Dilip Kumar Dey v. Punjab National Bank — 1999 DIGILAW 247 (PAT)

JUDGMENT S. K Chattopadhyaya, J.- The petitioner has impugned the order dated 29.5.1992, by which a departmental proceeding against him was initiated relating to the charges of the year 1974-75. 2. While the petitioner was working as an Accountant in the Exhibition Road Branch of the Punjab National Bank at Patna in 1975, the respondent-Bank at his Jodhpur Branch lodged an F.I.R. against him for certain irregularities and some omission and commission committed by the petitioner while posted at Jodhpur Branch. On 20.8.1975 he was suspended pursuant to filing of the said criminal case. On 17.7.1990 the petitioner was discharged from all the charges except one regarding issuance of a Bank draft of rupees two thousand. At the time of filing of the writ application the criminal case in respect of one charge was pending. Neither of the counsel for the parties could inform the Court about the ultimate result of the said criminal case. The order of the Judicial Magistrate discharging the petitioner from other charges was also affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge at Jodhpur in appeal preferred by the respondents. Even after discharge when the suspension order was not revoked and the petitioner was not taken back, he moved the Calcutta High Court for quashing the suspension order. On 12.11.1984 the suspension order was stayed by the Calcutta High Court, which was affirmed even up to the Supreme Court when approached by the respondent Bank. Even when the respondent Bank did not reinstate the petitioner, he filed a contempt application in which, tendering unconditional apology the Bank revoked the order of suspension in July, 1987, and directed the petitioner to join Regional Office. It is stated that while the petitioner was working as an Officer at Patna in May, 1992, respondent Bank issued a chargesheet relating to the same omission and commission alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while posted at Jodhpur and for which a criminal case was started. The petitioner filed his show cause immediately contending, inter alia, that the charges levelled against him were the same on which he was exonerated by the competent court of law in the criminal case. Inspite of that when the respondent-Bank proceeded with the departmental proceeding, the petitioner approached this Court in the instant writ application. 3. The petitioner filed his show cause immediately contending, inter alia, that the charges levelled against him were the same on which he was exonerated by the competent court of law in the criminal case. Inspite of that when the respondent-Bank proceeded with the departmental proceeding, the petitioner approached this Court in the instant writ application. 3. This writ application was admitted on 13.8.1993 and the departmental proceeding was directed to be stayed till final hearing of the writ application. Liberty was given to the respondent-Bank to move the Court for fixing an early date for hearing of this writ application. After conclusion of the criminal trial, however, it appears from the record that no such step was taken on behalf of the respondent-Bank. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank fairly submits that he has no instruction as yet about the result of the said criminal case. 4. The main thrust of the argument of Mr. Banerjee is that the respondent-Bank could not have started the departmental proceeding in the year 1992 relating to certain illegalities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the year 1974-75 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and another reported in A.I.R.1990 S.C. 1308. Elaborating his argument learned counsel submits that this is not a case where the respondent-Bank had no idea about the alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner while he was posted at Jodhpur because admittedly, for such illegalities a criminal case was filed by lodging a F.I.R. on 27.7.1975. According to him if the F.I.R. was lodged in the year 1975, the Bank could have easily initiated a proceeding in the year 1975 itself or immediately thereafter. Learned counsel further submits that only because the respondent-Bank had to tender unqualified apology before the Calcutta High Court in a contempt proceeding for not obeying the order of the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, out of vengeance the petitioner was subsequently harassed and a chargesheet was submitted against him. 5. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, on the other hand has tried to convince the Court by referring to the statements made in the counter affidavit that there were sufficient reasons for the Bank for not initiating the departmental proceeding simultaneously with the filing of the criminal case. 5. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, on the other hand has tried to convince the Court by referring to the statements made in the counter affidavit that there were sufficient reasons for the Bank for not initiating the departmental proceeding simultaneously with the filing of the criminal case. According to him there is no bar in initiating a departmental proceeding against the erring employee even after his acquittal by the criminal court. In support of his contention he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another, Vs. Biharilal Sidhana reported in (1997) 4 S.C.C. 385 . So far the explanation for not initiating the proceeding immediately after filing of the criminal case, it is only asserted that the criminal case was being prosecuted by the State Government and as the same was pending for the last several years it was felt desirable that the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner be initiated for lapses committed by him and, as such, the same was initiated in the year 1992. 6. In Bani Singh's case (supra) the facts were that the irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry were alleged to have taken place between the years 1975-77. The departmental proceeding was initiated in the year 1987. In those circumstances their Lordships observed that it was not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977, there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. According to their Lordships if that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In these back ground if we look to the facts of the instant case, it would be clear that for certain irregularities, illegalities F.I.R. was lodged on 27.7.1975 under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 477 and 477(A) of the Indian Penal Code. In these back ground if we look to the facts of the instant case, it would be clear that for certain irregularities, illegalities F.I.R. was lodged on 27.7.1975 under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 477 and 477(A) of the Indian Penal Code. Annexure-2 is the order of the Magistrate dated 17.7.1980 discharging the petitioner of all the charges except one as stated above. Annexure-3 is the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, dismissing the appeal preferred by the respondents and affirming the order of discharge. Thus it is clear that in 1975 the authorities were aware of the irregularities said to have been committed by the petitioner while posted at Jodhpur Branch. No steps was ever taken to initiate any departmental proceeding in 1980 when the petitioner was discharged by the Magistrate, which order was affirmed by the appellate authority in March, 1981. Even in July, 1987, when the respondent Bank allowed the petitioner to join the Regional office at Patna pursuant to order passed by the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court, no step was taken for proceeding against the petitioner departmentally. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why after five years of his re-joining in the Regional office, Patna, on 29.5.1992 the chargesheet was issued against the petitioner and a departmental proceeding was initiated. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank very fairly submits that exfcept the explanation given in the counter affidavit there is no other explanation which can justify the drawing up the departmental proceeding belatedly by the respondent-Bank. 8. In these circumstances, in my view, the facts of the present case is squarely covered by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the Bani Singh's case. 9. The reliance of Mr. Sinha in the case of Union of India and another (supra), in my view, is misplaced. In that case the delinquent officer was proceeded against departmentally even after he was acquitted by the criminal court. When this was challenged, their Lordships were of the view that acquittal by the criminal courts does not automatically give an employee the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent Government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent Government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. This position in law is well settled but in my view the facts of the instant case are quite different. In the present case the petitioner was not proceeded against departmentally after he was discharged by the Magistrate rather during the pendency of the criminal case. Chargesheet was issued in 1992. Thus the question remains as to why since 1975 till 1992 the respondent-Bank did not initiate any departmental proceeding. There is about 18 years of delay in initiating the proceeding when admittedly the respondent-Bank was aware of the alleged irregularities said to have been committed in 1974-75. It is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 13 years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner must be quashed. 11. In the result, this writ application is allowed and the departmental proceeding as well as chargesheet dated 29th May, 1992, are quashed.