Judgment The appellant appeals from a decision by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Madras, whereby the Commissioner directed that the compensation deposited by the management be paid over to Appa acharyulu, son of the deceased Bullemma alias Narasayamma, in respect of the death of Bullemma by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. The brief facts are: Bullemma was working as a labourer in the Radhakrishna Rice Mill, Pandalapaka. She died of an accident while working in the Mill. The only person who could claim to be dependant upon the deceased within the meaning of the Act was one Appalacharyulu, son of the deceased. The appellant, pursuant to section 8(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, deposited with the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, a sum of Rs. 500 in respect of his obligation under the Act. The said Appalacharyulu appeared as a dependent. The appellant denied that he was the dependent of Bullemma. The Commissioner after taking evidence on behalf of the appellant and the dependent held that Appalacharyulu was the son of Bullemma and directed that compensation amount deposited be given over to him. It is this order that is challenged in appeal by the employer. Shri Neti Subrahmanyam, learned counsel for the appellant, contended first that the Commissioner has erred in holding that Appalacharyulu was the son and dependant of Bullemma. It is next contended that even if this Court is of the view that Appalacharyulu was the son and dependent of Bullemma, he having died before the matter is finally decided and before distribution is effected by the Commissioner, his legal representative Brahmam would not be entitled to the compensation amount not being a dependant as defined in section 2(1)(d). In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel, a reference to the relevant provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is necessary, but before referring to these provisions, I may dispose of the first argument, which relates to whether Appalacharyulu is the son and dependent of Bullemma. Appalacharyulu produced three witnesses including himself to establish the relationship. In rebuttal, the employer examined two witnesses. Appalacharyulu, in his statement, has deposed that his mother was Bullemma alias Narasayamma and that his father’s name is Papa Rao. Appalacharyulu produced three witnesses including himself to establish the relationship. In rebuttal, the employer examined two witnesses. Appalacharyulu, in his statement, has deposed that his mother was Bullemma alias Narasayamma and that his father’s name is Papa Rao. He has also produced an extract of Exhibit A. This statement is supported by Kondamma, a sister of the deceased and Anniyam Lakshminarayana, an elderly resident of Sandipudi, who says that Appalacharyulu was born to Bullemma and that Bullemma was known also as Narasayamma. Against this evidence, the employer relies on the report of the Village Munsiff, the entry in the register of the Mill and oral testimony of the Village Munsiff and the clerk of the Mill. In the report, Exhibit 3, the Village Munsiff has mentioned that Bullemma has no heirs. In cross-examination, he explained that what he meant by his report that Bullemma had no children was that she had no children in Ramannapeta at the time of the enquiry. So, this statement does not help the case of the employer. The other witness of the employer is the clerk, who states referring to the entry in the register of the Mills that Bullemma was shown to be the wife of Satyanarayanamurthy. Relying on this, it is contended that the statement of Appalacharyulu and his witnesses could not be believed. The Commissioner has not accepted the statement of this witness and I too am not inclined to accept it in the face of the positive evidence. In my opinion also, the evidence produced on behalf of the dependant is sufficient to prove that he is the dependant and son of the deceased. The evidence produced on behalf of the employer does not rebut this evidence. I agree with the view of the Commissioner. I now turn to the legal argument advanced by the learned counsel. The relevant provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are section 2(1)(d), section 3, section 4, section 8 and section 9. The evidence produced on behalf of the employer does not rebut this evidence. I agree with the view of the Commissioner. I now turn to the legal argument advanced by the learned counsel. The relevant provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are section 2(1)(d), section 3, section 4, section 8 and section 9. Under section 2(1)(d),a dependant means: (i) a widow, minor legitimate son, and unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother and (ii) if wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a widower, a parent other than a widowed mother, a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter, a daughter legitimate or illegitimate if married and a minor or if widowed, a minor brother, an unmarried or widowed sister, a widowed daughter-in-law, or minor child of a deceased on, a minor child of a deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or, where no parent of the workman is alive, a paternal grandparent. Section 3, which imposes the liability upon the employer reads thus: “(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.........” Section 4 lays down the rules for determination of the amount of compensation, which runs thus: “4(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows namely: (a) Where death results from the injury- (i) in the case of an adult in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first Column of Schedule IV the amount shown against such limits in the second column thereof, and (ii) in the case of a minor-two hundred rupees;” Section 8 which relates to distribution of compensation reads thus: — “(1) No payment of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death and no payment of a lump sum as compensation to a woman or a person under a legal disability shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, and no such payment made directly by an employer shall be deemed to be a payment of compensation.......” Section 9 refers tonon-assignment and non-attachment of compensation amount. From the above provisions, it would appear that sections 3 and 4 make an employer liable to pay compensation upon the death of a workman and a fixed amount has to be paid. Under clause (4) of section 8, the Commissioner after he receives the deposit has got to give notice to each dependant, and if he is satisfied on enquiry that no dependant exists he has to refund the money to the employer. In case dependants exist, the money may be distributed amongst them in such manner as the Commissioner thinks proper, and may in his discretion be allotted to one dependant only to the exclusion of the rest. Section 8, clause (5) gives a right to the dependents of the deceased workman as a class but not individually to that compensation money. What is contended on behalf of the appellant is that as the distribution of the amount has not been effected by the Commissioner and the appeal is still pending, Appalacharyulu having died, his legal representative is not entitled to the compensation amount and there is no other course open but to refund the amount to the appellant. I am very reluctant to accept this contention. It is true that section 3 which imposes a liability upon the employer to pay compensation does not specify the person or persons to whom it is payable. But section 8 makes it clear that nobody has any right to it except the dependents. The right therefore accrues to the dependents as a class, subject to the Commissioner’s rights of distribution in such way as he thinks proper. This is a right which is given to the dependant because of the workman’s death. A duty to refund the amount of compensation arises only when there is no dependant ‘in existence’ and this must mean ‘in existence ‘at the time of the workman’s death i.e., at the time of the death of Bullemma. To put any other interpretation would be to frustrate the object of the Act, and place the right to compensation on an uncertain contingency. The contention of Sri Neti Subrahmanyam is that the dependent does not get any vested right and till the amount is actually distributed it cannot be said that the dependent acquires any right. This argument is equally devoid of force. The contention of Sri Neti Subrahmanyam is that the dependent does not get any vested right and till the amount is actually distributed it cannot be said that the dependent acquires any right. This argument is equally devoid of force. As stated eariler, after the deposit is made by the employer, the Commissioner has to find out who the dependants are so that he might effect the distribution among them. It is therefore clear that once an allotment of compensation to a dependant or distribution of compensation money among several other dependants is made, the compensation allotted becomes the property of the dependents and if the dependent dies, the said amount being his property would devolve on his or her heirs. I am supported in this view by the cases reported in Pasupati Dutt v. Kelvin Jute Mills1and Abdurrahiman v. Beeran Koya2. Both these cases arose out of proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and in both of them it has been laid down that the right to receive the compensation accrues to the dependant who is in existence at the time of the death of the workman. In other words, it is held that it is a vested right. It is further held that once the allotment of compensation is made on the dependant it becomes his property and devolves on his death on his heirs or legal representatives. A somewhat similar case arose under the English Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906, viz., United Collieries, Ltd. v. Simpson3, where a workman, whilst in the employment of a Colliery Company was knocked down by a wagon in the course of his employment on 9th July, 1907. He died of his injuries on 14th July. His mother, alleged to have been dependent upon him, died on the 16th October, 1907, without making any claim upon the appellants. Her executrix made a claim on 10th December, 1907, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906, as representative of the mother. The House of Lords found some difficulty in coming to a decision, but the majority held (Lord Dunedin dissenting) that the right of the dependant of the deceased workman passed to the executor of a sole dependant who had died without having made a claim. The House of Lords found some difficulty in coming to a decision, but the majority held (Lord Dunedin dissenting) that the right of the dependant of the deceased workman passed to the executor of a sole dependant who had died without having made a claim. Lord Loreburn observed at page 389 thus, while discussing the English Act of 1906: “Paragraph 5 of the schedule requires payment in the case of death ‘unless otherwise ordered or hereinafter provided’ into the County Court, to be dealt with in discretion ‘for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto under this Act’. This is, no doubt, in order to relieve the employer and ensure a proper custody, distribution and application of the money especially where there are minors or several dependants, or where there are persons for whom the County Court Judge thinks it advisable to take precautions. Paragraph 8 also contemplates payment to a dependant. And though the ninth reserves a power to vary the apportionment, neither it nor any other paragraph proceeds upon any other view than that there is a definite right on the part of dependants as a class to the money, subject to a parental power of the Court in dividing and applying it for their advantage. If there is this right, when does it arise, or become vested? The statute evidently treats it as arising because of the workman’s death. It seems to follow that it arises on the workman’s death unless some other event is fixed”. At page 390, he remarks further: “I observe that, in Lord McLaren’s opinion, if the claim is made within the statutory period, and the dependant dies before an award has been made, the right to an award of compensation has vested in the dependant and a right to follow out the proceedings in the arbitration passes to he legal personal representatives. But if the claim has not been made, his Lordship thinks that the employer’s liability is terminated by the death of the dependant. That opinion is entitled to the greatest respect, but I cannot agree. I cannot see why the claim instead of the death is to be regarded as the signal for the right to compensation vesting. But if the claim has not been made, his Lordship thinks that the employer’s liability is terminated by the death of the dependant. That opinion is entitled to the greatest respect, but I cannot agree. I cannot see why the claim instead of the death is to be regarded as the signal for the right to compensation vesting. And even if it were so, the Act does not require that the dependant himself should make the claim, and I do not see why that right to make the claim should not pass to the executor. It seems to me, therefore, that as the person represented by the respondent was the only dependant her representative may properly claim all that she was entitled to, the right being transmissible as property.” In the light of these observations, if I were to consider the instant case, I find that at the death of Bullemma, Appalacharyulu was the only person dependant on her. The Commissioner after holding that Appalacharyulu was the son and dependant of Bullemma directed that the amount be paid to him, but before he could receive the amount, the employer filed an appeal here and obtained a stay order. In the meantime, Appalacharyulu died. His legal representative, the present respondent, would therefore become entitled to the amount as allotment was already made in favour of the dependant and it would devolve on him as the property of the dependent. To say that after the death of the dependent, the amount has to be refunded to the appellant, would, under these circumstances, amount to an extremely narrow and unjust construction upon the section which, in my opinion, is not borne out by the purpose of the Act or the actual words used. What is urged is that no right could accrue to the dependent till it is finally decided, i.e., till the disposal of the appeal. I am very reluctant to accept this contention either. It is not dependent on the decision in appeal but on the allotment by the Commissioner. It is next contended relying on section 9 of the said Act that the right given under this section is a personal right and it cannot devolve on the legal representatives. This argument has no force. It is not dependent on the decision in appeal but on the allotment by the Commissioner. It is next contended relying on section 9 of the said Act that the right given under this section is a personal right and it cannot devolve on the legal representatives. This argument has no force. The section only refers to the restriction relating to the assignment and attachment of the compensation amount and it has nothing to do with the devolution of the right. It is lastly contended that even if it is held that the legal representative is entled to the compensation amount, he cannot get it unless he obtains letters of administration. Reliance is placed on section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. I am not inclined to accept this contention either. The appellant himself has brought him on record as the legal representative of the late Appalacharyulu. There is no provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act which provides that the dependents or legal representatives should obtain either letters of administration or a succession certificate. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. A.B.K. ----- Appeal dismissed.