Order The Additional Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh, has moved these two petitions for transfer of Cases Nos. 12/8 of 1957 and 11/8 of 1957 from the file of the Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, to any other Sessions Court in the State on the grounds primarily that the Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, has already formed an opinion about the merits of the two cases and has given expression to his view before the defence advocate, Sri Ramachandra Rao and that the attitude of the Sessions Judge is very partial to the accused and unreasonable to the prosecution. The petitioner has set forth a list of instances in which the attitude of the Sessions Judge complained of is evident. A report has been called for from the Sessions Judge and he covered every one of the points raised in the affidavit filed in support of these petitions. The petitions are contested by the accused whose advocate maintains that the petitions have to be rejected in limine on the grounds inter alia that they are not supported by the affidavit of a responsible officer of the Government like the Secretary or a Joint Secretary and that, in fact, the affidavits of a police officer and others filed are not sworn to before a competent person. On merits he would urge that none of the charges made against the Sessions Judge has a foundation in fact. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has selected three out of the whole list of grievances detailed in these petitions and confined his arguments thereto. The grievances expressed are (i) that the Sessions Judge told Sri Ramachandra Rao, counsel for the accused, in the chamber of the Judge, that there was no case against the accused; (2) (a) that on the deposition of the part-heard witness, Ramulu, his signature was not taken; (b) that the said deposition is not found among the records at all; and (c) that there is a further insinuation by the Sessions Judge that the prosecution had a direct hand in the disappearance of the deposition: (3) that there is an observation of the Sessions Judge in his report that Dhulappa, a witness, is clearly under the influence of the Police. In so far as the first objection by the learned advocate for the accused that the affidavits filed in support of these petitions have not been sworn to by a responsible officer of the State Government is concerned, there is considerable force in it. The main affidavit is by a police officer. For sustaining applications of this kind two things are necessary. One is proof of the facts alleged and the other an affirmation, that the State feels a real apprehension that there would be miscarriage of justice. Even assuming that the police officer’s affidavit suffices for proving the facts, there is no affidavit as to what the real state of the mind of the State is whether the State feels any apprehension or not. The Deputy Superintendent of Police is not competent to speak for and in the name of the State. A similar question came up for consideration in State v. Ram Sia1, before a Bench of the Allahabad High Court and their Lordships expressed their view in unequivocal terms that it is not right for the State to use the services of a Police officer for swearing to affidavits. Their Lordships drew a distinction between applications made by private parties and those presented on behalf of the State and this distinction was justified on the ground that the State is in a position to take a more sober view of things than a private citizen. “What may disturb the equanimity of mind of an ordinary villager is not likely to disturb the trained mind of men who have to deal with State matters”. An attitude of objectivity is expected of the State and we have no means of finding whether the State, through its responsible officers, really entertains an apprehension lest justice should miscarry if the trial is continued by the learned Sessions Judge of Hyderabad. The above view has been emphasised in a later decision of the same High Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Bahadur Singh 2. The above view has been emphasised in a later decision of the same High Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Bahadur Singh 2. Apart from the lack of competency on the part of the Police Officer to represent the mind of the State, what the particular Deputy Superintendent of Police swears to in regard to the main allegations against the learned Sessions Judge is that he was told by the counsel for the accused that the said counsel was in the chamber of the learned Sessions Judge on a particular occasion and heard him say that there was nothing in the case. I wonder how the State could deem it worthwhile to rely on this hearsay evidence and to transmit it for consideration by the High Court. It was clearly second-hand information that the Police officer was referring to. Whether he got the information verified or confirmed is not indicated any where in the affidavit. There is further no knowing whether the Police officer himself believed in the correctness of the information conveyed. The learned Sessions Judge has denied the charge in toto and I cannot believe that he would ever have been so indiscreet as to express his own opinion so early in the case and that too before the counsel defending the accused. The charge is frivolous. (2)(a) One Ramulu was examined on a particular date. It appears that he gave merely a line or two of his deposition. He was not examined further because he was a panch witness and there were number of other panch witnesses who were not produced by the prosecution that day. The learned Sessions Judge felt that it was a manoeuvre by the Prosecution to keep in reserve certain witnesses and to thrust into the witness-box only one of them for that day for obvious reasons. He declined to continue the examination of that witness and insisted on the production of all the witnesses of the panch on the subsequent date. He, however, neglected taking the signature of Ramulu on that deposition. In his report he explains that it was only a line or two and that, therefore, the signature was not deemed necessary. He certainly hoped or was expecting the continuation of the examination of Ramulu on the adjourned date, but it is undoubtedly an irregularity. He, however, neglected taking the signature of Ramulu on that deposition. In his report he explains that it was only a line or two and that, therefore, the signature was not deemed necessary. He certainly hoped or was expecting the continuation of the examination of Ramulu on the adjourned date, but it is undoubtedly an irregularity. Whether it is a line or half a line of deposition, the Sessions Judge was bound to have it interpreted to the witness and the signature taken. But this was a mere irregularity which cannot certainly connote a partiality or a bias of the Sessions Judge. (2) (b)and (c). Another circumstance emphasised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that the deposition itself has vanished from the records and the insinuation made by the Sessions Judge that significance should be attached to the circumstance that Prosecution alone became aware of the loss from the Court file. He refers to the file being handled by the prosecution and makes a faint suggestion that the prosecution must have had a hand in making the deposition disappear. Whatever may be the reason for disappearance, surely the learned Sessions Judge could not be held responsible, for nothing could be gained by him by causing its disappearance and no adverse inference can be based on the missing of the line or two of the deposition. (3) One of the witnesses examined in the case was Dhulappa, P.W.5. He affirms in an affidavit that the Sessions Judge treated him rudely and remarked that he had probably taken opium. In his report the learned Judge says that the deponent of this affidavit is clearly under the influence of the police. The argument by the learned Public Prosecutor is that Dhulappa is a material witness and that if the learned Sessions Judge feels that he is under the influence of the police, as expressed by him in his report, he is not likely to make a proper assessment of the evidence of this witness. But what the learned Sessions Judge was referring to was the circumstance of this witness filing an affidavit charging him with rudeness. He said nothing about the evidence of the witness on the merits of the case. It is regrettable that some of the presiding officers of trial Courts adopt the technique of making unwilling and refractory witnesses speak out, through the use of threats and strong expressions. He said nothing about the evidence of the witness on the merits of the case. It is regrettable that some of the presiding officers of trial Courts adopt the technique of making unwilling and refractory witnesses speak out, through the use of threats and strong expressions. The Sessions Judge denies it. I do not know if that was done in this case. But such behaviour on the part of the Sessions Judge, even if true, does not signify that there is any bias or prejudice against or in favour of any party. What we are now concerned with is whether justice is likely to miscarry under the circumstances narrated by the prosecution. I have noted the tone of moderation in which the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has made the selection of what he feels to be the most salient among the grievances expressed but none of them has been substantiated; nor do they suffice for sustaining petitions for transfer. Obviously there were differences between Public Prosecutor and the Sessions Judge regarding certain procedural details and these petitions are the result. But I am not convinced that the prosecution will suffer any detriment by the continuance of the trial before the same Judge. The petitions are dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Petition dismissed.