Order This is a Revision Petition preferred by the petitioner against the order of the learned First Class Magistrate, Civil Station, Bangalore, in Crl. Mis. No. 37 of 1955 granting maintenance to the respondent at the rate of Rs.15 per mensem under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The facts that have given rise to this petition are briefly as follow: The petitioner and the respondent are husband and wife respectively. The respondent filed an application under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the learned First Class Magistrate, Civil Station, Bangalore, claiming maintenance from her husband, the petitioner. Her case is that she v as married to the petitioner on 3rd November, 1954, that they lived on affectionate terms in petitioner’s house at Doddigunta for some time along with petitiorer’s parents, that petitioner’s household people ill-treated her, that the petitioner who is a Lance Naik in the Indian Army left Bangalore for Jhansi on duty leaving her in his parents’ house, that subsequently the petitioner’s people began to harass and ill-treat her, that they ultimately brought about misunderstandings between herself and her husband on a false charge of unchastity on her part, that the petitioner refused and neglected to maintain her and that he is, therefore liable for her maintenance. The objection statement of the petitioner is to the effect that the allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of his parents and others are false, that the petitioner had to leave Bangalore on account of exigencies of service, that during his absence the respondent has committed adultery with one Raman who was residing close to the petitioner’s house, that as such the respondent is not entitled to any maintenance, that he is getting only Rs. 60 as his pay and allowances, that the claim is high and that the application is liable to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate held that there were two instances of adultery on the part of the respondent but that they were not sufficient to disentitle her to maintenance and he accordingly granted her maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15 per mensem. As against that order, this petition is filed. The learned Magistrate has found on the evidence adduced in the case that the respondent was guilty of adulterous conduct on two occasions. 15 per mensem. As against that order, this petition is filed. The learned Magistrate has found on the evidence adduced in the case that the respondent was guilty of adulterous conduct on two occasions. In spice of that finding, the learned Magistrate has granted maintenance to the respondent and the reason given by him is that one or two lapses from virtue on the part of a wife would not amount to “living in adultery” within the meaning of clause (4) of section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that these words point to a continuous course of conduct and not to isolated cases of immorality. In support of this proposition of law, he has relied on certain authorities of some of the High Courts in the Indian Union. Those decisions, no doubt, support the view taken by the learned Magistrate. In Pathala Achamma v. Pathala Mahalahskmi1, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Benson and Wallis, JJ., has held that a single act of adultery does not necessarily amount to “living in adultery” within the meaning of section 488, clause (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and will not justify a Magistrate in refusing maintenance. Their Lordships further observe that the words “living in adultery” refer to a course of conduct and mean something more than a single lapse from virtue. The same principle is enunciated in the subsequent decision reported in Lakshmi Ambalam v. Andiammal2. Newsam, J., has observed that a husband will be absolved from obligation to maintain his wife when his wife has got a de facto protector with whom she lives and by whom she is being maintained. The same view has been taken by their Lordships Sanderson and Chotzner in Jatindra Math Mohan Banerjee v. Gouri Bala Debt3. They have observed that unless continuity of conduct is established, a single act of adultery is not enough to infer that the woman is “living in adultery”. In that case, the wife had given birth to an illegitimate child and their Lordships found that it was not sufficient to disentitle the wife to maintenance. In Kallu v. Kaunsilia4, His Lordship Aikman, J. has held that the birth of an illegitimate child to the wife about two years prior to the date of her application was not a sufficient reason for refusing to make an order for maintenance. In Kallu v. Kaunsilia4, His Lordship Aikman, J. has held that the birth of an illegitimate child to the wife about two years prior to the date of her application was not a sufficient reason for refusing to make an order for maintenance. The Bombay and Rangoon High Courts also have taken the same view, i.e., that one or two lapses from virtue are not sufficient to disentitle a wife to maintenance. Thus it is seen that the principle laid down in these cases is in brief that a single act of adultery does not necessarily amount to “living in adultery” within the meaning of clause (4) of section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that those words denote a continuous course of conduct as distinct from isolated acts of immorality and that such occasional lapses do not disentitle a wife from claiming maintenance. To put it plainly, the principle laid down in these cases is that a husband is bound to maintain his wife who living with him indulges occasionally in illicit connection with other men. In Lakshmi Ambalam v. Andiammal1, to which a reference has already been made, His Lordship has gone to the extent of saying that a husband is not absolved from maintaining his adulterous wife until she has got a de facto protector with whom she lives and by whom she is maintained. In Ma Mya Khin v. N.L. Godenho2 His Lordship Dunkley has observed that the words “living in adultery” mean that the woman must be living in a state of quasi permanent union with the man with whom she has committed adultery and that one or two lapses from virtue though would amount to acts of adultery would not be sufficient to refuse maintenance. Evidently the learned Magistrate was influenced by these decisions when he held that the petitioner was liable to maintain the respondent. In the present case, the parties are Hindus. It is rather doubtful if the principle enunciated in the decisions referred to above is in consonance with the notions and standards of morality as understood in this country. The decisions referred to are all of English Judges whose notions and standards of morality may not be the same as ours. These notions and standards must necessarily differ from country to country and nation to nation. The decisions referred to are all of English Judges whose notions and standards of morality may not be the same as ours. These notions and standards must necessarily differ from country to country and nation to nation. The various High Courts have interpreted the expression “living in adultery” as meaning a continuous course of conduct as distinct from isolated acts of immorality. I very much doubt whether the wording of section 488(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code would warrant such an interpretation. The words used are “is living in adultery”. In view of the present tense employed, it is a matter for consideration if the words cannot be interpreted as meaning that the wife must have lived in adultery at or about the time of her application for maintenance, i.e., shortly before or after the application was made, of course, interpreting the word “shortly” in a reasonable manner. An important point of law regarding the interpretation of the words “is living in adultery” appearing in clause (4) of section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code is involved in this case. There does not appear to be any decision of this Court on this point. The interpretation of these words constantly arises in the subordinate Courts and it is better to have an authoritative ruling of this Court on this point, and I, therefore, refer the case to a Bench. The records will be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Bench to deal with this matter. The Petition came on for hearing on 13th September, 1957, in pursuance on the above Order of Reference before H. Hombe Gouda and S.S. Malimath, JJ. The Order of the Court was made by Malimath, J.†-This Revision Petition raises an interesting point of law regarding the interpretation of the term “is living in adultery” appearing in clause (4) of section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The respondent filed Petition Crl. Mis. No. 37 of 1955 in the Court of the First Class Magistrate, Civil Station, Banga lore, claiming maintenance from her husband under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. The husband, viz., the present petitioner, contended that he was not bound to maintain her and that she had disentitled herself to any maintenance by reason of her infidelity to him inasmuch as on 9th May, 1955, she was found to be in criminal intimacy with one Raman. The husband, viz., the present petitioner, contended that he was not bound to maintain her and that she had disentitled herself to any maintenance by reason of her infidelity to him inasmuch as on 9th May, 1955, she was found to be in criminal intimacy with one Raman. The Magistrate came to the conclusion that adultery was proved on the part of the present respondent on two occasions. Relying on the rulings of certain High Courts, he further held that it does not amount to ‘living in adultery’ as contemplated under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On 6th July, 1956, he awarded maintenance at Rs.15 per month from the present petitioner to the respondent. Being aggrieved by this order, the present revision petition has been filed by the husband. When the matter came up for hearing before Padmanabbiah, J., apparently His Lordship was not quite satisfied with the interpretations of the High Courts on which the learned Magistrate had relied. One of the reasons that appears to have weighed with His Lordship is that almost all the Judges who decided those cases were “English Judges whose notions and standards of morality may not be the same as ours”. He, therefore, thought it fit to refer the case to a Division Bench “to have an authoritative ruling of this Court on this point.” The case has therefore come to be a placed before a Division Bench. Clause (4) of section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides: “No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery......” The term “living in adultery” appearing in this clause has seen the subject-matter of decision of various High Courts. In re Fulchand Maganlal1, it has been held: “A single act of adultery does not necessarily amount to ‘living in adultery’ within the meaning of clause (4) of section 488 and will not justify a Magistrate in refusing maintenance, because the words ‘living in adultery’ refer to a course of conduct and mean something more than a single lapse from virtue.” Although the judgment in this case was written by Fawcett, J., Mirza, J., (who was an Indian) has endorsed that he holds the same opinion. It may be mentioned here that in coming to the above conclusion, their Lordships relied upon the observations of Justice Chandavarkar made in the case of Parami v. Mahadevi2. That was a case of maintenance under Hindu Law where Chandavarkar, J., observed: “The general rule to be gathered from the texts is that a Hindu wife cannot be absolutely abandoned. If she is living an unchaste life, he is bound to keep her in the house under restraint and provide her with food and raiment just sufficient to support life.” These are, no doubt, considerations that are to be applied in the case of maintence to be granted under the Hindu Law and not strictly those that are to be considered under the provisions of section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. The interpretation in the above case of Fulchand Maganlal1 have been fully endorsed by Pandrang Row, J., in Kista Pillai v. Amirthammal3, where it is observed: “The clear implication from the words used by the Legislature in section 488 is that unless the wife is actually living in adultery at or about the time of the application she is not disentitled to obtain maintenance. It is nowhere said in the section, and there is no need to introduce additional words therein, that living in adultery must be in the house of the adulterer. The words ‘living in adultery’ are merely indicative of the principle that occasional lapses from virtue are not a sufficient reason for refusing maintenance. Continued adulterous conduct is what is meant by”living in adultery.“ ”As early as in 1907 it was held by the Madras High Court in Pathala Achamma v. Pathala Mahalakshmi4, that “living in adultery” refers to a course of conduct and means something more than a single lapse from virtue.“The same interpretation has been given to that term”living in adultery“in various subsequent decisions, e.g., Jatindra Math Mohan Banerjee v. Gouri Bala Debt5: Ma Mya Khin v., N.L.Godeno6 and Lakshmi Ambalan v. Andiammal7. The said term has been explained more clearly by Ramaswami, J., in the case of Mahalingam Pillai v. Amsavalli8. This was, however, a case under the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act and the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 13 of the latter Act provides that only living in adultery is a ground for dissolution of marriage. The said term has been explained more clearly by Ramaswami, J., in the case of Mahalingam Pillai v. Amsavalli8. This was, however, a case under the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act and the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 13 of the latter Act provides that only living in adultery is a ground for dissolution of marriage. At page 294, His Lordship observes: “There is a distinction between ‘committing adultery’ and ‘living in adultery’. Living in adultery means, following in a course of adulterous conduct more or less continuous; a single act of adultery cannot be considered as living in adultery. The words "living in adultery" used in subsection (4) of section 488, Criminal Procedure Code and section 13 of Act XXV of 1955, are merely an indication of the principle that occasional lapses from virtue are not a sufficient reason either for refusing maintenance under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or for granting divorce under Act XXV of 1955, as distinguished from judicial separation. The question, therefore, for Courts to decide is whether there had been such adulterous conduct at or about the time of the application, that is to say, shortly before or shortly after the application was made, interpreting the word "shortly" in a reasonable manner." As against these rulings, no other case has been cited to us where any of the High Courts or the Supreme Court in India has taken a contrary view or has held that a single lapse or two on the part of a wife would disentitle her from claiming maintenance under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After a careful consideration of the law on the point, we are of opinion that it is not a stray act or two of adultery that disentitles a wife from claiming maintence from her husband, but it is a course of continuous conduct on her part by which it can be called that she is living an adulterous life that takes away her right to claim the said maintenance. It is significant to note that the wording in section 488, clause (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code is not "if she commits adultery" but "if she is living in adultery". To our mind, there is a certain amount of emphasis on the term "living". It is significant to note that the wording in section 488, clause (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code is not "if she commits adultery" but "if she is living in adultery". To our mind, there is a certain amount of emphasis on the term "living". A mere lapse, whether it is one or two, and a return back to normal life cannot be said to be "living in adultery". If the lapse is continued and followed up by a further adulterous life, the woman can be said to be "living in adultery". Turning to the facts of the present case we have heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner at length. He has taken us through a number of letters alleged to have been written by the present respondent to her alleged lover Raman. The learned First Class Magistrate, after consideration of this evidence, has reached the conclusion that the evidence goes to establish two acts of adultery only. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, wants us to reach the conclusion that the course of adulterous conduct on the part of the present respondent continued right from the date when her husband left Bangalore on Military Service on 25th November, 1954 to 9th May, 1955, when she was caught red-handed. Firstly, this is a finding of fact on which we would be very slow to interfere. Even if we go into the question of evidence, we do not find that there is sufficient material to reach the conclusion which he wants us to reach. In our opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the Magistrate is correct. It establishes only two acts of adultery, the last being on 9th May, 1955. The evidence in this case has been recorded in Court from 26th June, 1955 to 21st June, 1956. No allegation has been made that after 9th May, 1955 till any date prior to 21st June, 1956, the present respondent betrayed any tendency of continuing or reviving her adulterous connection with her alleged paramour. Under such circumstances, what is proved is nothing more than two instances of lapses. The Magistrate has rightly held that she is not disentitled from getting maintenance. The petition is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.