Judgment This is an appeal on behalf of four accused who have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, on different charges. Originally a charge was laid against 7 persons, they having been charged under sections 148, 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. The case of the prosecution was that at 8 a.m. on 29th June, 1955, all the accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in the field belonging to accused No.1 with the common object of attacking and murdering one Dasari Balireddy and chat they committed rioting with deadly weapons and inflicted injuries on the deceased with those weapons in consequence of which he died. The deceased belonged to this village. It is stated that the deceased and his farm servant who is P.W. 3 were carting manure in the field of the deceased. It is also stated that the deceased had the right of way through the accused No. 1’s field who was the owner of the neighbouring land. The case is that the deceased had the right to run through the field of the accused No.1 with one wheel of the cart rolling on the field. The deceased ran his cart with manure over accused No. 1’s land the previous day and on the day of occurrence it is stated that the deceased drove his cart in such a way that both the wheels were moving through the field of the accused. At this time accused 1 to 4 obstructed the cart and later accused 5 to 7 along with accused 1 to 4 attacked the deceased. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and the prosecution examined 15 witnesses of whom P.Ws. 2 and 3 have been examined as eye-witnesses. On behalf of the defence a doctor was examined as D.W. 1. The Sessions Judge on an appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not been able to prove satisfactorily that the accused 5 to 7 had anything to do with the murder of the deceased. He also held that they had been falsely implicated. He, therefore, acquitted them of the charges. The Sessions Judge on an appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution had not been able to prove satisfactorily that the accused 5 to 7 had anything to do with the murder of the deceased. He also held that they had been falsely implicated. He, therefore, acquitted them of the charges. With regard to A-1, A-3 and A-4, he came to the conclusion that they were only guilty of grievous hurt and with regard to accused 2, he was of the opinion that it was his blow that proved fatal but having regard to the fact that according to him, there was no premeditation and that it was in a sudden fight in a passion that this blow was dealt he held that A-2 could be convicted under section 304, part II. Inasmuch as he came to the conclusion that the offences could be held to have been committed by A-1 to A-4 individually, only four of them, there could be no question of riot within the meaning of section 148. Therefore they were all acquitted of the charge of rioting. This appeal is now on behalf of the four accused who have been convicted and sentenced. The. learned counsel for the appellants argued before me that in coming to the conclusion that A-5 to A-7 were not guilty and had nothing to do with the crime, the Sessions Judge, had dilated upon the statements of P.W. 2 and had categorically stated that his statement with regard to A-5 to A-7 could not be believed. Under those circumstances he urged that where he had disbelieved the statement of this witness with regard to A-5 to A-7, the Sessions Judge could not have relied upon his statement in holding that A-2 was guilty of the murder. The next argument that was advanced was that in any event A-4 could not be convicted because the prosecution case is that he stabbed the deceased with a spear on the left palm was negatived by the medical evidence which was to the effect that there was no injury on the palm. The next argument that was advanced was that in any event A-4 could not be convicted because the prosecution case is that he stabbed the deceased with a spear on the left palm was negatived by the medical evidence which was to the effect that there was no injury on the palm. Finally the learned counsel argued that the lower Court had not believed the witness P.W. 3 and the whole case rested upon the sole testimony of P.W. 2 and when the statement of this witness was not one that could be relied upon with regard to A-5 to A-7 it would be unsafe to convict the accused on the sole testimony of P.W. 2. It has to be observed that in this case the attack on the deceased was made at 8 a.m. on the 29th June, 1955, and he was taken to the hospital where he died on the following day at 8 a.m. and it would appear from the record that a dying declaration was recorded by the village Magistrate about three hours after the occurrence took place. This is Exhibit P-14. With regard to this dying declaration the Sessions Judge thought it unsafe to place any reliance upon it for the following reason. According to P.W. 5 a doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, having regard to the injuries sustained by the deceased, the deceased could still be conscious and in a position to give his statement while the doctor examined by the defence D.W. 1 is positive about the fact that by the injuries sustained and the blood clots that have been found the deceased must have become unconscious immediately and the vision would have become blurred. He also says that he would have become unconscious and would not have recovered consciousness at all till the breath left his body. Because of the diversity of opinion between the two doctors the Sessions Judge was not in a position to come to any conclusion and consequently he preferred to say that he would not place any re dance upon the dying declaration. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses of whom P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 may be said to be the eye-witnesses. P.W. 1 is the owner of the cart which was used by the deceased to carry the manure to the field. He says he was present when the accused hit the deceased. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses of whom P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 may be said to be the eye-witnesses. P.W. 1 is the owner of the cart which was used by the deceased to carry the manure to the field. He says he was present when the accused hit the deceased. He also speaks to the village magistrate having recorded the dying declaration. He saw the accused from a distance of 15 yards. P.W. 2 is another eyewitness who says that as he was going to his field he heard cries about 100 yards away from his field. He also speaks to his having witnessed A-1 removing the rope from the necks of the bulls and protesting. He gives a detailed description of the hitting by each of the accused. P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 may be classed as witnesses who supply the circumstantial evidence in the case in support of the prosecution. P.W. 3 is the farm servant of the deceased, he speaks to A-1 to A-4 obstructing the cart. Being frightened he ran home but when he returned to the place of occurrence he saw Balireddy lying with injuries. He is not able to say as to what weapons they had. P.W. 4 is a woman who says that she was cutting grass. She says that she saw the accused with arms going to the village from Kanamade. P.W. 5 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and he deposes to the fact that death was due to the shock and haemorrhage on account of the injury. P.Ws. 6,7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 are formal witnesses relating to investigation, the sending of the body for post-mortem examination, etc. P.W. 9 is a lessee of the deceased who speaks to the fact of A-2 having objected to his taking the cart with both the wheels rolling through the field. P.W. 8 mediated and said that one wheel of the cart should move in the channel and the other in the field. P.W. 12, Obul Reddy, speaks to the fact of the village magistrate having written down the declaration of the deceased (dying declaration). There is evidence in the case of the accused going to the field armed with weapons. P.Ws. 1, 2 as also P.W. 4 saw the accused passing from the field armed. P.W. 12, Obul Reddy, speaks to the fact of the village magistrate having written down the declaration of the deceased (dying declaration). There is evidence in the case of the accused going to the field armed with weapons. P.Ws. 1, 2 as also P.W. 4 saw the accused passing from the field armed. The altercation between the deceased Balireddy and accused 1 is spoken to by P.Ws. 1 and 2. The inflicting of successive blows by the accused is deposed to by the same witnesses. There is no reason why the statement of these witnesses should not be believed. I find that the Sessions Judge has ignored the statement of P.W. 1 holding that it was highly artificial. I do not agree with him. Apart from this oral evidence there is the dying declaration which the Sessions Judge did not take into consideration. The dying declaration was recorded by one Gangireddy who was examined before the Committing Magistrate as P.W. 6. He could not be examined in the Sessions Court because he was continuously ailing and was a patient in the Madanapalli Hospital. The deposition has been marked as Exhibit P-20. The declaration was recorded as would appear from the evidence at 10 a.m. i.e., just two hours after the occurrence. P.W. 8 has attested it. He says that when the declaration was recorded Balireddy was conscious. P.W. 1 also says that he did not become unconscious when A-2 hit him on the head. P. 6 is the statement of the village magistrate who recorded the dying declaration. In that statement it is stated that Balireddy said ‘I am suffering very much. Record my statement’. It is also stated that what was recorded was read out to Balireddy who accepted it to be correct and affixed his thumb-impression on it. This would also indicate that Balireddy had not become unconscious at any rate when the dying declaration was recorded. The statement of P.W. 13 who is a Head Constable who went to the scene of offence at 4 p.m. is to the effect that he was responding to a call but speechless. It would appear that by 4 p.m. eight hours had elapsed since he received the fatal blow. It is just possible that the consciousness was slowly disappearing. The statement of P.W. 13 who is a Head Constable who went to the scene of offence at 4 p.m. is to the effect that he was responding to a call but speechless. It would appear that by 4 p.m. eight hours had elapsed since he received the fatal blow. It is just possible that the consciousness was slowly disappearing. We have the categorical statements of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, and P.W. 8 that soon after the occurrence, the deceased was conscious. There is no reason why those statements should be disbelieved. The statement of D.W. 1 the doctor is only hypothetical. He gives his own experience of cases like those. Under those circumstances the opinion of a medical man cannot be allowed to outweigh the testimony of disinterested eye-witnesses. It is not as though that there is only the sole testimony of P.W. 2 in support of the case, for the prosecution. As observed above P.W. 1’s statement also could be taken into consideration together with the dying declaration. Even if one were to regard P.W. 1’s evidence as being not very precise then there is the evidence of P.W. 2. The argument about P.W. 2’s evidence is that he has been disbelieved with regard to his statement about A-5 to A-7 and, therefore, he could not be regarded as a truthful witness and as such his version about A-1 to A-4 should also be rejected. There is no rule of law that where some statements of a witness are found not corroborated by other evidence or for the matter of that are found to be not correct, his statement with regard to other matters could not be believed. Unless the witness is stamped as a wholly untruthful witness or his presence at the place of occurrence is rendered improbable there is nothing to prevent the Court from relying upon his statement with regard to some matters. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court, the duty of the Court would be to remove the grain from the chaff; the chaff would be discarded and the grain taken. A reading of the statement of P.W. 2 would impress the Court that his statement with regard to A-1 to A-3 is true, the details furnished by him not having been rebutted by any evidence on behalf of the defence. A reading of the statement of P.W. 2 would impress the Court that his statement with regard to A-1 to A-3 is true, the details furnished by him not having been rebutted by any evidence on behalf of the defence. The learned counsel for the appellants cited a decision of this Court in the case of Inja Vengalareddy v. The State1. The learned Judges in this case emphasised the fact that where a witness had committed perjury by falsely implicating the accused, his evidence against the others should not be accepted. It would also appear that the learned Judges observed that where it appears that the witness had given a false statement and implicated some of the accused out of some motive and where he is shown to be interested or his evidence of a partisan nature, it is to be rejected on that ground. The grounds on which the Sessions Judge has disbelieved the statement of P.W. 2 with regard to A-5 to A-7 is that P.W. 2 might have been disgruntled with A-5 to A-7. The Sessions Judge ignored this portion of P.W. 2’s statement, because, in his opinion, P.W. 2 might have given his statement out of spite that he bore to A-5 to A-7. That would not, in my opinion, justify his being regarded as untruthful witness in so far as A-1 to A-4 are concerned. To quote the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Abdul Gani v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, the Court has to make an effort to disengage the truth from falsehood and not come to the conclusion because of certain discrepancies in certain matters, that the whole story is untrue. I may also quote Field in his Law of Evidence ‘that if a portion of the deposition is true it should not be arbitrarily rejected because of want of veracity on some very minor point’ — Field’s Law of Evidence. It has not been shown that that portion of the evidence which relates to A-1 to A-4 is untrue because of the improbabilities or the other circumstances in the case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a case where P.W. 2’s statement in so far as A-1 to A-4 are concerned could be relied upon to sustain a conviction. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a case where P.W. 2’s statement in so far as A-1 to A-4 are concerned could be relied upon to sustain a conviction. In as much as the scope of section 34 has been taken out of the case each accused has to be dealt with having regard to the individual act of his. It would therefore be necessary to consider the individual acts of each of the accused. In so far as accused No. 4 is concerned, the prosecution evidence is that he stabbed on the left palm with a spear. The doctor’s version is that there is no injury on the left palm. It may be said that where the doctor’s evidence does not corroborate the statements of the prosecution witnesses it would be unsafe to convict the accused on such a statement which is not corroborated by medical evidence. That has been the view taken by the Supreme Court. With regard to A-4 therefore, I am of opinion that he is entitled to an acquittal, the prosecution not having satisfactorily established the case against him. In so far as the other accused are concerned, the evidence in the case in my opinion is enough to bring home the guilt to the accused. I, therefore, uphold the conviction as against A-1 to A-3. With regard to the sentences awarded to the various accused I do not think there are any extenuating circumstances to warrant a more lenient sentence. The appeal therefore of A-1 to A-3 is dismissed, the conviction and sentence is upheld while the appeal of A-4 is allowed. He be set at liberty if he is not required in any other case. The material objects be disposed of as directed by the Sessions Judge. A.S.R. ----- Conviction of accused Nos 1 to 3 confirmed. Conviction of accused No. 4 set aside.