Raman Nayar, J.-These appeals and connected revisions by the State, arise out of five cases where motor drivers in Government employ (four in the State Transport Department and the fifth, the accused person concerned in Criminal Appeal No. 101 of 1957, in the Excise Department) were separately tried for offences resulting from rash or negligent driving. At different stages of the proceedings the accused persons concerned raised the question of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and the trial Courts have thrown out the cases deciding this question in favour of the accused. In four of the cases, orders of acquittal have been pronounced. In the fifth, namely, the case concerned in Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 1957, there is only a bare dismissal. It is apparent that the so-called acquittals are not acquittals properly, speaking and are mere refusals to take cognizance of the offences for want of the requisite sanction, the cases being consequently struck off the file. The proper remedy against this striking off lies in revision rather than in appeal, and by way of abundant caution the State has filed appeals as well as revisions in four of the cases although in the one case, where there was not even a purported acquittal but only a bare dismissal, it has filed only an appeal. That appeal, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 1957, will be treated as a revision and the appeals in the remaining four cases will be struck off as superfluities. 2. The accused persons are admittedly public servants, and the case against them being that they committed the offences alleged in driving vehicles which it was their official duty to drive, it is not disputed that two of the three conditions necessary for attracting section 197(1), Criminal Procedure Code, namely, that the person concerned must be a public servant and that he must be accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, are present. But it is contended on behalf of the State that the third requisite, namely, that the accused person is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government does not obtain, and the learned Public Prosecutor has produced certain Government orders which go to show that persons in the position of the accused are removable by the heads of the concerned departments. 3. In four of the cases the learned Magistrates who tried them threw them out on the strength of the decision in State v. K. Neelakanta Panicker1. In the fifth case also, the so-called acquittal seems to be based on the same decision although it is not expressly referred to K. Neelakanta Panther’s case,1the accused person concerned was a mechanic in the State Transport Department and all that was decided there was that, when he was driving a State Transport vehicle on the public road for a test (which he was expected to make) he was acting in the discharge of his official duties. The question whether the accused there was not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government was not considered; and this seems to have been taken for granted. That question is a question which has to be decided with reference to the particular accused person concerned in each case, and the decision referred to is certainly not authority for the position that drivers of the State Transport and Excise Departments are not removable save by or with the sanction of the Government and that therefore the previous sanction of Government is necessary for their prosecution for offences committed in the discharge of their official duties. We might also remark that the learned Magistrates seem to have thought that it was enough for an accused person to plead the bar under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code and that, when once that was done, it became incumbent on the prosecution to show that the bar did not exist. That is not so. It is really the other way about, and it is for an accused person who pleads want of sanction as a bar to establish the facts, necessary to attract the bar. 4. That is not so. It is really the other way about, and it is for an accused person who pleads want of sanction as a bar to establish the facts, necessary to attract the bar. 4. With reference to the Government orders produced by the learned Public Prosecutor to show that the accused persons in these cases are removable by the heads of the concerned departments, it is urged on their behalf that they will be in a position to show that they were actually appointed by the Government, that, under the rules governing their recruitment, Government is the appointing authority, and that therefore these orders are void in the face of Article 311 of the Constitution. That being so, the cases will have to go back to the respective trial Courts for being continued from the stage at which they were thrown out and for being decided afresh after giving the accused person concerned an opportunity of showing that he is not removable save by or with the sanction of the Government. 5. Before leaving the case we may dispose of an argument put forward on behalf of the accused to show that they are not removable save by or with the sanction of the Government. It runs thus: Article 252 of the Travancore Service Regulations lays down what is “inferior service” and what is “superior service”. Service as peons and in similar posts and all other menial service, and service in posts the pay, or maximum pay of which, does not exceed Rs.18 a month is inferior service. All other service is superior. Motor drivers are not peons or menial servants and it not disputed that the monthly pay of every one of the accused persons exceeds Rs.18. Therefore the accused are in superior service or, in other words, they are superior servants. This is the first step of the argument. 6. Next, in rule I of the Rules regulating enquiries into the conduct of Public Servants passed by His Highness the Maharajah of Travancore on 12th December, 1896 (printed as appendix C at page 1527 of Vol. VI of the Regulations and Proclamations of Travancore)-the Inquiry Rules for short-it is said that for the purposes of those rules, public servants not removable from office without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah shall be designated “superior public servants” and all others “inferior public servants”. 7. VI of the Regulations and Proclamations of Travancore)-the Inquiry Rules for short-it is said that for the purposes of those rules, public servants not removable from office without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah shall be designated “superior public servants” and all others “inferior public servants”. 7. Therefore-and this is the conclusion-superior public servants like the accused (superior public servants because they draw more than Rs. 18 per month) were not removable from office without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah, and are not removable today without the sanction of the State Government which has taken the place of His Highness. 8. The fallacy underlying this argument is apparent. It lies in equating the definition of two things which are not the same although they may bear similar names-because A equals B and B equals C, therefore A equals C. Supposing the Inquiry Rules had said that, for the purposes of those rules, public servants drawing a salary exceeding Rs. 200 a month shall be designated superior public servants, the argument advanced on behalf of the accused would lead to the conclusion that a person in "superior service", namely, a person drawing a salary exceeding Rs. 18 per month, is a person drawing a salary exceeding Rs. 200 a month. And every person in superior service within the meaning of the Travancore Service Regulations could claim on the strength of the Inquiry Rules that he should be paid more than Rs.200 a month with as much logic as the accused now claim that by reason of rule 1 of the Inquiry Rules they are not removable without the sanction of the Government. The point is that the superior servant of Article 252 of the Travancore Sen ice Regulations is an entirely different thing from the superior public servant of the Inquiry Rules. The Travancore Service Regulations defines "superior service" for the purpose of determining the two kinds of services qualifying for pension, and it does not pretend to lay down any rules as to the authorities competent to remove public servants. The Inquiry Rules make separate provisions for enquires into the conduct of "superior public servants" and of inferior public servants" and, for that purpose, lay down that "a superior public servant" shall be a public servant not removable from office without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah. The Inquiry Rules make separate provisions for enquires into the conduct of "superior public servants" and of inferior public servants" and, for that purpose, lay down that "a superior public servant" shall be a public servant not removable from office without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah. Those rules make no attempt to say who are those public servants not removable without such sanction. For that we have to go to the rules or orders governing the removal of public servants. 9. In support of the argument advanced on behalf of the accused reliance is placed on Ahammed Kannu v. Travancore-Cochin State1. There it was held that a clerk being an officer in superior service within the meaning of Article 252 of the Travancore Service Regulations was a superior public servant, who, under rule (2) of the Inquiry Rules of 1896, could be dismissed only after a formal public enquiry in the manner prescribed by those rules. It is observed in the judgment (at page 38 of the report) that the petitioner therein belonged to the superior service as defined in Article 252 of the Travancore Service Regulations which is extracted in full. This is followed by the statement that no superior civil servant is removable from service without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah and it is on this statement that express reliance is placed on behalf of the accused. But the judgment does not explain how this result is arrived at. If all that was meant was that no superior civil servant within the meaning of the Inquiry Rules of 1896 is removable from service without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah, that would only be putting the definition in rule (1) of those rules the other way about, and would be an unexceptionable statement although of little use. If all that was meant was that no superior civil servant within the meaning of the Inquiry Rules of 1896 is removable from service without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah, that would only be putting the definition in rule (1) of those rules the other way about, and would be an unexceptionable statement although of little use. But if what was meant was that an officer belonging to the superior service as defined in Article 252 of the Travancore Service Regulations is not removable from service without the sanction of His Highness the Maharajah, as appears to be what was meant from the conclusion arrived at that rule (2) of the Inquiry Rules and the provisions of Act II of 1122, the law regulating enquiries into the conduct of public servants not removable from their appointments without the sanction of the Government, were applicable to the petitioner in that case, we must express our respectful dissent both to the premise and to the conclusion. For, they proceed on the assumption which we have shown to be unwarranted that the "superior service" of Article 252 of the Travancore Service Regulations and "the superior public servants" of the Inquiry Rules of 1896 connote the same thing, and that a member of the former is necessarily one of the latter. 10. It is argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that in the light of some later Division Bench and Full Bench rulings the statement in the decision referred to that the Travancore Service Regulations is existing law and that the Inquiry Rules of 1896 constitute a primary and independent legislative measure is incorrect and that the Travancore Service Regulations as also those rules, are mere executive directions, in the case of the Inquiry Rules superseded by subsequent legislation. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to go into this question. 11. We allow the petition and direct that the cases be restored to file and reheard in accordance with the observations in paragraph 4 of this judgment. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed.