JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J. (Oral) 1. The appellants-claimants are aggrieved by order dated 4.10.1997 whereby their claim petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of the compensation awarded to them by the Land Acquisition Collector for the acquired land belonging to them was I dismissed. It is not in dispute that no court fee was affixed on the memorandum of appeal when it was initially filed on 9.1.1998. It also suffered from number of other objections and was returned to the learned Counsel for the appellants on 26.4.1998, who re-filed it on 3.11.1998 alongwith requisite Court fee. Again, it was returned with objections, inter alia, that since it was re-filed after a considerable delay an application under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for condonation of delay may be filed. Application for condonation of delay (CMP No. 60 of 1999) was filed on 24.12.1998 stating that delay was caused in removing the objections in making correspondence with the appellants, who took time to arrange requisite Court fee. This application remained, under consideration, and only another application (CMP (M) No. 323 of 1999) was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay in filing appeal from 9.1.1998, when memorandum of appeal was filed without Court fee to 3.11.1998, when requisite Court fee was affixed stating that despite their best efforts the appellants could not arrange for purchase of requisite Court fee, as such, delay has occurred due to unavoidable circumstances. 2. The respondent-State of Himachal Pradesh has opposed these applications by filing replies thereto stating that there was no validly constituted appeal till Court fee was affixed on 3.1.1998 and no sufficient cause has been shown in condoning the delay. 3. We have heard learnad Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellants has referred to Section 149, Code of Civil Procedure, and has urged that this Court has a wide discretion ; to allow the appellants to pay the whole or part of the Court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal at any stage and looking to the facts and circumstances on record it is a fit case to exercise such discretion. 5. 5. On the other hand learned Assistant Advocate General appearing for the State has urged that it is not a fit case to exercise the discretion to allow the appellants to affix Court fee after such a long delay without even moving an application seeking such a permission at the time of either filing appeal or affixing Court fee. It is not in dispute that application for extension of time for affixing Court fee was filed on 25.4.1999 and another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay was filed on 21.6.1999. According to learned Assistant Advocate General except the bald statement that the amount of Court fee could not be arranged, nothing has been said why the Court fee could not be arranged. 6. After giving our best consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that though it is a case of serious negligence on the part of the appellants not to affix Court fee on the memorandum of appeal When it was filed on 9.1.1998 and to take about 10 months to affix the requisite Court fee without seeking extension of time for affixing Court fee by moving an application, yet in the totally of facts and circumstances on record including the fact that requisite Court fee has already been affixed on 3.11.1998, we find it a fit case to exeecise our discretion to condone delay in affixing requisite Court fee and treat the appeal as a validly constituted appeal. For taking this view we have also considered that the appellants intend to challenge the order whereby their reference petition for enhancement of the compensation of their acquired and was rejected and by dismissing the appeal at this stage we would deprive them of an opportunity to re-agitate their claim for enhancement of compensation by filing the present appeal. Moreover, there is no material on record to counter the averments of the appellants, who are villagers and majority of them are ladies, that they were not able to arrange for purchase of Court fee of the amount which comes to Rs. 2,344/-. Moreover, there is no material on record to counter the averments of the appellants, who are villagers and majority of them are ladies, that they were not able to arrange for purchase of Court fee of the amount which comes to Rs. 2,344/-. A mere reading of Section 149, Code of Civil Procedure, makes it clear that Court has discretion, at any stage, to allow a person to make good the deficiency of whole or part of Court fee prescribed for any document by the law and on such payment he said document shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. No doubt this discretion is to be exercised by a Court in accordance with judicial principles and cannot be claimed as of right. Normally this discretion should be exercised in favour of the litigant except in case of contumacy or positive malafides or reasons of similar kind causing great injustice to the other party. The mere fact that the opposite party is deprived of his right to plead the bar of limitation on account of grant of time for making good the deficiency in Court fee, will not warrant the conclusion that gross injustice was done to him by the grant of time. 7. In Indian Statistical Institute v. M/s. Associated Builders and others (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 335) it is held by learned Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 13 that: "Equally when the petition is not properly stamped the Court has ample powers to extend the time for affixing proper court-fee. Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers ample power on the High Court to exercise its powers in order to do justice to a litigant where the failure is not due to any fault of the litigant." 8. Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers ample power on the High Court to exercise its powers in order to do justice to a litigant where the failure is not due to any fault of the litigant." 8. In Mohammad Mahibulla v. Seth Chaman Lal ((1991)4 S.C.C. 529) learned Judges have laid down a guide-line that when a court comes to the conclusion that memorandum of appeal is not sufficiently stamped, instead of out rightly dismissing it, an opportunity should be given and the appellant should be called upon to make good the deficiency in view of the provisions of Section 149, Code of Civil Procedure, finding that no such opportunity was given in the case before them the dismissal of the appeal for want of proper Court fee was set- aside and restoration of the appeal was ordered on payment of appropriate Court fee. (Also see Faizullah Khan and another v. Mauladad Khan and Others (A.I.R. 1929 Privy Council 147), Baliram Bhagawanii v. Champat Zamraji (A.I.R. 1954 Nagpur 224), Dasondhi Ram and another v. Kaka Ram and Others (A.I.R. 1966 H.P.66), Anil Kumar Sahnev and another v. Satish Kumar and others (1990 Sim LC.131), Om Naravana and others v. Risaldar Ganpat Singh (1991 P.L.J.666), V.O. Devassv v. Perivar Credits and another (A.I.R.1994 Kerala 405) and Manan Lal v. Mst.Chhotka Bibi (dead) by her legal representatives and others (A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1374)). 9. In the result, the applications are allowed and-time for affixing court fee on the memorandum of appeal is extended. Appeal be registered.