Chandra Reddi, J.-This matter was placed before a Bench as it was thought that there was divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether infringement of section 92 of the Village Panchayats Act (hereinafter called the Act) is a continuing offence within the proviso to section 103 of the Act. The petitioner was charged under section 92(b)read with section 115 of the Act in that he failed to get the permission of the Village Panchayat to install 30 h.p. electric motor for running a rice and flour mill. The gravamen of the charge was that the petitioner was the owner of a rice-mill in Bhamidipativari Street, Chodavaram, called Ventateswara Rice-Mill, and he had erected another rice-mill called Varalakshmi Rice-Mill in the same compound on 22nd March, 1953, without the requisite permission from the Panchayat and thereby was guilty. The defence was that there was only one rice-mill called Venkateswara Rice-Mill, that they had applied for permission to install another rice-mill, but that was not completed and in any event the prosecution launched beyond three months of the offence was barred under section 103 of the Act. These objections were overruled and the petitioner was convicted as charged and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100, by the Sub-Magistrate of Chodavaram which was confirmed on appeal by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Yellamanchili. The main contention urged before us was that an offence under section 92 read with section 115 is governed by the main section 103 and does not fall under the proviso to that section. To appreciate the controversy it is convenient to refer to the terms of the relevant provisions of the Act. “Section 92.-No person shall, without the permission of the Panchayat and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such permission- (a) * * * * * * * (b) install in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by any power as aforesaid, not being machinery or manufacturing plant exempted by the rules”. The penalties for infraction of any of the requirements of the Act are provided in section 115. Section 103 fixed a period of three months for the prosecution of offences under the Act. The penalties for infraction of any of the requirements of the Act are provided in section 115. Section 103 fixed a period of three months for the prosecution of offences under the Act. The proviso to section 103 runs thus: “Provided that failure to take out a license or obtain permission under this Act shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any, for which the licence or permission is required and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within 12 months from the commencement of the offence”. It is maintained for the petitioner that failure to obtain permission to install a machinery cannot be deemed to be a continuing offence for purposes of the proviso. It is argued that the proviso contemplates an offence which consists of a series of acts and can have no application to a single and solitary act like the installation of a machine. The language “licence or permission for which no period is prescribed” connotes a licence or permission for an indefinite period as contrasted with a fixed period. In support of this submission, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on some rulings of the Madras High Court in Muthu Balu Chetti, In re1, Muthu Balu Chettiar v. Chairman, Madura Municipality, Madura2, and Kandaswami Pillai v. Executive Officer, Panchayat Board3, and a judgment of one of us in Crl. R.C. No. 657 of 1954. None of these rulings has any relevancy to this enquiry. In Muthu Balu Chetti, In re1, the provisions of sections 249 and 250 of the District Municipalities Act which are in pari materia with sections 91 and 92 of the Village Panchayats Act fell to be considered. It was decided there that the object and scope of sections 249 and 250 of the District Municipalities Act were entirely different, the second dealing with permission to install a machinery while the former concerned a licence for running the machine and that permission to install a machinery would not absolve the owner from taking out a licence for running it. A different note was struck by another Bench of the same Court in Madura Municipality v. Muthu Balu Chetti4, which ruled that, while section 249 applied to industries, section 250 referred to factories, that these two sections were mutually exclusive and that if permission to construct or establish a factory or install any machinery in any premises was obtained under section 250 it was not obligatory, on the owner to get a licence under section 249 of the Act. It was to resolve this conflict that a Full Bench was constituted in Muthu Balu Chettiar v. Chairman, Madura Municipality2. The Full Bench approved of the view taken by Odgers and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in Muthu Balu Chetti, In re1. The rule stated therein was that permission under section 249 was given solely for the construction, establishment or installation of a machinery and does not deal with the user of such places for which an annual licence under section 249 should be taken out. Much to the same effect is the judgment in Crl.R.C. No. 657 of 1954. It is thus manifest that these pronouncements do not touch the question to be answered by us. Nor does Fernando v. Emperor5, really assist the petitioner. There, the accused applied for a licence on 4th September, 1928, to the Union Board, but his application had not come up before the Board and so he was deemed to have obtained permission by the 4th December, 1928. He was permitted by the Union Board to begin the machine work. This permission was cancelled, the following August, by which time the machinery was installed. Notwithstanding this, the accused was paying licence fee up to 31st March, 1930. For the next period, licence was refused and the accused was prosecuted not under section 193 which corresponds to section 91 of the Village Panchayats Act but under section 194 analogous to section 92. The learned Judge setting aside the conviction of the accused observed that the user of the machinery could not be said to be a continuous installation. Kandaswami Pillai v. Executive Officer, Panchayat Board, Attur6, does not carry the petitioner any farther. In that case, the petitioner was acquitted on a prior occasion of an offence under sections 194 and 207 of the Local Boards Act for having erected a factory without the permission of the authority concerned. Kandaswami Pillai v. Executive Officer, Panchayat Board, Attur6, does not carry the petitioner any farther. In that case, the petitioner was acquitted on a prior occasion of an offence under sections 194 and 207 of the Local Boards Act for having erected a factory without the permission of the authority concerned. Later on, he was prosecuted for running the factory and convicted. Thereafter a fresh charge-sheet was filed against him for erection of the factory, an offence punishable under sections 194 and 207 of that Act. The plea of autrefois acquit was raised. This did not find favour with the Courts below. On revision, the learned Judge accepted that plea in the opinion that the erection of a factory without permission was not a continuing offence. It is only meant that it was not a continuing offence in the sense that a fresh prosecution could be initiated without attracting the doctrine of autrefois acquit. None of these cases had to consider the question from the angle of limitation, It has to be borne in mind that the language used in the proviso is “deemed to be acontinuing offence” thereby implying that it is by virtue of the fiction that the offences mentioned therein become continuing offences. All offences which consist in the failure to take out licences are brought within the purview of the proviso. If the licence or permission is required for a particular period, the limitation for prosecution starts after the period for which the licence or permission required expires. The present case is not covered by that clause because the permission is not needed for any particular period. We have, therefore, to consider whether it comes within the scope of second clause, viz., cases where no period is specified for the licence or permission. The proviso makes only one distinction and that is between cases where a duration is prescribed for a licence or permission and where it is not specified Would the second clause take in cases where permission is required for a single or solitary act or should it be confined only to licences or permission which would be granted for an indefinite period? Our attention was not drawn to any provision either in the main Act or in the rules or notification which requires or permits licences or permissions to be granted for indefinite periods, i.e., for durations without fixing any limit therefor. Our attention was not drawn to any provision either in the main Act or in the rules or notification which requires or permits licences or permissions to be granted for indefinite periods, i.e., for durations without fixing any limit therefor. So it looks to us that this clause would be rendered otiose if offences of the type of the instant case are excluded from its operation and we interpret it as applying only to licences or permissions for continuous periods but without restricting the duration. Further, the language used is general and there does not seem to beany warrant for reading a limitation into it. In our opinion, that clause embraces all offences under section 92 read with section 115 of the Act. These words are of wide import and would include failure to take permission to do a single act. The Legislatures seem to have advisedly made such offences continuing ones so that the local authority may have sufficient time to detect the offences under the Act and launch prosecutions. A number of cases in the Madras High Court proceed on the assumption that failure to obtain permission either to erect a factory or industry or install a machinery is a continuing offence and would be governed by the proviso to section 223 of the Local Boards Act or section 347 of the District Municipalities Act analogous to section 103 of the Act. See Commissioner of Municipal Council, Vellore v. Damodara Mudaliar1, Kandaswamy Pillai v. Municipal Commissioner, Palghat2, and In re A. Rahim Saheb3, and C.A. No. 80 of 1954, Madras4. This leads us to the question whether the erection or installation took place within twelve months of the launching of the prosecution. It was urged on behalf of the Panchayat Board that the offence was commenced on 22nd March, 1954, the day of detection. We cannot accede to this contention. The commencement of an offence is not the same thing as its detection. Detection might take place long after the offence has commenced to be committed. The commencement is different from detection. But this case does not present any difficulty so far as fixing of the commencement of the offence is concerned. It is clear from an application made in October 1953, that the construction of the rice-mill or the installation of the machine was not done before that time. The commencement is different from detection. But this case does not present any difficulty so far as fixing of the commencement of the offence is concerned. It is clear from an application made in October 1953, that the construction of the rice-mill or the installation of the machine was not done before that time. It must have been done sometime between October, 1953 and 22nd March, 1954, in which case the prosecution was well within time. Now coming to the merits, there is not much to be said in support of the petition. Both the Courts reached the conclusion on the material before them, that the petitioner had contravened the provisions of section 92. The lower appellate Court has elaborately discussed the matter and gave very cogent and convincing reasons in support of its conclusions. In addition to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, we have Exhibit P-4 the contents of which leave no room for doubt that the petitioner had constructed the factory and installed a 30 h.p. motor. The recitals in Exhibit P-4 clearly indicate that not only had he constructed the Varalakshmi Rice-Mill but he had also fixed electric motor also. It is urged by Mr. Venkatesam that the petitioner was not questioned after admission of Exhibit P-4. Assuming that there was no questioning of the accused after the admission of this document, it is not shown that the petitioner has been prejudiced in any way. It does not look that he asked for an opportunity. That apart, it is a petition sent by him and the whole petition proceeded on the assumption that it has been completed at a huge cost and that unless permission was given to run the mills, he would sustain heavy loss. In the circumstances, the conviction is confirmed. So far as the fine is concerned we think the ends of justice will be met by reducing it to Rs.10 having regard to the nature of the offence. Fine, if paid will be refunded. A.B.K. ----- Conviction confirmed; fine reduced.