ORDER Srivastava, J. – 1. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, Bench Gwalior, dismissing his application seeking quashing of the order dated 31.8.1994, rejecting his claim for continuance in service taking his date of birth to be 6.8.1939, the petitioner has now approached this Court seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Advocate representing the respondents-authorities and have carefully perused the record. 3. The brief facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this writ petition lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner was appointed on the post of sub-overseer on 29.5.1957. It is not in dispute that the original service-book which had been prepared when the petitioner had been taken in service is lost. A duplicate service-book was therefore prepared. In this service-book the date of birth of the petitioner as recorded is not decipherable. When the petitioner came to know that the department intended to retire him from service taking into consideration the date of his birth to be 6.8.1936, he made a representation asserting that his date of birth was 6.8.1939 and he could not be retired prematurely. The concerned Authority after an inquiry into the matter found his case to be genuine and made recommendations in his favour seeking permission from the State Government to record the date of birth in the service-book so as to indicate it to be 6.8.1939. When nothing was done on the recommendations of the Departmental Authorities, which had been made in favour of the petitioner, and no orders were passed, the petitioner approached the Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties disposed of the case with a direction to the competent authority to pass an order on the representation of the petitioner in the light of the recommendations made by the Chief Engineer within a period of 45 days from the date of the communication of the said order. 4. A perusal of the order passed by the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal dated 30.8.1997 indicates that the Tribunal had made it clear that the Chief Engineer had made a recommendation in favour of the petitioner and had come to the conclusion that his correct date of birth was 6.8.1939. 4. A perusal of the order passed by the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal dated 30.8.1997 indicates that the Tribunal had made it clear that the Chief Engineer had made a recommendation in favour of the petitioner and had come to the conclusion that his correct date of birth was 6.8.1939. The State Government was required under the aforesaid direction issued by the Administrative Tribunal to pass appropriate orders on the representation of the petitioner in the light of the aforesaid recommendations. 5. Pursuant to the directions issued by the Administrative Tribunal the State Government passed an order dated 13th July 1995 whereunder the representation of the petitioner was rejected declining to treat the date of birth of the petitioner to be 6.8.1939 instead of 6.8.1936. A true copy of the aforesaid order has been filed as annexure P-12. A perusal of the aforesaid order indicates that the main ground on which the representation of the petitioner had been rejected inspite of the recommendations of the Chief Engineer was that in case his date of birth was accepted to be 6.8.1939 he would have been clearly ineligible for being taken in service as he would have been a minor at that time. The State Government, apart from the above had also observed that there had been interpolation in the service-book so as to make the entry relating to the date of birth undecipherable with malafide intention to seek an extension of service. However, holding that since the petitioner would have been a minor and on that account ineligible for being appointed on the Government post and taken into service there could be no justification for holding his date of birth to be 6.8.1939. 6. The Tribunal while affirming the aforesaid order and endorsing the findings returned against the petitioner went further and held that a perusal of the report submitted by the Board of High School indicated that the High School Certificate which was sought to be relied upon by the petitioner in support of his claim in regard to his date of birth could not be accepted as It purported to relate to a person who was the son of Bal Krishna Sharma. This finding of the Tribunal was based on the report called by it from the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, in which report dated 1.2.1997 the Joint Secretary (Satyapan) of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad, had observed that the candidate with the Roll number indicated in the High School Certificate relied upon by the petitioner was the son of Bal Krishna Sharma. In the records maintained by the Department the name of the father of the petitioner is shown to be Bal Krishna Pande. The Tribunal further expressed the view that the petitioner had put in a delayed claim with regard to the correction of his date of birth and was not entitled to the correction sought for at such a belated stage. It was also observed that had the Departmental Authorities cared to check the High School Certificate presented before them by the petitioner with his parentage, the matter would have ended then and there with adequate legal action against him which was required to be taken now. The Tribunal further issued a direction purporting to act in public interest requiring the departmental authorities to take suitable measures to prevent such and other malpractices of tampering with service records. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the Tribunal has manifestly erred in entirely over-looking the implications arising under its earlier order dated 25.11.1994 referred to hereinabove, which had attained finality, whereunder the State Government was directed to act upon the recommendations made by the Chief Engineer in favour of the petitioner. The contention is that once the direction had been issued by the Tribunal requiring the State Government to pass an order in the light of the recommendations, the State Government was bound to pass the order which was to be in consonance with the recommendations and not against it. 8. So far as this aspect is concerned, it will be appropriate to reproduce the penultimate paragraph contained in the order dated 25.11.1994 passed by the Tribunal, which reads asunder :-- "In view of the above, this application is disposed of with a direction to the respondents that they shall pass an order on the representation of the applicant persuant to the recommendation made by the Chief Engineer within a period of 45 days from the date of communication of this order. The applicant shall be at liberty to file a fresh petition if he is aggrieved by the order which may be passed." In view of the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal the State was required to decide the representation accordingly. 9. We have ourselves examined the record, which was produced before the Tribunal, which makes it apparent that on the own showing of the department the date of birth of the petitioner on the basis whereof he was sought to be retired from service was apparently •incorrect. As has already been. noticed hereinabove the petitioner had been appointed on 29th May, 1957. Since, on that date he did not satisfy the minimum eligibility criteria in regard to the age and fell short by about two months from the minimum age• prescribed proceedings had been initiated seeking relaxation of the relevant rules. In these proceedings the State Government had passed an order for regularising the appointment of the petitioner granting relaxation in the service rules. In these proceedings the State Government had passed an order for regularising the appointment of the petitioner granting relaxation in the service rules. This order passed by the State Government has also attained finality. The mere fact that the State Government was conscious of the fact that on the date of appointment the petitioner did not satisfy the minimum eligibility criteria in regard to the age as he was to complete his 18 years of age after two months and eight days from the date of his appointment, it had chosen to grant relaxation and to regularize his appointment, vide the order dated 30.8.1973 passed by the State Government which clearly indicates that in no case the petitioner could be treated to have been born on 6.8.1936 as had it been his actual date of birth, the action to grant relaxation in the rule or regularise his appointment could not arise. There was no other reason disclosed which necessitated the relaxation in the rule and the regularisation of his appointment. 10. Further, from the perusal of the appointment order dated 29.5.1957, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-2, it is obvious that the original High School Certificate relied upon by the petitioner had been submitted by him to the Department. 10. Further, from the perusal of the appointment order dated 29.5.1957, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-2, it is obvious that the original High School Certificate relied upon by the petitioner had been submitted by him to the Department. The aforesaid appointment letter clearly acknowledges that the High School Certificate had been submitted by the petitioner and that certificate was sent to the Superitending Engineer for the purposes of record. When the original High School Certificate was in the custody of the Department itself no adverse inference could be drawn on the ground that the petitioner had filed a duplicate copy of the High School Certificate when the Department itself after making the inquiries from the concerned Board was fully satisfied about the genuineness of the High School Certificate which had been submitted by the petitioner at the time of his appointment and was sought to be relied upon in support of his claim in regard to his date of birth being 6.8.1939. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in disregarding the High School Certificate relied upon by the petitioner on the basis of the report submitted by the Board raising a dispute with regard to his paternity. 12. In the aforesaid connection it may be noticed that the respondents-authorities had not come up with any such pleadings which could lead to an inference that the genuineness of the High School Certificate was being challenged. There was no pleading to the effect that the High School Certificate on the basis whereof the petitioner had been granted appointment on the Government post did not relate to him. In the absence of any such pleadings it was not open to the Tribunal to carve out a new case to the effect that High School Certificate which had taken into account by the department itself while granting the appointment to the petitioner, in fact related to a person other than the petitioner. No dispute in regard to his paternity having been raised it was not open to the Tribunal to disregard the High School Certificate on the basis of the report submitted by the Board, when it has come on the record that the father of the petitioner was known as 'Balkrishna Sharma' as well as 'Balkrishna Pandey'. No dispute in regard to his paternity having been raised it was not open to the Tribunal to disregard the High School Certificate on the basis of the report submitted by the Board, when it has come on the record that the father of the petitioner was known as 'Balkrishna Sharma' as well as 'Balkrishna Pandey'. Difference in surname was wholly insignificant as the High School Certificate did not disclose the name of the father of the petitioner as stated in those days. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the direction for taking legal action against the petitioner. In para 13 of the impugned order the Tribunal had observed that had the Departmental authorities cared to check up the High School Certificate presented to them by the applicant with his parentage, the matter would have ended then and there with adequate legal action against the applicant, which shall be required to be taken now. 14. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid observation was totally misconceived and baseless. From the materials brought on record placed before the Tribunal specially the letter dated 6.3.1962, Annexure P-2, to the writ petition, it was clear that the original High School Certificate had been submitted by the petitioner to the department. The genuineness of the certificate was never challenged. There was nothing on the record to indicate that the Department had ever come up with a case that the aforesaid High School Certificate did not relate to the petitioner. The aforesaid certificate did' not indicate the name of the father of the petitioner. There is no such entry therein. From the report submitted by the Board it is apparent that in the year 1954 there was no provision for showing the name of the father of the candidate in the High School Certificate. The particulars shown in the certificate are the roll-number, name of the candidate, the Centre from which he appeared in the examination and other particulars in regard to his division etc. but the name of the father of the candidate was not shown. 15. The particulars shown in the certificate are the roll-number, name of the candidate, the Centre from which he appeared in the examination and other particulars in regard to his division etc. but the name of the father of the candidate was not shown. 15. In the aforesaid circumstances when the department itself had never challenged the genuineness of the Certificate and had further not raised any dispute in regard to the aforesaid certificate being referable to a person other than the petitioner, there could be no occasion for making any observation to the above effect. 16. The learned Government Advocate has tried to support the impugned order on the basis of the reasonings contained therein. It is, however, conceded that the State Government had made no effort to challenge the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal dated 25.11.1994 whereunder the State Government had been directed to pass an appropriate order on the representation of the petitioner is the light of the recommendations made by the Chief Engineer. What has been contended is that the petitioner had not challenged the entry in regard to his date of birth as shown in the gradation-list prepared in the year 1987 wherein the date of birth of the petitioner was shown to be 6.8.1936. What has been contended is that since the petitioner had failed to object to the aforesaid entry and did not challenge the correctness thereof he stood estopped from challenging its correctness later on. 17. In the aforesaid connection suffice it to say that no effort has been made by the respondent authorities to establish that the aforesaid gradation list was ever served on the petitioner and that he had been given an opportunity to challenge the correctness of that entry relating to his date of birth. Further, on the own showing of the respondents-authorities the aforesaid gradation list contained obvious incorrect entries. So far as the petitioner is concerned it is obvious that while the entry relating to his date of birth shown there indicates that he was born on 6.8.1936, the other entry shows that he was appointed on 8.7.1957 which was wrong ex-facie. In fact, before the Tribunal the respondents admitted the correctness and the genuineness of the letter dated 6.3.1962 and the order dated 30.8.1973, Annexure P-10. In fact, before the Tribunal the respondents admitted the correctness and the genuineness of the letter dated 6.3.1962 and the order dated 30.8.1973, Annexure P-10. In the aforesaid circumstances when on the own showing of the respondent-authorities the aforesaid gradation list contained incorrect entries the said gradation list could not come to their rescue. 18. The learned Government Advocate has further placed reliance on paragraph 84 of the Financial Code while supporting the impugned orders. The provisions contained in Paragraph 84 of the aforesaid Code are to the following effect :- "84. Every person newly appointed to a service or a post under Government should at the time of the appointment declare the date of his birth by the Christian era with as far as possible confirmatory documentary evidence, such as a matriculation certificate, municipal birth certificate and so on. If the exact date is not known an approximate date may be given, The actual date or the assumed date determined under Rule 85 should be recorded in• the history of service, service book or any other record that may be kept in respect of the Government servant's service under Government. The date of birth once recorded in this manner, must be deemed to be absolutely conclusive, and except in the case of a clerical error no revision of such a declaration shall be allowed to be made at a later period for any purpose whatever." 19. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions make it clear that the date of birth once recorded in the manner prescribed therein must be deemed to be absolutely conclusive and except in the case of clerical error no revision of such a declaration shall be allowed to be made at a later period for any purpose whatever. 20. It must be emphasised that the presumption in regard to the correctness of the entry relating to the date of birth as recorded in the service-book of an employee is available only in case it is established that the said entry had been made in the manner prescribed. Further, this presumption is available for an entry recorded for the first time in the relevant service-book. In the present case what we find is that on the own showing of the respondents-authorities the original serice-book of the petitioner is lost and is not traceable. Further, this presumption is available for an entry recorded for the first time in the relevant service-book. In the present case what we find is that on the own showing of the respondents-authorities the original serice-book of the petitioner is lost and is not traceable. The entry relating to the date of birth in the duplicate serice-book which had been prepared is undecipherable and is not consistent with the confirmatory documentary evidence that was produced being the matriculation certificate. In the circumstances it was incumbent upon the respondent authority to first establish that the entry relating to the date of birth of the petitioner sought to be relied upon by them had been made in the manner prescribed at the time of his entry into service in the, service-book prepared at the stage. No such effort was made in. the present case. 21. Considering the facts and circumstances brought on record therefore no such presumption as envisaged in the aforesaid provision can be deemed to be available to the respondents. 22. The learned Government Advocate has heavily relied upon on the observations made in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamilmadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, reported in 1994 (6) SCC 302 . The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision had observed that the application for correction of date of birth of an in-service employee should be made within five years from the date when the Rules had come into force. If no application is made, after expiry of five years, the Government employee loses his right to make an application for correction in the date of birth. It was also observed that it was common phenomenon that just. before superannuation, an application would be made to the Tribunal or Court just to gain time to continue in service and the Tribunal or Courts are unfortunately unduly liberal in entertaining and allowing the government employees or public employees to remain in office, which is adding an impetus to resort to the fabrication of the record and place reliance thereon and seek the authority to correct it. 23. We have carefully perused the aforesaid decision. In the aforesaid decision the statutory rule itself had prescribed the period of limitation for moving an application seeking correction of the entry relating to the date of birth. 23. We have carefully perused the aforesaid decision. In the aforesaid decision the statutory rule itself had prescribed the period of limitation for moving an application seeking correction of the entry relating to the date of birth. In the present case, the learned Government Advocate failed to point out any such rule prescribing any limitation within which an application for the purpose could have been filed seeking correction of an entry relating to the date of birth. What is further apparent is that the respondent-authority was trying to take advantage of its own wrong ignoring the finality of the earlier orders and its own admissions which were conclusive and decisive and had not been shown to be incorrect or explained away. 24. In an other decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Government Advocate representing the contesting respondent in the case of State of Orissa and others v. Ramanath Patnaik reported in (1997)5 SCC 181 the Apex Court reiterating its earlier view expressed in the case of State of Tamilnadu v. T. V Vendugopalan (supra), had observed that it is well known that the service record would be opened after the government servant enters the service and normally the entry in the service record would be counter-signed by the government servant. The date of birth as entered in the school record is the source material for making entry in the service record. It was further indicated that when entry was made in the service record and when the employee was in service he did not make any attempt to have the service record corrected, any amount of evidence produced subsequently would be of no avail. 25. Ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted in the circumstances of the present case. As has already been noticed hereinabove, there is nothing on the record to show as to what was the original entry in the original service book which was prepared by the respondents authorities. The High School Certificate, as has already been indicated hereinabove, had been submitted by the petitioner with the department long back at the time of his appointment. There is nothing to indicate that the entry relating to his date of birth that was recorded in the service-book originally prepared was not consistent with the entry relating to the date of birth as entered in the High School Certificate. There is nothing to indicate that the entry relating to his date of birth that was recorded in the service-book originally prepared was not consistent with the entry relating to the date of birth as entered in the High School Certificate. Further, the State Government was fully conscious of the fact that the petitioner could not have been born on 6.8.1939 and treating him to be short in age requirement had granted relaxation in the relevant rules so that his minority could not come in the way of his appointment and had regularised his services. The State Government having itself decided to treat the entry in regard to the date of birth of the petitioner as claimed by him i.e. 6.8.1939 to be the correct one had proceeded to pass the aforesaid order. In such a circumstance, the decision relied upon by the respondents cannot give them any assistance, especially when the petitioner was not seeking reliance upon any subsequent evidence as referred to in the aforesaid decision. He was placing reliance only on the evidence and the materials on the record which was already with the department and the fact that the respondent-authority while disposing of the representation had totally over-looked the finality of the order of the Tribunal and the further fact that the .State Government itself had granted the relaxation in the relevant rules and regularised the appointment accepting the date of his birth to be as claimed by the petitioner. 26. The learned Government Advocate representing the respondents authorities has further placed reliance on the observations made in the case of Secretary & Commissioner, Home Department and others v. R. Kirubakaran, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2647 . The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision had observed that an application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the Tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned, and unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the Court or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed and within the time fixed by any rule or order. It was further clarified that if no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be filed within the time, which can be held to be reasonable. The' applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. In this case it was also emphasised that whenever an application for alteration of the date of birth is made on the eve of superannuation or near about that time, the Court or the Tribunal concerned should be more cautious because of growing tendency amongst a section of public servants to raise such a dispute, without explaining as to why this question was not raised earlier. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the materials brought on record the respondents-authorities cannot derive any advantage from the observations referred to hereinabove made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision. As has already been indicated in the preceding paragraphs it is not disputed that there is no rule or order in existence prescribing any period of limitation for moving an application seeking alteration in the date of birth as recorded in the service-book. The question in regard to the belatedness of the claim cannot be reopened now after the finality of the decision of the Administrative Tribunal dated 25.11.1994. This question, if at all could have been raised before the Administrative Tribunal at that stage but it was not done. The respondents-authorities chose to abide by the direction issued by the Tribunal and allowed the said direction to become final. However, they failed to carry out the same and tried to find out fault in the claim of the petitioner totally ignoring the vital evidence on record which was in their own custody which shows the total non-application of mind to the real controversy involved in the case. However, they failed to carry out the same and tried to find out fault in the claim of the petitioner totally ignoring the vital evidence on record which was in their own custody which shows the total non-application of mind to the real controversy involved in the case. The record indicates that unimpeachable evidence in the custody of the department itself was totally ignored carving out a new case which was neither pleaded before the Administrative Tribunal either for the first time or for the second time when the matter reached there. 28. It may be noticed that the order-sheet dated 20.3.1997 indicates that the respondent authorities had been directed to produce certain original record relating to the petitioner maintained by the department specially Annexures A-2, A-10 and A-14 but inspite of the clear cut directions the aforesaid documents which were of vital importance and conclusively negatived the claim of the department were not produced. In such a circumstance, it was obvious that the genuineness of the aforesaid documents was not being disputed and their authenticity could not be doubted. Even in this Court also on 3.11.1998 Government Advocate had been directed to ensure that the entire record relating to the service of the petitioner maintained by the department including the documents of which photostat copies had been filed on record be produced before this Court for perusal of this Court but inspite of ample opportunity having been provided the relevant original records have not been produced. 29. The learned Government Advocate representing the respondent-authorities states that Annexure R-1 is the photostat copy of the service-book of the petitioner. A perusal of Annexure R-1 indicates that it does not bear signature of the petitioner. It shows the date of birth as recorded in the aforesaid copy to be 6.8.1936 although the Tribunal has clearly observed that the entry of the date of birth of the petitioner is not decipherable. No reliance, therefore, could be placed on the copy of the service-book filed as Annexure R-1. Which does not bear the signature of any officer or authority on any of its pages. It has further not been certified to be a true copy of the original. 30. No reliance, therefore, could be placed on the copy of the service-book filed as Annexure R-1. Which does not bear the signature of any officer or authority on any of its pages. It has further not been certified to be a true copy of the original. 30. From the materials brought on record, it is apparent that the order rejecting the representation of the petitioner as well as the order passed by the Tribunal under challenge were based on entirely erroneous assumptions ignoring the admissions of the respondents authorities which had not been explained away in any manner whatsoever. The findings returned against the petitioner stand vitiated in law and are manifestly illegal having been reached without application of mind to the vital evidence having material bearing on the controversy involved in the case. 31. We are of the considered opinion that sufficient ground has been made out for interference by this Court while exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226/227 of the Constitution to prevent the manifest miscarriage of justice. 32. The petitioner has since retired on 31.8.1994. He is therefore entitled only to the post-retiral benefits. 33. In the result, this writ petition succeeds in part. The impugned order dated 30.8.1997 passed by the State Administrative Tribunal, Bench Gwalior, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-21, as well as the order dated 13th July 1995 passed by the Secretary, to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Public Works Department, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-12, are quashed with the direction that the petitioner shall be entitled to all the post-retiral benefits treating him to be continuing in service till his attaining the age of superannuation computed taking his date of birth to be 6.8.1939. 34. The respondents shall ensure that the consequential post-retiral benefits are released to the petitioner within a period not later than three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the State Government. 35. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs and the counsel's fee Rs. 500/-.