Judgment This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Messrs. Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., Manager lent of the Pamba River Factory, Thiruvalla, praying that this Court be pleased (a)to call for the records of the case and to quash the order of reference No. L. Dis. 4270 of 1956, dated the 30th October, 1956 (produced along with the affidavit and marked "A" for identification) by the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order, or direction, or in the alternative to issue a writ directing the second respondent to forbear from proceeding with the enquiry in pursuance of the Notification Exhibit-A; and (b) to pass such other and further writs, orders or directions as are deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case. The first respondent is the State of Kerala represented by the Labour Secretary to Government, Trivandrum and second respondent is the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey. Exhibit-A referred to above is the order, dated 30th October, 1956, of the former Government of Travancore-Cochin referring a dispute as an industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey, which is the second respondent in this application. The said order runs as follows: No. L. Dis. 4270/56/DD. "Government of Travancore-Cochin Labour Department, Dated, Trivandum 30th October, 1956. ORDER. Whereas, the Government are of opinion that an industrial dispute exists between the Management of the Pamba River Factory, Thiruvalla, represented by the General Manager and the boatmen of the above concern represented by the Dashinabharatha Navika Thozhilali Union, Pulikeezhu, Thiruvalla, in respect of matters mentioned in the annexure to this order: And, whereas, in the opinion of Government it is necessary to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947) the Government hereby direct that the said industrial dispute be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey." Government Secretariat, Development Department. By Order of His Highness the Raj Pramukh, G. Bhaskaran Nair Labour Secretary. Addl. Secretary to Government. Annexure. Are the boatmen entitled to bonus from the Factory and if so what should be the quantum of bonus and what is the period for which it is payable? Are the boatmen entitled to unemployment wages for the periods of involuntary unemployment with retrospective effect from the year 1954? Addl. Secretary to Government. Annexure. Are the boatmen entitled to bonus from the Factory and if so what should be the quantum of bonus and what is the period for which it is payable? Are the boatmen entitled to unemployment wages for the periods of involuntary unemployment with retrospective effect from the year 1954? Are the boatmen entitled to waiting charges for the periods exceeding 12 hours they are made to wait at the cane loading points or at the Factory boat basin and if so, at what rate? Are the boatmen entitled to get refund of the amounts deducted from their wages by the Management of the Pamba River Factory during the years 1952 to 1954? It will be seen that the prayer in the application is either to issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ quashing the order of reference, Exhibit-A, or in the alternative, to issue a writ directing the Industrial Tribunal, the second respondent from proceeding with the inquiry in pursuance of the Notification, Exhibit-A. The alternative prayer should be understood as asking for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the second respondent from proceeding with the enquiry on the basis of Exhibit-A. The substantial contention raised in the affidavit filed in support of the application is that there is no relationship of employer and employee between the applicants and the boatmen referred to in Exhibit-A and that the boatmen are not ‘workmen’ within the meaning of that expression as defined in section 2, clause (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947). According to the petitioners, the order of reference, Exhibit-A itself is bad in view of the fact that the very foundation for the existence of a dispute namely, the employer-employee relationship is nonexistent as such, and hence the decision of the State to refer to adjudication, is without jurisdiction and is an act outside the scope of authority given to them under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There are several matters referred to in the affidavit to show that according to the petitioners, the boatmen cannot be considered to be ‘workmen’ under section 2 (s) of the Act. There are several matters referred to in the affidavit to show that according to the petitioners, the boatmen cannot be considered to be ‘workmen’ under section 2 (s) of the Act. The State of Kerala has filed a counter-affidavit traversing the material allegations of the applicant and in particular, has also challenged the position taken up by the petitioner that the boatmen are not "workmen.‘ In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that in making the order of reference, Government cannot be deemed to act as a judicial body and that the reference is made by the Government only in the exercise of its administrative powers. It is further stated in paragraph 5 that the question as to the relationship between the parties as constituting or not constituting the relationship of employer-employee, is a pure question of fact, the decision of which has to be left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the application is premature and has to be dismissed on that sole ground. It is further reiterated in paragraph 7 that the reference under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is only an administrative act of the Government and no writ can be issued in respect of such an act. There are other statements made in the counter-affidavit controverting the position taken up by the applicant in his application. At the beginning itself, I indicated to the learned Advocate-General appearing for the State and to Mr. G.B. Pai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that before going into the merits of the case, arguments may be confined as to whether the jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked at this stage and I have heard arguments only on this preliminary point of jurisdiction. The question as to whether the boatmen referred to in Exhibit-A are workmen or not, or as to whether there is the relationship of employee and workmen in this case has neither been argued nor considered by me in these proceedings. I am making this quite clear so that any incidental reference to this question in this judgment should not be understood even in the slightest degree as an adjudication on this point. I am making this quite clear so that any incidental reference to this question in this judgment should not be understood even in the slightest degree as an adjudication on this point. It will be seen from Exhibit-A that the Government are of opinion that an industrial dispute exists between the Management of the Pamba River Factory and the boatmen of the said concern and that in the opinion of the Government, it is necessary to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication. The notification further states that in exercise of the powers conferred by section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Government directs that the said industrial dispute be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. It contains also the points on which adjudication is to be given by the Tribunal. I am not considering those points because it is unnecessary at this stage. ‘Industrial Dispute’ has been defined under section 2(k) as meaning any dispute or difference between employers or between employees and workmen, or between workmen and workman, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The term ‘workman’ has been defined in section 2(s). The contention of the learned counsel Mr. G.B. Pai is that Government has got power to refer only an industrial dispute which will come within the definition in section 2(k) of the Act. One of the types of industrial dispute under the said definition will be a dispute or difference between the employers and workmen. Unless the relationship of employer and workmen is established the dispute will not come as an industrial dispute under the Act. In this case, the management has been all along contending that there is no such relationship between 1 he management and the boatmen referred to in Exhibit-A. The boatmen referred in to Exhibit-A are also not workmen under the definition of section 2(a) of the Act. The order of reference is bad and without jurisdiction, as the very foundation for the existence of an industrial dispute namely, the employer-employee relationship is non-existent in this case and as such, the Government has no jurisdiction under the Act to refer the dispute for adjudication. The Government cannot by a wrong interpretation of the facts of the case get jurisdiction when they have none under the Act. The Government cannot by a wrong interpretation of the facts of the case get jurisdiction when they have none under the Act. Therefore, the order of the Government Exhibit-A is one passed without jurisdiction and as such, must be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. So ran the argument of Mr. G.B. Pai. In the alternative, the learned counsel contended that even if the order of the Government could not be quashed by a certiorari proceedings on some ground or other, a writ of prohibition has been asked for to stop further proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, because the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction at all to conduct an enquiry on the basis of a reference made by the Government which itself is without jurisdiction. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State, on the other hand contended that the order of the Government, Exhibit-A passed under section 10(1) of the Act, is an administrative order not amenable to be quashed by proceedings by way of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. He also contended that the alternative relief of writ of prohibition also cannot issue against the second respondent, because the question sought to be raised in these writ proceedings regarding the absence of a relationship of employer-employee, is essentially a matter for the second respondent to go into and give a decision. Those are all essential questions of fact and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to be gone into and adjudicated upon. The Tribunal has got full jurisdiction over such matters and it cannot be said that the Tribunal is acting in any way without jurisdiction and as such, no writ of prohibition either can issue. After hearing the arguments of both the learned Advocate-General and Mr. G.B. Pai, I am of the view that the learned Advocate-General is well-founded in his contentions on both the points. The circumstances under which writs of certiorari and prohibition can be issued has been very elaborately dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque1. Mr. G.B. Pai, I am of the view that the learned Advocate-General is well-founded in his contentions on both the points. The circumstances under which writs of certiorari and prohibition can be issued has been very elaborately dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque1. Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, who delivered the leading judgment of the Court, after an exhaustive review of the case-law, observes as follows: "both writs of prohibition and ‘certiorari’ have for their object the restraining of inferior Courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, and they could be issued not merely to Courts but to all authorities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. But there is one fundamental distinction between the two writs, and that is what is material for the present purpose. They are issued at different stages of the proceedings. When an inferior Court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are takes can move the superior Co art for a writ of prohibition, and on that, an order will issue forbidding the inferior Court from continuing the proceedings. On the other hand, if the Court hears that cause or matter and gives a decision, the party aggrieved would have to move the superior Court for a writ of ‘certiorari’ and on that, an order will be made quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction. It might happen that in a proceeding before the inferior Court a decision might have bee 1 passed which does not completely dispose of the matter, in which case it might be necessary to apply both for ‘certiorari’ and prohibition: ‘certiorari’ for quashing what had been decided, and prohibition for arresting the further continuance of the proceeding. Authorities have gone to this extent that in such cases when an application is made for a writ of prohibition and there in no prayer for certiorari’, it would be open to the Court to stop further proceedings which are consequential on the decision. But if the proceedings have terminated then, it is too late to issue prohibition and ‘certiorari’ tor quashing is the proper remedy to resort to. But if the proceedings have terminated then, it is too late to issue prohibition and ‘certiorari’ tor quashing is the proper remedy to resort to. Broadly speaking and apart from the cases of the kind referred to above, a writ of prohibition will lie when the proceedings are to any extent pending and a ‘writ of certiorari‘ for quashing after they have terminated in a final decision". According to Mr. G.B. Pai, the Government will get jurisdiction under section 10(1) only if it is an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, and one of the essential elements, that will go to make up an industrial dispute is that such a dispute or difference must be between employers and workmen. Unless the relationship of employer and workmen is established, there is no industrial dispute and the Government does not get any jurisdiction to refer under section 10(1). It is in considering this contention that the question arises as to whether the Government, in referring a dispute under section 10(1), acts under its administrative powers, or whether it acts in a judicial or in a quasi-judicial capacity; and the further question will arise whether a writ of prohibition can issue against the Tribunal. According to Mr. G.B. Pai, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended on a valid reference under section 10(i)(c) of the Act and the reference could be valid only if there was a dispute which in fact, and in law amounted to an industrial dispute. In this case, the Government have committed an error both in fact and in law in holding that there is an employer-employee relationship and on this mistaken assumption, they have made the reference which is incompetent in law. Once it is established that there is no relationship of employer-employee in this case, there is no industrial dispute and the reference itself is without jurisdiction, and therefore, the order of the Government has to be quashed. Mr. G.B. Pai relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal1, and in particular, the observations of their Lordships at page 539. According to him, the observations of their Lordships make it clear that a party has a right to satisfy the Court that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute at all and that is what he is attempting to do in this case. According to him, the observations of their Lordships make it clear that a party has a right to satisfy the Court that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute at all and that is what he is attempting to do in this case. I am not able toaccept the contention of the learned counsel based on these observations of the Supreme Court. It must be remembered, in that case, their Lordships were considering the validity of an award passed by an Industrial Tribuanl on the basis of a reference by the U. P. Government. The controversy in that case was as to whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within the definition of industrial dispute as used in the U.P. Act. In that case a leno-typist was dismissed from service by the appellant company. His case was not taken up by any union of workers of the company nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in similar trades. But it was taken up by the U.P. Working Journalists Union with which the leno-typist had no connection whatsoever. The U. P. Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that there was an industrial dispute between the appellant therein and its workmen. The State Industrial Tribunal decided in favour of the lenotypist and the said order was confirmed on appeal by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. An application under Article 226 for quashing the said order was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court and the question came up before the Supreme Court on a certificate under Article 133, clause 1(c) of the Constitution. The main contention before their Lordships was that the order of the Industrial Tribunal should be set aside inasmuch as there was no Industrial dispute within the meaning of that expression as used in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVII of 1947 and that consequently the U. P. Government had no power to make the reference in question. The main contention before their Lordships was that the order of the Industrial Tribunal should be set aside inasmuch as there was no Industrial dispute within the meaning of that expression as used in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVII of 1947 and that consequently the U. P. Government had no power to make the reference in question. Their Lordships after considering the scheme of the Act and the interpretation given to the corresponding phrase ‘Trade dispute’ in English Law and ‘Industrial dispute’ in Australian law and the leading decisions bearing on the point came to the conclusion that the decided cases to the extent that they take a contrary view, i.e., an individual dispute comprised in an industrial dispute must unless there is something peculiar as to facts, be held to have been wrongly decided. It is after arriving at this conclusion that their Lordships say as follow: “In spite of the fact that the making of a reference by the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act is the exercise of its administrative powers, that is not destructive of the rights of an aggrieved party to show that what was referred was not an ‘industrial dispute’ at all and therefore the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to make the award can be questioned, even though the factual existence of a dispute may not be subject to a party’s challenge.” State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy1. It will be seen that their Lordships were not at all dealing with a question as to the stage at which a reference made by the Government can be challenged and found to be bad. In that case, reference had been made and an award also had been passed which was confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and by the High Court. It was in proceedings initiated under Article 226 after the award had been made, that this question was gone into and considered. In my opinion, their Lordships are only reiterating the view expressed in their previous decision in the State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathi1, on which the learned Advocate-General very strongly relies. That decision will be dealt with by and when dealing with the contentions of the learned Advocate-General. These observations, in my opinion, make it very clear that the Government in making a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act is acting only in the exercise of its administrative powers. That decision will be dealt with by and when dealing with the contentions of the learned Advocate-General. These observations, in my opinion, make it very clear that the Government in making a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act is acting only in the exercise of its administrative powers. Notwithstanding that the reference by the Government is under its administrative powers, their Lordships emphasized, that a party has got a right to show that what was referred was not an Industrial dispute at all and therefore the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to make the award based upon such a reference can be questioned. The reference to their Lordships’ previous decision makes this position quite clear. Therefore, I am not able to accept the contention of Mr. G.B. Pai that the said decision lays down that a party is entitled to challenge the reference itself at this stage. Mr. G.B. Pai referred to two decisions of the Madras High Court-one of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in Radhakrishna Mills v. State of Madras2, and the other of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar in Abdul Kader Sahib v. State of Madras3. Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in the decision reported in (1956) 1 M.L.J. 280 had to deal with an application for a writ of certiorari to quash a reference made by the State of Madras under section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. One of the points raised in the application was that a dispute between an individual worker and the Management was not an industrial dispute as defined under section 2(k) of the Act. From the reports, it is seen, that the Workers Union contended that none of the questions raised in the application could be investigated in certiorari proceedings, as the order of reference under section 10(1)(c) by the Government was an administrative act to correct which, no writ of certiorari could issue. The learned Judge relied upon the passage from the Judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Madras State v. C.P. Sarathy1, and accepted the contention of the Workers Union and held that the order of reference by the State cannot be quashed. It is further seen that the applicants before the learned Judge amended their prayer and asked for a writ of prohibition against the Industrial Tribunal. It is further seen that the applicants before the learned Judge amended their prayer and asked for a writ of prohibition against the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Judge negatived the contention that there was no industrial dispute and held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. Nevertheless, the learned Judge again considered the question as to validity of the reference under section 10(1)(c). The learned Judge observes at page 282 as follows: "The next question is: was the reference under section 10(1)(c) valid. The extreme contention, that the validity of what was an administrative act, done no doubt in the exercise of a statutory power conferred by the Government under section 10(1)(c), could not be questioned even for deciding whether a writ of prohibition could issue to the Industrial Tribunal, has to be rejected. What I have to consider is whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the industrial dispute referred to it. If it had no jurisdiction a writ of prohibition could issue even as a writ of certiorari could issue to quash an award of the Tribunal if it had acted without jurisdiction. Absence of an industrial dispute would obviously be sufficient to negative jurisdiction. The validity of the order of reference is open to examination by this Court to decide whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction. There was an industrial dispute in this case as I have already pointed out." It is on the passage extracted above that Mr. G.B. Pai, relies very strongly to show that the validity of a reference can be canvassed even at this stage in these proceedings. Prima facie these observations may appear to support the contention of Mr. G.B. Pai. But it will be seen that in the next paragraph dealing with the contention of the Workers Union on this point, the learned Judge observes that it is not necessary for him to pronounce any opinion on the soundness or otherwise of the contention of the Workers Union to dispose of the questions at issue in the proceedings before the learned Judge. The learned Judge further observes that in that case, an industrial dispute did exist and further held that it is left to the discretion of the Government to refer the dispute for adjudication under section 10(1) and the Government has to be satisfied about the same. The learned Judge further observes that in that case, an industrial dispute did exist and further held that it is left to the discretion of the Government to refer the dispute for adjudication under section 10(1) and the Government has to be satisfied about the same. The factual existence of the industrial dispute and of the expediency of referring that dispute, the learned Judge says, the Government is the sole Judge. Dealing with the contention of the absence of notice by Government, the learned Judge held that the issue of an order under section 10(1)(c) itself is an administrative act and does not amount to a judicial of quasi-judicial determination of the rights of any of the parties and the failure to give notice to the parties does not vitiate the exercise of statutory power vested in the Government by section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The quotation extracted above will only show that the learned Judge was considering the question from the point of view of issuing a writ of prohibition to the Tribunal. I have dealt with this judgment fairly long, because the learned counsel Mr. G. B Pai, placed very great reliance on this judgment. In my opinion, the observations relied upon by the learned counsel in this judgment, have to be read in its context and with further reasoning of the learned Judge as to the administrative character of an order under section 10(1)(c).The judgment of the learned Judge taken in its entirety, does not, in my opinion, lead to the conclusion that the Court can interfere as such with a reference made under section 10(1)(c) by the Government. Anyhow, it is unnecessary for me to deal more with this decision, as the learned Judge himself has explained the scope of this judgment in a later decision of his reported in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras1. The learned Judge has dealt with this point more fully in the later judgment and restricted the scope of his decision in Radhakrishna Mills v. State of Madras2. In fact, the learned Advocate-General places very great reliance on this later judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras1, and I will deal with that decision in due course. The next decision relied upon by Mr. G.B. Pai is that of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, in Abdul Kader Sahib v. State of Madras3. In fact, the learned Advocate-General places very great reliance on this later judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras1, and I will deal with that decision in due course. The next decision relied upon by Mr. G.B. Pai is that of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, in Abdul Kader Sahib v. State of Madras3. The application before the learned Judge was under Article 226 for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing the Industrial Tribunal therein to forbear from proceeding with an enquiry in pursuance of a reference made by the State Government under section 10(1)(c). The contention raised before the learned Judge was that there was no relationship of employer-employee between the parties and as such, there was no Industrial dispute and in consequence, the reference made by the Government cannot be sustained. The learned Judge at pages 575 and 576 observes as follows: "It does not need much argument to show that under the Industrial Disputes Act the existence of the relationship of employer and employee is necessary before there can be any industrial dispute, and the existence of an industrial dispute is necessary before there can be any valid reference by Government of such dispute to an Industrial Tribunal. When the petitioner proved, that in the present case there was no such relationship between the petitioner and the workers, who were impleaded as third respondent, the Government in their counter-affidavit stated in paragraph 2 that ‘if there does not exist such a relationship (that is as employer and employee) his contention that there was no industrial dispute and that the reference made by the Government as if there was such a dispute was without jurisdiction may be correct’. Nothing more has been brought before me either by the Government or by the workers to whom notices have been issued in this writ petition to show that the relationship between the petitioner and the workers was that of an employer and employee. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the reference of the alleged dispute to the Industrial Tribunal is without jurisdiction and the reference is quashed." Naturally, Mr. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the reference of the alleged dispute to the Industrial Tribunal is without jurisdiction and the reference is quashed." Naturally, Mr. G.B. Pai strongly urged the acceptance of this decision as laying down the principle that if the Court is satisfied about the absence of the relationship of an employer and employee, it can quash the order of Government making the reference and thus put an end to the proceedings here itself. In my view, the decision of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar is only one of those extreme cases where ex facie, on admitted facts, a Court can immediately come to a conclusion one way or the other and finally dispose of the matter once for all even at the stage of a reference under section 10(1)(c). It is further seen that the applicant was able to satisfy the learned Judge there about the non-existence of the relationship of employer and employee in that particular case, and workers who were parties before the learned Judge and the Government stated that if there was no such relationship as employer and employee, the applicant’s contention about the validity of the reference by Government as being without jurisdiction may be correct. Evidently, the parties had nothing more to say on that matter excepting the materials then placed before the learned Judge. In fact, the learned Judge himself says that nothing more was brought to his notice either by the Government or by the workers to whom notices had been issued to show that the relationship between the petitioner and the workers there was that of an employer and employee. It is under these circumstances that the learned Judge held the reference itself as being without jurisdiction. But it will be seen that the question of the stage at which the matter could be interfered with, was neither argued by any party nor considered by the learned Judge. In fact, even the application itself was not to quash an order of reference but only to issue a writ of prohibition forbearing the Tribunal from proceeding with the enquiry. Therefore, this judgment will not help Mr. G.B. Pai. In so far as the case before me is concerned, the matter is entirely different. In fact, even the application itself was not to quash an order of reference but only to issue a writ of prohibition forbearing the Tribunal from proceeding with the enquiry. Therefore, this judgment will not help Mr. G.B. Pai. In so far as the case before me is concerned, the matter is entirely different. The State and the Management are not agreed as to the existence or non-existence of the relationship of employer and employee in this matter. According to the Management, there is no such relationship, but according to the State, there is such a relationship. But the most curious feature is that the persons who will be vitally interested in opposing the contention of the Management, namely, the boatmen represented by the Dakshina Baratha Navika Thozhilali Union referred to in Exhibit-A, have not been made parties in this application. Therefore, it is not possible to know what their contention is going to be. Before Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, the workers were also parties and actively took part in the writ proceedings before the learned Judge. It is in that connection, that the learned Judge observes that the workers there have not placed any further material before the Court to controvert the statements of the applicants therein. As I am rot going into the merits of the contentions of the Management, I am not dealing with this matter any further. It is enough to state that Government does not accept the contention of the Management about the absence of the employer and employee relationship. Therefore, the circumstances existing before Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, do not exist before me. Mr. G.B. Pai referred to a decision of Mr. Chagla, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Desai of the Bombay High Court in F.T. & H. Co. v. K.P. Krishnan1. That decision relates to a converse case as to whether a mandamus can issue when the Government refuses to make a reference under section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that decision has no bearing on the point under consideration. Justice Desai of the Bombay High Court in F.T. & H. Co. v. K.P. Krishnan1. That decision relates to a converse case as to whether a mandamus can issue when the Government refuses to make a reference under section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that decision has no bearing on the point under consideration. In fact, the learned Chief Justice at page 275 of the reports refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Madras State v. C.P. Sarathy1, and observed that the Supreme Court was emphasising the wide powers of the Government to refer a dispute under section 10(1) in the interest of industrial peace and they would have supported the order of refusal to make a reference, if it had been stated to be in the cause of industrial peace. But in the absence of such evidence, the learned Judges were not inclined to grant such an absolute power in the Government to refuse to make a reference under section 12(5). Therefore, this decision does not in any way help the contentions of Mr. G.B. Pai. The two other decisions referred to by Mr. G.B. Pai are those of the Patna High Court reported in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, and South Bihar Sugar Mills, Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Orissa3. The decision of Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad, JJ., in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, again related to the question whether a dispute between an individual workman and a Management can be an Industrial dispute or not within the meaning of the Act. The Central Government had referred the industrial dispute under section 10(1)(c) of the Act for adjudication by the Tribunal. An application for the issue of a certiorari to call up the records of proceedings pending before the Tribunal and for quashing the same on the ground that there was no jurisdiction on the part of the Central Government to make the reference was made to the High Court. The main contentions urged before the High Court was on the question as to whether a dispute between an individual workmen and the Management can be an industrial dispute. There appears to have been no dispute on the facts and the whole decision related to the interpretation of the Act. The Government, the Management, the employee and the employee’s association were all parties in the writ proceedings. There appears to have been no dispute on the facts and the whole decision related to the interpretation of the Act. The Government, the Management, the employee and the employee’s association were all parties in the writ proceedings. Absolutely no controversy about facts arose before the learned Judges and the controversy centered round only the various sections of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judges, on an interpretation of the Act, and on the admitted facts came to the conclusion that the dispute does not fall within the expression of ‘Industrial dispute’ as defined in section 2(k) of the Act and in consequence, the learned Judges further held that the proceedings initiated under section 10(1) were without jurisdiction and that the reference made by the Government under section 10(1) also was beyond its jurisdiction and ultra vires. It will be seen that even in this case, the application related to only challenging the record of the proceedings before the Tribunal and for quashing the same and in view of the facts being beyond controversy, the learned Judges quashed the proceedings before the Tribunal on the ground that the reference by the Government itself was one without jurisdiction. Even here, the stage for the issue of the writ was not considered and the question of issuing a writ quashing the order of the Government itself was not separately considered. In the decision of the Patna High Court reported in South Bihar Sugar Mills, Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Others3, a similar question appears to have arisen. That was also a case of an individual dispute; and the same question as in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, arose in this case also. The application was for quashing the reference of the Government and also for prohibiting the Tribunal from proceeding with the enquiry in consequence of the reference made by the Government. Even there, the Management, the Government, the employee and the Worker’s Union were all represented before the Court. The facts were not in dispute and it was again a case of interpreting the sections of the Act. The learned Judges followed their previous decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, and came to the conclusion that there is no industrial dispute as defined in section 2(k). In this view, the learned Judges prohibited the Tribunal from proceeding with the inquiry. The learned Judges followed their previous decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, and came to the conclusion that there is no industrial dispute as defined in section 2(k). In this view, the learned Judges prohibited the Tribunal from proceeding with the inquiry. But the learned Judges held that they cannot quash the reference made by the State Government. In my opinion, the two Patna decisions relied upon by Mr. G.B. Pai do not advance his case any further. All parties, namely, the Government, the Management, the employee and the employee’s Union were parties before the High Court in both the decisions and there was no controversy about the facts and as such, no facts required to be investigated. The only question was about the interpretation of the Act. These two cases again are only instances where parties were able to satisfy the Court even ex facie that the reference by the Government cannot be sustained under the clear terms of the Act. It will be further seen that in the decision reported in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Orissa1, the application was for quashing the notification of the Government making a reference and also for issue of a writ of prohibition against the Tribunal from proceeding with the enquiry consequent on the reference by the Government. It was contended on behalf of the State that the order of reference made by the Government is an administrative act and not amenable for being corrected under certiorari proceedings. No decision was given on this point, as will be seen from the Judgment of Mr. Justice Sinha at page 503: “I am, however, not called upon in the present case to decide as to whether the action of the State Government in referring the dispute to the Tribunal under section 10(1) of the Act, is merely an administrative act, or a judicial or a quasi-judicial act, because this application can be disposed of without deciding that question.” The learned Judges also observe that in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government2, the question as to the nature of the act of the State Government in making the reference was not raised. Mr. v. Central Government2, the question as to the nature of the act of the State Government in making the reference was not raised. Mr. Justice Sinha further says: “I would, therefore, refrain from deciding the question as to whether the State Government in referring the dispute, under section 10(1) of the Act, was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity or its action in so referring was merely an administrative act”. Therefore, it will be clearly seen that the learned Judges never adverted to the question as to whether a writ can issue against the order of the State Government making a reference. It is also finally seen that the learned Judges appear to realise the force of this contention as will be seen from their observation at page 503: “In the present case, even though this Court may not be in a position to quash the reference made by the State Government by issuing a writ of certiorari, there is no doubt that this Court can issue a writ of prohibition by quashing the proceedings before the Tribunal, which has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties”. In this view, and in view of the admitted facts before the learned Judges, the Court there issued a writ of prohibition to the Industrial Tribunal. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General contends that whatever may be the view taken by the Government, it has got the jurisdiction to refer the dispute as an industrial dispute, once it is satisfied that there is an industrial dispute, with all its implications. Notwithstanding the reference it is open to the petitioners to contend before the Tribunal that there is no industrial dispute and as such, challenge its jurisdiction to go into the matter. But that is something totally different from saying that the order of the Government itself must be quashed or the proceedings before the Tribunal must be stopped forthwith even now. The learned Advocate-General very strongly relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madras State v. C.P. Sarathy3. In that case, the proceedings started by way of charge-sheeting the 1st respondent there for failure to implement certain terms of award made by the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. The learned Advocate-General very strongly relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madras State v. C.P. Sarathy3. In that case, the proceedings started by way of charge-sheeting the 1st respondent there for failure to implement certain terms of award made by the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. An objection was raised by the 1st respondent before the magistrate that the latter had no jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry because the award on the non-compliance of which the prosecution was based, was ultra vires and also void on the ground that the reference by the Government under section 10 of the Act was itself not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The magistrate declined to deal with the objection and proceedings were initiated by the 1st respondent under Article 226 for quashing the proceedings pending before the magistrate. The Madras High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent and quashed the proceedings. The State of Madras took up the matter to the Supreme Court and contended that the question whether there existed an Industrial dispute when the Government made the reference, was an issue of fact which the High Court had no jurisdiction to negative at the preliminary stage even before evidence was recorded by the magistrate. Their Lordships held that the Government had jurisdiction to make the reference and that the award made in consequence of that reference, was also binding on the respondent therein. Then follows the significant observation of their Lordships at pages 57: “This is, however, not to say that the Government will be justified in making a reference under section 10(1) without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an Industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of establishments engaged in a particular industry.......But it must be remembered that in making a reference under section 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But, if the dispute was an Industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters.” These observations if I may say with respect, forcibly bring out the view of their Lordships that the Government is acting only in its administrative jurisdiction when exercising powers under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and Courts cannot canvass the order of reference very closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as would be the case if the Government’s order of reference was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. If I may say so again with respect, their Lordships sufficiently safeguard the right of a party who wants to impugn the award passed upon such a reference; and that is the right of the party aggrieved in challenging the award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and that in consequence, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. Therefore, in any award that may be passed on a reference made by the Government, the party is entitled to challenge not only the award as such but also the basis of the award, namely, the order of reference by the Government. Their Lordships have referred with approval to this decision in their later decision reported in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal1, already referred to. The learned Advocate-General also relied upon the judgment by Mr. Their Lordships have referred with approval to this decision in their later decision reported in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal1, already referred to. The learned Advocate-General also relied upon the judgment by Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in K. Motor Service Ltd. v. State2. In that case, the applicants wanted to have a decision from the High Court on the question as to whether there was an Industrial dispute as defined in the Act to justify a reference by the Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. The learned Judge rejected the application on the ground that the validity of the reference under section 10(1)(c) by the Government cannot be challenged in an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, because in making the order of reference, Government was only doing a ministerial or administrative act. The learned Judge further observes at page 701: “It has been held in more cases than one that despite the fact that the validity of the reference itself cannot be challenged by an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of reference, the question whether a given dispute is an Industrial dispute has yet to be decided. It is primarily for the Industrial Tribunal to decide that issue. If there is no Industrial dispute at all as defined by the Act the Industrial Tribunal would obviously have no further jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute”. The learned Judge further stated that no writ of prohibition or mandamus can issue, as the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the question whether an industrial dispute existed. The learned Advocate-General further very strongly relied upon the latest judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan reported in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras1. In that decision the learned Judge has as already mentioned, explained the scope of his previous decision in Radhakrishna Mills v. State of Madras2, and he has specifically stated that in the earlier decision he did not consider the stage at which those matters are to be considered. In the latest case, the point was as to whether the High Court can go into the question about the validity of a reference of the Government under section 10(1) even at the initial stage and as to whether a writ of prohibition can issue as against the Industrial Tribunal. In the latest case, the point was as to whether the High Court can go into the question about the validity of a reference of the Government under section 10(1) even at the initial stage and as to whether a writ of prohibition can issue as against the Industrial Tribunal. Before the learned Judge, the applicants very strongly relied upon his previous judgment reported in Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras2, as also the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar reported in Abdul Kader Sahib v. State of Madras3. The learned Judge has considered the scope of those two decisions and laid down the principles to be borne in mind in deciding a matter at that preliminary stage. The State of Madras had made a reference under section 10(1) to the Industrial Tribunal for enquiring into an Industrial Dispute and in consequence of that reference, the Industrial Tribunal was beginning to start the enquiry. The applicants challenged the jurisdiction of the State Government to refer the dispute and they contended that the weavers there, were not workmen, as defined by section 2(s) of the Act. In consequence, they contended that what was referred for adjudication was not an Industrial Dispute as defined under section 2(k). As stated earlier, the application was for issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the Tribunal from proceeding with the inquiry. The respondents therein including the Government contended that it was not the stage when a writ of prohibition can issue as regards the Tribunal. The learned Judge referred with approval to his previous judgment in K. Motor Service, Ltd. v. State4, already referred to. Regarding his decision in Radhakrishna Mills v. State of Madras2, the learned Judge states at page 867 of the Law Weekly Report that he was not concerned in that case, with the stage at which a writ of prohibition could issue. The learned Judge further says that there is really no conflict between the views recorded by him in his previous decisions. After referring to the judgment of Mr. The learned Judge further says that there is really no conflict between the views recorded by him in his previous decisions. After referring to the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar in Abdul Kader Sahib v. State of Madras3, the learned Judge observes: "In each of these cases the decision was based on the finding that the dispute that was referred under section 10(1)(c) of the Act for adjudication by the Tribunal was not an Industrial Dispute at all as defined by section 2(k) and that therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication. Neither Rajagopala Ayyangar,J., nor I had occasion then to determine whether the Tribunal itself had jurisdiction to decide whether the dispute that was referred to it for adjudication was an industrial Dispute. It is true that in each of these cases the Court examined the facts pleaded and proved by affidavits and came to the conclusion that what had been referred was not an industrial dispute. But I can look upon neither decision as having a direct bearing upon the ques-tion,whether this Court has exclusive jurisdiction even in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution to decide whether what was referred was an Industrial Dispute, and whether the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try even as a preliminary issue the question whether what was referred was an Industrial dispute". (See 70 L.W. 867). Dealing with the contention that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended on a valid reference under section 10(1)(c) of the Act and that the reference could be valid only if there was a dispute which in fact and in law amounted to an Industrial Dispute and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of the reference under section 10(1)(c) the learned Judge held at page 868: "The jurisdiction of this Court, even in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution todecide, where it is necessary to do so, whether a given dispute is an industrial dispute cannot be doubted That does not necessarily imply that the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try such an issue should it become necessary to do so in the proceedings before it. In my opinion, the Tribunal had that jurisdiction. If it comes to a right conclusion that it is an Industrial dispute, it has jurisdiction to proceed further with the adjudication of that dispute. In my opinion, the Tribunal had that jurisdiction. If it comes to a right conclusion that it is an Industrial dispute, it has jurisdiction to proceed further with the adjudication of that dispute. If, however, it comes to the conclusion that the dispute is not an industrial dispute, it can have no jurisdiction toproceed any further. As a statutory Tribunal whose jurisdiction is to be sought within the terms of the Statute which created it it cannot give itself jurisdiction by deciding wrongly such a jurisdictional issue. If the Tribunal wrongly decides such a question, the error can be corrected by appropriate proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution." The learned Judge further observes at page 869: "With reference to an Industrial dispute, an error in the assumption of jurisdiction by the Industrial Tribunal could be proved by showing that the decision of the Tribunal on the jurisdictional issue, whether the dispute that was referred to it for adjudication was an Industrial dispute was erroneous........................ If I am right in my view that the Industrial tribunal has jurisdiction to decide whether the dispute referred to it was an Industrial dispute as defined by section 2(k), and as incidental thereto decide whether the weavers represented by their Union, the third respondent in the proceedings before me, were workmen as defined by section 2(s) of the Act, it should be obvious that no writ of prohibition can issue at this stage to restrain the exercise of that jurisdiction." After referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in Han Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque1, regarding the scope of writs of certiorari and prohibition, the learned Judge observes at page 869 as follows: "On the application of these principles it should be clear that, if an Industrial Tribunal wrongly decided the jurisdiction issue and comes to the conclusion that the dispute is an industrial dispute when it is not, the aggrieved party can ask for the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding further in the matter. The aggrieved party can also ask for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings so far taken resulting in the erroneous decision, that what was referred was an industrial dispute." The learned Judge again at page 870 observes: "There is nothing in the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act which denies jurisdiction to the Industrial Tribunal to decide whether the dispute referred to it for adjudication is an industrial dispute. In the circumstances of this case, where the truth of the facts alleged by the petitioner and at least not admitted by the respondents has yet to be investigated, the Industrial Tribunal would appear to be appropriate forum for such investigation. It has jurisdiction to undertake such an investigation and to decide upon proof of the materials placed before it the question at issue." The learned Judge rejected the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of a reference under section 10(1)(c) of the Act and observed as follows at page 570: "Despite the order of reference under section 10(1)(c), an Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction, in fact, it will be its duty to decide if required to do so, whether the dispute that was referred under section 10(1)(c) was an Industrial Dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of that Act. The learned Judge also has quoted from Halsbury’s Laws of England, III Edition, Vol. XI paragraphs 218 and 219 to the effect that prohibition goes as soon as the inferior Tribunal proceeds to apply a wrong principle of law when deciding a fact on which jurisdiction depends and that in any event, where the jurisdiction of the inferior Court depends on the judicial determination of the facts the order does not lie until the Court has wrongfully given its jurisdiction. To quote Bailey, Vol. II, Law of Jurisdiction at page 668: "Prohibition cannot be made the drag-net by means of which all controverted and litigated questions between individual suitors may be brought into Court and tried and determined, for its office, as we repeat is to prevent the exercise by a Tribunal possessing judicial powers or jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. It is preventive rather than remedial process." I have quoted fairly in extenso from the judgment of Mr. It is preventive rather than remedial process." I have quoted fairly in extenso from the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in 70 Law Weekly 865, as, if I may say so with respect, the learned Judge has very exhaustively dealt with the jurisdiction to be exercised by Courts in the matter of issue of writs of prohibition. I respectfully agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge on all points covered by that decision. There is only one more decision cited by the learned Advocate-General and that is the decision of the Supreme Court in D.C. Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra2, The question before their Lordships was as to the interpretation of the expression "workmen’‘ as defined in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. At page 269 their Lordships observe: "The question whether the relationship between the parties is one as between employer and employee or between master and servant, is a pure question of fact." The reasoning of the learned Judges show that this is a question which the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide. The following passage in paragraph 116 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, III Edition, Vol. XI, at page 59, also brings out the true functions of inferior Tribunals: “The jurisdiction of an inferior Tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent (such as notice) or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior Tribunal has to try, and the determination whether it exists or not is logically and temporally prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior Tribunal has to try. The inferior Tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral facts when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not...............an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess or deprive itself of a jurisdiction which it otherwise would possess. If it purports to do so it may be restrained or compelled (as the case may be) by an order of prohibition or mandamus....” I may also state that Mr. If it purports to do so it may be restrained or compelled (as the case may be) by an order of prohibition or mandamus....” I may also state that Mr. G.B. Pai referred to the decision of Mr. Justice Subramonia Ayyar in S.C. Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal1, which I am informed, has been confirmed on appeal by a Division Bench. But that was also an instance of a dispute in respect of a single individual. The application itself was for quashing the proceedings pending before the Tribunal and in that case also a decision depended really on an interpretation of the Act. In view of the admitted facts, the learned Judge held that the reference is ultra vires and the proceedings started by Tribunal were also ultra vires. The said decision is similar to the decisions relied upon by Mr. G. B. Pai and discussed earlier in the judgment and it does not take us any further. On a consideration of the principles laid down by the decisions of 1 he Supreme Court in Madras State v. C.P. Sarathy2, and Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal3 it follows that the State, in making a reference under section 10(1)(c) of the Act is acting only in its administrative jurisdiction and a reference so made, cannot be challenged in proceedings by way of writ of certiorari. To the same effect is the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in the decision reported in K. Motor Service Ltd. v. State4, and further confirmed by the learned Judge in his later judgment in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras5. In this case, the parties before me are at variance on the question of the existence or non-existence of the relationship of employer and employee. The boatmen or the Union referred to in Exhibit-A, are not parties to these proceedings. Therefore it is not possible for me, ex facie to decide as in the Patna Cases and in the case decided by Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, that the order, Exhibit-A is in any way beyond the jurisdiction of the Government and as such, no writ of certiorari can issue quashing that order as prayed for. Then the question arises whether the alternative prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition against the Tribunal can be granted. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, that the order, Exhibit-A is in any way beyond the jurisdiction of the Government and as such, no writ of certiorari can issue quashing that order as prayed for. Then the question arises whether the alternative prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition against the Tribunal can be granted. The Supreme Court in the decision in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque6, has laid down the principles as to when a writ of prohibition can be issued. Mr. Justice Rajagopalan in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. State of Madras5, has also very exhaustively dealt with the principles regarding the issue of a writ of prohibition. The decision of the Supreme Court in D.C. Works Ltd v. State of Saurashtra7, clearly indicates that it is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide this question about the existence or otherwise of the employer and employee relationship. There is nothing in the Act which denies jurisdiction to the Tribunal to decide these questions. As already stated, there is keen controversy on this point between the Government and the Management. The parties who will also be vitally interested in a decision on this question namely, the boatmen represented by the Dakshina Bharatha Navika Thozhilali Union referred to in Exhibit-A are not parties in these proceedings. As observed by Mr. Justice Rajagopalan the Management can pursue the appropriate remedies available to them in law from any decision that may be given by the Tribunal on this jurisdiction issue. Therefore, the prayer for the alternative relief of the issue of the writ of prohibition against the second respondent cannot also issue in the circumstances of this case. Reference may also be made to another judgment of Mr. Justice Rajagopalan reported in Paramount Films of India Ltd., Madras Branch, In re1. There the application was for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order of reference made by the State of Madras under section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The learned Judge in rejecting that application stated that an order under section 10(1)(c) is only an administrative order and therefore outside the purview of correction by the issue of certiorari. The learned Judge also stated that a writ of prohibition either cannot be issued to the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Judge in rejecting that application stated that an order under section 10(1)(c) is only an administrative order and therefore outside the purview of correction by the issue of certiorari. The learned Judge also stated that a writ of prohibition either cannot be issued to the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Judge further observes at page 358: “It is open to the petitioner to raise the question he has raised here, that there was in law no industrial dispute at all for adjudication, even as a preliminary issue by the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal has to decide such a jurisdictional issue in the first instance............... As I said, the order the petitioner seeks to avoid is the order of reference under section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for that no application for the issue of a writ of certiorari can lie.” I respectfully agree with the reasoning contained in this judgment . In the result, this application fails even on the preliminary point and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent State fixed at Rs.150. The Rule nisi issued by this Court on 14th November, 1956 is discharged. As mentioned at the beginning of this judgment, this application is disposed of only on the question of jurisdiction. The other question namely as to the existence or non-existence of the employer and employee relationship and as to whether the boatmen referred to in Exhibit A, are workmen and as to whether the dispute referred by the Government under Exhibit-A is an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act, are not at all even considered in this judgment. The question as to whether the boatmen referred to in Exhibit-A are workmen within the definition of section 2 (a) of the Act and the further question whether there is the relationship of employer and employee in this case so as to make the dispute an industrial dispute within the meaning of that definition in section 2(k)of the Act will be decided as preliminary issues by the Tribunal the 2nd respondent herein. The Tribunal will direct the parties to file statements and also adduce evidence oral and documentary strictly limited only to this question in the first instance. The Tribunal will direct the parties to file statements and also adduce evidence oral and documentary strictly limited only to this question in the first instance. The Tribunal will decide and give a finding on these points in the first instance and adjourn the hearing, consequent upon its decision on these points, for a month. M.C.M. ----- Application dismissed.