents parrot-like and that the way they have deposed to each part played by the accused in inflicting the injuries to the three deceased persons renders their story unbelievable as it is not possible that the witnesses could have marked with precision all the particulars of the three lightning attacks that were made simultaneously. It is further urged that from the inspection note it would appear that the width of the eastern street at the junction is only 14 feet and if the prosecution story is taken at its face value, it would appear that there were on the scene of the incident 12 prosecution witnesses and 10 accused, i.e., in all about 22 people and that in a fight where several persons are thus involved, it is impossible to imagine that the witnesses would note the individual act of each participant and depose about it with precision and unanimity. We are not prepared to believe that the depositions of the witnesses are parrotlike in the sense that they convey the impression of their being tutored. There can be little doubt that these persons were present at the scene when the occurrence took place. We are not prepared to believe that the depositions of the witnesses are parrotlike in the sense that they convey the impression of their being tutored. There can be little doubt that these persons were present at the scene when the occurrence took place. Some of them have been named by a few accused in their statements under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Some others are named as accused in the counter-complaint filed while two of them are the persons who received injuries at the place. Being residents of the locality itself it is not unlikely that they had come to the place of occurrence at the time. They no doubt have given the particulars of the incident with one accord and without much discrepancy. But that is not unnatural for such a grave incident which resulted in the death of three persons is bound to leave its deep impressions in the minds of the observers and the details of the concentrated attack can, therefore, be recounted in their true sequence without material discrepancies. So the story told by them gives us the true picture of what they have seen and not what they have been tutored so that it may be said to be parrot-like. Their story in relation to the individual acts of the accused has been consistent at all stages throughout and there is no force in the argument that they could not have seen and remembered such acts. Yet another attack by the accused on the prosecution evidence is that the evidence adduced is interested and when independent evidence was available and was not produced, it goes much to discredit the prosecution story. In this connection. it is pointed out that P.W. 1 is the son of the deceased No. 3, Audiseshaiah. P.W. 2 is his wife. P.W. 3 is the uncle of P.W. 10. P.W. 4 is the son of Audiseshaiah. P.W. 5 is the person against whom A-8 filed a suit for partition. P.W. 6 is the father-in-law of the deceased Satyanarayana. P.W. 7 is the brother-in-law of deceased 2. P.W. 8 is the accused in the counter-complaint. P.W. 9 was the farm servant under the father of A-6 against whom A-6 filed a complaint. P.W. 10 is the accused in the counter-complaint. P.W. 11 and deceased 2 are brothers-in-law. P.W. 12 is the maternal uncle of the deceased persons. P.W. 7 is the brother-in-law of deceased 2. P.W. 8 is the accused in the counter-complaint. P.W. 9 was the farm servant under the father of A-6 against whom A-6 filed a complaint. P.W. 10 is the accused in the counter-complaint. P.W. 11 and deceased 2 are brothers-in-law. P.W. 12 is the maternal uncle of the deceased persons. P.W. 13 is the brother-in-law of P.W. 6. No doubt, most of the prosecution witnesses are related to the deceased, but these witnesses are related to the accused as well because the accused and deceased are all related to each other. The mere fact that the witnesses are related would not be sufficient to discredit their testimony unless there is something in their depositions not to believe them. So far as we can see from the evidence, there is nothing to discredit them. They are corroborated by the evidence of the persons other than relatives. The last contention on behalf of the accused is that even if the prosecution evidence is taken at its face value, the accused cannot be held guilty as the deceased and his partymen were the aggressors and the acts of the accused would be deemed to be in the exercise of their right of private defence. In this connection, the learned counsel drew our attention to Exhibit P-23 and 24, statements given by A-7 and A-1 before the village munsif and to the fact that A-1, 12 and A-7 suffered injuries. This contention is equally devoid of force. It is true that the prosecution evidence is silent as to the immediate cause of quarrel that day or what had made the pent up indignation burst out with all its force that very moment but the evidence discloses that as soon as the deceased and his partymen were seen coming to the street the accused came to the scene of the incident in batches from different directions and attacked the deceased. The way in which they had suddenly advanced to the scene fully armed indeed suggests their preconcert and determination to take by surprise the undefended and unarmed opponents and put an end to their lives. There is nothing in the evidence of the witnesses to show that the deceased and his partymen had started the fight first. The way in which they had suddenly advanced to the scene fully armed indeed suggests their preconcert and determination to take by surprise the undefended and unarmed opponents and put an end to their lives. There is nothing in the evidence of the witnesses to show that the deceased and his partymen had started the fight first. The learned counsel for the accused draws our attention to the statements of some of prosecution witnesses recorded before the police which shows that Satyanarayna had a stick in his hand and Audiseshaiah and his son were going towards the accused, the deceased Ramamurthy and the witnesses were stopping them from proceeding further. These statements, if accepted also, do not show that the deceased and his partymen had attacked the accused. Excepting the fact that Satyanarayana had a small stick in his hand, there is nothing on record to show that the deceased and his other partymen were armed or that they were threatening or attempting in any manner to attack any of the accused whereas the prosecution evidence sufficiently establishes that the accused had come there fully armed with deadly weapons. In this view of the matter, there could not be any reasonable apprehension of an attack by the deceased and his partymen so as to give the right of private defence to the accused within the meaning of section 102, Indian Penal Code. There is nothing to show that before the attack there was even a wordy quarrel between the parties at that time. There is evidently no circumstance to suggest that the accused had acted in exercise of right of private defence. It is no doubt argued that since some of the accused also have been injured that should be a sufficient circumstance to raise an inference that the accused must have acted in exercise of the right of private defence. This argument falls flat when it is evident that out of the ten accused persons only A-7 gets a grievous injury, two others only slight injuries, and all others escape unhurt. It is affirmatively established that the deceased and his partymen were not armed with and the only stick that Satyanarayana had with him was a small one. This argument falls flat when it is evident that out of the ten accused persons only A-7 gets a grievous injury, two others only slight injuries, and all others escape unhurt. It is affirmatively established that the deceased and his partymen were not armed with and the only stick that Satyanarayana had with him was a small one. It cannot be ruled out that the way in which several persons made attack with spears in such a narrow place may result in some accidental injuries to some of the asailants themselves packed at one place. At any rate, that the fatal injuries were inflicted on the three deceased persons and who were unarmed negatives the contention of the accused that they had acted in self-defence. In this connection, we may also point out that excepting the statements of A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-7 in their statements under section 342, the other accused have denied their presence on the scene of the incident. Even these accused did not plead right of self-defence. Of course, such a plea need not be taken specifically, but there should be circumstances to raise such an inference or even reasonable doubt in favour of the accused that they might have in fact acted in exercise of their right of private defence. Of these accused, A-1 has said that the deceased and his partymen were beating A-7 when he reached the place. Upon his arrival at the instance of Venkat Ram Rao they inflicted injuries on him with sticks and spears. A-2 says P.W. 1 stabbed him with a spear. A-7 says that he had no spear in his hands and was stabbed at the spot. These statements by themselves do not raise any inference as to bring their proved acts under any general or special exception. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the accused while attacking the deceased acted in the exercise of their private defence. In the result, Appeal No. 234 of 1956 on behalf of A-2, A-4, A-5, A-8 and A-9 would stand dismissed with modifications. Appeal No. 5 of 1957 on behalf of the State would be allowed partly. A-1 and A-10 are held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, under charge No. 2 relating to the death of Ramamurthy deceased and sentenced to life imprisonment. A-6 is acquitted of this charge. Appeal No. 5 of 1957 on behalf of the State would be allowed partly. A-1 and A-10 are held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, under charge No. 2 relating to the death of Ramamurthy deceased and sentenced to life imprisonment. A-6 is acquitted of this charge. A-1 and A-6 are also acquitted of the charge of causing hurt to P. Ws. 1 and 2. A-2 is held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Satyanarayana and sentenced to life imprisonment. A-4, A-5 and A-8 are also held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, read with section 149, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Satyanarayana and each sentenced to life imprisonment. A-2 is further held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Audiseshaiah and sentenced to life imprisonment. A-8 and A-9 are held guilty under section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Audiseshaiah and each sentenced to life imprisonment. A-1, A-2,A-4,A-5, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are held guilty under section 148, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two year’s rigorous imprisonment. A-3, A-6 and A-7 are acquitted of this and the other charges. The sentences to run concurrently. A.S.R. ----- Appeal Mo. 234 of 1956 dismissed with modifications. Appeal Mo. 5 of 1957 allowed in part.